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Abstract 
 
Much of the rationalist literature in International Relations explains the nature of the 
EU-Russia energy relationship by assuming that tensions evident in the relationship are 
a product of the actors’ distinct interests. In contrast,  for conventional constructivists 
any tension is seen to  derive from the essentially different identities of the actors. 
Conversely, existing discourse-based accounts analyze the construction of competing 
energy discourses or how the different approaches of the EU and Russia are indicative 
of a struggle for ‘Europe’. 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the discourse-based literature by adding a focus on how 
energy discourses between Self and Other are constructed in the first place. This implies 
an understanding of discourses as socially constructed and ‘sedimented’. Deploying a 
framework drawn from Wæver the thesis identifies a tripartite and layered discursive 
structure through which key discourses are both ‘sedimented’ and can be studied. 
Layer one investigates the historical narratives and representations that Western Europe 
and Russia have constructed to represent each other; layer two investigates how the EU 
and Russia have constructed their energy paradigms and how actors have used these 
paradigms in their mutual energy relations. This layer also examines the extent to which 
the historical narratives and representations of layer one are reflected in the mutual 
energy relations between the EU and Russia. Layer three focuses on discursive practices 
(e.g. statements, written texts or symbolic acts) and examines how the discursive 
structure made up of layer one (historical narratives and representations) and layer two 
(energy paradigms) is played out in the debates over the Nabucco / South Stream 
pipeline competition and in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue.   
 
The study of EU-Russia energy relations through ‘sedimented’ discourses provides the 
basis for arguing  that actors’ positions alternate between cooperation and confrontation, 
rather than continually interacting in an assumed ever-present tension.   
The political implications that emerge from conceptualizing EU-Russia energy relations 
as a Self/Other discursive interaction are that a deeper discursive contest underlies  EU-
Russia energy relations. Such a contest sheds light on the mutual construction of actors’ 
identity, and on their construction of ‘Europe’ as a political project.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
EU- Russia relations have been the subject of a number of analyses aiming to 
understand the nature and the possible developments of this complex relationship. In 
particular, energy represents a crucial issue in the broader context of EU-Russia 
relations. Rationalist approaches have long dominated the understanding of both broad 
EU-Russia relations and their specific energy relations. These accounts lack dynamism 
and fail to explain the process through which social reality and foreign policy are 
constructed. Conventional constructivism, most clearly identified in the work of 
Wendt1, has pointed out   the flawed rationalist view of the nature of social reality and 
has emphasised the importance of identity in inter-subjective relations. However, whilst 
this focus on identity is to be welcomed, conventional constructivism’s explanatory 
potential has been curtailed insofar as it has  remained state-centric in its focus.  
This chapter provides a critique of rationalist and conventional constructivist 
approaches to International Relations (IR) and is located within a critical constructivist 
tradition that draws from post-structuralism. Given the combined use of elements of 
critical constructivism and post-structuralism, it is important to clarify the link between 
the two. Critical constructivist approaches to foreign policy focus on the mutual identity 
construction that occurs in the discursive Self/Other interaction through the ‘othering’ 
process. Post-structuralism draws from this theoretical background and adds a focus on 
actors’ discursive contestation for hegemony over political projects. In particular, the 
post-structuralist approach of this research relies on the discursive framework 
elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe who hold that meaning and its borders are constructed 
through discursive antagonism. As such, constituting discursive antagonism is a 
necessary condition for the imposition of a political project. 
This research, therefore, employs a critical constructivist/post-structuralist approach to 
the case of EU-Russia energy relations and aims to understand what this energy 
relationship tells us about EU-Russia relations in general and about their construction of 
‘Europe’ as a political project. It follows that the actors’ debates around their energy 
relationship  may have much wider political meanings compared to what usually is 
                                                      
1 Alexander Wendt was one amongst others, e.g. Nicholas Onuf,  Richard K. Ashley, Friedrich 
Kratochwil, John Ruggie. 
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made apparent, while it is also argued that, to some extent, the energy  relationship itself 
is framed by identity politics. 
 
It follows that EU-Russian energy relations are here viewed as an inter-subjective 
interaction between Self and Other, advancing discursive representations of each other. 
The advantage of viewing this relation as a Self/Other interaction is that it helps 
understand how actors have discursively constructed cooperative and conflicting 
positions; it also illustrates the meaning of energy for the broader relationship between 
the EU (Western Europe) and Russia and for the construction of Europe as a political 
project. In this light, the main research question is:  
 
• Can self-other discursive interactions explain the alternation between 
cooperative and conflicting positions in EU-Russia energy relations? 
 
In order to address this research question, this introductory chapter will first engage 
with the relevant literature to locate the thesis within IR debates. Subsequently, a review 
of the existing discursive literature on EU-Russia energy relations will demonstrate how 
it is overly focused on ‘energy policy discourses’, thereby failing to explain EU-Russia 
energy relations in regard to historical narratives, mutual representations and the 
constitutive power of outsiders. 
 
The rationalist approach to IR, as most clearly epitomised in neorealist and neoliberal 
approaches will be explored. It will be noted that rationalism is mainly concerned with 
discovering universal laws of rational behaviour and, thus, addressing the ‘why’ 
question – as opposed to the ‘how’ one.  In other words, rationalist approaches are 
interested in ‘why’ questions, which call for causal types of explanations (e.g. why did a 
specific fact/event happen). Constructivist approaches are focused more on ‘how’ 
questions such as how a given option became possible in the first place, or how a given 
matter was understood in a specific way. For example, rationalism would investigate the 
causes that led states such as the UK or China to opt for nuclear power.  Constructivists 
instead would explore ‘how’ nuclear become an option – among others – for the 
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security of these states.  Or, it would analyse how the nuclear equipment of the UK and 
China, although similarly potentially harmful, was understood differently by the US.2 
In addition, the rationalist account treats actors’ identity and interests as given, and thus 
external to the investigation.  
 
Next section presents the main assumptions of conventional constructivism and its 
understanding of identity. In doing so, this analysis will mainly refer to the work of 
Alexander Wendt, considered one of the fathers of conventional constructivism. 
Therefore, this thesis will use Wendtian constructivism and conventional constructivism 
interchangeably. It will be noted how Wendtian constructivism is still grounded in a 
rationalist tradition and is fundamentally state-centric. In fact, Wendt studies interaction 
among states that are charged with a clearly identifiable identity that produces effects on 
actors’ behaviours. This makes possible the formation of a collective identity that 
expands unilaterally to include the identity of other states. Ultimately, identity remains 
fixed and unproblematised. Therefore, the following section analyses the problems of 
conventional constructivist understandings of identity. In contrast, critical 
constructivism focuses its analysis on the origin and reproduction of identity rather than 
on its impact. In order to study the identity formation of Self, it is necessary to draw 
boundaries with Other through the ‘othering’ process. It emerges that Other holds a 
constitutive power towards Self and vice versa. In addition the ‘othering’ process 
towards Other (critical constructivism), unfolds in discursive practices in which 
competing views of Other compete for discursive hegemony (post-structuralism). Thus, 
in order to understand how the critical understanding of identity addresses the gaps of 
the conventional constructivist approach, it is necessary to illustrate the limitations of 
the latter. 
This theoretical analysis provides the basis for examining the different ways in which 
mainstream IR approaches and critical constructivist/post-structuralist approaches have 
accounted for EU-Russia relations. 
Similarly, this chapter will provide an overview of the main strands of the literature on 
EU-Russia energy relations. The literature on EU-Russia energy relations has started to 
                                                      
2 A., Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, 1995, pp. 71–81, 
quoted by A.M., Slaughter, International Relations. Principal Theory, in R., Wolfrum, eds., Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Available from: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf 
Accessed 30/12/2013 
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move away from strict rationalism and conventional constructivism towards 
explanations that focus on the discursive dimension of such a complex relation. Since 
these discourse-based approaches are the main contenders of this study, the arguments 
and limitations of such approaches will be presented in more detail as a way to 
understand how this study fits in. 
 
The thesis aims to be located close to the works of Aalto and Morozov since these 
authors attempt to shed light on the fact that EU-Russia energy relations have a socio-
political determinant and are ultimately related to the political construction of ‘Europe'.3  
Both rely on social (e.g. discourse), rather than material factors but they have not 
sufficiently focused on how the discursive contestation occurs, how the ‘othering’ 
process unfolds in actors’ discourses, and how the ‘degree of Otherness’ and historical 
representations of Self in relation to Other can explain the alternation between actors’ 
cooperative and conflicting positions. In particular, through the adaptation and 
application of a layered discursive structure – initially proposed by Ole Wæver – to the 
case of energy, this research ultimately aspires to build a three-layered framework to 
grasp the structure of meaning underlying EU-Russia energy relations. The basic 
assumption of the structure is that the overall meaning held by each discourse is 
‘sedimented’. In other words, it results from the overlapping of sub-levels of meanings. 
These sub-levels taken together define the overall meaning of the discourse itself (see 
diagrams below).  
Wæver’s three-layered structure offers the occasion to briefly make some clarifications 
related to the terminology used. The terms narrative and story are used interchangeably. 
A narrative/story refers to a representation of a circumstance (e.g. actors’ relationship) 
that emerges from a specific ordering and selection of historical events in a way that 
produces a unified meaning. A paradigm refers to a set of ideas and norms that define a 
way of viewing a specific policy field (e.g. energy). The term discursive practice 
indicates the actual expression of a thought (in written or spoken form) or a symbolic 
action. The relation between discursive practice, paradigm, and narrative/story is 
pyramidal. The discursive practice is more directly accessible to the audience – in 
written or spoken – forms and echoes a specific paradigm. The latter is, in turn, justified 
                                                      
3 V., Morozov, Energy Dialogue and the future of Russia: politics and economics in the struggle for 
Europe, in P., Aalto, eds, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s future energy security, Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2008, p.59 
  16 
 Discourse 
through, and grounded in a broader historical narrative context. In the context of this 
thesis, the degree of sedimentation of a discourse  can be described as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drawing from the three-layered structure proposed by Wæver, each layer investigates a 
specific semiotic concept. Therefore, the most basic layer investigates the 
narrative/story of relations between Western Europe (EU) and Russia in a historical 
perspective. Scaling down the layered structure, the second layer focuses on the energy 
paradigms that the EU and Russia have adopted. Layer three switches the focus from 
theoretical investigation to actual policy analysis and illustrates how official 
representatives of the EU and Russia have in practice used paradigm in a consistent way 
with the broader narrative/story informing relations between Western Europe and 
Russia. Such a structure enables one to discover the broader political meaning 
underlying EU-Russia energy relations.  
Layer one 
Narratives/stories of relations between Western Europe/EU and Russia in historical perspective. 
Mutual historical representations. 
 
Layer two 
EU’s and Russia’s energy paradigms 
 
Layer three 
Discursive practices in the context of 
a) Nabucco-South Stream pipeline politics  b) EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue. 
Narratives/stories 
  Paradigms: set of ideas /norms 
Discursive 
practices: written 
documents, 
speeches, 
symbolic acts 
 
  17 
 
 
2 Rationalism and the Constructivist Critique 
 
 
As this thesis is located in the broad constructivist tradition, the aim of this section is to 
present and reject the assumptions of rationalist approaches, introduce the key debate 
within the constructivist tradition - between conventional and critical constructivism - 
and explain why this thesis sits on the critical / post-structuralist side of this debate. 
Rationalism relies on empirical epistemology according to which validation or 
falsification are the methodologies to understand reality, which is fixed and follows an 
immutable logic. Rationalism also holds that decision-makers and states are cost-benefit 
maximisers who act according to a 'logic of consequentiality'.4 Interests and identities 
are exogenously given and thus, are external to the investigation. In the discipline of IR, 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism are the key approaches rooted in a rationalist tradition. 
They mainly focus on a state-level analysis and assume that states are self-interested 
and power maximisers (in military and economic terms) acting in an anarchic 
international arena. The anarchic international context – meaning there is an absence of 
an overall sovereign authority to enforce agreements – is taken to be of fundamental 
importance for neorealist approaches in particular. For them anarchy turns inter-state 
relations into a zero-sum game between states inherently distrustful of each other. In 
this respect anarchy is also seen to elicit a determining influence on the nature of state 
interests and identities. In an anarchic environment the dominant state interest is, for 
neorealists, a question of power accumulation, while in terms of identity states are 
necessarily socialised through the competitive process to become like-units, 
differentiated only in terms of the variable distribution of material capabilities.5  
Anarchy is seen to dominate international politics and to determine that states’ principal 
interest is to ensure its security.   
Neoliberalism shares basic Realist assumptions concerning the anarchic nature of 
international politics, the egoistic ethos of states that act to preserve their security and 
augment their material positions, and that distrust characterizes relations between states. 
                                                      
4 J.G., March, and J.P., Olsen, Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of politics, New York: 
Free Press, 1989,  p.23 
5 K.N., Waltz , Theory of international politics, New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979 
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Yet, differently from neorealism, by drawing on microeconomic principles and game 
theory, neoliberalism concludes that cooperation between states is possible. According 
to Keohane, cooperation is a rational, self-interested option for states to seek.6 Realists 
counter-argue that states are inclined to deceive, thus, cooperation is possible only in the 
presence of a powerful state. Neoliberals, reply instead that institutions – norms and 
policy-making rules that contribute to the formation of expectations – create the 
conditions for cooperation to occur. In addition, neorealism aims to analyse 
international politics and phenomena through the metaphor of ‘equilibrium’ and the 
‘balance of power’ with actors looking for stability, whereas for neoliberalism, 
institutions and actors’ cooperation ensure the stability of the international system. Also, 
in the neoliberal tradition, economic wealth rather than security is actors’ main interest.  
 
Despite these differences, neorealism and neoliberalism neglect normative and identity-
based issues. By positing a scenario in which anarchy is the main determinant of actors’ 
interests, it turns out that actors’ identity might also exist but it is completely irrelevant 
and taken as given. As a consequence, actors are dislocated from their historical 
background while cultural differences between them are discounted as causally 
meaningless.7 The focus of rationalist research aims, therefore, to explore actors’ 
rational behaviours triggered by the broader and immutable international structure. 
 
Constructivism challenges the assumptions of rationalism, particularly the notion of an 
unchanging reality of international politics that is taken to frame the scope of what 
constitutes rational behaviour. As noted, rationalism is an acontextual, acultural and 
static approach that treats agents as largely interchangeable utility maximisers. 
Constructivism instead places great emphasis on changes through interaction, the social 
construction of reality, the ‘consolidatory’ effects of practices, and explores the reasons 
for tensions existing between partners. While rationalism might accept that interests 
change as a result of shifts in the incentive structure of the balance of power, 
constructivism argues instead that interests change through inter-subjective agent-agent 
relations and dialectical agent-structure relations. Things are perceived as objective and 
                                                      
6 R.O., Keohane,  After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984 
7 R., Price, and C., Reus-Smit, Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory and constructivism, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol.4, No.3, 1998, p.273 
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become social fact based on ‘human agreement’ as long as this agreement exists.8 By 
evolving and assigning new meanings to cooperation or conflict, interacting partners 
produce new realities and establish new structural and institutional conditions. Hence, 
anarchy is not seen as an unavoidable feature of international politics but is, in Wendt’s 
words, ‘what states make of it’.9 Wendt’s popular expression indicates that the notion of 
self-help as defined by realists (and mainly by Waltz) originates from the interaction of 
the units in the system, and not from anarchy. This conception conflicts with the 
structural, deterministic argument that realists put forward in which anarchy is the 
crucial explanatory variable that drives interactions. 
This last point refers to structural and deterministic rationalist theories which are 
described in opposition to constructivism. In order to understand the main arguments of 
the competing theories, the next section will further illustrate the principles and 
shortcomings of two rationalist theories: neorealism and neoliberalism. The 
understanding of identity will become clear through analysis of the two approaches that 
have dominated IR as well as EU-Russia (energy) relations. 
 
 
2.1 Neorealism and Neoliberalism 
 
 
Structural rationalist theories hold the concept of structure at the core of their 
explanation of international politics. They believe that such a structure (rather than the 
power and status characteristics of actors in the system) influence states’ behaviours. It 
follows that the main hypothesis of these approaches is that the identification of the 
structure of the system indicates the behaviour of states within that system. 
Neorealist approaches are rooted in a materialist ontology. The realist matrix led to a 
conception of the international structure as accountable for states’ interests, which are, 
in turn, considered as given. Ideas of actors are regarded as derived from interests. 
Consequently, the structural constraints faced by actors are the main focus of the 
neorealist account, as what constitutes rational behaviour for actors is taken as fixed and 
dependent on structures. In the neorealist view, anarchy is a self-help system in which 
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states are induced to act egoistically. Unlike traditional realism which views states’ 
behaviour as being directed by its self-interested nature, Waltz holds that structure 
determines the behaviour of the states. As a result, only changes in the structure impact 
on international politics.10 Anarchy constrains identity so extensively that it is reduced 
to merely  a secondary  factor.  
Waltz also illustrates why the anarchic international structure reproduces itself. By 
rejecting the hierarchical order of domestic politics, the neorealist anarchic system lacks 
any centralised organisation to arbitrate over disputes.11 The absence of a central 
authority leads to a self-help attitude among states that compete for survival and 
security through military power. Although all are concerned with self-security, the 
distribution of capabilities among states is unequal and shifting. This defines the relative 
power of states and reflects a variation in the balance of power. 
 
In a scenario of constant competition in an anarchic world, states only have two choices: 
balance or bandwagon. As such neorealists are divided on whether balancing or 
bandwagoning behaviour is more likely. The first group argues that states in an anarchic 
context are inclined to balance, that is ally ‘against’ threatening powers. The second 
group holds that, states ally themselves ‘with’ the most powerful state.12 Similarly, in 
the broader realist literature, the anarchic nature of the international system contributed 
to the development of two versions of neorealism.  Waltz is a 'defensive' realist since 
states are seen as mainly aiming to preserve what they have rather than attempt to 
achieve more.13 Conversely, Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive’ realism stresses how the 
anarchic nature of the international structure produces power-seeking states that aim to 
achieve a regional or global hegemonic position.14  
In both versions, cooperation and interdependence are limited because states mainly pay 
attention to the relative rather than the absolute gains that any cooperation might 
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produce.15  Overall, Waltzian neorealism tended to overlook ‘reductionist’ explanations 
of international relations at the ‘unit’ or state level and he initiated a debate over the 
importance of international ‘structure’.16 Subsequently Gilpin and Krasner extended 
structural realism to international political economy and ‘hegemonic stability theory’. 
They both argued that the distribution of power among states determines the openness 
and stability of the international economy defined as the main dependent variable.17 
From this perspective, a powerful hegemon is needed to preserve such an open and 
stable international economic structure.18 
 
While neorealism postulates that the anarchic structure induces states to adopt a self-
help attitude, neoliberal inspired theorists have advanced the idea that interdependence 
and institutional factors can govern rational structuralism. By departing from realist 
assumptions – such as anarchy, self-help among states and state-centrism – Keohane 
puts forward an institutionalist version of structuralism. He argues that in a world with 
no hegemonic power, institutions or ‘institutional regimes’ make cooperation among 
actors possible. International regimes can substitute for government and promote 
decentralised cooperation among selfish actors.19 The literature on international 
economic structure believes, in general, that national policy choices derive from the 
international economic structure rather than from the political one. From this 
perspective, Katzenstein contended that the change in the structure of the world 
economy accounts for states’ orientation and role in international politics. Within such a 
structure, big states have some scope of manoeuvre to make their impact, whereas small 
states are obliged to adapt accordingly.20 In ‘Power and Interdependence’, Keohane and 
Nye21 developed the concept of complex interdependence to indicate the increasingly 
crucial role of transnational relations and asymmetrical dependencies among states in 
the world’s structure, to the detriment of military power.  An implication of complex 
interdependence is that factors such as the degree of international interdependence and 
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the degree of institutionalisation of international rules do not differ from one state to 
another according to their internal features but are structural characteristics. 
Waltz neglects international economic processes and institutions that can also affect 
states' behaviour. According to the literature on international economic structure, 
analysing states’ position in the international division of labour can shed light on actors’ 
preferences.22 The argument of scholars dealing with economic interdependence is that 
the international system represents both a world economy and a system of states.23  
The arguments of economic structuralists draw insights from neorealist assumptions 
concerning the self-interested nature of states and the imperatives of self-help. What 
neoliberalism adds is that these assumptions are also evident in the individualistic 
nature of the economic market. 
 
Similarly to neorealism, neoliberalism holds state identities and interests to be given a 
priori and exogenously determined. In the light of these assumptions, it is not surprising 
that both theories share the same critiques concerning the a priori nature of identity and 
interests.  As mentioned, the utilitarian perspective is also a characteristic of neoliberal 
theory through which it is possible to assign a marginal role to ideational factors. This is 
because the logic of each agent’s action a rationalist one; therefore the analysis of ideas 
is irrelevant.  
 
 
2.2  Conventional Constructivism 
 
 
Neorealism and neoliberalism attribute a regulative role to the structural factor, while 
treating identities and interests as constant. This makes it possible to isolate the causal 
role of power – for neorealism – and international institutions – for neoliberalism. The 
emphasis placed on the constraints of structure tells us why these theories cannot 
explain specific dynamics of international politics. The fact that an anarchic system 
determines the egoistic identity of the units erases the possibilities for states to live in a 
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world different from self-help. This implies a clear lack of agency that is contested by 
constructivists. In fact, by conceptualising identities as formed through interaction, 
constructivists open the possibility for systemic changes. In addition, for constructivists, 
assuming an egoistic identity does not help our understanding of systemic changes and 
it is not necessarily accurate because identities are formed and not given. Therefore, 
Waltz cannot explain systemic changes, as he allows little room for agency.24 
 
As a consequence of recognising that interaction influences outcomes, the social world 
is perceived as constructed, not given. States may be self–interested but they constantly 
(re)define themselves in interaction with others. This implies that their identity and 
normative preferences may change and produce different meanings as a result. The 
relevance of inter-subjective meaning rather than material structure is therefore one key 
aspect in understanding the detachment from rationalism. In other words, actors’ 
identities are not fixed but are developed, sustained and changed in interaction. While 
rationalism may admit that behaviours change, it essentially considers identity and 
interests as external and prior to the process of international politics. In contrast 
constructivists aim to demonstrate that identity may change through interaction and that 
this matters. By failing to grasp the complex process of change and evolution occurring 
in the interaction between actors (e.g. EU and Russia), rationalist approaches emphasise 
‘being’ over ‘becoming’. As a result, they lack ‘dynamism’ and thus, they deny space to 
identity formation and subjectivity since actors are expected to behave ‘rationally’ and 
in response to the relevant structure.25 
In respect of the debate within IR, the constructivist tradition introduces an innovative 
approach, arguing that dynamics of international politics are socially constructed rather 
than resulting from the egoistic nature of states or the anarchic architecture of 
international politics.  This represents the key principle from which a number of 
constructivist approaches have developed. In this respect, the main divide within 
constructivism is that between conventional/mainstream constructivism on one side, and 
critical constructivism/ post-structuralism on the other.  
This section will illustrate the main claims of conventional constructivism, placing a 
particular focus on how identity is investigated. This is important in order to understand 
the limitations of conventional constructivism and the advantage of a critical/post-
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structuralist approach to identity. Conventional constructivism builds a bridge between 
rationalism on the one hand, and more reflexive approaches that interpret events and 
process rather than empirical data on the other hand.26 The merit of conventional 
constructivism is to introduce an emphasis on Self/Other interaction in the study of 
international politics. 
The most influential figure in respect of conventional/mainstream constructivist analysis 
within IR is Alexander Wendt and as such this section draws heavily upon his work. 
Wendt challenges neorealism, arguing that identities and interests are not given. 
Similarly, he argues international politics is not necessarily a self-help system. The 
neorealist concept of self-help derives, he contends, from the interaction of units (states) 
in the system and not from anarchy. This opens the possibility that interaction can also 
originate from a different structure other than anarchy. In particular, Wendt argues that 
there is nothing determining about anarchy and that anarchy can support different 
cultures – be they Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian.27 
Given that interaction determines the principle underlying the international structure, it 
emerges that process, rather than structure is the factor to focus on. The neorealist 
anarchic structure is no longer the key explanatory variable that drives interaction. 
Neoliberalism has tried to explain cooperation by focusing on process, but it failed to 
accurately explore systemic variables. Wendt, instead, introduces actors’ identities and 
interests as variables. Therefore, he argues that neoliberalism and conventional 
constructivism should be combined to analyse how systems explain state identity, 
preferences and interests.  
Wendtian constructivism is located, therefore, within the broader debate between 
rationalism and reflectivism. The rationalist assumption that agents’ identities and 
interests are given is thus rejected.  
Against this background, Wendt’s aim is to develop a  ‘via media’ between these two 
traditions.28 By focussing on process and inter-subjective interaction, it emerges that 
collective meaning – rather than material factors – constitutes the underlying principle 
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of the structure. By participating in collective meanings, actors acquire identities, which 
Wendt defined as ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about 
[the] self’.29 Identity, he argued, is a ‘property of international actors that generates 
motivational and behavioural dispositions’.30 Conceptualising identities is crucial 
because they provide the basis for understanding interests. Interests, in turn, are 
involved in the process of defining situations. Focusing on the relation between interests 
and identity, a world in which identity and interests are learned and sustained by inter-
subjectively grounded practice – carried out by states in their interactions – is one in 
which ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. This famous expression means that states are 
actively involved in constructing the nature of anarchy, which is not given a priori. 
Rather, as Brown argued, anarchy is subject to and conditioned by state actions.31 This 
implies that there can be various kinds of anarchy. The kind of anarchy that prevails 
depends on the conception of security the actors have, on how they articulate their 
identities in relation to others. Notions of anarchy ‘differ in the extent to which and in 
the manner in which Self is identified cognitively with Other, and it is upon this 
cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power 
depends’.32 Positive identification with other states may lead them to perceive security 
threats not as a private issue for each state but as a collective responsibility. It follows 
that if the collective Self  prevails between a group of states, practices in the security 
field will be altruistic. Wendt thus studies identity, analysing whether and under which 
conditions identities are more collective or more egoistic. On the basis of where states 
are positioned in this range from positive to negative identification with other states, a 
state will be willing or not to implement collective security measures. Hence, for 
Wendtian constructivism, identity is crucial to the evolution of a different understanding 
of anarchy. In short, identity determines the ‘culture of anarchy’.33  
 
As mentioned, Wendt goes on to argue that identity provides a category which may be 
subject to change but which at the same time is ‘relatively stable’. In Wendtian terms, 
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‘identities may be hard to change but they are not carved in stone’.34 The change of 
identity requires social learning. Ego/Self, in fact, may decide to engage in new 
practices. As this new behaviour affects the partner in interaction, this implies a 
pressure on Alter/Other to behave in a new way as well. In this respect, when in 
interaction Self presents Other with a new role, Wendt refers to it as ‘altercasting’, a 
process through which Self encourages Other to acquire a new identity.35  
However, it can be argued that mainstream constructivism offers a ‘thin’ lens to explore 
international relations. It centres on the possibility to develop and produce inter-
subjective meanings occurring through the interaction process between states. It does 
not include alternative sources of identity formation beyond inter-state interaction. The 
focus is on states’ behaviours and identities that existed prior to internal and external 
factors. Therefore, the Wendtian approach is state-centric and takes a state’s identity as 
given.  
By rejecting the a priori nature of identity, Zehfuss adds that the research focus should 
be on how states’ identity is constructed.36 In this respect, the problem with 
conventional constructivism is that it imbues state actors with a number of assumed 
attributes such as institutional legal order, monopoly on the legitimate use of organised 
violence, sovereignty, society and territory. 
In conventional constructivism, identities and interests are not only created in 
interaction, they are also sustained and articulated. Actors create and maintain the social 
structure, which subsequently constrains choices. However, once the structure of 
identity and interests has been established, they are resilient to transformation, because 
the social system becomes an objective social fact to the actors. Wendt captures this 
effect in the notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy according to which culture tends to 
reproduce itself. Actors may have an interest in maintaining stable identities (such as 
incentives established by institutions)37 and interests originating during interaction 
among them.38  If this holds true, then identity transformation is possible only in first 
encounters with other states/identities. 
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For Wendt, actors have a corporate identity ‘constituted by the self-organising, 
homeostatic structure that makes actors distinct entities’.39 In the case of state actors, 
this aspect of identity is based on domestic politics, which Wendt considers 
‘ontologically prior to the state system, exogenously given’.40 As Zehfuss put it,  as part 
of a corporate identity, states relate with each other holding a certain a priori  notion 
about ‘who they are, even beyond their awareness of their individuality and their ability 
to act’.41  
The change in this a priori idea is correlated to change in state behaviours. Ultimately 
this is, for Wendt, an identity change. However, such a parallelism makes it difficult to 
distinguish ‘identity’ and ‘behaviour’.42 Wendt replies that identity refers to stable 
expectations regarding a specific  behaviour.43 However, this does not tell us when a 
change in behaviour is to be considered as a fundamental identity change. Given that the 
possibility of identity transformation may determine a significant move from one kind 
of anarchy to another, Wendt’s idea of stable expectations seems to be weak and it is an 
aspect that ultimately ties conventional constructivism to rationalism. Again, the 
problem is that, to detect an identity change it is necessary to recognize the identity 
beyond a mere state-centric interaction. The Wendtian Ego presents Alter with a new 
identity, which the latter will either approve or reject. Contestation over identity occurs 
only between Alter and Ego. How either of the actors or the ideas about Self and Other 
get constituted in the first place is not part of the account.44 Excluding the process of the 
construction of the state as a bearer of identity and excluding domestic processes as 
factors that articulate state identity is part of the problem of conventional 
constructivism. This reduces identity to something negotiable between states.  
Negotiation takes place around the question of who is considered part of Self. In other 
words, if other states identify themselves as part of Self, the result is that there is a 
collective rather than egoistic identity.45  Wendt adds ‘identification is a continuum 
from negative to positive – from conceiving the other as anathema to Self to conceiving 
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it as an extension of the self’.46 However, as Todorov contends, the assessment of Other 
is only one of the many possibilities along which Self/Other relations can be analysed. 
The risk of the unique negative/positive continuum is to reduce the definition of 
Otherness to a measurement of Self’s assimilation or submission of Other.47  As will be 
noted, Todorov’s intuition underlies the concept of  ‘degree of Otherness’, that refers to 
a continuum including intermediate Self/Other representations exisitng between 
‘commonness’ and radical ‘difference’. 
Neumann rejects Wendt’s claim about the global convergence of Self’s values that 
triggers a collective identity formation. Such a process assumes the existence of the 
‘us/them’ dichotomy.48 For Neumann, the process of ‘othering’ does not reflect an 
‘objective’ cultural difference (that cannot be claimed). Difference is rather the result of 
the way in which symbols are activated. In addition, any difference has political 
significance and reflects a distinctive characteristic of identity. In this light, the 
delineation of Self from Other is an active and incessant aspect of identity formation 
that produces meaning rather than being the result of a global integration force. The 
focus for analysis of identity formation should thus be on how these boundaries are 
generated through ‘othering’ and how they are sustained.49 
In addition, Self’s collective identity is not only maintained towards Other.  In fact, it is 
important to consider that Self is committed to sustain its collective identities towards 
other forms of political organization – internal society, international organisation etc. 
Therefore, the notion of collective identity involves a number of dimensions – including 
the internal one – and needs to be analysed as many-sided.50 
For Wæver, the Wendtian concept of collective identity may lead one to believe that, in 
order to cooperate, actors simply need to agree and define concepts identically (e.g 
acquis communautaire). However, cases where the condition is the opposite also exist: 
states, for example, pursue similar policies but the story/narrative sustaining this policy 
might be justified differently from one state to another.51 
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Drawing from this last element, it emerges that Wendtian constructivism fails to analyse 
the domestic and discursive dimensions of interaction. Even if Wendt acknowledges the 
importance of rhetorical practice or verbal communication, in reality he holds that only 
behaviour is construed as the key to identity change.  In the Wendtian relationship 
between Ego and Alter (Self/Other), interaction between the two parties is a symbolic 
interactionism developed on the basis of physical gesture. Wendtian actors do not 
interact discursively. They only send signals to each other. While it is true that a social 
act consists of an exchange of signals, and the answer to it is based on reflection and 
interpretation, the problem is that, in order to be capable of reflecting and interpreting, 
actors need to share a language. Wendt, and conventional constructivism in general, 
fails to accurately examine the role of language in interaction.52 As Zehfuss put it, in the 
Wendtian approach, communication resembles the exchange of moves in game theory. 
An interpretation of a situation consists of an exchange of moves where Ego interprets 
Alter’s signs and responds to them on the basis of Ego’s experience. As Mercer points 
out, interpretation is ‘nothing but supposition, analogy or projection’.53 In other words, 
Alter’s perspective is overlooked. Ego’s interpretation is unrelated to the meanings that 
Alter may attribute to its gesture. The analysis of Alter/Other’s interpretations is 
however possible through focusing on language. 
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics barely refers to the relevance of 
language and discourse.54 Physical behaviour remains at the centre of his approach 
(symbolic interactionism). As it is, the Wendtian approach focuses on behaviours that 
can be grasped without analysing language. 
The linguistic dimension of interaction represents the main divide between critical 
constructivism/post-structuralism and conventional/mainstream constructivism. The 
former does incorporate symbolic interactionism and it places it on the same level as 
spoken discourse. In short, discourses are not only about language but also about action 
and practices. Actions in fact, are no less a form of communication than speech. 
By drawing on the discursive contestation over the German identity, Zehfuss 
demonstrates that Wendt’s overlooking of domestic politics and the disregard towards 
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the discursive production of identity is not a methodological choice but is intrinsic in 
the conventional constructivist account.55 
In this light, Wendt’s version of constructivism seems to be a sort of scientific realism. 
It is still grounded in rationalism since it believes that causal mechanisms do exist.56 In 
general, the increasing focus of conventional constructivists – not necessary Wendtian – 
to study identity through the positivist methodology of validation and falsification share 
the same criticism. These accounts seek to determine ‘when’ identity matters by 
investigating whether a specific action was caused by identity, or by material interests 
(security/economics). Making such a distinction is problematic in the first place since 
all identities and actions are subject to construction.  
Overall, the reason why the Wendtian approach is still tied to rationalism lies in the 
symmetric attribution of a specific identity to a specific state. Such assumptions also 
confirm that his approach remains state-centric: a specific identity is attributed to a 
specific state-actor.  States’ identity is fixed and a theorisation of identity is limited to 
the process of interaction with other states-actors. Specifically, Wendt’s concept of the 
state as a unitary actor cannot cope with an understanding of identity as relatively 
unstable. As critical constructivism/ post-structuralism holds, identity should be studied 
as a fluid concept constituted in discourses and they are not logically-bounded entities. 
Identities are continuously (re)articulated and contested. This makes them hard to be 
detected as explanatory categories. It follows that the stories we tell about ourselves are 
not necessarily coherent. Wendt’s view of identity as attached to and negotiated 
between pre-existing anthropomorphic actors characterise identity as a unitary, and 
circumscribable concept.  
 
From this perspective, the next section analyses the limits of the understanding of 
identity as elaborated by conventional constructivism and introduces the critical 
constructivist/post-structuralist approach. 
 
 
3 Critical Constructivism/Post-structuralism: Towards a 
Discursive Approach  
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This section examines the debate occurring within the constructivist tradition on the 
understanding of identity. This will pave the ground to explore how the critical 
constructivist/post-structuralist approach addresses the problems related to identity that 
conventional constructivism has left unsolved. In addition, as noted, critical 
constructivism draws from post-structuralism in that it conceives world order as 
constituted by a discursive structure rather than a material and deterministic one. Given 
the emphasis on the discursive dimension, the section will explore the post-structuralist 
discursive approach and its implications on the study of foreign policy. The reference to 
foreign policy is essential as it represents the remit in which the EU and Russia frame 
their relations. 
 
As noted, Wendt overlaps the concept of ‘identity’ with that of ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’. 
However, the Wendtian theory offers little to understand meaning originating from 
within the state – how each state establishes its own meaning, its identity and foreign 
policy57. As argued by Ringmar, Wendt’s theory of identity formation is: 
 
‘Fundamentally one sided: the problem of identity formation is constantly seen 
from the perspective of the system and never as a problem each state and each 
statesman has to grapple with. He can tell us why a certain identity is 
recognised, but not what that identity is… What Wendt needs, but cannot 
provide with his theoretical perspective, is an account of how states interpret 
the structures of international politics and how they use them in interaction 
with others.’58 
 
Although Wendt contends that the world is constructed, there are certain aspects of the 
world which he takes as given. As Doty puts it, Wendt ‘seems to suggest that one 
should go with social construction when it is convenient and reify when it is not’.59 
What is particularly significant is that it is precisely with respect to the key move of 
identity transformation that Wendt is not consistent with the constructivist principle that 
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‘reality’ is constructed rather than given. According to Wæver, a Wendtian 
constructivism holds well only until change occurs, but it is unable to explain why the 
same identity can promote contradictory foreign policies. Identity is a much more 
unstructured and unstable concept. In order to move towards self-producing identities 
(addressing the problem of the Wendtian perspective), the approach needs to become 
more critical and post-structuralist.60 
As explained, through the notions of collective identity and symbolic interactionism, 
conventional constructivism depicts identity formation as a process of socialisation 
through which Other perceives Self in the way that Self does. Hence, Other lacks 
constitutive power. Other simply represents other states rather than alternative and 
different identities.61  
In particular, conventional constructivism has argued that there is a social structure to 
international politics, constituted by norms, institutions, ideas and collective meanings 
that represent the benchmark to derive subject positions. In other words, the self-
identification of a state and its recognition of others is derived from its position vis a vis 
the dominant (mainly Western) social structure of international politics.62 The 
Self/Other relationship is limited to a symbolic recognition of Self towards Other rather 
than in terms of mutual identity formation.63 
Conversely, the constitution of identity and meaning in relation to ‘difference’ (Other) 
forms the basis of critical constructivism/post-structuralism. The solution proposed by 
this approach to overcome the Wendtian fixed conception of identity is to study the 
construction of identity as a process of linking to and differentiation from an Other 
identity.64 For example, as Rumelili describes, to be considered as significant identity 
categories such as democracy and human rights have to link to and differentiate from 
the existence of their ‘logical opposite’ that is, non-democracy. Thus, positive 
discourses on the promotion of democracy and human rights unavoidably produce two 
identity categories: a moral (human rights) and superior identity (democracy), that is 
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opposed to an inferior Other (dictatorship).65 
 
Conventional constructivism downplays the role of ‘difference’ (or Otherness) in 
identity formation through various counter-arguments. One regards the possibility to 
discern between pre-social (corporate) and social identities of states, and that corporate 
identity is ‘constituted by self-organising homeostatic structure’ and as such is 
‘constitutionally exogenous to Otherness’.66  Wendt argues that ‘if a process is self-
organising, then there is no particular Other to which the self is related’.67 In addition, 
there is the criticism that the concept of corporate identity establishes states as 
‘unequivocally bounded actors’ and that this ‘brackets the struggle among many 
possible and rivalling selves’.68 Wendt replies by arguing that ‘the self-organisation 
hypothesis does not deny the ongoing process of boundary-drawing’ but it simply 
underlines the existence of an internally driven process that does not involve ‘the 
agency and discourse of outsiders’.69 
For Rumelili, here Wendt conflates two different processes. The constitution of identity 
in relation to difference does not mean that the constitution of identity necessarily 
involves an interaction process with outsiders. What is necessary is the mere existence 
of Other, that is alternative identities. It follows that no process can be self-organising 
because it implies a constant boundary-drawing process between a Self and an Other 
and it does not necessarily require Other’s active engagement in such a process.70  
Another way in which conventional constructivism downplays the role of difference in 
identity construction is by arguing that some state identities are ‘type’ identities (e.g. 
democracy) that need only minimal interaction with Others, and that embed 
characteristics ‘intrinsic to the actors’. It emerges that a state can derive its democratic 
nature by itself. Only so called ‘role’ identities such as enemy, friend or rival are 
relational and necessitate the existence of other states. While democracy reflects a 
state’s internal arrangement and all states may become democratic if they incorporate 
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democratic rules, democracy – as a category of identity – is still constituted in relation 
to difference in two respects. Firstly, its existence as an identity presupposes the 
conceptual existence of non-democracy. Secondly, the element that allows one to 
distinguish between a true democratic Self and a semi or non-democratic Other is the 
discursive ‘performance’ of the former that outlines the ‘false’ nature of the Other.71 
Hence, the concept of drawing the boundary through discourses is central for 
distinguishing ‘false’ identities from ‘true’ ones. 
Conventional constructivism ultimately relies on the notion of collective identity among 
states as a justification for neglecting the notion of difference in identity construction. 
What Wendt fails to consider is that the construction of difference remains integral to 
the production of the collective identity. As Neumann put it, ‘collective identity is a 
relation between two human collectives and it always lies in the relation between the 
collective self and its others’.72 For a critical constructivist / post-structuralist approach, 
the identity presupposes a constitution of Self in relation to an Other. Even in the case in 
which collective identity expands to embrace Other, such an expansion will reproduce 
the logic of identity in a broader collectivity which relies on the difference with Other. 
 
To sum up, the constructivist IR literature is divided over the importance of ‘difference’ 
in identity formation. Critical constructivism / post-structuralism infers ‘difference’ 
from the discursive contest between Self and Other. In doing so, it emphasises the 
constitutive role of Other’s discourse in the identity formation of Self. In contrast, 
conventional constructivism minimises the role of ‘difference’ in identity formation 
through various counterarguments, which, ultimately, jeopardise its original principle 
concerning the socially constructed nature of identities and ‘reality’. These debates 
within the constructivist tradition have created a divide between conventional (‘thin’) 
and critical (’thick’) constructivists.73 The latter group draws extensively on post-
structuralist principles concerning the study of international politics, in particular their 
emphasis on discursive clashes between political projects as a way to define competing 
selves. 
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This section turns its focus more specifically to the alternative critical constructivist / 
post-structuralist approach that proposes solutions to the limits of conventional 
constructivism, especially on the issue of identity formation.  Critical constructivism / 
post-structuralism understands identity in a more elaborate and systematic way 
compared to conventional constructivism.  
Post-structuralism does not mean anti-structuralism, but a philosophical stance that 
emerges from structuralism.74 In an attempt to distinguish conventional constructivism 
from post-structuralism, Adler warns that the latter ‘concedes too much to ideas’ and 
that there is a non-socially (material) constructed reality as well as a socially 
constructed one.75 On the other side, Laclau and Mouffe contend that post-structuralism 
aims to avoid the idealism / materialism dichotomy as a way to explain the world: post-
structuralism affirms the material character of every discursive structure.76 With 
reference to identity, post-structuralism is an approach that contests and deconstructs 
the conventional identity of the subject. It tends to both disaggregate and dislocates the 
identity conventionally attributed to Self. This does not mean that the subject is 
eliminated but that it is systematically distributed. The subject resides in different and 
undefined structures with no common rule.77 It is in a nomadic existence and driven by 
a constant tendency to be established in finite structure. The subject becomes manifest 
through the way it fills the structures and the ‘empty spaces’ it relates to. Subjectivity is 
loosely connected through structures.78 When a new events occurs, the subject can react 
by questioning shared intersubjective norms and values rejecting, as a consequence, the 
assumption of absolute truth. This is not to deny the existence of norms and values or 
truth. It is to deny their determinant character in favour of their discursive nature. 
Bringing this reasoning to the study of politics, it follows that determinism is not the 
basis on which political action should be studied.79 According to Ringmar, the stories / 
narratives we tell each other about ourselves are only one possible story among many, 
and as such, none enjoys a privileged status. Similarly, social scientists should discard 
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assumptions about the existence of a unified, coherent and transcendental Self. Hence, 
there is no underlying ‘essence’ which accounts for unity and which makes it possible 
for us to rank our preferences consistently over time and between narrative contexts. 
From this perspective, it is conceivable that people and states act inconsistently and that 
their self-identification, their interests and their actions vary on the basis of the audience 
(Other) they address.80 Self’s identity relates with its audience through, and on the basis 
of, narratives and discourses.  
Having clarified the relation between identity and discourse, it is now important to 
position the category of ‘interest’.  Policymakers cannot present interests outside of a 
broader narrative structure. An interest-based argument is always made on the basis of a 
particular distribution of layered identities. In other words, the relation between interests 
and identity is not fixed per se but it holds as long as identity and interest are framed in 
a specific discourse. Within two different discourses it is possible to find the same 
identity connected to different interests and vice-versa. For example, Russian 
Westernizers view Russia’s identity as belonging to Europe and therefore argued that 
Russia should follow the Western course of development (pro-Western narrative). Thus, 
Russia’s interests should be consistent with the Western model. Conversely, Russian 
Slavophiles describe the same Russian identity as belonging to a unique (non-European) 
course of development (exceptionalist narrative).  
Similarly, Ringmar contends that neither actions nor interests can exist outside of a 
discursive context. Moreover, since these discourses vary by unfolding in different 
rhetorical backgrounds, the way in which we define our interests will vary 
correspondingly. As a consequence, interests can never refer to something that we 
‘really’ or ‘objectively’ want but only to what we may want ourselves to want before a 
specific audience.81 
As Ringmar put it, “a good story ‘activates’ the interests that we have and makes them 
‘come alive’.82 Subject, object and concepts cannot be conceived as existing 
independent of discourses. Specific arguments and representations that are meaningful 
in one period, and spoken before a particular audience in one place, can be meaningless 
if place, period and audience vary.   
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In other words, an explanation phrased in terms of conflicting / converging interests 
alone is not sufficient. Instead, the relation between discourse / identity / interests is 
triangular. The description of our actions is always linked to the description of our 
identity. The resulting interests are a consequence of our self-identification which, in 
turn, tend to reflect the descriptions under which we can gain recognition.83 In this way, 
the applicability of the interest-driven explanation will always stem from the stability of 
Self to whom these interests are claimed to belong. An explanation of events based only 
on the description of actors’ interests holds only in the framework of a specific 
discourse. In fact, when a new identity is in the process of being established (‘formative 
moment’), meanings are contested and new discourses (with their various implied 
interests) are advanced.84 Overall, the contestation is over identities rather than interests 
and it has a discursive rather than material character.85 
 
This relationship between discourses, identities and interests is crucial also with 
reference to foreign policy and it has important implications. Referring to foreign policy 
is important as it represents the ground on which international politics is played. The 
relationship between identity and foreign policy is at the centre of post-structuralism‘s 
research agenda: foreign policy in fact relies upon representations of identity, but it is 
also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are (re)produced and their 
related interests advanced.86 Campbell, for example, concentrates on demonstrating how 
foreign policy is not simply the response and action of a pre-given subject, but it reflects 
how subjectivity is reproduced.87 Post-structuralism argues that foreign policy 
discourses offer a basis to analyse how material factors and ideas are intertwined to 
such an extent that the two cannot be separated. Furthermore, foreign policy discourses 
have an essential social basis because policymakers advance their discourse to address 
political opposition in the attempt to institutionalise their understanding of the identity 
and policy options. This also confirms that identity emerges through discursive 
practices. Unlike rationalism and conventional constructivism – which assume ideas to 
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be a variable of foreign policy analysis88 – for post-structuralism, ideas alone are not 
variables and they cannot generate any objective causality relationship.89 Consequently, 
it is impossible to conceive of identity as a variable that is causally separated from 
foreign policy, or to measure its explanatory value in competition with non-discursive 
material factors. The conceptualisation of identity as constructed through discursive 
interaction and as generative of policies (and interests) rejects the claim that there are 
objective identities located in the extra-discursive sphere. Thus, identity per se cannot 
represent a variable against which behaviour and non-discursive factors can be derived. 
This explains why causality, in a Humean sense, is impossible when speaking about 
identity. This also entails a conceptualisation of identity as a category existing only as 
long as it is continuously re-articulated and contested by competing discourse.90 A 
discourse can articulate a subject’s identity and generate related interests, but another 
discourse can articulate the identity of the same subject along different lines and this 
generates different interests. There is no ‘extra-discursive’ materiality that presents 
itself independently of its discursive representation. This is not to say that materiality is 
meaningless, but rather that it is always discursively mediated and accessed.91 In short, 
the search for ‘objective’ truth cannot rely on causal epistemology. Rather truth is 
located in historically-situated discourse, not in an extra-discursive, extra-historical 
universal objectivity. In addition, the post-structuralist choice of employing a non-
causal relationship does not imply that analysis should be conducted without any 
epistemological or methodological principles. Conversely, the focus on exploring 
discourse (discursive epistemology) implies that causality is to be sought within the 
discursive framework.  
 
To sum up, this thesis understands critical constructivism as a strand of IR 
constructivism that embraces the post-structuralist linguistic turn. As such, drawing on 
post-structuralist discourse analysis, critical constructivism focuses on power relations 
as they emerge from the communicative pattern among actors. Although the 
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methodology of a post-structuralist discourse-analysis will be largely discussed in 
Chapter 2, the next section will briefly introduce its basic principles. 
 
 
3.1 Discourse, Language and ‘Degree of Otherness’ 
 
 
As Ole Wæver noted, post-structuralism extensively relies on political discourses. 
Discourse analysis focuses on public texts and does not attempt to extrapolate the 
thoughts of the actors or their secret objectives or intentions. In particular, in the sphere 
of foreign policy where a lot is unknown, a discourse approach represents a 
methodological asset.92 The focus of a discourse approach is not on what decision-
makers truly think but which narrative references each actor uses during interaction with 
others. In doing so, the logic of arguments remains much more clear-cut if the analyst 
sticks rigorously to the discourses created.  Discourse, in fact, constitutes a sphere with 
its own logic, coherence and meaningful tensions.93 
The discursive analyst creates the coherence and tension of discourses by inferring 
common themes from reading political texts, speeches and symbolic actions. What 
contributes to the unity and coherence of a discourse are the regularities showed by the 
relations between different statements. The resulting political discourse contains 
justification for specific policies and draws the margins with competing discourses and 
policies. There is no space in this approach for individual cognitions – that is what 
people really think about specific policies (for example through interviews). This in 
fact, would introduce a subjective criterion for judging all texts. Discourse analysis has 
overcome this obstacle, finding in the use of language the solution. The assumption here 
is that if actors share the same language, then the analyst can rely on a tangible tool to 
understand their relations and logics.  
 
The use of language as a system per se allows studying it as a separate stratum of 
reality. The advantage of language compared to other tools/sites of investigation is that 
it is possible to focus on it.  In other words, language is ontologically relevant: it is only 
through their construction in language that Self, Other, states, and material structures 
acquire meaning and identity. To understand language as a social tool implies 
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considering it not as a private property belonging to individuals but as a range of 
collective conventions that each entity uses to make sense of the social reality, which, as 
noted, is made of different and opposed concepts. From this perspective, by expressing 
this ‘difference’ in the form of Self’s exclusion of Other and vice-versa, language has 
meaning.94 As such, post-structuralism approaches language as a system of meaning 
that sheds light on external realities. As noted, it is worth reiterating that not only 
language per se (such as politicians’ statements, official documents) but also actors’ 
symbolic actions (even silence) can be considered as being a communicative act. 
Wendtian symbolic interactionism only emphasises behaviour as the key to grasp 
identity change while rationalism overlooked it altogether. The ultimate difference 
between critical constructivism / post-structuralism and mainstream IR theories 
(conventional constructivism and rationalism) lies in the understanding of language. 
 
Conversely, the advantage of studying foreign policy through discourses and language 
is that it opens up a theoretical and empirical research agenda aiming to examine 
discursive contestation among opposed political forces.95 As noted, post-structuralism 
conceptualises identity as relational and social while the constitution of identity occurs 
through linking with and differentiating from ‘Other’ in a process of mutual 
constitution. This puts great emphasis on the constitutive role of the outsider to explain 
the formation of Self-identity and vice-versa.  Heller for example, focuses on the 
importance of competing narratives in Russia’s debate between Slavophiles, 
Westernisers, Pan-Slavists and Nihilists for the conceptualisation of the ‘West’. The 
attempt of Russians to define an identity distinct from the West contributed, in turn, to 
the formation of a distinctive identity for the ‘West’ which then came to be perceived as 
‘Other’.96 
 
In foreign policy, security discourses are particularly important as they have 
traditionally fostered the construction of a Self who faces a threatening Other with a 
different identity from that of Self. In this respect, Campbell explicitly examines 
security as a primary source through which Self and Other are constituted. In ‘Writing 
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Security’, Campbell argues that in order to maintain and preserve security, nation states 
need to engage in the continual reproduction of boundary-producing practices and to 
continually perform their identities. This refers to a particular mode of subjectivity 
based on a relationship with Other which is constantly characterized as confrontational 
and possibly violent.97 However, although it is undoubtedly true that Self’s and Other’s 
identities are often engaged in a contrasting game, it cannot be inferred – from a post-
structuralist starting point – that antagonism is the only main source of meaning.98 In 
this respect, Laffey argues that, despite his commitment to the view that the production 
and reproduction of identity is an unstable and unfinished issue, Campbell fails to 
account for changes in the reproduction of the US identity, which remains consistent 
over a long period of time. In his critique, Laffey contends that Campbell fails to locate 
subject formation in the multiple logics that constitute the social and that thus influence 
the reproduction and transformations of subjectivity. As such, the social is not 
constituted through antagonism only, but it involves multiple logics.99 This means, for 
example, that discursive linking and differentiation to a threatening Other is only one 
possibility. The ultimate factor that accounts for the construction of identity is the 
‘degree of Otherness’ that measures how alien Other is, ranging from a fundamental 
difference between Self and Other to constructions of less than radical difference. In 
other words, Other is not necessarily constituted in radicalised terms or as the ‘rival’ to 
oppose but it can also be depicted as a ‘partner’.  
This goes beyond a simple Self/Other dichotomy and sheds light on how Other is 
located within the web of multiple identities.100  As such, the ‘degree of otherness’ 
should be imagined as a continuum that has at its extremes radical confrontation on one 
side, and partnership and cooperation, on the other side. However, a number of 
intermediate possibilities and representations101 – such as partner, learner, and threat – 
lie between these extremes. Therefore, as the diagram below shows, the qualitative 
value of Otherness can vary.102   
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In addition, for Hansen, in the construction of identity and difference in foreign policy 
discourse, spatial, temporal and ethical identities are intertwined dimensions that help to 
define the ‘degree of Otherness’. Spatiality, temporality, and ethicality are analytical 
lenses that illustrate the political substance of identity construction and implicit signs.103 
In short, Self’s identity is not necessarily constructed through a discursive opposition to 
a different threatening Other; but spatiality, temporality and ethicality can help measure 
what kind of entity Other is (‘degrees of Otherness’).104 This reinforces the view that 
there is not a sole aspect of Otherness but multiple combination. 
 
 
4 Relevant Literature on EU-Russia Relations 
 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a review of the main accounts on EU-Russia 
relations proposed by mainstream IR theories: (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, and 
conventional constructivism. The discussion focuses on the strengths, weaknesses, and 
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limitations in these accounts and helps us understand how critical constructivism / post-
structuralism instead explains the relations. Such a discussion prepares the ground to 
illustrate how this research project fits in and the contribution which it seeks to make.  
Generally speaking, the main objective of the existing literature on EU-Russia relations 
has been to understand the normative rivalry deriving from the Western expansion 
towards Russia and the latter’s resistance to it.  
With reference to the realist tradition, as noted, anarchy in international politics is the 
element that determines the self-interested nature of states. Classical realism holds that 
national security requires uneven distribution of power in one’s favour. Meanwhile 
hegemonic stability theorists – such as Gilpin, Keohane and Krasner – suggest 
hegemony, not balance, is preferable at a systemic level. From this perspective, realist 
studies tend to describe the tension in EU-Russian relations through the conflict of 
economic and political interests that undermine actors’ security.105 Russia, it is argued, 
perceives enlargement as a Western attempt to undermine Russian security and the 
balance of power. Drawing from this zero-sum game, realist studies have explained the 
2004 EU enlargement, the launch of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
Russia’s ambitions in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) expansion in the European continent as 
attempts to marginalise Russia at the expense of extending Western European 
influence.106 Other analysts have outlined how the conflict of interests and threats to 
security mainly derive from the asymmetric energy interdependency of the actors.107 
The neorealist approach has focused more on the structure of international politics as 
the factor that determines actors’ actions. As such, the Russian aim to achieve a regional 
hegemonic position in Europe is driven by the intention to challenge the unipolar power 
of the US. This, it is argued, would enable Russia to re-establish the balance of power in 
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the structure of international politics.108 By rejecting the neorealist overemphasis on the 
structural element, neoclassical realists have sought to complement the analysis by 
considering internal factors as a further determinant of states’ action in foreign policy. 
From this standpoint, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and resistance to Western 
expansion stem from a choice of domestic policy that promotes a neo-revisionist foreign 
policy. External factors such as (im)balance of power in international politics and the 
ideological conflict with the West are less important issues.109 With reference to the last 
point, it emerges that the constitutive power of outsiders in determining the conflict 
with the West is also overlooked. Rather, the tension derives from a specific foreign 
policy direction which emerged in Russia’s internal politics. 
From this perspective, neoliberal readings believe that Russia’s move from the 
democratic (Western) model towards an authoritarian regime is linked to the re-
emergence of an aggressive foreign policy in Russia that tends to regard the relationship 
with the West (EU and US) in confrontational terms. Ambrosio110 takes Russia as an 
example of a semi-democratic state – emerging as a Great Power – that poses a 
challenge to the leading strategy of the West (e.g. democracy promotion) by supporting 
authoritarianism.  
Another liberal or ‘transitionalist’ strand elaborated by Prozorov, focuses on the degree 
of interdependence between the EU and Russia and argues that the sluggish progress of 
liberal (read Western) reforms in Russia is at the core of the political and normative 
conflict between Russia and the EU.111 From a Western perspective, Russia is 
essentially seen as the bad learner incapable to absorb the Western political and 
economic models and, thus unable to accomplish a real transition.  
In his critique of the liberal account, Prozorov contends that the exogenous incongruity 
of EU and Russian identity becomes ‘a matter of conceptual premise rather than an 
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empirically derived conclusion’.112 In short, the alleged difference between the actors’ 
interests is given and not examined. Whereas the traditional literature explains tension 
by assuming Russia’s essential difference and incapacity to embrace West’s models, 
Prozorov argues that conflict lies at discourse level. For example, the integrationalist 
discourse – used by the EU to govern its relationship towards Russia – is a cause of 
conflict as it includes the idea of transferring the EU’s normative ideal to Russia.113  
Overall, rationalist approaches fail to include the impact of ideational and historical 
factors in their investigations. In addition, the tension between the EU and Russia 
neglects identity-related factors. Rather, actors’ identities are assumed as incompatible 
and different. 
 
Conventional constructivism attempts to address these gaps by conceptualising the 
relation as a Self/Other interaction in order to account for the normative tensions 
between Russia and the EU. Romaniuk for example, stresses that a norm-based tension 
in EU-Russian relations creates obstacles to further cooperation. These tensions are due 
to the different identity of actors  – Russia as a self-interested modern state, and the EU 
as a post-modern entity.114 
Other conventional constructivists hold the assumption that Russia’s target is the EU’s 
recognition. They provide an historical background and introduce an ideational element 
to explain the origin of such an assumption. For example, Splidsboel-Hansen analyzes 
how, following the collapse of the USSR, the emerging Russian Federation started to 
seek EU’s recognition of its new identity after 1991.115 By looking back into history, 
authors such as Haukkala116 found that Western Europe’s failure to recognise Russia as 
a legitimate power explains the tension between the actors and triggers practices of 
‘Othering’ in Western Europe. Therefore, by posing recognition as lying at the core of 
the tension, these authors are able to frame the relation along binary dichotomies such 
as teacher/learner.  
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However, the issue of recognition is mainly seen unilaterally: Western Europe, in fact, 
stands as the reference posit by which Russian status and identity is measured. The 
perspective of the Russian Other and its impact on Western identity is neglected. The 
fact that recognition is measured only vis a vis Western Europe leads to the assumption 
that Russia and Western Europe have intrinsically different identities. To give an 
example, we might note Haukkala’s analysis of EU-Russia relations in which he depicts 
a binary opposition between both parties in respect of their relationship to sovereignty. 
For Haukkala, the EU is a post-modern, post-sovereign organisation that pursues 
regionalisation and globalisation, while Russia understands sovereignty in a ‘modern’ 
fashion.117 In doing so, he assumes that actors hold a pre-existing understanding of 
sovereignty.  
 
Overall, the strengths of the rationalist and conventional constructivist approaches are 
that they provide a comprehensive explanation to understand ‘why’ the tension between 
the EU/Western Europe and Russia occurs in practical terms. In particular, conventional 
constructivist renderings contribute by introducing the role of different identities.   
However, the very reason for the tension – the fact that these two actors have different 
normative foundations and thus, different foreign policy positions – is still an external 
factor taken for granted. In other words, the ‘how’ question is neglected. In particular, 
the discursive practices that enable us to grasp how actors’ identities become 
constructed are not part of the analysis. 
 
Moving away from conventional constructivism, other authors engage in post-structural 
forms of discourse analysis to explain EU-Russia relations by looking at Western 
discourses. 
Joenniemi acknowledges that the proof of Russia's belonging to Europe mostly regards 
various phases of history. In this respect, throughout history Russia was discursively 
represented as the ‘true’ and only guardian of the European Christian tradition, a ‘first-
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rank European power’, a ‘defender of Europe’ involved in the Crusades and in the battle 
against the Nazi threat.118  
Other analysts focus more on identity construction and argue that it occurs through the 
delineation of a temporal Self rather than a spatial Other. Wæver, for example, argues 
that the EU is constructed not against an external Other – such as Russia – but rather 
against its ‘temporal Other’, that is its own past.119Thomas Diez instead holds that a 
territorial/geographical Other replaced the concept of ‘temporal Other’ as a modality of 
identification of post-war Europe.120 
 
While these authors put forward post-structuralist accounts, a methodological – rather 
than theoretical – critique could be moved that this critical constructivist/post-
structuralist strand only looks at one side of the self-other relationship.  Russia’s 
belonging to Europe, for example is seen unilaterally from the perspective of Western 
European discourses. This is only one half of the story. Russian internal discourse and 
positions vis a vis the concept of Europe and Western Europe are neglected.  The 
‘Other’ is exclusively associated with Russia, therefore, Western Europe is Self, entitled 
to measure the ‘degree of Otherness’ of Russia. 
To address this shortcoming, another critical constructivist strand looks at the difference 
between actors’ identities as they have emerged through mutual discourses rather than 
only from a Western perspective. The difference in actors’ identities is problematised121 
and the EU-Russia relationship is examined through the concepts of ‘othering’ and the 
‘degree of Otherness’. These concepts enable critical constructivism to avoid the 
exogenous nature of actors’ identity and ultimately, to explain ‘how’ – as opposed to 
‘why’ – both tension and cooperation between actors occurs. It follows that discursive 
‘othering’ needs to consider both  Self’s and Other’s perspectives. This enables us to 
grasp how Self and Other mutually construct their identities during their discursive 
interaction. In other words, other critical constructivists add that Other holds 
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constitutive power over the construction of Self’s identity. For example, Neumann and 
Makarychev analysed how, in EU-Russia relations, internal identity discourse and the 
foreign policy debate in Russia are not only interrelated122 but they also contribute to 
the construction of the West’s identity.123 
In general, on one side, critical readings examine how the EU’s discursive challenge 
impacts on the internal Russian debate and contributes to the construction of Russia 
either as a member of Western civilisation, or as a Eurasian/special/different power. 
However, on the other side these accounts add a focus on how the EU’s discourse that 
constructs Russia (e.g. as an ‘object’), also contributes to the articulation of the EU’s 
subjectivity. In fact, thanks to the focus on the ‘constitutive power of outside’, it is 
possible to understand how the EU’s discourse on the Russian Other not only reinforces 
the EU’s identity as a ‘benevolent’ civilisational project124, but it also sheds light on 
how exclusion – rather than the claimed inclusion – is ultimately at the core of the EU’s 
external security.125 
Similar readings also emphasise the value of the concept of ‘Europe’ as a ‘signifier’ in 
the Russian search for self-identification.126 From this perspective, critical 
constructivists127 have analysed specific case studies (e.g. Northern Dimension 
Initiative, Kaliningrad, Schengen) within EU-Russia relations as a way to focus on the 
mutual construction of identity. The emerging implication is that the debates around 
these issues go beyond EU-Russia relations. Rather these debates are framed through 
identity interaction between actors and tend to produce meaning for the construction of 
‘Europe’ as a political project.  
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In fact, this mutual dynamic within EU-Russia relations influences the broader debate 
on Europe, which is in the middle of the interaction. In their discursive interaction, 
actors utilise the concept of ‘Europe’ as a basis for triggering the ‘othering’ process 
through, for example, the false/true dichotomy. From this perspective, by depicting 
Other as belonging to the ‘false’ Europe – that is, a flawed version of Europe –, Self 
(both EU and Russia) can claim its ‘true’ Europeanness.128 
  
As noted, post-structuralism draws from the critical constructivist tradition in that it 
conceptualises the Self/Other interaction and the mutual construction of identities in 
terms of discursive contestation for hegemony. In other words, post-structuralism adds 
an element of antagonism to the discursive ‘othering’. This sheds light on how 
interaction is characterised by a discursive contestation where a counter-hegemonic 
discourse antagonises the established one. As discussed by Thomas Diez, the concept of 
hegemony does not result from a pre-given set of norms with fixed meanings, but rather 
the contest among competing norms and values contributes to constantly shape the 
meaning of hegemony.129 From a post-structuralist perspective, political meaning is 
created as a result of this discursive contestation for hegemony over political discourses. 
This is because each discourse aims to establish the borders of its meaning over specific 
political concepts. In other words, each actor aims to fill the content of political 
concepts with the meaning of the specific discourse they advance. The dynamic of 
discursive antagonism explains, for example, why Russia resists the EU’s normative 
expansion to acquire ownership on crucial political concepts such as democracy and 
sovereignty in Europe.  
With reference to the concept of Europe, post-structuralist reading outlines how in 
Russian discourse, ‘Europe’ is a ‘irreducible signifier’ – neither fully incorporated into 
the political space of Self, nor fully rejected by the outside130 – or an ‘empty signifier’ – 
an ambiguous entity with fuzzy borders that can be used as needed for meaning-
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making.131 By virtue of this partial belonging to ‘Europe’, Russia finds ground for 
contesting any hegemonic attempt of the West or the EU to impose a discourse that 
excludes Russia from ‘Europe’.132 Similarly, Russia can use such a partial belonging to 
advance a discourse in favour of its Eurasian essence as opposed to the European one. 
Against this background, Sergei Medvedev, for example, has studied how Russia’s 
belonging to ‘Europe’ emerges from Russia's internal debate that sees a contestation 
between Europeanisation (Culture One) and sovereignty (Culture Two).133  
In general, a critique that can be moved to these strands analysing discursive 
contestation and shifts is methodological. In particular, the ‘degree of sedimentation’ of 
the discourses under examination is not adequately explored. As will be shown below, 
this research employs the layered structure elaborated by Ole Wæver that sets out the 
three levels on which various discourses are played out. This will provide a tool to 
explore more in depth how discourses are constructed in the first place. 
The focus on exploring the ‘degree of sedimentation’ of discourses provides a basis to  
understand how the EU and Russia have constructed – throughout history – the 
narrative/story they tell about their identity. In short, such this approach ultimately 
contributes to explain EU-Russia relations through identity politics, but identities are 
layered and not given.   
 
As noted above, the critical constructivist / post-structuralist approach provides a lens 
through which discursive differences, similarities and changes can be studied. This 
ultimately facilitates the theoretical understanding of the link between identity and 
policy (interests). Rather than simply identifying two constructions of identity as 
‘different’, it is more relevant to focus on how this difference is discursively constituted 
and contested and how it is located in spatial, temporal and/or ethical constructions of 
identity. The analysis of EU-Russia relations as an interaction between Self/Other is 
important because it derives the formation of identity and interests not through an 
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impersonal and anarchic structure, nor through the undifferentiated concept of collective 
identity, but through a relational and contested process based on difference and 
similarity and supported by a discursive approach. 
The above-mentioned critical and post-structuralist readings have definitely provided a 
more comprehensive understanding of EU-Russia relations by focussing on issues such 
as mutual identity formation, the constitutive power of the outside, and the struggle over 
the political construction of ‘Europe’ from a perspective of discursive contest. The aim 
of this thesis is to apply such a theoretical apparatus to the case of energy relations 
between the EU and Russia. In order to do so, the next section provides an overview of 
the existing literature on EU-Russia energy relations. 
 
 
5 Literature on EU-Russia Energy Relations 
 
 
This thesis examines EU-Russia relations through the prism of the energy relationship 
between the parties. In light of its policy relevance, energy is a good case for 
understanding how a deeper discursive contest underpins the mere technical aspects of 
the relationship. In other words, this thesis considers the energy relationship between 
the EU and Russia as more than a conflict over technical issues. It is rather an identity-
based issue that ultimately reveals a contestation for hegemony over the construction of 
‘Europe’ as a political project. In particular, the aim is to investigate EU-Russia energy 
relations through a critical constructivist / post-structuralist lens and consequently infer 
what such an approach can tell us about the broader dimension of the EU-Russia 
relationship. In order to adequately locate the thesis, a specific literature review of EU-
Russia energy relations needs to be explored. 
 
The mainstream literature on the EU-Russia energy relationship can be divided into two 
groups. The first examines the nature of the energy relationship under the liberal prism 
of interdependence. In particular, the interdependence paradigm has been primarily 
applied to EU–Russia gas relationship described as a field where actors have a common 
interest in cooperation, with this seen as likely to spill over beyond energy relations into 
other fields. The EU’s 2004 enlargement – that included eight states from Central and 
Eastern Europe historically dependent on Russian energy – indicates that the degree of 
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interdependence has increased.134 From this perspective, for some, such as the Russian 
politician and diplomat Sergey Yastrzhembsky135, interdependence is positive for both 
Russia – that depends on stable long-term European demand – and for the EU – that 
depends on Russia’s stable supply. From this perspective, interdependence means that 
energy is a common platform that can only consolidate the strategic relationship 
between the EU and Russia and trigger win-win cooperation. Energy cooperation is 
seen as a mutually beneficial partnership likely to promote cooperation in other 
fields.136 Given that the two actors have no better options for the time being – Russia 
lacks more preferable markets, while the EU lacks alternative sources – they try to 
support and promote their energy relationship in order to continue to benefit from it.137 
In this respect, for Monaghan and Montanaro-Jankovski138, the EU’s relationship with 
Russia is reciprocal and mutually supportive, since neither party has an interest in losing 
the other, which represents a crucial factor of their respective energy and economic 
security. 
However, contrary to neoliberal expectations, the prospect of increased EU dependence 
on Russian energy has also created fears in the EU that the Kremlin could exploit this 
vulnerability as a diplomatic leverage.  These concerns became evident in January 2006 
when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and consequently also to Member States 
(MS) of the EU since Ukraine is a transit country for Russian supplies to Western 
Europe. As a result, Russia’s reliability has been strongly questioned by the EU, which, 
as a result, put increasing emphasis on the need to diversify energy imports from non-
Russian sources. The choice to diversify sources has been justified by arguing that a 
situation of overreliance on one exporter creates concerns related to energy security, 
which instead is more reliable if imports diversify.  Concerns, however, also came from 
Moscow who became more aware of its increased overreliance on the EU market.  
In this light, the ‘shadow on the future’ and the spill-over effect hypothesised by 
(neo)liberals do not seem to have occurred as a result of the mutual energy 
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interdependence. Rather, interdependence creates problems and anxieties and is actually 
having the opposite effect of inscribing actors’ positions in confrontational terms: the 
EU’s diversification may undermine Russia’s position as the main exporter in the EU’s 
market, whereas Russian concern about overreliance may undermine the EU’s security 
of supply.  
 
Drawing from the liberal-inspired ‘transitionalist’ strand, a further strand of the 
literature on EU-Russia energy relations positions the EU’s liberal approach to energy 
policy as the term of reference from which Russia has recently moved away. The energy 
crisis and tensions derive from Russia’s detachment from the EU’s liberal standards. 
According to Kaveshnikov, the dissimilar nature of energy markets and economic 
interests on both sides ultimately generates such disengagement.139 The assumption of 
such a strand is that Russia has opted for state intervention and control of natural 
resources, thus deviating from the EU’s model of energy governance, that is, a 
liberalised energy market. In this light, Russian nationalism – which downplayed the 
principle of an open market in energy governance – puts at risk the established 
international energy market institutions and the EU’s energy security.140 Generally, 
these explanations suggest that Russia should return to liberal energy governance in 
order to ‘normalise’ its energy relations with the EU.141 
Overall, the EU’s liberal energy governance stands as the reference point against which 
the validity of Russian energy governance is measured. As a result, authors of this 
strand assume the liberal market approach as the dominant/preferred model of energy 
governance. It follows, that the impact of Russia’s energy practices and governance on 
the interaction is neglected. This characterises the relationship as static and unilateral 
with no attention to how a change of actors’ positions and their energy governance 
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occurs as a result of interaction. Rather, emphasis is put on material factors such as the 
EU’s declining oil and gas production and Russia’s large reserves. In other words, 
authors tend to overlook the implications of the energy relationship on the broader level 
of EU-Russia relations. Rather, they focus too much on describing the reasons behind 
the partners’ disagreements over technical issues related to energy. 
 
Other existing accounts are located between rationalism (especially neoliberalism) and 
conventional constructivism. They maintain the assumption that the EU’s liberal 
approach to energy policy is the benchmark from which Russia is moving away. But, 
they provide an historical background to explain the origin of such an assumption, and 
conclude that the actors simply hold different understandings of energy security. In a 
historical perspective, Russian development in its energy policy is measured against the 
Western (EU/US) liberal principle that became dominant after the collapse of the USSR 
in the 1990s. The implication of this reading is that the liberal model of energy 
governance as it has emerged during the post-Cold War period, reinforced the EU’s 
position and image as a ‘teacher’ – that prefers economic over political logics – and, in 
turn, determines the Russian position as a ‘learner’ that instead, still tends to prioritise 
(geo)political calculations.  
The dominance of liberal principles allowed the EU to sit on the privileged side in the 
post-Cold War negotiations with Russia on a number of fields, including energy.142 
Therefore, such dominance contributed to the creation of a rule maker/rule taker 
dichotomy.143 The EU’s privileged position as ‘teacher’ explains why energy-related 
policies – such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the EU–Russia Energy 
Dialogue (ED) – have been read by some as evidence of the EU’s objective to introduce 
pro-market and liberal principles into Russia.144 Similarly, Russia’s privatisation of its 
energy sector in the 1990s is, therefore, seen as the effort of a ‘learner’ to learn this 
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lesson. This distinction provided the basis to assume that the EU and Russia are 
ultimately two different actors that understand energy security along different logics. 
Russia aims to have energy relations with the EU based on the principle of reciprocity 
in access to the market and mutual guarantees. For Russia, energy security is part of its 
national and foreign policy and it is fundamental for its post-Cold War reconstruction. 
This view does not match with the EU’s holistic aim of establishing a wider European 
energy market based on market values and rules – such as energy efficiency and 
liberalisation – already advanced within the EU.145 As such, progress or dissatisfaction 
related to their energy relations arises from the radically different understanding of 
energy that the EU and Russia hold. For Hadfield, such a difference is at the basis of the 
failure of common projects and policies.146 
However, these readings fail to consider that the liberal paradigm might no longer be 
the dominant one. As such, the tendency to make such an assumption contributes to 
making these approaches static and one-sided. Little attention is, in fact, paid to analyse 
how Russia has been able to challenge the alleged dominance of the liberal approach to 
energy. The identity construction process – the EU as ‘teacher’ and Russia as ‘learner’ – 
is analysed only in the direction of the EU that, as a liberal-inspired actor, determines 
Russia’s position as a ‘learner’. As such, the constitutive power of the outside (e.g. 
Russia) on Self’s identity (e.g. EU) is not taken into account. In other words, the degree 
of internal discursive contestation – especially on the Russian side – and Russia’s 
‘othering’ of the EU is largely understated.   
Regarding the different understandings of energy security held by these actors, a kind of 
state-centric perspective is here adopted since the two actors are connected through their 
identity claims. The unstable and fluid nature of identity and its claims is lacking. From 
this perspective, it can be argued that this strand of the energy literature draws from 
conventional constructivism. 
In addition, these works devote little time to the reflection on what EU-Russia energy 
relations may mean for the political construction of Europe and for the EU-Russia 
relationship beyond the ‘teacher’/‘learner’ dichotomy.147 
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Moving to a realist reading of EU-Russia energy relations, some works inspired by  the 
neo-classical realism focus on the impact of domestic intervening variables on the 
decision of a state’s foreign energy policies. As such, in order to provide a complete 
picture of the energy relationship, internal policies of the EU and Russia should also be 
taken into account.148 Other neorealist-inspired approaches stress that Russia’s 
pragmatic approach reveals a zero-sum understanding of its energy relations with the 
EU. Thus, Russia uses its energy exports for political and security purposes especially 
in its relations with ex-Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics in order 
to counter-balance the EU’s political expansion.149 
Generally speaking, these accounts only describe ‘why’ the tension arises (conflict of 
interests) and do not explore ‘how’ it was politically constructed and produced. The 
alleged tension is assumed and not problematised. In addition, issues related to actors’ 
identities are neglected. 
To address this gap, Lisa Pick150 deconstructs the perspective of the existing literature, 
which describes a situation where the EU aims to trigger changes in Russia by 
projecting its liberalised and rule based agenda (social constructivism); while Russia 
operates as a neo-realist actor exploiting its energy exports for political reasons. 
However, while – through a critical approach – she deconstructs the assumed difference 
proposed by the existing literature, Pick does not adequately engage in discourse 
analysis. Thus she fails to look at how actors’ views emerge as a result of discursive 
contestation over competing discourses.  In a way, she sticks to a critical perspective 
without adding the post-structuralism focus on how various discourses compete to 
emerge as ‘dominant’. 
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From this perspective, another strand of the literature on EU-Russia energy relations 
started to move away from strict rationalist and conventional constructivist accounts to 
explanations that focused on the discursive dimension of such a complex relationship. 
Since these discourse-based approaches are the main contenders of this study, it is 
necessary to further detail their arguments and limitations as a way to understand how 
this study fits in. 
Policy paradigms such as ‘Kuwaitisation’ and ‘Liberalisation’ have been used to explain 
Russia’s energy policy151 in general, and competing foreign energy paradigms within 
the EU-Russia context.152 ‘Kuwaitisation’ refers to a situation in which Russia derives a 
comparative advantage from exploitation of its natural resources. An alternative 
paradigm of ‘Liberalisation’ postulates that economic liberalisation through market 
forces and the removal of state restrictions represent the only means for Russia to 
develop. In this light, Russia’s internal debate over production sharing agreements 
(PSAs) and the ECT proposed by the EU have been characterised by the opposition of 
these two paradigms: Kuwaitisation versus Liberalisation.153  
 
With reference to the understanding of EU’s energy policy, other works focused on 
internal discourses to understand what the European Commission (EC), EU Parliament 
and MSs mean by energy security. The focus on the main discourses of institutions 
provided the basis to understand where energy policies (interests) arise. It also 
demonstrated why specific discourses of the EC and the European Parliament about 
energy were not able to mobilise support and become dominant.154 Similarly, 
Kuzemko155 focuses on the degree of ideological contestation occurring within and 
between the EU institutions. Such an analysis enables one to problematise the common 
representation of the EU as a liberal market energy actor.   
In studying EU-Russia energy relations through discourses, Khasson evaluates the 
influence and clashes of the main EU discourses: the first focuses on the need to 
integrate Russia, the second on the need to securitise energy supply through 
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diversification. The author notes that, following the recent supply crisis, the 
securitisation discourse currently dominates the EU’s internal debate but at the same 
time it obstructs the integrative process occurring in the context of the EU-Russia 
ED.156 
These discourse-based approaches overcome the materialism of rationalism by focusing 
on social factors such as discourses. They also go beyond the state-centrism of 
conventional constructivism since they investigate the degree of discursive contestation 
occurring within the actors’ internal debate. However, these energy debates are one-
sided; they are either investigated within the EU or within Russia. The role of the 
Self/Other discursive encounter in the policy field of energy is neglected. As a result, 
the constitutive role of outside is understated. 
As such, Kratochvil and Tichy157 combine the two perspectives by focusing on the 
speeches of both the Russian and EU policymakers. The texts and speeches analysed 
present ‘regularity’ around common themes. This enables the authors to construct three 
separate discourses on integration, liberalisation and diversification. However, while 
this study focuses extensively on energy discourse, it fails to provide a historical 
narrative framework. In other words, energy discourses are not historically 
contextualised within the framework of EU-Russia relations. The authors do not 
historically ground the energy discourses identified; rather the focus is only on the level 
of analysis of discursive practices in the energy field. In doing so, the study fails to 
illustrate the broader political implications of energy for wider EU-Russia relations. A 
similar critique can be applied to the work of Feklyunina who explores how EU’s image 
of Russia as reliable energy partner has been affected as a result of the gas dispute 
between Ukraine and Russia.158 Despite the effort to provide an explanation based on 
representations, little attention is paid on how Russia’s image was historically 
constructed from outside.  
 
This provides the ground to illustrate a common problem with these explanations, which 
is their failure to account for the influence of social and historical factors in the 
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formation of their energy governance. To fill this gap, Aalto focuses on social and 
political factors in his analysis. He also includes an historical dimension to examine the 
past and the present of the European energy debate and, assess how this debate fits into 
the broader discourse of wider European integration. He notes that a contestation took 
place between two discourses told by the EU’s leaders and experts on European 
integration: economic vs political (normative) integration. The first considers European 
integration in terms of an economically cooperative project that emerged as a result of 
the mutual material interests of involved states. The second holds that European 
integration is a political and normative project that arises from a peculiar historical 
period where peace was needed to avoid future wars among participating states. Against 
this background, Aalto demonstrates how EU leaders have extensively used the 
discourse of economic integration to explain the EU-Russia ED.159 
Aalto’s analysis puts the EU Self in interaction with its own past. The discourse of 
integration to be used towards Russia is derived from the temporal Self. Little attention 
is however devoted to the constitutive role of the Russian Other and to the implication 
for the construction of ‘Europe’ as a political project. Morozov complements this 
analysis by re-establishing a Self/Other identity interaction and illustrating the wider 
political implications on the political construction of ‘Europe’ as they arise from the 
debate around the EU-Russia ED. Technical issues of the relations are considered as 
indicative of actors’ identities. These identities express two projects for the political 
construction of ‘Europe’, which are in tension and in constant re-articulation: the 
‘imperial’ EU on one side, and the ‘sovereign’ Russia, on the other. The fact that the 
interaction between these projects occurs also in the EU-Russia ED, confirms how a 
struggle for the political construction of Europe results from the parties’ interaction on 
technical issues.160 
 
Generally, the discourse-based strand of EU-Russia energy relations has contributed to 
turning the focus from the analysis of a technical issue to a more comprehensive 
examination of the political dynamics of the relations. Actors’ differences do not merely 
rely on individual interests and material capabilities, but also on how this difference is 
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told.  Actors’ interests and their utility functions are not given a priori but unfold in the 
discursive contestation. 
However, the existing analysis still pays too little attention to the historical 
representations of Other and the role of ‘otherness’ in the explanation of actors’ energy 
relations. These works should be complemented by a coherent methodology that allows 
understanding of how the narratives identified from the historical encounter of the 
actors influence the actors’ energy paradigms and discursive practices performed in the 
energy fields. It is, therefore, necessary to complement the existing critical/post-
structuralist accounts by illustrating the link between the three levels of analysis – 
historical narratives and policy discourses. Therefore, the last part of this chapter 
illustrates the contributions of this thesis to the discursive strand of the literature on EU-
Russia energy relations. 
  
 
6 Contributions and Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter has argued that attention to the discursive structure and identity interaction 
rather than to material factors provides a better explanation of the current status of EU-
Russia energy relations. From this perspective, the energy policy towards each other is 
based not only on interests and material capabilities, but also on the identity interaction 
emerging from the discursive encounter of actors in historical narratives and policy 
discourses. 
Conventional constructivism and rationalism do not adequately substantiate the 
complexity of the power relations between the EU and Russia by simply assuming 
identities (rationalism) and their difference (conventional constructivism). 
The critical constructivist / post-structuralist approach argues that identity is layered and 
constructed through a Self/Other discursive interaction. For the discursive interaction to 
produce meaning, it is necessary to produce meaningful boundaries beyond the basic 
Schmittean black and white divide. This should be complemented by an analysis that 
measures how alien the Other is (e.g. ‘degree of Otherness’). This presupposes outsiders 
possess constitutive power. The fact that the ‘degree of Otherness’ measures the 
diversity between Self and Others is the key factor that overcomes the bias of the 
existing (rationalist and mainstream constructivist) literature on EU-Russia (energy) 
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relations that, as noted aims to explain an assumed tension between actors. The critical 
constructivist / post-structuralist approach challenges and problematises such an 
assumption and opens up the possibility of conceptualising ‘otherness’ not only as 
threatening or confrontational but also in terms of cooperation and partnership.161 In this 
light, the critical constructivist / post-structuralist tradition enables one to deconstruct 
the rationalist and conventional constructivist belief that the interests and identities of 
the EU and Russia are simply different and in conflict. The added value of the proposed 
approach is to indicate the way through which ‘difference’, ‘similarities’ and ‘changes’ 
should be investigated.162 
From this perspective, the post-structuralist reliance on the discursive contestation 
provides the means to better understand the political meaning of EU-Russia energy 
relations for both broader EU-Russia relations and the construction of ‘Europe’ as a 
political project. As such, this research is in this respect close to the approach elaborated 
by Aalto and Morozov.163  By investigating the way in which EU-Russia energy 
relations are played out, it is possible to understand the different or similar political 
projects concerning Europe’s construction which are upheld by the EU and Russia, and 
how they cooperate or strive to impose their own projects and, as a consequence, how 
the EU and Russia construct their specific interests in their energy partnership. This 
arises from an understanding of energy security as something more than a mere 
exporter-importer relation or as a mere issue in EU-Russia relations but rather as 
something impacting on the identity formation of the actors. As a result, this study sets 
aside the technical, material and institutional aspects of the relationship. It rather 
focuses on exploring the discursive framework – and on the resulting representations – 
characterising the energy relationship between the EU and Russia. As such, the 
methodological spotlight  will be on  how discourses have formed and evolved through  
policy documents, speeches and symbolic acts.  In particular, this research examined 
texts (official documents and speeches) and symbolic acts from the representatives of 
the ruling elite – mainly the president, prime-minister and key ministries for Russia; the 
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President of the Commission and Commissioners, for the EU. 
The ‘degree of sedimentation’ of the discourses composing  this discursive framework 
is investigated in three levels of analysis (layers): the first related to the history of 
relations between Western Europe and Russia (historical narratives and representations), 
the second related to the field of energy security (energy policy paradigms), the third 
related to the actual written texts, speeches and  symbolic acts played out in the 
Nabucco-South Stream pipeline politics and the EU-Russia ED (discursive practices). 
The examination of these dimensions aims to investigate both the ‘degree of Otherness’ 
and the kind of ‘otherness’. This is because the ‘degree of Otherness’ not only ranges 
from positive to negative164, but it encompasses a number of possibilities beyond the 
mere enemy-friend dichotomy165, such as superiority and emulation.  From this 
perspective this thesis hypothesises that analysing EU-Russia energy relations as a 
Self/Other discursive interaction enables one to investigate the ‘degree of Otherness’, 
which ultimately explains the alternation between the cooperative and conflicting 
positions of actors. Such an analysis also illustrates the meaning of energy for the 
broader relations between the EU and Russia and for the construction of Europe as a 
political project. 
 
In conclusion, the existing discursive literature on EU-Russia energy relations has 
barely hinted at critical / post-structuralist concepts – such as discursive contestation, 
‘degree of Otherness’, ‘degree of sedimentation’ of discourses, constitutive role of 
outside and historical narrative and representations – to explain such a relation. The 
existing literature has exclusively focused on the level of analysis regarding ‘energy 
policy paradigms’ (i.e. comparable to layer two). This thesis not only adds a broader 
level of ‘sedimentation’ of energy paradigms (i.e. historical) but it studies how this 
broader level influences energy paradigms and, in turn, discursive practices (layer 
three). Therefore, this research in fact dedicates the entire Chapter 3 to unearth the 
dominant historical narratives and representations through which Self represented 
Other. The historical analysis dates back to the eighteenth century in the case of Russia, 
and to the early contact with Muscovy in the case of Western Europe. Chapter 4 will 
then demonstrate how the identified historical narratives are reflected in the energy 
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paradigms that actors play out towards each other.  Finally, in order to produce new 
empirical data, this thesis applies the identified discursive framework – resulting from 
layer one and layer two – to explain the ‘degree of Otherness’ in the Nabucco-South 
Stream pipeline politics and the EU-Russia ED. As noted, in order to uncover the 
discursive framework, this research adopts the layered structure of meaning elaborated 
by Ole Wæver. This, along with the emphasis on discursive analysis, represents the 
leading methodology of this thesis. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss in more 
detail the methodological principles underpinning this research.  
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Chapter 2 – Methodology and Data 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 1 suggested some key principles of the post-structuralist discursive approach, 
which represents the leading methodology of this research. Chapter 2 aims to detail and 
explore this methodology. The first section will explain the methodological debate in IR 
between rationalism/positivism and reflectivism. Given the aim to explain social 
phenomena through discursive contestation, critical constructivism / post-structuralism 
can be subsumed under a reflectivist methodology that relies on discourse-analysis. 
Therefore, the aim of the first section is to explain the principles and advantages of the 
proposed approach compared to a positivist / rationalist approach. In particular, the 
relation between identity and discourse and language will be investigated, with this 
following a discussion of the importance of discursive contestation to contextualise 
debates. The second section provides guidelines on how this research applies the 
specified discursive methodology to gain an understanding of EU-Russia energy 
relations. On this basis, a detailed research design will be provided. In particular, to 
support the building of this research design, many of the references will be to 
Hansen’s166 practical approach to discourse analysis and to the three-layered structure of 
meaning elaborated by Ole Wæver.167 The three-layered structure of meaning is the 
main practical guide for this research and it ultimately denotes the methodological 
contribution of this study to the existing discourse-based accounts of EU-Russia energy 
relations.  
The dispute between rationalism / positivism (which includes realist and liberal 
approaches, but also others such as Marxism) on the one hand, and reflectivism 
(including critical theory, post-structuralism, post-modernism, feminism) on the other 
hand, represents a methodological debate in IR.168 Rationalism relies on falsification 
and validation as leading principles to access knowledge and to understand reality. 
Reflectivism focuses on interpretation and subjectivity (identity) and emphasises the 
socially constructed nature of knowledge and social reality. Reflectivism attempts to 
reveal the power contest behind concepts (e.g. democracy vs autocracy) and ‘recover 
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the meaning that actors give to their activities’ 169 by using language and discursive 
antagonism as a source of meaning in the power contest. From this perspective, 
meaning is not intrinsic in the objects or actions that can be observed. Rather, meaning 
is continually articulated through changes in social activities. At the heart of this 
perspective lies the principle that language, and thus discourse, produces social reality, 
which can fluctuate across cultures and time.170  
Critical constructivist / post-structuralist discourse analysis has been chosen because it 
can offer a more significant understanding of EU-Russia energy relations than both the 
mainstream IR tradition and other discourse-based accounts. In fact, the proposed 
approach avoids merely describing the tension and conflict within the context of EU-
Russia energy relations. This scenario seems to represent the starting point of many 
existing rationalist accounts. However, this is only one of the possible options. The 
proposed approach, instead, embraces the possibility that cooperation and partnership 
can equally occur. In addition, it also sheds light on the political significance of energy 
relations both for broader EU-Russia relations and for the contest between the two 
actors over the political construction of ‘Europe’. Unlike other discourse-based 
explanations, it will be shown how the application of Wæver’s methodology helps us to 
understand how the discursive contestation underlies the energy relations between the 
EU and Russia and how historical representations of the Self in relation to the Other 
(layer one) is reflected in their mutual energy relations (layer two) and discursive 
practices (layer three).  
As noted in the previous chapter, the role of the Other’s identity in IR is divisive: either 
it is taken for granted as ‘different’ (conventional constructivism), or it is neglected 
(rationalism). Yet, in the examination of the specific case of relations between the EU 
and Russia, both choices are misleading. The constitutive role of the Other for self-
identification was key for the identity formation of Western Europe / EU and Russia as 
a ‘European’ power. The constitutive role of the Other, it is argued, can therefore offer 
an understanding of EU-Russia relations. It follows that the decision to focus on the 
energy relations between these actors lies in the hypothesis that the dynamic of the 
constitutive outside can also be found at the level of their mutual energy relations 
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which, consequently, has political implications for the broader EU-Russia relationship 
and for their political projects of ‘Europe’.  
 
The importance of the constitutive role of the outsider will emerge more clearly in 
chapter 3, which will deal with history. Here it will be noted how Russian thinkers have 
been trying to answer the question of Russia’s self-identity since 1830. The various 
answers provided to this question contributed to the development of a specific 
understanding of ‘Europe’ and of Western Europe (or the West).  On the other hand, in 
Western Europeans’ representations of Russia, the concept of ‘Europe’ was imagined as 
a Concert of Great Powers in which Russia was perceived as either a ‘learner’, a ‘threat’ 
or as an ‘equal’ participant within the Concert. Through the examination of the 
historical narratives put forward by Western Europeans and Russians to identify 
themselves in relation to the Other, it is possible to detect claims about competing or 
compatible identities and to illustrate how these claims have been central to determining 
the constitutive role of outsiders.  
Having addressed these crucial questions – why adopt a critical / post-structuralist 
discursive approach and why focus on EU-Russia energy relations – the next section 
will locate the post-structuralist discursive approach in IR methodological debates and 
explore its main sources.  
 
1.1 Locating Discourse Theory in the IR Methodological Debate  
 
 
Generally, discourse theory is placed within a deconstructive and anti-essentialist 
tradition of enquiry opposed to positivism. Fuss defines essentialism as “a belief in the 
real,  true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the  
‘whatness’ of a given entity”.171 Conversely, the notion of anti-essentialism opposes this 
stance and argues that the ‘whatness’ of any given entity is socially constructed. Rather 
than investigating explanations of behaviours based on cause-effect relations, the 
research agenda of discourse theory aims to understand how identities and meaning are 
socially produced.172 Political identities are always relational, historically and 
discursively produced. As such, they are the result of a contingent and unstable 
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construction. Thus, discourse analysts reject the existence of empirical phenomena 
generating identities and accept the irreducible gap between objectivity and its 
representation.173 Following the specific French epistemological tradition headed by 
Foucault, objects are not ‘given’ by the world of experience and facts, but are 
constructed in specific systems of knowledge. In ‘Madness and Civilization’, Foucault 
illustrates how the object of mental illness derives from the ‘rules of formation’ of 
psychiatric discourse, and does not exist a priori.174 In ‘The Archaeology of 
Knowledge’, he adds that psychiatric discourse does not reflect a specific object, but is 
the result of the way in which dispersed objects are put together.175  Questions of ‘truth’ 
and ‘falsity’ turn out to be subject to criteria set by the knowledge and rules existing 
within discourse. In this light, discursive analysis aims to detect the rules of discourses,  
how they are constructed, and how actors identify themselves discursively. In this 
respect, discourse theory draws on the works of Heidegger, Kuhn, Wittgenstein and 
Foucault who discarded the notion of ‘objectivity’ in favour of that of ‘meaning’.176  
From this perspective, the positivist / rationalist analysis of society based on casual laws 
is thus questioned by the reflectivist focus on social behaviour and its interpretation. As 
noted, on one side, the rationalist / positivist methodology  explains social phenomena 
through the cause / effect relationship (what caused what). On the other side, the 
reflectivist methodology explains the same social phenomena by investigating how it 
was possible, meaningful and how it can be interpreted. In addition, rationalist 
approaches to social science give priority to explanation but they neglect  the discourse 
of social agents and their understanding of the world. In fact, a deeper relationship 
between understanding and explanation exists. For Winch ‘understanding is the goal of 
explanation and the end-product of successful explanation’.177 Following this reading, 
explanation is based on understanding. Instead, drawing from reflectivism, critical 
constructivism / post-structuralism believes that explanation is supported through 
categories, which are manifest in a specific conceptual language (e.g. Self / Other, 
antagonism / equivalence, or recognition / hegemony). When the Self is in the process 
of identifying itself  it tends to make categories. By doing so, the Self produces a 
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positive inner identity opposed to that of the Other. This self-identification occurs 
through the ‘us / ‘them’ dichotomy, which contributes to construct ‘otherness’. By 
measuring the ‘degree of otherness’ – that is, how alien the Other is on a continuum 
from sameness (equivalence) to radical difference (antagonism) – it is possible to 
decipher if the Other is a friendly or an antagonist entity. The measurement of 
‘otherness’ is supplemented by an examination of the discursive context of the Self / 
Other interaction. Such a discursive context includes unrestricted forms of ‘causal 
explanation’. Rather than explaining the cause-effect relationships of a social 
phenomenon in deterministic terms, the discursive ‘causal explanation’ enables us to 
understand why and how specific discourses emerged while others did not, or why a 
certain identity’s claims were constructed, and how they came to prevail over others in 
certain historical contexts.178  
This is not to say that ‘reality’ cannot be accessed through the positivist methodology of 
falsification and validation, but rather that reality is always discursively and socially 
mediated.179 By conceiving ‘reality’ as discursively and socially produced, discursive 
approaches open the ground to innovative research inquiries – which rationalism has 
overlooked – such as the interpretations and the social meaning of political phenomena.  
 
The discursive and social nature of ‘reality’ has implications also with regard to the 
relation between identity and policy, As demonstrated in Chapter 1, identity and 
policy180 are linked within a political discourse. Foreign policies are discursively 
presented as caused by a representation or the effect of a specific identity.181 However, 
given the unstable nature of identities – which are (re)produced – identities and policies 
become ontologically inseparable only if this inseparability is sanctioned within a 
specific discourse which is, in turn, never fully stable. By contrast, for rationalism – and 
partially for conventional constructivism – causal epistemology is the crucial tool 
through which understanding can be gained. Yet, the rationalist causal epistemology 
fails to consider that ‘truth’ is generated through the historical reiteration of knowledge 
within a specific discourse, rather than in an extra-historical, extra-discursive 
objectivity.    
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1.2 Language, Discourse and Identity 
 
 
Having rejected the positivist methodology based on the cause-effect principle to 
explain social phenomena, this section will examine the main concepts that a discourse 
theory generally relies on: language, discourse and their relations with identity. 
Language is a key source in the proposed methodology. It constitutes material objects 
and social practices as meaningful182, thus making materiality intelligible. Given that 
each statement involves an understanding of the language system and given the 
impossibility of objectively accessing and understanding thoughts and intentions, public 
texts, speeches and conveyed actions (e.g. symbols) are instead accessible through 
language.183 Language represents the medium that enables us to investigate the 
articulation and the performance of identities and its claims within a discursive 
structure. Meaning is produced as a result of such a linguistic articulation and 
performance.184 Subjects produce meaning through language. In other words, within the 
discursive context, language has a performative and productive function that enables 
subjects to manifest their claims to identity. Overall, the focus on language is important 
because it helps us to understand subjects’ identity claims, which ultimately become 
constitutive of subjects’ interests. Thus, the latter turn out to be constructed rather than 
pre-given, as argued in rationalist accounts. On the practical level, discourse (see below) 
represents the basis on which the policy interests of a political actor are justified. As 
such, interests are then discursively reflected in policies. Rather than deriving interests 
and policies from an anonymous structure – as rationalists do – the way to discover an 
actor’s interests is through language (written text, speeches, signs).  
 
As noted, discourse analysts also tend to classify symbolic actions (non-linguistic 
elements) as belonging to language. This perspective draws from the linguistic school 
initiated by Saussure who conceived of ‘signs’ as lying at the core of discourse. For 
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Saussure ‘signs’ derive from the relationship between a signifier (sound or written 
mark) and a signified (concepts). These two concepts – signifier and signified – do not 
produce sense only through their reference to entities in an independent and objective 
world. Instead, they produce meaning through reference to each other. As such, 
language is a system of signs, each of which acquires significance only in relation to 
another signs and only through the broader context within which it is included.185  There 
is no given signified prior to its relationship to a signifier. Meaning is thus a social 
convention originating from signifying practices that structure the relation between 
signs.186  
 
Other theorists such as Roland Barthes have defined semiology as the science of signs. 
He applied a structuralist account of language to practices of popular cultural models 
(e.g. films, food systems) in order to discover the structure of the signs in these models. 
He thought that communication in each model was organised into coded systems, which 
followed rules primarily established in the field of linguistics.187 Semiological analysis 
involves finding this structure, which is not to be seen  as a single  bloc but includes 
different levels of meaning. The aim is to find the last layer – or ‘the first order 
language’ – on which all the other layers rely. Similarly to Wæver, Barthes conceived a 
layered structure of meaning to demonstrate that there is no single ‘first order language’ 
through which we have direct access to reality.188  Rather, second-order signifying 
systems are erected on first-order signifying systems, which are socially constructed and 
‘sedimented’.  
 
Although identity expresses itself through language, this is not enough. Its construction 
also involves relationships with other identities. Language also needs to be 
complemented with another very strategic terminology: discourse. If we focus only on 
language, there is the risk that whatever an individual may state will constitute 
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discourse. A discourse not only relies on the language but it also relates to a specific 
historical and socio-cultural context, which contributes to set the boundaries within 
which the language can be used. Language is, in fact, meaningful only within the limits 
of a given discursive structure. It follows that, in order for language to be meaningful, it 
is necessary to analyse that discursive structure from a historical perspective. This will 
enable us to understand how a specific language has progressively acquired meaning. 
Yet, as no discursive structure can be fully closed, the challenge is how to identify a 
discourse. Foucault resolves this pitfall by tying together the concepts of ‘statement’ 
(minor element), ‘discourse’ (group of formulated statements) and ‘discursive 
formation’ (which refers to the regularity in the dispersion of statements). As such, a 
discourse is a signifying practice in which the statements belonging to it have a regular 
and dispersed relationship.189 The discursive formation is not detected by reference to a 
common object of investigation or a common theme. Rather, it is the continued 
interplay of the rules of a discourse produced throughout history that explains the unity 
of discourse itself.190  
Yet, ‘regularity in dispersion’ does not tell us where one signifying practice terminates 
and another begins, since there is no means of deriving regularity. To address this 
weakness, it is necessary to postulate that the limits of a discourse are to be found 
within the discourse itself by exploring how, in a particular discourse, the boundaries 
are drawn. Therefore, the task of discourse analysis is to create a discourse and draw its 
boundaries on the basis of the textual analysis conducted and the sources available. In 
other words, unity within discourses is reached when a unified meaning is historically 
reiterated. Through such a process, it becomes a narrative with specific rules. Thus, a 
discourse analyst also examines how, in a given historical circumstance, various 
components of a discourse are unified in a narrative.191 The historical root of each 
discourse paves the way to clarify the distinction between the various ‘degrees of 
sedimentation’ of a discourse.  
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1.3 Degree of Discursive ‘Sedimentation’: Narrative/Story, Paradigm and Discursive 
Practices  
 
 
In social science discourse is increasingly used as an umbrella term. Generally speaking, 
discourses are tools through which individuals permeate reality with meaning. They can 
unfold in a variety of forms such as language (public text and speeches) or symbolic 
signs. However, in the context of this thesis, discourses are ‘sedimented’.192 As 
suggested in the previous chapter, the focus on the ‘degree of sedimentation’ is key in 
the context of Wæver’s three-layered structure. This research identifies three levels of 
sedimentation: narrative/story, paradigm and discursive practices. Narrative/story refers 
to a historical interpretation of an ‘event’ or core concept. This narrative interpretation 
relies on a specific understanding of how the historical event or core concept was 
generated. Therefore, a narrative represents the basic level of cognitive understanding 
and offers a broader explanatory and historical structure to frame contemporary policy 
debates. From this perspective, layer one of Wæver’s structure aims to explore the basic 
historical representations and narratives that actors have used to describe their mutual 
relationship.  
As such, a narrative / story constitutes the deeper bedrock upon which further levels of 
sedimentation are built. A paradigm represents the next level of sedimentation of a 
discourse. A paradigm  is a set of beliefs and views that represent a frame of reference 
used to organise reasoning regarding a policy field. When operating at level of 
paradigms, the concept of ‘difference’ becomes gradually more clear because the 
distinction of views and actions of others who operate within a different paradigm 
emerges more clearly. From this perspective, paradigms help to problematise the 
‘difference’ as well as the changes in views. By analysing the role of paradigms in 
natural sciences, Kuhn193 studied the tendency of one paradigm to become ‘sedimented’ 
and resilient to significant change. Yet, he adds, as soon as the weaknesses of that 
paradigm became manifest, a new paradigm emerges and replaces the old one.194 By 
facilitating the identification of changes in views, paradigms also help to reject their 
‘taken for granted’ character. Rather, they are one possible point of view among 
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many.195  
A paradigm is performed through discursive practices. These practices refer to codified 
linguistic usages or symbolic acts which enable a given policy paradigm to acquire 
meaning. In practical terms, the paradigm represents written and spoken texts and 
symbolic actions produced by political actors or policy-makers in their activities. The 
focus on textual / symbolic analysis enables the researcher to study the actual 
documents and actions. However, examining these discursive practices alone is a mere 
end in itself. These practices make sense only when contextualised in the broader 
framework that takes into account historical narratives (layer one) and policy paradigms 
(layer two).  
For example, the historically ingrained narrative of Westphalian sovereignty was at the 
basis of political community (layer one). Such a narrative can support various political 
paradigms (layer two) about the ideal nature of that political community – e.g. 
democracy, monarchy, communist, etc. Consequently, the principles regulating the life 
of a specific political community – say democracy – are established and performed in a 
constitution (layer three).  It emerges that the contextual (layers one and two) and 
textual (layer three) levels are in continuous dialogue and they finally aim to generate 
interpretation. Thus, these three levels are not separate moments of analysis. Rather, 
each new event pertaining to the issue under examination (e.g. launch of a new 
framework policy within EU-Russia energy relations), should be examined in terms of a 
backwards and forwards interaction between the three levels.196  
 
 
1.4 Identity 
 
 
Within discourse theory identities are understood as relational. The construction of 
categories involves their insertion into a discursive system of similarities and 
differences. In fact, the identity of the Self originates from its position in relation to the 
Other and its characteristics as represented through a signifying system. The Self has 
multiple positions and roles depending on the social context it relates to. For example, 
the Self can be described as democratic and catholic. These multiple Selves are possible 
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because each social context in which the Self interacts puts forward a meaningful 
description of the Self that can be added to other existing descriptions.197  
Although the Self can acquire multiple identities, there is always a distance between the 
acquired identity and its subject. Similarly to discourse, this distance generates the 
impossibility of constituting a complete identity. It follows that the subject does not 
completely fit within the space of its identity because instability and change are 
constitutive elements of any identity.198 Having said this, it is important to understand 
the process through which an identity is ‘acquired’, and how it can change. Derrida 
holds that identity is always unstable and contingent. The acquisition of identity implies 
a process of self-understanding and identification. Identification, in turn, involves a 
process of exchange between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ and this locates identities 
within a certain context.199 However, this does not create a full and fixed identity. The 
identity of the subject can change through a new act of identification (e.g. dislocation, 
see below) and through its adherence to a new project (e.g. Russia’s identification 
moved from its self-identification with Yeltsin’s project to a self-identification with 
Putin’s project). The scope of the change depends on the relative success of that project 
in becoming hegemonic. The more limited the space available for identification outside 
the hegemonic discourse is, the smaller the possibility there is for a change. As such, the 
examination of the way in which the limits of discourse are historically constructed 
makes it possible to observe how subjectivity itself is constructed. Consequently, it is 
relevant to consider how the Self is constructed within a discourse, how it acquires and 
establishes its position and how it relates to and differentiates from ‘otherness’. Besides 
claiming the relational foundation of identity, Laclau and Mouffe also assert that 
identity is constructed through unstable differences. The constant comparison with the 
Other implies that the construction of the Self passes through a confrontation with a 
system of difference that can never be eradicated.200 The Self’s confrontation with the 
system of difference embodied by the Other results in a political contestation of 
discourses. This political contestation between the Self and the Other is ultimately a 
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contestation for power and hegemony and stems from the awareness that the Self and its 
discourses are vulnerable and incomplete. It is around these processes that, drawing 
from a Gramscian position, Laclau and Mouffe affirm the centrality of political 
contestation between identities.201  
 
Laclau and Mouffe complement the theory of discourse by introducing three further 
notions: dislocation, hegemony and antagonism.202  
As noted, the processes of subject positioning and identification within a discursive 
structure are not fixed and ‘any concrete individual’ can acquire multiple subject 
positions.203 From this perspective, the concepts of identification and positioning 
involve the possibility of dislocation, which refers to the process by which the subject 
adheres to another political project. In fact, as a reaction to the unstable nature of the 
social and political world, an identity can dislocate itself. The subject is forced to take 
decisions – that is to identify with other political projects and discourses – each time 
that a social identity is in crisis and a new structure needs to be generated. It is in the 
process of identification that, for Laclau and Mouffe, political subjectivities are formed 
or reshaped. Dislocation, hence, means that the subject is not determined by an a priori 
structure.204  
 
Overall, the fact that the unity of identity and its discourses are incomplete is due to the 
presence of a counter-identity and counter-discourse that poses a continued ‘threat’. 
This circumstance opens the ground for a hegemonic contestation about how to 
overcome the continued dislocation of self-identity and its discourse. The presence of 
conflict and counter-practices marks the concept of the ‘primacy of politics’, which 
ultimately represents the arena where contestation for hegemony over competing 
discourses and identity takes place.205  
 
Hegemony refers to the dominance of a political project in its contestation with 
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competing discourses. The hegemony of a discourse is measured through its ability to 
secure meaning within a specific context. According to Sayyid and Zac, two conditions 
have to occur in order to consider a project as hegemonic. Firstly, when a discourse 
turns its political project and rules into the ‘natural’ rules of a group and its limits 
become the ‘natural’ limits of the group. Secondly, when it dismisses the other projects 
against which it was competing, although the latter do not dissolve. Yet, the hegemonic 
discourse has also some degree of instability. Thus, to maintain its hegemony, the 
dominant discourse has to establish and reiterate rules to oppose the constant challenge 
from competing projects attempting to destabilize the rules and limits of the hegemonic 
discourse.206  
Overall, in a context of volatility of political borders, the hegemonic practice always 
faces the presence of antagonistic forces. This explains the impossibility of fixing 
meaning and the continued possibility of competing political projects. It follows that all 
the social practices that constitute new meaning and identities are conceptualized as 
partially internal and partially external to the discourses that define them.207  
 
As previously stated, the conception of hegemony includes the concept of competition 
between discourses and, thus, social antagonism. Antagonism does not derive from a 
‘real opposition’ of a priori objects, but it is a part of identity construction. Furthermore, 
it introduces the element of confrontation into the encounter of identities and their 
claims, and it confirms the relational essence of identity. Drawing from Derrida’s notion 
of the ‘constitutive outside’, Laclau and Mouffe contend that antagonism takes place 
when the presence of the Other prevents the Self from being totally it-Self causing, as a 
consequence, the unfeasibility of Self-formation. This impossibility derives from the 
mutual experience of both the antagonising entity and the entity being antagonised.  The 
secondary effect of social antagonism is that it contributes to unifying the hegemonic 
discourse by establishing a threatening outside that prevents the closure of the 
discourse.208 As previously noted, the task of a discursive methodology is to explore the 
mechanism by which actors construct the blockage of identity in antagonistic terms. The 
concept of antagonism supports Laclau and Mouffe’s thesis that identity formation is 
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not the result of an anonymous structure or the self-interested action of rational actors, 
but is a political and historical process subject to the negative outside that determines a 
constant redefinition. To explain how antagonisms are discursively constituted, it is 
important to stress the importance of a ‘negative outside’ and the process through which 
a Self’s discursive system relates to and differentiates from it.209  
In general, discourse analysis has been the object of a number of critics underlining the 
excessive and fundamental volatility and lack of objectivity of this approach.  Thus, the 
next section aims to explore the main limits of discourse analysis and proposes solutions 
to close the gaps identified.  
 
 
2 Limits and Weaknesses of Discourse Theory   
 
 
Discourse analysis is a generic term including a heterogeneous variety of theoretical 
approaches and analytical constructs. It mainly stem from linguistics, psychology, 
ethnography and post-structural social theory.  
Each of these fields applies its own assumptions and methods. These various 
approaches differ in many ways such as, in their conceptions of discourse, in the role 
they assign to agency and subjectivity; in the way they recognize texts and contexts.  
Discourse analysis is a qualitative method of studying texts, which aims to investigate 
the connections between language, communication, knowledge, power and social 
practices.  
As explained, discourse is a form of language; therefore linguistic methods of analysis 
have been dominant in the study of texts and speeches. Linguistic methods focus on 
how discourse are structured or how sentences are connected. Subfields of linguistic – 
such as phonology, morphology, and syntax – have emerged to study sound structures, 
word formation, and the formal structures of sentences. Similarly, semantics was 
developed to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions through interpretation.  
Rhetoric instead proposes to study discourses beyond its linguistic and grammatical 
rules. Discourses are, thus, considered as a form of social interaction, which occurs 
within a communicative pattern. In particular, rethoric suggests that discourses have a 
persuasive communicative function, that is performed through a structure made of 
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figure of sounds, style, syntactic structure or meaning210. 
 
The discourse historical approach argues that objective social structures alone - such as 
gender or ethnicity - cannot satisfactory account for language variation and discourse 
construction. Rather the interaction between social and discursive structures is mediated 
by the cognitive context. Discourse historical approach explores the interplay between 
social structures and individual actors, by introducing subjectivity and agency. 
Furthermore, while the construction of discourse depends on the context and its 
linguistic practices, discourse historical approach also underlines the importance of 
memory and history into this construction. From this perspective, discourses include 
both a structured form of knowledge and the memory of social practice.211 
Another method is the discursive psychology, which considers inner mental processes 
of an individual as constituted through discursive practice. This implies that 
psychological language follows external, not internal, criteria, and as a result, 
phenomena such as emotions are socially constructed. Thus, according to discursive 
psychology, in order to understand emotions, psychologists should examine the action 
of the individual who claims that feeling.  A consequence of focusing on external 
criteria for inner states is that individuals lose their privileged position.  
This research adopts a critical discursive approach, which focuses primarily on political 
issues in the belief that power relations are discursive. Rather than merely describe 
discourse structures, such a approach aims to investigate their social nature , that is, to 
examine the  ways discourse structures enact, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge the 
control of public discourse.212 
 
 
Despite the variety of approaches, it is also important to note that there are a number of 
limitations generally concerning discourse theory as such and critical discursive 
approach in particular.  Generally speaking, a methodology employing discourse theory 
does not capture the subjects through its discourses, it cannot reveal the inner thoughts 
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of an actor, nor can it resolve the distance that exists between the analyst and the object 
of study. Rather, discourse theory enables the researcher to interpret how an identity’s 
claims unfold in the historical narratives (layer one), policy paradigms (layer two) and 
discursive practices (layer three) that construct a specific debate. This, in turn, helps us 
to understand current debates. Therefore, the objective of the researcher is to study how 
these three layers are constructed in a given debate.213 
 
Against this background, one of the main weaknesses of the discourse approach relates 
to the fact that meaning of each discourse played in a given debate is never fixed and 
thus everything can be re-interpreted. This can be very challenging, as any analysis can 
be contested and each new interpretation gives rise to a further critique.214 As a result, 
there is indeed a ‘non-rule’ perspective, according to which general and universal rules 
are inapplicable, rather rules governing a discourse should be articulated and detected 
in the research process. From this perspective, the researcher cannot rely on pre-
existing discourses and fixed theoretical structures for the empirical cases they are 
investigating. It follows what Derrida called the impossibility of the ‘singularity of 
each reading’. For Derrida, each attempt to investigate the singularity of the 
construction of the text is doomed to fail as each text has been previously altered by 
another consciousness.215    
Like Derrida, Laclau believes that each empirical research articulates a specific concept. 
In Foucault’s reading, each genealogy represents a specific ‘history of the present’, built 
around specific concerns, which leads to an investigation into how they became an 
issue. The condition necessary for this approach is that the concepts have to enjoy an 
appropriate degree of ‘openness’, ‘deformation’, and ‘transformation’.216 This can also 
imply that discourse analysis provides greater flexibility allowing multiple views on 
issues. However, while multiple views may be possible, some will surely be recognized 
as being more valid than others while ‘truth’ will always be elusive. 
 
Against this background, Hansen raises further methodological issues regarding the 
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reliability of discourse analysis: would another researcher come to the same result if 
selecting the same texts? Is it possible to declare some discourse analyses better than 
others? This triggers another critique according to which discourse analysis runs the 
risk that ‘anything goes’.217  However, a response to this critique would be that the 
focus on the discursive articulations of signs and identities implies that the researcher 
has to pay particular attention to how signs are linked and differentiated (see below) 
and how they construct Selves and Others. It follows that if relevant signs are 
neglected, if the ‘degree of otherness’ between Self and Other is overstated or 
minimized, if the connection between identity and policy is not recognised, the 
connection between linked and differentiated signs becomes artificial and the overall 
research turns out to be a vulnerable reading.218  
 
In general, as Sayyid and Zac noted, the critiques of discourse theory attempt to find 
foundations and objectivity, and downplay the ‘primacy of politics’ and language. As 
such, these critiques appeal to materiality when asserting the ‘facticity’ of material 
objects or when demonstrating that the foundations lie in the intrinsic properties of 
objects. The intention is to uncover the ‘reality’ underlying the language and to find in 
the ‘hardness of stone’ something which is exempt from discursive practices. Such a 
search for materiality as a way of locating foundations is, however, based on a 
misinterpretation of the discourse approach. Discourse theorists do not hold that objects 
are created simply through the pronunciation of the world that identifies them. 
Language does not create objects. Rather, the main assumption is that the material 
world is reachable through the description made by language and descriptions are, in 
turn, situated in some signifying practice.219  In other words, reality is socially 
constructed through the description of the world. These descriptions are subject to 
changes, and when a description changes, our understanding of ‘realty’ is affected. For 
example, as Sayyid and Zac report, science believed that the universe was made of 
atoms and that atoms were the smallest components on Earth. As science developed, we 
learnt that the universe is also made of subatomic particles. The universe has not 
changed; but our description of it has. This leaves the possibility that in the future, our 
descriptions might change again.  
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Overall, although an extra-linguistic element is present, the change of a description is 
also a social process as it is mediated through language.220 
 
Furthermore, against the critique of excessive volatility, it can be said that discourse 
analysts examine political phenomena by putting attention on the limits of discursive 
and narrative formations, and, at the same time creating, and tracing the logics that 
structure competing narratives and discourses. Their principles are drawn from various 
fields: linguistics (sign, signifier, signified), psychoanalysis (subjectivity, identification, 
repression), philosophy (deconstruction), political science and political theory 
(hegemony and power).221 In methodological terms, discourse theory enables analysts to 
study political phenomena by creating drawing and disentangling. The focus is on the 
way in which groups construct their interests; their relationship with the Other; the 
narratives through which they tell their past and future as well as their self-
understanding. In the study of foreign policy where lots of information is unknown, 
discourse analysis offers a big methodological advantage as it relies on public texts, 
speeches and symbolic signs. If the researcher frames his analysis within the discursive 
structure he creates, then the logic of argumentation emerges more comprehensibly.222 
 
 
3 Methodological Techniques and Decisions   
 
 
3.1 How to Study Texts  
 
 
The previous sections discussed the main tools of discourse analysis – classified as a 
reflectivist methodology – with a view to illustrating its advantages vis a vis rationalist 
/ positivist methodology. This section aims to provide guidelines on ‘how’ to 
practically study the discursive methodology and build a research design. The 
methodological focus on discourses as articulated in written and spoken texts raises a 
number of questions regarding how identities are detected and defined within foreign 
policy texts and how the relationship between competing discourses should be studied. 
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In addition, further questions are raised regarding the criteria used to select a body of 
material and data as well as the types of text that should be chosen. The second section 
of this chapter aims to clarify these points.  
 
A discourse analyst is expected to come across a variety of texts. Depending on the 
issue, each text refers to a specific discursive structure. Such a reference is often 
implicit, and thus the analyst needs to discern the codes that link the text together with 
its discursive structure; make differentiations; and locate it spatially, temporally and 
ethically. As a result, the meaning of a text is rarely self-evident but it is often drawn 
from a discursive structure.223 According to Kristeva, the text is not an individual, 
isolated object but a set of cultural textuality. Kristeva believes that the individual text 
and the cultural text are made from a shared textual space and cannot be separated from 
each other.224 This process of inter-textuality highlights the fact that texts are posed 
against other texts and they draw upon each other in shaping identities and policies. 
Texts also establish authority by citing other texts and, eventually, reinterpreting the 
past. The inter-textual link generates mutual legitimacy and can also contribute to the 
creation and reinforcement of meaning and narratives. In general, inter-textuality 
facilitates the gathering of facts and knowledge, and helps the analyst situate them 
within specific foreign policy debates.225 This will ultimately help create a discourse.   
 
Having said that in this research textual material is the basic source to construct the 
various levels of ‘sedimentation’ of a discourse (narratives / stories, paradigms and 
discursive practices), it is now necessary to understand how to study the content of a 
discourse. In this light, two research techniques are briefly outlined here: genealogy and 
deconstruction. They mainly stem from the works of Foucault and Derrida. Inspired by 
Nietzsche, Foucault elaborated a genealogical approach, in which the investigative 
strategy aims to explore the historical emergence – or the narrative character – of the 
rules and practice of a contemporary discourse.  For Foucault, genealogy studies the 
historical accidents and contingencies that originated (or dissolved) a representation, as 
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224 J., Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980, quoted by V. M., Simandan, Julia Kristeva’s Concepts of Intertextuality, Voicu 
Mihnea Simandan, 2010,  Available from:  http://www.simandan.com/?p=2067 Accessed 1/06/2013 
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well as the conditions determining the marginalization of other representations.226  From 
this perspective, this thesis draws from Foucault’s insight, as one of the main objectives 
is to explore the genealogy (layer one) of contemporary energy discourses and 
discursive practices played in EU-Russia energy relations (layer two and three). 
 
If Foucault examined the rules and conditions of historical representations, Derrida 
focuses on how these representations unfold. His technique of deconstruction 
emphasizes the practice of reading, which considers written text as ‘object’. Derrida 
believes that the meaning emerging from a text is not fixed but it is subject to re-
interpretation, which, in turn, opens the possibility to produce new meaning from the 
same text.227 Derrida’s concept of ‘double reading’ aims to reorganize a text while 
demonstrating its limits through the identification of the impossible ‘points of closure’ 
in a text. The deconstructive stance also implies that texts are constituted around 
opposition – what Derrida calls ‘the metaphysics of presence’ – and the repression of 
others. Derrida's ‘double reading’ aims to re-define these oppositions, while 
articulating new conceptual ‘infrastructures’, which allocate the oppositions in different 
ways. The ‘method’ of deconstruction is useful for discourse theorists as it implies a 
deconstructive practice that opens up the ground closed by dominant interpretations.228   
 
 
3.2 How to Study Identity  
 
 
Textual analysis also accounts for identity construction. In particular, the discourse 
analyst should investigate how, in a set of texts, the claims of a Self-identity are linked 
with (similar) or different (antithetical) claims compared to those of the Other. In the 
specific field of foreign policy discourse, the focus is on how identity claims are imbued 
with political content. Such content emerges from locating identity spatially, temporally 
and ethically. Each of these steps is further elaborated below. Understanding identity as 
produced through the process of ‘linking and differentiation’ implies the existence of an 
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Other towards which the Self can be linked and differentiated. 
 
Methodologically, the first step would focus on detecting those terms in the text that 
indicate a clear articulation of the Other as opposed to the Self. Identity construction, in 
fact, does not stem from a mere attribution of a specific sign to the Other or to the Self. 
Rather, it emerges through the positioning of the sign within a broader system. In this 
respect, the twofold process of linking and differentiation explains how meaning and 
identity are constructed through a series of linked signs that represent relations of 
sameness as well as through another series of juxtaposed signs that constitute relations 
of difference. This ultimately contributes to measuring and constructing the ‘degree of 
Otherness’. For example, the construction of ‘Russia’ as different from ‘Western 
Europe’ does not generate much meaning if this construction is not located within a 
discourse that links and differentiates these signs. A discursive option, for example, is 
to link ‘Russia’ to concepts of ‘modernity’, lack of democracy and ‘underdevelopment’ 
and pose it in opposition to a ‘postmodern’, ‘democratic’, ‘developed’ and ‘civilized’ 
Western Europe. In this light, the construction of identity should be conducted taking 
into account signs articulated by a particular discourse or text, how a specific text 
associates signs to achieve the discursive stability of the Self, where instabilities and 
gaps between these constructions lie, and how the competing discourses of the Other 
construct the same sign differently.229   
 
However, it is necessary to stress that, although identity is relational and the Self is 
constructed through differentiation against an Other, it is unlikely that all texts reiterate 
always the same juxtaposition of a Self and an Other. In fact, a particular discourse 
might be so well established that the texts no longer need to detail a construction of the 
same identity.  
In addition, the investigation of the identity’s articulation poses also the issue of 
‘discourses disappearance’, that is, identities articulated at one time might have lost 
their significance, and, as a consequence this discourse is no longer recognized. In 
short, the processes of linking and differentiation provide a theoretical ground to 
understand how the discourses of the Self aim to construct stability, how they become 
unstable, how they can be deconstructed and the process through which they transform 
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or become irrelevant. However, as the meaning of each sign is created through linking 
and differentiation, there is always a gap arising from the fact that signs are linked to 
each other, but never fully the same.230  
 
Furthermore, when adopting an identity-based account to study foreign policy, it is 
important to assign a political character to the identity, which leads to the necessity to 
explore the spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions of the identity. There is not one 
dimension, which can be said to determine the other two. Rather, they are 
complementary. 
Spatiality focuses on the way boundaries are drawn. To understand identity as spatially 
produced it is necessary to underline that the identity formation process involves the 
construction of boundaries and the demarcation of space. The measure through which 
the demarcation is made depends on the concepts of sovereignty and security and their 
relation with other spatial identities. To give an example, if a spatial construction of 
identity is based on the concept of a ‘sovereign nation state’ (e.g. Russia), this implies 
an egalitarian relation with other sovereign nation states based on the mutual respect of 
spatial / geographical borders.231  
Identity, however, emerges not only around spatiality but also through its temporal 
articulations. The identification of a temporal identity relies on temporal schemes such 
as ‘development’, ‘change’, or ‘stasis’. The employment of these schemes implies, in 
turn, a central role for history and Other. In fact, the temporality of  a contemporary 
identity is based on how Self’s historical identity has developed in comparison with 
Other.  
The third dimension relates to the investigation of the ethical identity. This focuses on 
the construction of responsibility and the sense of mission that actors deploy in their 
foreign policy discourses. The articulation of ethical identity looks at the discursive 
construction of ethics, morality, and responsibility.  For example, the moral 
representation of wars can be framed within the scheme of ‘genocide’ or that of 
‘humanitarian intervention’. 
Focusing on the way in which these three dimensions of identity construction are 
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connected sheds light on how political subjectivities are constituted as well as on the 
possibility for analysing differences between discourses and how they change over time. 
By combining a discursive approach on the one hand, with the study of identity through 
the three dimensions of identity construction on the other hand, it is possible to grasp 
the type of Selves and Others constituted in foreign policy discourse and how radical 
the difference between them is (‘degree of Otherness’). It follows that, rather than only 
recognising two constructions of identity as ‘different’, this approach also allows for a 
focus on how this difference is spatially, temporally and ethically situated. This should 
be considered as one of the main strengths of a discursive approach.232 
 
Turning to the practical adaptation of discourse analysis to the specific study of EU-
Russia energy relations, a series of decisions need to be made. Following Hansen’s 
approach, for a research design to be built, it is important to determine whether one 
should examine the foreign policy discourse of one Self or of multiple Selves and, 
whether one should select one particular moment or a longer historical development. On 
the basis of the decisions made, it will then be possible to select the textual material 
(primary and secondary sources). 
 
 
3.3. Step 1: Number of Selves, Discourse Encounter and Temporality 
 
 
This research studies the articulation of a foreign policy issue across a series of 
historical Selves and Others. In addition, it opposes the discourse of the Self with the 
competing discourse of the Other, bearing in mind that the Self is constituted through 
the relation with the Other who, in turn, can be articulated as a ‘superior’, ‘inferior’, 
‘threat’, ‘partner’, ‘learner’ or ‘in need of assistance’.   
Studying the discourse of both Self and Other through the discourse encounter 
mechanism helps us to understand how the discourse of the Self might be received by 
the Other. Discursive encounters trigger constructions of inferiority and superiority and 
thus produce a specific distribution of discursive and political power. For example, from 
a Western European perspective, the encounter between the EU and Russia is not 
always set in the terms of a dialogue between two equally powerful parties. Rather, the 
EU has often posed itself in a privileged position vis a vis the ‘Russian learner’. This 
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explains, for example, why the EU has sought to transfer its energy legislation to Russia 
aiming to constitute the discursive structure to which Russia has to respond.233  
For example, as Morozov outlines, in the discursive encounter with the West, Russia 
has proven to respond to the Western discursive structure by acknowledging the 
universal significance of liberal democratic values. At the same time, Russia also tries 
to challenge the Western control over the term democracy by adding its own meaning 
through the emphasis on the principle of sovereignty234.  
 
In this research the choice of a discursive encounter combined with a comparative Self-
Other study is influenced by pragmatic questions of linguistic abilities235. In fact, in 
order to conduct a comprehensive discursive encounter, the researcher usually needs to 
know the language of the Self as well as the encountered Other. In addition, questions 
of access to material documenting the discourse of the Other need to be considered. 
This is why this research employs the process of discourse encounter as mainly 
interpreted from a Western perspective. In other words, the discourses of both EU 
(Western Europe) and Russia are gleaned from texts belonging to a Western political 
debate and available in English. 
 
Another important decision regards the temporal perspective. In light of the 
methodological choices made, this research opts for the analysis of an event (e.g. EU-
Russia relations)  in two protracted historical periods. The first regards layer one and 
analyses – through discursive encounter – the historical trajectory of the relations 
between Western Europe and Russia as seen from a Western perspective. The historical 
analysis dates back to the eighteenth century in the case of Russia, and to the early 
contact with Muscovy in the case of Western Europe. The second historical period is 
analyzed in layer two and examines the energy paradigms implemented by the EU and 
Russia from the second half of the twentieth century up to recent developments. 
Academic writings will be the main basis through which these historical periods are 
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studied. As such, the next section will elaborate on the criteria to define a genre and 
distinguish among the textual material object of this research.  
 
 
3.4. Step 2: How to Define a Genre 
 
 
For the purpose of this research, genres are classified on the basis of the authority and 
power of their authors. It follows that foreign policy texts drafted by state bodies belong 
to the main genres of official policy documents and are considered as primary sources, 
while media, journalism and academic writing are considered as non-official texts and 
thus, categorized as secondary sources. From a discursive perspective, the definition of 
the authority of a text, that of its author and, that of the discourse advanced in that text 
relies on knowledge.236 Given that knowledge is discursively constructed and subject to 
contestation, it needs ‘power’ in order to be dominant and have capability of 
mobilization within foreign policy debates. The degree of empowerment of genres’ 
authors determines the different authorities of the genres.237 For example, this means 
that DG Energy representatives are in general more empowered by their institutional 
position and responsibilities to constitute and shape knowledge, thus a policy document 
authored by them would carry a higher level of authority compared to journal articles.   
It is, therefore, the different authority of the genre that enables a distinction between 
primary (e.g. official documents) and secondary sources (e.g. non-official material). For 
the purpose of this research, official materials will be utilized mainly to investigate the 
contemporary energy paradigms of the EU and Russia (layer two) as well as in the 
analysis of the case studies presented in layer three. Conversely, for the historical 
chapter 3, the impossibility to study the position of the EU before its creation, makes it 
necessary to assume that Western Europe is the entity that, more than others, overlaps 
with and can historically be approximated to today’s EU. As a result of the impossibility 
to study the EU’s historical position through official texts, this thesis conceptualizes a 
discourse encounter between Western Europe and Russia. For this reasons, the mutual 
representation of the Western European interpretation of Russia will be derived from 
secondary sources.238  
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4. Mapping the EU-Russia Energy Debate: A Detailed 
Research Design 
 
 
Each debate presents a variety of discourses available. However, not all the discourses 
are on the same level. In this respect, as noted in Chapter 1, this research employs the 
‘layered structure’ elaborated by Ole Wæver that sets out the three levels on which 
various discourses are played out. Discourses are hierarchically linked to each other 
depending on their different level of depth. The metaphor of depth does not mean that 
deeper is truer.239 Rather, it confers a ‘taken for granted’ character and refers to the 
‘degree of sedimentation’: the deeper structures are more ‘segmented’ and more 
difficult to change, but change is always in principle possible since all layers are 
socially constructed.240  This structural approach has a number of advantages. Firstly, it 
organizes discourses within a specific debate. It can be contended that every text 
provides an exclusive construction of identity and policy, and thus, a separate 
discourse. Yet, political debates are linked through repeated issues, and the researcher 
should select a smaller number of basic discourses around which the debate revolves.241 
Secondly, by creating a link between the various levels of analysis, the layered 
structure of meaning contributes to the consistency of a given political project, from its 
historical inception to its practical actuation. A third advantage of the layered structure 
is that by exposing both dominant and competing positions, it is possible to give an 
indication of where the debate is and how it can evolve. In this respect, the layered 
discursive structure explains changes within continuity, which addresses one of the 
main limits of discourse theory: the fact that discourses seem to jump from one order to 
another with different discursive rules. The emphasis on change and history provides a 
more complete understanding to contextualize a debate.242  
 
In practical terms, the most basic layer of a discourse includes historical narratives and 
representations of Western Europe and Russia in their mutual relation. The second layer 
has the merit of specifying the paradigm in the specific policy field (e.g. energy). Layer 
                                                      
239 Wæver, in Hansen and Wæver, European Integration and National Identity, p. 31 
240 Hansen, in Hansen and Wæver, European Integration and National Identity, p. 5 
241 Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, p.38 
242 Wæver, in Hansen and Wæver, European Integration and National Identity, pp. 30-33 
  91 
three switches the focus from theoretical investigation to actual policy analysis. It 
illustrates how actors have practically used paradigms in a consistent way with the 
broader narrative/story.  
Wæver’s structure should be seen as a pyramid in which the three layers are in 
continuous interaction. The first layer provides the grounds on which certain 
discourses/paradigms in layer two become meaningful. Layers one and two form the 
discursive context through which the discursive practices of layer three (e.g. policy 
documents, speeches and symbolic actions) acquire meaning. As such, each of the three 
layers relies on the meaning, which emerged from the previous one and sets the 
boundaries of the political contest. From this standpoint, any debate depends on basic 
and wider conceptual logic (layers one and two), which are reproduced and eventually 
modified in discursive practices (layer three). Across the three layers, it will emerge 
how, by contesting the Other’s project, the Self constructs the Other and at the same 
time, reinforces its own project. In the section on research design (see below), this 
three-layered structure will be adapted to the case of EU-Russia energy relations.  
 
 
4.1 Layer One: Historical Encounter, Mutual Representations and the Project 
of ‘Europe’ held by Western Europe/EU and Russia (Chapter 3) 
 
 
Foreign policy debates are constituted through individual texts revolving around 
familiar themes, which, in turn, refer to a smaller number of discourses such as basic 
discourses. In the Wæverian layered structure of meaning, basic discourses represent 
the deepest level of ‘sedimentation’ (or meaning). They examine the historical relations 
between the Self and the Other; and the construction of the historical Other by stressing 
the degrees of difference. Methodologically, basic discourses are detected in the 
historical texts of an academic or intellectual debate. Yet, references to basic discourses 
do not occur systematically – especially if a long-lasting issue is examined – but are 
(re-) constructed.243  
In light of this research, layer one detects the mutual narratives and representations of 
Western Europe/EU and Russia throughout history. In turn, this layer also identifies 
how these actors have constructed their political identity as a result of these mutual 
representations. Such a discursive encounter will demonstrate what the concept of 
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‘Europe’ as a political space means to them. Practically, it leads to the following 
questions: how have Western Europe/EU and Russia represented themselves in relation 
to each other throughout history? And how have they built their respective identities on 
the basis of this mutual representation? What is their understanding of ‘Europe’ as a 
political project? To answer these questions, this layer includes the basic narratives, 
which are the most ‘sedimented’ and resilient to change.  The analysis identifies that, 
as a result of the encounter with Russia, Western Europe relies on the following basic 
narratives and representations for its self-representation: ‘Europeanization’, ‘Civilian 
Empire’ and ‘Concert of Europe’. As a result, Russia is constructed as a ‘learner’, 
‘threat’, or ‘equal partner’. 
On the Russian side, the encounter with Western Europe produces the following basic 
self-narratives: ‘Russia as Sovereign State’, ‘Russia as exceptional nation’, and ‘Russia 
as student of the West’. As a result, Western Europe is constructed as the ‘intrusive 
West’, the ‘equal partner’ or the ‘model’. These historical narratives and basic 
representations are read considering the ‘degree of Otherness’ they express. The textual 
material used for identifying the historical discourse consists mainly of secondary 
sources. For this purpose, works such as ‘Russia and the Idea of Europe’244, and ‘Uses 
of the Other’245, by Iver B. Neumann are examples of secondary sources analyzing how 
Western European discourses across history contributed to the construction of the 
Western European Self and the Russian Other. Once basic narratives and 
representations are identified, it is possible to climb down to the lower layers and 
integrate them within the context of a more specific energy paradigm.  
 
4.2 Layer Two: the paradigm of the EU and Russia on energy governance 
(Chapter 4) 
 
 
The findings emerging from layer one serve as a basis to build layer two on EU’s and 
Russia’s energy paradigms. In particular, layer two explores how historical narratives 
and representations found in layer one are reflected in the energy paradigms of both the 
EU and Russia. As such, in structuring this layer, the following questions will be 
addressed: How are the historical and mutual narratives of Western Europe and Russia 
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(layer one) reproduced in the energy paradigms of the EU and Russia in relation to each 
other (layer two)? 
In addition, this layer identifies two competing energy paradigms –‘Market and 
Institutions’ (MI) and ‘Regions and Empire’ (RE) – which refer to two different visions 
of energy governance employed by the EU and Russia internally and in their mutual 
energy relations. A further question is: How did the EU and Russia discursively 
construct their energy paradigms around the MI and RE?  In order to do so, the chapter 
provides examples demonstrating how the EU and Russia have (discursively) utilized 
these energy paradigms and what is the underpinning historical narrative and 
representation. In other words, the aim of the chapter is to demonstrate how the use of 
one paradigm or another is consistent with (or is justified in a way that looks consistent 
with) the historical narratives and representations identified in layer one. As with the 
construction of layer one, for the construction of layer two, it will be necessary to 
embark on a historical evolution of how these energy paradigms have come about. 
However, the time span analyzed in respect of the construction of layer two is shorter 
compared to the construction of layer one.  Indicatively, the temporal trajectory of layer 
two is mainly limited to the energy debate in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
This exercise will help map and contextualize the meaning of EU-Russia energy 
relations by taking into account basic narratives and representations (layer one) and 
energy paradigms adopted by the EU and Russia (layer two). The interaction between 
layers one and two is grasped through a top-down and a bottom–up perspective. In 
particular, as for a top-down perspective, the analysis at narrative level (layer one) helps 
us to understand how the broader historical encounter and mutual representations 
influences the energy governance adopted by the EU and Russia in their mutual energy 
relations (layer two). In addition, a bottom-up perspective suggests that through their 
mutual energy relations (layer two), the EU and Russia contribute to constructing and 
reinforcing their historical identities (layer one). Layer two emerges from a mix of 
primary and secondary sources. This includes official texts of the EC, official speeches 
of Russian and EC officials, media and Western academic debates.  
 
 
  94 
4.3 Layer Three: The Discursive Practices of the EU and Russia: The Cases of 
Nabucco-South Stream Pipeline Politics and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 
(Chapters 5 and 6) 
 
 
Layer three switches the analytical strategy from general discursive structure resulting 
from layers one and two, to the concrete performance of such a structure in the context 
of the energy relations between the EU and Russia. As such, while layers one and two 
are discursively constructed, layer three focuses more on the study of concrete policies 
and, in doing so, it adds specificity to the discursive structure which emerged from 
layers one and two.  Layer three also elucidates the reasons why actors adopt certain 
energy policies rather than others. In fact, it will be demonstrated that an actor pursues a 
specific energy paradigm and its deriving policies (layers two and three) only when it 
recognizes a link with the historical narratives in which it represents itself (layer one).   
In order to empirically support the layered structure of meaning, layer three proposes 
two case studies in two separate chapters: the pipeline politics on the South Stream vs 
Nabucco, and the EU-Russia ED.  
The reason why these two cases have been selected is because the literature commonly 
explains them by assuming ‘confrontation’ and ‘cooperation’ as the dominant 
discourses respectively.246 While these readings may be accurate, this thesis rejects the 
fact that the above-mentioned discourses are given; the aim, in fact, is to deconstruct 
these assumed discourses and explore how they become constructed as dominant / 
hegemonic to describe the two cases. That is, how dominant discourses triumphed 
against antagonism from competing discourses. By doing so, it will be demonstrated 
that  ‘confrontation’ and ‘cooperation’ are not always valid and fixed lens of analysis 
for these two case studies, rather they alternate. From this perspective, the assumed 
discourses might also turn out to be misleading and possibilities are open for alternative 
explanations.  
In practical terms, layer three focuses extensively on concrete policies, officials’ 
speeches and other documents from which it is possible to derive the nature of EU-
Russia energy relations. Consequently, in order to build this layer, mainly primary 
sources will be examined.   
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To sum up, the aim of this thesis is to offer a discursive structure to contextualize the 
ongoing energy debate between the EU and Russia. In particular, by drawing from the 
layered structure elaborated by Ole Wæver, this research proposes to build a three-
layered structure to analyze how those relations are impregnated with questions of 
identity. In line with the overall aim of the thesis, the case studies aim to provide an 
innovative reading of two of the most keenly debated issues that is detached from a 
mere rationalist analysis and from the existing discourse-based approaches. The 
proposed reading of the two case studies focuses on uncovering the discursive structure 
underlying EU-Russia relations through a comprehensive methodology that studies 
discourses as made up of three ‘degrees of sedimentation’.  
 
The next chapter constructs layer one and explores the historic narratives and 
representations in West-Russia relations. In other words, it examines the various 
representations and narratives through which the West/Western Europe and Russia 
established their identities and represented themselves in relation to the Other 
throughout the centuries.  
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 Chapter 3 - Historic Narratives and Representations in West-
Russia Relations 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter is centered on layer one that explores the historic narratives and 
representations in relations between Western Europe and Russia. This layer attempts to 
investigate the historic position of Western Europe / EU in Russia’s identity debate on 
the one side, and the representations of Russia in the various phases of Western 
European / EU history on the other. In other words, the aim is to examine the narratives 
and representations existing respectively in Russia in relation to Western Europe / EU 
and those existing in Western Europe / EU in relation to Russia.  
In order to avoid confusion, the differences among the concepts of ‘West’, ‘Western Europe 
/ EU’ and ‘Europe’ will be better investigated through the examination of the existing 
narratives in Russia. As a general rule, this thesis refers to the ‘West’ in the sense of 
Western civilization as a whole. In Russian political discourse, the terms ‘Western Europe’ 
and the ‘EU’ are seen as expressions of Western civilization. Therefore, these distinctions 
will be used unless a clear difference is noted throughout the historical period considered.  
Perceived as constitutive Others of Russia, the West, Western Europe and the EU 
undoubtedly represent a key component of Russia’s identity formation. Conversely, the 
Russian vision of ‘Europe’ is more complex.  The geographical and cultural ambiguity of 
Russia vis a vis Europe, generates a situation is which the concept of Europe alone is not a 
sufficient element that impacts on Russia’s identity.247 As a result of this ambiguity, 
Russians generally perceived themselves as being both outside and inside Europe. Given 
such a liminal position, ‘Europe’ represents an empty-signifier, imbued with political 
meaning and, in constant flux.248 For example, when Russians consider ‘Europe’ as the 
embodiment of the West and Western civilization, the feeling of belonging to it is 
questioned.249   
 
Another key issue to clarify regards the extent to which historical Western Europe and 
Russian empire (including USSR) can be assumed to represent the EU and the Russian 
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Federation.  In fact, a critique could be moved that Western Europe and imperial Russia do 
not exactly represent their contemporary entities. For example, imperial Russia has 
historically been the expression of a much broader political entity than the contemporary 
Russian Federation. This critique is particularly evident in relation to Eastern European 
countries, which, in different phases of history, have politically been associated with 
Russian empire and USSR, as well as Western Europe and the EU. In particular, some of 
the Eastern European countries – now officially member states of the EU – have been 
historically described as ‘Eastern Europe’ with closer political ties with Russia, especially 
during the Soviet experience. Thus, they represented historical Other of Western Europe 
and part of the Russian Self. Their accession to the EU in 2004 has overturned such a 
scheme.  
 
Although this can be seen as a limitation, the ‘politics of becoming’ could help to fill such a 
gap. As noted, critical constructivism holds that both Self and Other are complementary 
entities. To understand the Self, it is necessary to study Other’s reaction to Self’s attempts to 
construct its collective identity.250 However, unlike the conventional constructivist vision – 
that portrays actors as having clearly defined statist borders and identities – a critical 
approach implies that these categories are in constant evolution and construction.  The 
‘politics of becoming’ is further justified through Foucault’s genealogical methods of 
analysis. As noted, in the previous chapter, genealogy regards the study of research objects 
(e.g. Western Europe and Russia) by examining the historical practices from which they 
were constructed.251 Following the Foucaultian approach, genealogy regards the history of 
how the Self became itself through its interaction with Other and it also implies that Self 
and Other evolve and their borders and relationship are subject to change. 
In this light, the EU’s 2004 enlargement could be interpreted as an expansion of the borders 
of historical Western Europe, a consequent contraction of imperial Russia, and ultimately a 
notable redefinition of the their identities.  
Generally speaking, since the end of the Cold War debates about ‘true’ Europeanness, have 
been associated with membership of the EU. This implied that the EU, originally set up as a 
Western organisation, increasingly described itself as the embodiement of Europe.  The EU 
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proved to have no fixed boundaries and EU’s enlargements imply a formal ratification of 
EU’s Treaties through which new member states commit to introduce the body of EU laws 
at national level. Besides the formal recognition as Western European through the EU 
membership, Eastern European countries have also solved the dilemma between ‘true 
Europe’ and ‘Europe but not quite Europe’ and, thus acquired subjectivity as Western 
European.252  
Through the concept of the temporal dimension, Diez notes that the EU has projected itself 
in the Eastern European new members, which now represent a small-scale version of the 
West European Self.253 In other words, as in a father/son relationship, Eastern European 
members should be seen as the early stage of the evolution of the Western European self.  
From a Western European perspective, while new Eastern European members of the EU are 
seen as that part of ‘East’ that has returned on the right path after a confused past, Russia – 
also seen as the image of Western European past – still represents that part of the ‘East’ that 
keeps deviating from the ‘right’ path.   
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into two sections. The first maps the Russian debate on the 
role of the West / Western Europe in Russian identity politics and its resulting impact on the 
vision of ‘Europe’. Three narrative fields can be detected: exceptionalism (‘Russia as 
exceptional Great Power’), westernism (‘Russia as learner of the West) and pragmatic 
statism (‘Russia as Sovereign State’). As a result, Western Europe is constructed as the 
‘intrusive West’, the ‘equal partner’ or the ‘model’.  Similarly, the second section 
illustrates the narratives through which Western Europeans have represented themselves in 
relation to Russia. Western Europe / EU relies on the following basic narratives for its 
self-representation: ‘Europeanization’, ‘Civilian Empire’ and ‘Concert of Europe’. As a 
result, Russia is constructed as a ‘learner’, ‘threat’, ’equal partner’ or even ‘land of the 
future’.  
 
In general, each of these narratives detected embed a specific view on ‘Europe’ as a 
political project. More specifically, these views are ascribable to the divide between false / 
true ‘Europe’. This is the master narrative used to understand the concepts of ‘Europe’ in 
Russia and Western Europe. From a Russian perspective, 'false Europe' includes 
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countries with anti-Russian sentiments and those that have lost an understanding and 
commitment to 'genuine European values'. Conversely, 'true Europe' is composed by 
those nations friendly to Russia, that comply with what Russia considers to be 'the 
original spirit of Europe', and thus that have some degree of cultural affinity to 
Russia.254  A similar true / false divide can also be hypothesized in the Western 
European view of ‘Europe’. 'False Europe' includes countries, which reject liberal and 
democratic principles or that are ruled by an autocratic political regime. In contrast, 
European states that have adopted Western European principles – or that have shown 
political  will to do so - are considered as part of the 'true Europe'.255  
Such a divide has provided the basis for both Western Europe and Russia to define 
themselves as the 'defender of European values', to judge the 'Europeaness' of the 
Other, and ultimately to define their belonging to ‘Europe’. In other words, on the one 
side, this divide enables the Self to construct its 'true' European identity through Othering 
the Europeaness of the 'false' Other.  On the other side, the Other holds a constitutive role 
for the Self's identitification as European.  
 
The conclusion underlines how these narratives and representations are not completely 
separate but rather often present similarities. In addition, they advance various descriptions 
of the Other that are historically available (e.g. ‘threat’, ‘learner’, ‘norm-maker’ / ‘norm-
taker’, ‘developed’ / ‘underdeveloped’, ‘equal’). These possible options of Otherness help 
measure the ‘degree of Otherness’ and explain the actors’ position of conflict or 
cooperation.  
 
 
2 The Nineteenth Century Debate on Russia’s Identity   
 
 
This section illustrates the representations of ‘Western Europe’ and the ‘West’ in Russian 
internal debate over its identity. As noted in the introduction, before starting the analysis, it 
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is important to elaborate more on the distinction often made in Russian internal debate 
between the terms ‘West’ and ‘Europe’. In Russian political thought, the ‘West’ is viewed 
as an ‘alien’ political entity and embodiment of a distinct civilization. From this perspective, 
Russia tends to understand Western Europe as the part of the European continent adhering 
to the principles promoted by the West. It follows that the EU is the political project of 
Western Europe based on Western principles. 
Conversely,  ‘Europe’ is not seen necessarily as an expression of an antagonistic entity as is 
the case for the term ‘West’ which, historically represents a rival force.  Russia might 
belong to ‘Europe’ while her belonging to the ‘West’ has been much more contested. 
When, in the nineteenth century Russian thinkers initiated a debate on the relationship 
between Russia and the ‘West’, the concept of ‘Europe’ alone was not solid enough to 
represent a constructive Other for Russian identity. In fact, culturally and geographically 
Russia was understood as being both outside and inside ‘Europe’, and therefore the latter 
did not represent a completely separated entity.256 Examples of Russia’s liminal position in 
‘Europe’ can be easily provided.  Although being part of Christendom, Russia was an 
Orthodox country rather than Roman Catholic. Russian language belongs to the Indo-
European tradition that draws from both European and Asiatic linguistic lines. Moreover, 
geographically Russia spans two continents, Europe and Asia. On one side, the containment 
of barbarians and the consequent feeling of superiority over those backward groups 
threatening her borders engendered a clear-cut sense of belonging to Europe and an 
understanding of Russia as ‘Europe’s defender’.  On the other side, the expansion of 
Russia’s sphere of influence eastward, the myth of the ‘wild men of the Caucasus’ created 
by Russian intelligentsia, and the presence of a massive agrarian population challenged the 
sense of commonality with most ‘civilised’ European nations.257   Overall, historically 
Russia has had ambivalent relations with Europe. As Baranovsky put it: 
 
For Russia Europe was always both charming and frightening, appealing and 
repulsive…Russia was anxious to absorb Europe’s vitality – and to ward off its 
contaminating effects; to become a fully-fledged member of the European family 
of nations and to remain removed from it.258  
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Heller argues that the concept of the ‘West’ as a distinct category emerged as a solution to 
this ambiguity. During the modernisation process that occurred in the nineteenth century, 
the distinction between ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ became clearer. The most developed part 
of Europe started to describe itself as being both ‘Western’ and more civilized. This new 
description indicated a need for a distinction between the civilized part of Europe (Western 
Europe) and the Other part of Europe – defined as ‘Eastern’ –which included Russia.259  
 
The notion of the ‘West’ – understood as a social and political category – appeared in 
Russia after the failed coup of the Decembrists260 in 1825 and it was the object of the 
intellectual debate of the 1840s among Russian intellectuals who discussed the relationship 
of Russia with the ‘West’.  
This debate saw Russian intellectuals divided into two groups:  those who wanted 
Russia to follow the West and to borrow its values and those who believed that Russia 
had to defend its ‘distinctive path of development’. These tendencies were intertwined 
in Russia’s search for identity.261  
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Peter Chaadaev, an intellectual who had 
played an active role during the Napoleonic wars, wrote a letter referring to ‘Europe’ as 
‘Western’. He used the term ‘West’ to refer to ‘Europe’ as a separate and superior 
civilization. Having identified the ‘West’ as the embodiment of ‘Europe’, he 
specifically placed Russian civilization as subject to comparison, thereby seeking to 
demonstrate its backwardness. As an extreme Westerniser, Chaadaev even came to 
affirm that Russia had not contributed to the development of European culture.262  
This letter is important because it represents the starting point of a dispute that opposed 
Slavophiles and Westernisers.  The dispute initiated by Chaadaev concerned whether 
Russia’s identity derives from an independent process of development or whether it was 
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the result of the influence of the ‘West’. Chaadaev claimed that world history consisted 
of the gradual inclusion of peoples into the civilization initiated by the Roman Catholic 
Church (i.e. West European civilization), and that Russia had no role in this process.263 
Based on the claims of Chaadaev’s letter, two schools of thought – the Slavophiles and 
the Westernizers – commenced a long series of polemical disputes over the character of 
Russian history contributing, at the same time, to shaping the concept of the ‘West’ as a 
social and political ‘signifier’.264 
Westernisers positively assessed the impact of Western European civilization as well as 
Peter the Great’s reforms (1672- 1725) to westernise Russia. For them the ‘West’ was 
used as a benchmark to measure the political, legal, economic, social, and religious 
backwardness of Russia that remained characterised by feudalism and an autocratic 
monarchy, while many Western European regimes – influenced by the Enlightenment – had 
overthrown absolutist monarchism.265 As such, Russian Westernisers perceived a need for a 
strategy through which Russia could begin a process of cooperation with the West and 
undertake the path of modernization by absorbing Western ideas in the conviction that 
Russia’s future depended upon the adoption of universal Western standards and ideas. 
Unlike Chaadaev, the Westernizers did not criticise the entire Russian spirit, but rather 
rejected oppressive and exploitative Russian practices, which they classified as 
‘Eastern’, ‘Oriental’ or ‘Tartar’. For example, Vissarion Belinsky, a Russian writer and 
literary critic of Westernising tendency, did not aim to reject Russian culture, but rather 
pushed for Russians to evolve in a ‘European spirit’.266 Within the Westernizing 
tradition, Herzen contributed to the creation of a sub-narrative that identified the 
American-West – and not the European-West – as the promoter of progress. In fact, he 
thought the concept of ‘Europe’ was a disappointment as its proposals to disseminate 
democracy triggered instead aggressive nationalism rather than freedom. America 
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instead could, in his view, better contribute to the advancement of humanity.267         
 
As a response to Chaadaev’s provocation and to the claims of Westernizers, 
Slavophile thinkers developed an alternative narrative with principles emphasizing 
things such as the autonomy of the Eastern Orthodox Church (rather than the state), 
the importance of rural community, opposition to the savage individualism of 
Western liberalism and the importance of the concept of ‘sobornost’ (Spiritual 
community). The Slavophiles believed that Russia had to return to its original culture 
(before Peter the Great ‘opened a window to Western Europe’268). This implies that 
Slavophiles believed in the superiority of Russian civilization over the West, which, 
as a consequence, was seen in confrontational terms.269 For Slavophiles the history of 
Russia undertook a very different path compared to the Roman empire. Kireevsky, a 
Slavophile thinker, considered that contemporary Western civilization deviated from 
the established path of history and acquired tendencies that resulted in the realization 
of a society founded upon the institution of private property and radical 
individualism, and in which individuals’ lives are joined only through a ‘social 
contract.’270 Conversely, these features were not rooted in Russian culture.  Thus, 
Kireevski used the terms ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ as synonyms and in opposition to 
Russia and the ‘East’.271  
 
Despite evidence of competing ideologies, the differences between Westernisers and 
Slavophiles were not always clear-cut. Although they use two different entities as 
their terms of reference – the notion of the ‘West’ on one side, and the East / 
Orthodoxy on the other side – a number of themes such as uniqueness / 
exceptionalism, universal goodness, superiority, and a sense of messianism constitute 
common features of both narratives. For instance, Slavophiles believed that Russian 
civilization was unique and superior to the Western culture because it was based on 
the Orthodox Church, and on the superior character of Russian social structure  (e.g. 
peasant communities governed by popular assembly). Drawing from Slavophilism, 
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Tolstoy also argued that Russia should take an ‘exceptional’ path based upon the 
independent peasant community. The mission of Russian civilization was that of 
rescuing the world from its current decline caused by the West. Similarly, by 
indicating the Western path as the model to follow for modernization and by denying 
Russia’s unique character, Westernisers implicitly claimed the superiority and the 
universal goodness of Western civilization and ideas. Moreover, similarly to 
Slavophilism, writers coming from a Western-oriented perspective, such as Belinsky 
specifically believed that Russia had a ‘special mission’.272 Finally, as Berdyaev, 
reports, both doctrines included visionary aspects and set their purposes in opposition 
to the insufferable regime of tsar Nicholas II.273  
 
With time, Slavophilism and Westernism began to disintegrate and evolve into revised 
ideologies. Internal divisions between those favoring conservative reforms and those 
advocating a nationalistic / Panslavist approach caused the fall of Slavophilism in the 
19th century. The strong support for the latter was driven by Russia's defeat in the 
Crimean War (1854–56). As for Westernisers, some remained moderate liberals, while 
others embraced a nihilist position, a radicalized version of Westernism (see below).274  
Despite some differences, Panslavism represents a development of Slavophilism. 
Intellectually, it drew on the romantic ideas of early Slavophiles, such as Alexei 
Khomyakov and  Ivan Aksakov.275 Specifically, Panslavism called for the unity and 
‘brotherhood of Slavic peoples’276 and not only by that of Russian Slavs as initially claimed 
by Slavophilism.   
Also, Panslavism took from Slavophilism the idea that Russian civilization was 
superior to that of its Western European competitors. Moreover, the Panslavist vision 
of the ideal government echoed the Slavophile notion of an idealized peasant 
community with freedom allowed in the local sphere but with the central government 
devoid of people’s representatives in the domain of high politics. Further, although 
expressed differently, both narratives focused on the role of the state. Unlike 
Slavophilism, which conceived of the state as an indispensable entity to be tolerated, 
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Panslavists saw the state as a necessary tool for national development and for the 
constitution of the Panslavic empire. A centralized and autocratic Russian state had to 
restore unity within the dispersed slavdom and oppose all forms of Western 
particularism.277  
Regarding the link between imperial ambitions and the ethnic theme, if Slavophiles 
were mainly concerned to define Russia’s authentic culture, Nicholas Danilevsky, a 
conservative nationalist considered the most influential Panslavist thinker, promoted 
Panslavism as a project to unite all Slavic people under Russian leadership against the 
imperialist Great Powers.278 Such a vision demonstrates how relevant the imperialist 
and nationalist theme was for Panslavism.279  
In addition, by stressing that Europeans fuelled mistrust and suspicion towards Russia’s 
imperialist ambitions in geopolitical affairs, Danilevsky also traced a distinction 
between the European – meant as Western – and Russian civilization. Europe and 
Russia were separate and competing civilizations.280 He rejected the idea of a single 
master narrative of world history. Rather, all civilisations were distinctive individual 
organisms with their own peculiar values. As such, the West did not discover any 
universal truths. The principles informing Western civilization were not universal. 
Russia could not subscribe to the false ideology of Westernism and become – along 
with other Slavic populations – an imitation of the West. Rather, Danilevsky described 
Russia as the latest and most vigorous among other civilizations, and, thus, destined to 
surpass all the others. In his version of Panslavism, Danilevsky believed that a clash 
between Europe and Russia was inevitable. From the conflict, the peaceful and stable 
Slavic civilisation was destined to take over as leader of the nations and spread  peace 
in the world.281  
In this version of Panslavism a number of themes can be gleaned:  messianism, the 
superiority of Russia and Slavic civilization, Russia’s imperial ambition, mistrust 
towards the imperial ambitions of Western Europe, rejection of Western principles, and 
an emphasis on the clash of civilizations.  
Dostoevsky built on this nationalist element elaborated by Panslavists. He argued that 
the Russian nation was superior to all others and endowed with the vital mission to 
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carry out what he referred to as the ‘universal pan-human unification’. This messianic 
sense of the destiny of the Russian people (so-called Russian Idea) to rescue humanity 
and bring it into a universal harmony combined elements of the Slavophile narrative with 
elements of Christian-Orthodox messianism, and Third Romeism.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, the Westernising narrative also evolved into more 
extreme positions. As a result, a new group of thinkers, known as the nihilists or ‘men of 
the sixties’ emerged in the 1860s. This generation of Westernisers backed an extreme 
version of ‘westernization’ as the only source of historical meaning in the 
contemporary world. Furthermore, scientific rationalism and materialism were the 
supreme principles to pursue in order to organize all aspects of social life.282 This 
narrative excluded Russia completely, and called for the destruction of the existing 
Russian order in favour of a new world order.283 In framing their thought on Russian 
history, nihilists advanced three connected ideas:  the destruction of the old Russia, Russia 
as the natural location for a landmark revolution, and the consequent creation of a new kind 
of humanity and  society emerging from that Russian revolution.284 These ideas became 
rapidly popular among Russian intellectuals. As Berdyaev reports, the communist 
generation of the Russian revolution drew from the nihilist focus on natural sciences 
and political economy285, which can be seen as the primary source of Bolshevism.286 In 
fact, the nihilist and anarchic belief in the destruction of Russian autocracy as the 
solution to establish the new Russia, influenced Lenin’s version of socialism. 
Particularly, Lenin’s revolutionary ideals took inspiration from the principles outlined 
in the ‘Chatechism of the Revolutionary’, a manifesto authored by Sergey Nechayev, a 
Russian revolutionary associated with the nihilist movement.287 However, nihilism 
gradually became a loosely organized revolutionary movement that rejected the 
authority of the state, church, and family. Generally, it was too disorganized and fanatic 
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to persist as a movement and never had enough momentum, or the right conditions to 
become a structured philosophy. As such, it gradually evolved into political terror 
engendering a philosophy of violence. As a result, it can be considered as an 
approximation to a body of ideas rather than a proper narrative.288 For these reasons, it 
became a marginal narrative.  
 
In 1920-21 a group of Russian émigré intellectuals289 contributed to the debate on 
Russia’s identity, arguing that the century-long dispute between Slavophiles and 
Westernizes was misconceived. They developed a Eurasian ideology with roots harking 
back to Slavophilism. According to Delanty, Eurasianism attempted to overcome the 
split in the Russian intelligentsia between pro-reform Westernizers and pro-tsarist 
Slavophiles. Russia should not imitate European liberalism and democracy, or reject it 
altogether. Rather, Russia’s unique role was to find a ‘third way’ between the Asian and 
European culture.290 Borrowing from Slavophilism, classical Eurasianism held that 
Russia was neither European nor Asiatic, but rather an independent historical civilization 
with a number of ethnic roots, including the Mongols who contributed  to the 
development of the Russian state.291 With reference to the ‘West’, Eurasianism drew  
from the nationalist tradition to define it as Russia-Eurasia’s greatest threat and 
challenge.292 The idea of a continued contrast with the ‘West’ and the perception of it as 
being the cause of all the negative historical events in Russia traced back to 
Danilevsky’s Panslavism which, as noted, foresaw an opposition between Western 
European civilization and Russia-Eurasia.293 Also consistent with Slavophiles and 
Panslavism was that Eurasianism categorically rejected the Petrine project to westernise 
Russia.  This was considered as a process aiming to undermine the ethno-cultural 
uniqueness of Eurasianism and impose the hegemony of the Western model, practices 
and codes. If Slavophilism and Panslavism combined a negative description of the 
‘West’ with the ethnic ambition of uniting all Slavic peoples, the concept of ‘anti-
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Westernism’ is much more emphasized in classical Eurasianism and presented in 
antithetical terms. In fact, Eurasianist thought is mainly based on the criterion of 
difference from and opposition to all that is an expression of Western culture. Unlike 
Slavophilism and Panslavism, Eurasianists abandoned the idea and strategy of Slavic 
unity.294 More specifically, the Eurasianists considered Eurasia to be a unique 
civilization, a continent in itself which occupies the center of  the ‘World Island’ that 
the British geopolitician Halford John Mackinder called the ‘Heartland’. Thanks to its 
geographical distinctiveness combined with its particular material and spiritual 
resources, Russia could emerge as the embodiment of the Eurasian independent entity. 
All these elements contributed to the development of classical Eurasianism as an  
‘isolationist’ standpoint, especially when compared to its contemporary version (neo-
Eurasianism) which can instead be categorized as ‘expansionist’ (see below).295 As it 
will be noted, this is an element that differentiates classical from post-Soviet neo-
Eurasianism. 
In general, it can be said that Eurasianism belongs to the Slavophile and Panslav 
tradition as it encompasses the themes of exceptionalism, uniqueness as well as 
opposition to the West. It also shares with Westernism and Slavophilism the features of 
civilizational superiority and the messianic mission. However, the vision of the West as 
a rival and threatening force is much more consolidated. 
 
The Eurasian discourse re-emerged in a slightly revised form in reaction to the 
disappointing pro-Western orientation in Russia in the immediate years following the 
end of the Cold War. Neo-Eurasianism took the anti-Western orientation to the extreme. 
Aleksandr Dugin, leader of the International Eurasian Movement (a non-governmental 
organization), contributed to the essence of neo-Eurasianism as anti-Americanism. 
Dugin can be considered as a promoter of ultranationalist ideas as well as an ‘integral 
traditionalist’. In 2000 he created the International Eurasian Movement attracting a 
number of highly-ranked officials.296 Dugin believes that the mission to lead the world 
belonged to Russia-Eurasia rather than to the US. In his Eurasian New World Order, 
Dugin identifies four macro-regions (‘geoeconomic belts’): Euro-Africa, Asia-Pacific, 
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America, and Eurasia. Importantly, relationships among the four zones should, for him, 
be based on the principles of equality and mutual recognition. Through an alliance of 
three of the macro-regions, Dugin intends to establish multi-polarity as the dominant 
mode of geopolitical power at the global level and, consequently, secure the elimination 
of the threat of American global hegemony.   
Importantly, for the purpose of this thesis, it is worth noting that ‘Western Europe’ loses 
its traditional identity as the Other. The word ‘Western’ refers to the nations 
geographically located in the Western part of the European continent and it has no 
political meaning. In Dugin’s scheme, Western European states (in a geographical 
sense) are potential allies for cooperation given their vulnerability – like all other parts 
of the world – to US hegemony. Therefore, given that ‘Europe’ has natural ‘geopolitical 
affinities’ with Russia-Eurasia, cooperation is not ruled out. This is Dugin’s idea behind 
the so-called Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis.297 In short, although clearly anti-Western, neo-
Eurasianism contemplated the possibility of cooperating with other states in the 
European continent, in contrast to the West. This idea of siding with geographical 
Western Europe reveals a strategy aiming to exacerbate divisions between the Europe-
West and the US-West. This, in turn, refers to the specific theme of ‘splitting the West’. 
Besides evoking the nationalist principle of classical Eurasianism, neo-Eurasianism also 
shares with Panslavism the theme of imperial ambitions as it believes in the creation of 
a global Eurasian empire. However, imperial ambitions go much beyond those of 
classical Eurasianism and Panslavism. Neo-Eurasianists aim to establish a universal 
empire that includes cooperation with ‘greater’ Eurasia including post-Soviet Russia, 
continental Islamic states, China, India, Eastern Europe and almost any non-Western 
country fighting against American hegemony. In particular while classical Eurasianism 
refers mainly to Western Europe as a point of ‘otherness’, Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism 
offers a much broader understanding of the West, which refers to the entire Western 
universe. For Dugin, any country or region of the world that opposes American 
hegemonic designs and civilization, is potentially a part of Eurasia.298  
 
Overall, the parallel between classical Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism is an example 
of how themes belonging to the narrative debates of the 19th century – such as the 
uniqueness of civilization(s), the pursuit of national development distinct from the 
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West, statism and, cooperation – have re-appeared in twentieth century debates. Next 
section aims to further explore this parallel and to analyse how the debate on Russian’s 
identity developed in the 20th century. 
 
 
3 The Renewed Debate on Russia’s Identity: From the Soviet 
Union to Post-Soviet Russia 
 
 
As said, in the post-Soviet period, the debate over Russia’s self-identity and on the role 
of the ‘West’ seems to have the fundamental nature of historical repetitiveness as they 
revolved around the dichotomy between the basic narratives of westernism and 
exceptionalism. In particular, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western liberal 
democracy represented an attractive alternative for the formation of the new Russian 
state for many Russians. Conversely, advocates of Russian exceptionalism believed that 
the new Russian state had to be rebuilt on the basis of three notions:  autocracy 
(samoderzhabie), the people (narodnost), and the Orthodox church (pravoslavie). 
Recalling the disputes between Westernisers and Slavophiles in the 19th century, the 
discursive tension in the post-Soviet period broadened into a controversy between 
Atlanticism (West-oriented) and nationalist-oriented narratives.299  
In the first instance, from a Western perspective the reforms of ‘glasnost’ and 
‘perestroika’ contributed to depict Mikhail Gorbachev as a pragmatic and less 
ideological leader.300 In particular, ‘perestroika’ referred to the restructuring of the 
Soviet political and economic system. As a fundamental component of ‘perestroika’, 
‘glasnost’ called for parties and government to act more openly and, it could also be 
interpreted an attempt to increase the overall level of democracy by promoting the 
freedom of information and speech.301 Yet, it is important to note that Gorbachev 
intended to regenerate rather than dismiss Soviet socialism, while preserving the 
Leninist outlook of his reforms. He rejected the way his predecessors had interpreted 
Leninism and called for reading Lenin ‘in a new way’.302  However, he also downplayed 
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some Leninist beliefs  – such as the class struggle – while emphasising  other principles 
such as the right of every country to determine its own international orientation and 
domestic political system. Thus, Gorbachev’s approach presented an inner tension 
between the attraction to the Western European version of social democracy and the 
need to conform with traditional USSR’s Leninism.303 The way he resolved this tension 
was through a selective reading of Leninism and by presenting his own ideas as being 
bequeathed from the ‘real’ Leninist orthodoxy.  
He also dismissed the project of a European / global communist empire and promoted a 
Russian foreign policy based on the principles of cooperation with, and integration into, 
the ‘West’. However, unlike new westernizers such as Yeltsin and Kozyrev who called 
for a complete integration with the West, Gorbachev’s idea of integration did not imply 
a loss of identity of Russia. Rather, Russia had to be recognized as a country with 
distinct principles and willing to join forces with the West to contribute to world 
development.304 As McFaul put it, Gorbachev’s idea was that ‘the East might meet the 
West in some transformational blending of socialism and capitalism’.305 In other words, 
Gorbachev changed some of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy narrative 
supported during the Soviet period from conflict to cooperation and solidarity with the 
‘West.’306  As a result, in the Washington summit in June 1990, Gorbachev defined the 
US-USSR relationship as almost a ‘partnership’.307 
As for ‘Europe’, Gorbachev not only wanted to position Russia within a shared 
European discourse, he also opted for a proactive approach on the broader European 
scene as the launch of the ‘Common European Home Initiative’ demonstrates. 
According to Neumann, rather than delineating a distinction between the ‘true’ and the 
‘false’ ‘Europe’, the concept of the Common European Home sought to recognize the 
fundamental civilizing unity of the European continent while preserving space for 
Russia to play a pivotal role.308 As such, the idea behind the Common European Home 
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– similarly to the policy of perestroika – was that of a gradual convergence and 
peaceful-coexistence between Western Europe and the USSR, which – despite basic 
differences – belong to the same continent and have contributed equally to its historical 
development. 309  
As Gorbachev precisely stated:  
 
‘Some in the West are trying to ‘exclude’ the Soviet Union from Europe. Now 
and then, as if inadvertently, they equate 'Europe' with 'Western Europe'. Such 
ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities. Russia's 
trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have 
deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by 
Christianity [...] The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European 
history’.310 
 
However, the Western bloc did not support Gorbachev’s politics of cooperation and 
integration. While the West proclaimed the successful end of the Cold War, Russians 
were more concerned about the worsening of their living standards and weakening of 
the Russian state. Internally, Gorbachev was victim of the polarization between statists, 
neo-imperialists and new liberal Westernizers and lost his initial support. Despite he 
did not intend to replace Russian socialist identity with a pro-Western liberalism, 
Gorbachev contributed to the rise of a new group of Westernizers.311 
President Yeltsin and his foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, tried to seize the 
Westernizing momentum in the new Russia Federation.  
 
The foreign policy conducted by Kozyrev favoured a cooperation with the ‘West’ in the 
conviction that a partnership was the only way to guarantee Russia’s future greatness 
                                                      
309 N., Malcom, The Soviet Concept of a Common European House, in J., Iivonem, eds., The Changing 
Soviet Union in the new Europe, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991, p.66 
See also I., B., Neumann, The Geopolitics of Delineating ‘Russia’ and ‘Europe’: The creation of the 
Other in European and Russian Tradition, in O., Tunander, P., Baev, and K., Einagel, V. I., eds., 
Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity, Oslo: SAGE, International Peace 
Research Institute, 1997,  p.150 
310 M., Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, New York: Harper and 
Row, 1987, p.190, quoted by Neumann, 1999, Uses of the Other. “The East” in European Identity 
Formation, p.163 
311 Tsygankov, Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Change and 
Continuity in National Identity, p.17 
  114 
and boost Russia’s economy.312 Interestingly, hinting at themes of multipolarity and 
equality, Kozyrev wrote that with the end of the USSR “the way was clear for Russia to 
claim its status of being a ‘normal country’ and to become a reliable partner in the 
community of civilized states”.313 
The new pro-Western leadership believed that, faced with a strong Russia’s 
commitment in favour of liberal reformism, the West would have provided the country 
with the necessary support to overcome the political and economic difficulties. But, 
these reforms were perceived as policies ‘dictated’ by the West and turned out to be 
irrelevant as the entire Russia economy was in free-fall.314  
Furthermore, once again the West inscribed the new Russia in the scheme of  ‘learner’ 
of Europe. For example, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund sent top 
Western advisers such as Jeffery Sachs and Anders Aslund to tell Yeltsin how to set up 
a market economy.315 In addition, Western governments announced plans to expand 
NATO to Central European countries once part of the Warsaw pact. 
Overall, the West failed to grant Russia a full inclusion in the Western coalition 
contributing to fuel the feeling of alienation and humiliation among Russians. 
In addition, the awareness of the declining capacity of the state made the Westernist 
opposition more powerful and offered it an opportunity to challenge the ruling elite.316 
As a result, a Realist doctrine of pragmatic statists – unhappy with the principles 
guiding the ‘perestroika’ – emerged in the 1993 parliamentary election and 
progressively increased their support.317  
The loss of internal appeal of the Westernist line and the simultaneous emergence of 
the statist movement led the new Westernist leadership to shape their initial political 
course in a way that was compatible with the growing statist thinking.  
For example, Russia’s relations with the West, were now framed more in terms of  
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‘shared interests’ than of cultural values and affinities.318 
The new Russia started to turn from a general pro-Western stance to a revisionist and a 
more nationalist attitude based on a commitment to political realism.319  
By the second half of 1993, Kozyrev intended to discard the initial narrative of ‘radical 
superdemocratism’ for a post-perestroika discourse of foreign policy that mainly 
focused on the ‘national interests of Russia’, its status of being a nuclear superpower, 
and its ‘regional responsibilities.’  
References to Russia’s ‘national interests’ also replaced references to Russia’s ‘calling’ 
and ‘mission.’320  The fact that economic progress and domestic stabilization were 
prioritized over security issues in Russia’s national security priorities was a 
revolutionary shift. As a consequence, the messianic element (e.g. ‘Third Rome’, 
‘world socialism’) – which was the long-standing principle of foreign policy-makers – 
became marginal and a process of ‘secularization’ and ‘liberation’ from the ‘special 
spiritual mission’ was fostered in Russian foreign policy. The country’s ‘vital 
interests’, it was declared, were domestic: ‘securing state and territory integrity’, 
‘maintaining stability and strengthening constitutional order’, and ‘securing a stable 
progress in the economy and respectable standard of living for the people’. 
Importantly, after centuries, the concept of the Russian state was progressively 
‘decoupled’ from that of the Russian empire.321 
  
A consequence of the detachment from the initial pro-Western stance was the assertive 
and threatening foreign policy in CIS countries, which was openly criticized by the 
Western world and ultimately at odds with the alleged adherence to Western principles 
of respect for international organisations. In a way that resembled a shortened version of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine (e.g. Moscow’s right to intervene in the former Communist 
world),  at the UN General Assembly Kozyrev declared that: ‘Russia realizes that no 
international organization or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this 
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specific post-Soviet space.’322 As such he defended the use of force against armed 
extremists in Chechnya.  
 
Overall, it can be argued that, in the post-Gorbachev period, there was a need for a 
definition of new narrative that would combine inclination to cooperate with the ‘West’ 
(westernism) and the ambition to promote national interests.323  A combination of these 
two became more balanced when Primakov replaced Kozyrev as foreign minister, paving 
the way to the realist doctrine of pragmatic statism. This doctrine shared a number of 
features with (neo)-Eurasianism, such as the idea of a multipolar world order based on 
balancing powers and the strategy of pursuing regional alliances to counter-balance US 
hegemony. Along with these beliefs, pragmatic statism also includes elements of the 
Westernising narrative since cooperation and coexistence with the ‘West’ remained a 
significant opportunity for Russia’s economic development. The mix of pro-western 
liberalism and the patriotic-nationalism aspect of pragmatic statism engenders a view 
according to which Russia’s relations with the ‘West’ should follow the formula of 
integration and cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for mutual sovereignty and 
interests, and freedom to take decisions. In short, relations with the ‘West’ should occur 
through a civilised and privileged partnership between equals and not between leaders 
and followers.324 The balance between (neo)-Eurasianism and Westernism can be 
summarized by saying that contemporary Russia recognizes the values of western 
civilization (such as democracy, pluralism, capitalist market economy, and human 
rights) but at the same time, it feels entitled to define these values in her own terms. 
Importantly, it is relevant to note that the inclusion of such nationalist and pro-Western 
elements enables the doctrine of pragmatic statism to play out two separate discursive 
options. As such, when the pro-Western discourse is at work, pragmatic statism 
conceives of the ‘West’, not as posing a serious threat to Russia, but views it instead as 
a possible actor for co-operation. Western interests are seen as different from Russia’s 
but not antagonistic. In this circumstance, Russia is open to set relations with the ‘West’ 
on an equal basis. Conversely, if the nationalist card is played out, Russia perceives the 
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‘West’ as a threat to her interests and seeks cooperation with other states (e.g. Japan, 
South Korea, India, China) to restore the balance between ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘North’ 
and ‘South’.325  
Along with Eurasian and pro-Western themes, the doctrine of pragmatic statism also 
borrows from Panslavism the need for a strong central state. The state is seen as a tool 
to oppose all the external forces attempting to interfere in Russia’s domestic arena as 
they weaken state sovereignty and the interests of Russia. 
 
The Russian foreign policy founded on these realist principles has been strongly 
endorsed since 1996 by the then foreign minister Primakov through concepts of multi-
polar and multi-vector diplomacy and then by Putin (President of Russia from 2000 to 
2008, and again elected in 2012) through the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. At his 
first press conference, Primakov stated that Russian foreign policy would reflect the 
‘country’s status as a great power’, that the main objective of Russian foreign policy is 
to protect and promote Russia’s ‘interests’ through an ‘equal, mutually beneficial 
partnership’ with the ‘West’ while avoiding confrontation.326 Primakov welcomed a 
‘tendency’ toward a ‘multipolar world’ with a view to create an external environment 
enabling to economic growth.  
Yet, Primakov’s intention to achieve a greater ‘balance’ in Russian foreign policy is to 
be seen in association with the notion of leverage. Similarly to the ‘divide and rule’ 
strategy, such an association can be described as the ability of Russia to improve its 
relative position in the international arena by splitting rivals.327 
 
As an exponent of pragmatic statism, Putin formalized the slogan of ‘state patriotism’ and 
promoted the idea of the state as an ethnically neutral symbol of Russianness.328 Similarly 
to Primakov, Putin’s Russia has to ‘win its own place in the international system’ and 
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become an influential great power.329 Other priorities include boosting domestic 
reconstruction and the distinctiveness of Russia’s civilisation vis a vis the ‘West’. To 
achieve these goals, it is necessary to consolidate the Russian state, to gain influence 
over the ex-Soviet states and to exploit energy resources. As a result, geopolitics is a 
necessary tool. Evidence supporting the realist and geopolitical visions of Putin’s 
Russia can be provided. For example, as a reaction to the United States’ plans for a 
Ballistic Missile Defence shield – that included a partial extension to Europe - Putin 
stressed the unavoidability of an arms race and the possibility to re-target Russian 
missiles on Europe.330 
With regard to Russia’s ‘near abroad’, Russia’s military invasion of Georgia in 2008 
and Putin’s project to create a Eurasian Union with ex-Soviet states further illustrates 
the rise of Russia’s new imperialism and how Putin’s version of pragmatic statism 
incorporates the imperial destiny proper of the Eurasian tradition.331 In the case of the 
Georgian war, van Herpen argues that Russia acted as an imperialist great power by 
deliberately causing a regime change in Georgia. Similarly, the Eurasian Union 
represents an attempt to re-establish the lost empire and ground it on new basis.332  In 
particular, with the Eurasian Union, Putin challenges the US-West global hegemony by 
‘suggesting a model of a powerful supranational union that can become one of the poles 
of today's world while being an efficient connecting link between Europe and the 
dynamic Asia-Pacific Region’.333 As for representations of the West and the EU, 
although considering US-West and EU-West as different entities, a conviction remains 
that behind the Western European projects of regional cooperation is hidden the neo-
imperial plans of US-West to weaken the Russian state.334 In this respect, NATO 
enlargement ‘represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust’.335 
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However, while frictions exist in sensitive issues such as military interventions and 
human rights, EU-West is also seen as a crucial partner in fighting against terrorism and 
in economic relations.  
As Averre put it, Russia’s relations with European institutions – especially in the 
political-military field – fluctuates between the intention to develop strategic 
partnership and cooperative security on one side, and the objective to pursue an 
independent foreign and security policy on the other side.336 
In fact, the image of EU-West is further complicated because of Putin’s idea that 
Russian identity has a ‘European calling’. Here, Putin does not endorse the Slavophile / 
Eurasianist tradition that conceives of the existence of multiple competing civilizations. 
Conversely, he is closer to Gorbachev’s belief in the existence of an organic and unique 
(European) civilization to which Russia and EU-West belong but in which both actors 
can express their specificities and contending interpretations of political concepts. 
Therefore, Putin resists Western leaders’ intention to clearly delineate borders of inside 
/ outside on notions such as democracy and civilisation as well as their tendency to 
locate the ‘West’ as the guardian of universal civilisation entitled to interfere in others’ 
democratic development.337 
 
 
4 Overview 
 
 
As demonstrated, Russian thinkers and politicians have contributed to create a number 
of narratives on how Russia relates to the ‘West’ and Europe. This section recaps the 
narrative positions and explains what they mean in light of the discursive framework 
under construction. As noted, Russia’s encounter with ‘Western’ civilization (‘Western 
Europe’ and the EU) produced the following narratives: exceptionalism (‘Russia as 
exceptional Great Power’), westernism (‘Russia as learner of the West’), and pragmatic 
statism (’Russia as Sovereign State’).  
By referring to the themes of messianism and uniqueness, the exceptionalist narrative – 
in its different variants – represents Russia as a superior actor vis a vis Western Europe, 
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which is, in turn, represented as ‘inferior’, a ‘threat’, and ‘untrustworthy.’  In addition, 
Panslavism and neo-Eurasianism also add the theme of ‘imperial ambition’ of a Great 
Power Russia. In particular, Panslavists, emphasize the role of the state as a necessary 
tool for national development and for the constitution of the Panslavic empire. The 
state-centric theme reappears in the narrative of pragmatic statism.   
With reference to Europe, Slavophilism and Panslavism used the terms ‘West’ and 
‘Europe’ to refer to European culture, which is presented as both a separate entity from 
Russia and characterized by a divisive and conflictual nature.338 In addition, by stressing 
Russia’s unique character, Eurasianism believed that Russia is fundamentally distinct 
from both Europe and Asia. The neo-Eurasian project instead, foresees a mutually 
beneficial, peaceful and equal relationship with Europe, but only in anti-western 
perspective. 
 
Conversely, the Westernizing narrative insists on the need to follow Western 
civilization, its socio-political system and culture in order to overcome Russia’s socio-
economic backwardness.  
Overall, by recognizing the superiority of the Western model, the westernizing narrative 
attributes Russia a role of ‘follower’ vis a vis the West which, in turn, comes to be 
represented as a ‘leader’, ‘partner’ or ‘model’. In other words, the themes of superiority 
or inferiority – evident in exceptionalist narratives – merged into the idea of cooperation 
and emulation of the Western model through mutual partnerships and integration. 
Kozyrev’s version undermined Russian imperial ambition and provided the foundation 
for a new foreign policy to be based on Russia's national interests as a way to boost the 
economy. To achieve these, cooperation with the ‘West’ is again seen as necessary. The 
conception of Russia’s belonging to ‘Europe’ also changes since Russia’s belonging 
will occur only if the western model of development is adopted. In the Gorbachevian 
version, however, ‘Europe’ is a whole continent to which Russia belongs by virtue of 
her cultural ties and despite some differences.  
 
Primakov and Putin were described as the main interpreters of the narrative of 
pragmatic statism. Primakov promoted a pragmatic statism that focused on the 
following principles: the central role of the Russian state, the principle of equality and 
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reciprocity with the West, and respect for mutual sovereignty in a multipolar 
international arena.  Regarding the West, pragmatic statism combines elements of 
exceptionalism (especially eurasianism) and westernism. As such, depending on the 
circumstances, Western Europe/EU is either perceived as a cooperative partner or as a 
threat in which case Russia should seek cooperation with other states.  
Finally, Putin sees the US-West and EU-West as equal partners of Russia, although the 
former is thought of as standing behind the actions of the latter.  As for ‘Europe’, 
Russian identity has European traits. 
 
In particular,  the ‘coloured metaphors’ can help summarize how the main Russian 
narratives (exceptionalism, westernism and pragmatic statism) draw the border within 
‘Europe’ and consequently how the relationship with Western Europe is understood. 
Exceptionalism relies on the ‘red lines’ metaphor which refers to a configuration through 
which Russia draws a neat line in Europe, between Russian civilization and a Western 
Europe perceived as an  ‘alien’ entity. Pragmatic statism and to some extent neo-
Eurasianism elicit a ‘grey zone’ metaphor which refers to Europe as an ambiguous area 
between the white (e.g. Western European democracy) and the black (e.g. autocracy). 
Russia feels not entirely accepted or completely alien. Conversely, westernism sees 
‘Europe’ as a ‘white zone’. This metaphor reflects a logic of convergence and sameness 
between Russia and Western Europe that derives from a feeling of belonging to the 
European continent and culture. 339 
 
Having illustrated Russia’s narrative representations of itself in relation to the ‘West’ / 
Western Europe and ‘Europe’, the next section illustrates the narratives through which 
Western Europe / EU have represented itself in relation to Russia and ‘Europe’. 
 
 
5 West/Western Europe: The Representations of Russia as 
‘Learner’, ‘Threat’, or ‘Equal Power’? 
 
 
If the ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ have been the main Others in Russia’s identity formation, 
Russia can be considered as a crucial Other in the formation of the Western European 
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identity. As such, while the first section examined the internal debate within Russia, as 
to how it relates to the ‘West’ and ‘Europe’, similarly, this second section examines the 
narratives existing in Western Europe in relation to Russia. As for the concept of 
‘Europe’, it can be argued that Western Europe has mostly tended to identify itself as 
the embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe and, from this perspective it has judged Russia’s 
belonging to it.   
 
Generally speaking, in developing its relations with Russia,  Western Europe has  
positioned Russia as (i) a ‘learner’ who needs to be europeanized, (ii) a ‘threat’ aiming 
to subvert the political order of Western Europe, (iii) as a recognized ‘equal Great 
Power’, (iv) or as a ‘land of the future’. This section will explore each of these 
narratives and representations.  
Self-identified Westerners have certainly spent much effort outlining different visions 
of the concept of the ‘West’. Historically, the concept of the West has been constructed 
around mainly three narratives revolving around ideas of civilisation, modernity and 
ideology.340 Ifversen identifies current internal debates that frame the concept of the 
‘West’ by focussing on a transatlantic divide (US-EU), and intra-European divides (e.g. 
Atlantic Europe’ vs ‘European Europe’, ‘central and eastern Europe’ vs ‘western 
Europe’).341 However, rather than being only the result of an internal process of self-
identification, outsiders have also contributed to the definition of the concept of the 
‘West’. According to Heller, Russia can be considered as the first and most important 
Other of Europe, an expression of ‘Oriental despotism’ against which Europe started to 
identify itself as ‘Western’.342 
 
One of the most used Western European representations of Russia is that of a ‘learner’ 
with no or little constitutive voice in the discourse on Europe. As a result of this 
narrative representation, Western Europeans believed that Russia had to be engaged in 
processes of reacting and adapting to Western European practices rather than impacting 
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on the structures of social knowledge and power.343 This intersubjective process 
contributed to the creation of Western Europe as a superior identity vis a vis the Russian 
‘learner’.  Neumann’s regime types argument represents the basis of Western European 
constructions of Russia as a ‘learner’ and ultimately contributed to Russia’s 
construction as a ‘threat’. As Russia's ability to project itself as a credible player 
augmented from the 18th century onwards344, the Great Powers in Western Europe had to 
face Russian claims about her parity or superiority with them. Neumann   hypothesizes 
that the refusal of the Great Powers in Western Europe to accept the legitimacy of Russia’s 
autocratic and feudal structures of governance explains Russia's difficulty in gaining 
recognition as a Great Power. This represents the main discourse through which 
Western Europe has been able to claim its superiority throughout history and to hold the 
power to locate Russia in international affairs.345 
In light of this argument, Neumann rejects the realist assumptions according to which 
Great Power status depends on material factors (e.g. size of population and territory, 
resource endowment, economic potential, military strength, political stability and 
competence,346 and the ability to exert influence on a global or regional scale). Although 
in various phases of  her history Russia was recognized as a Great Power (such as 
during the 19th century concert of Europe and in the aftermath of the second world 
war), in other epochs (e.g. Muscovy, Holy Roman Empire, during and following Peter 
the Great's reign, and finally in the Soviet period) Russia had the material resources of a 
Great Power but Western Europeans refused  to recognize her as a member of the 
European concert and culture. In other epochs, Russia was recognized as a Great Power. 
As a result, reservations still remained in Western Europe about Russia’s belonging to 
Europe . As Napoleon famously said ‘scratch a Russian and find a Tartar’.347 One of the 
reasons for this continued understanding of Russia as ‘Other’ lies in the substantial 
difference in the regime established in Russia as opposed to that widespread in Western 
Europe. In other words, Western Europeans rejected Russia's Great Power status on the 
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basis of the ‘uncivilized’ and backward nature of her regime.348 As such, the recognition 
of Russia was associated with the risk of a potential threat and a move back to the 
political arrangement of Western Europe. By stressing such political differences, the 
process of differentiation and the building of the ‘otherness’ of Russia was 
strengthened. This, at the same time, reinforced and legitimated claims of the ‘West’s 
superiority. 
 
Since the time of Muscovy (ca. 1147-1613), because of the wide presence of violent 
barbaric groups, Russia was perceived as a minor presence in the Western European 
part of the continent. The existence of different ethnic groups, labelled as barbaric 
groups was associated with the image of a threatening entity at Europe’s gate, and an 
expression of an underdeveloped and inferior civilization because Western Europe had 
experienced barbarism only in ancient times. As such, Russians were negatively 
identified as ‘Scythians’, ‘Tartars’, ‘Kalmucks’, ‘Asiatic’ or ‘barbarous’.349  All in all, in 
this period, the Western European image of Russia as a ‘learner’ was intertwined with 
perceptions of Russia as a ‘threat’ due to the perceived presence of barbarians and the 
country’s religious difference.350 From a Western European perspective, the 
intersubjective encounter with Russia not only engendered the idea of a threatening 
Russia professing an ambiguous religion but it also contributed to mark the ‘us’- ‘them’ 
dichotomy and bolster a self-understanding of Western civilization as superior.     
 
When in the 16th century  the principle of cuius region eius religio351 emerged in 
Europe as the dominant criteria for having granted religious pluralism, relations with 
Russia were further complicated. Indeed, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty 
became the key concept for setting the criteria of legitimate actorness in Europe. This 
concept also set out the system of mutual recognition between national states and it 
symbolized the first norm on which constitutional arrangements had to be structured.352  
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However, while in Western Europe the construction of national states gathered 
momentum, at the same time,  Muscovy’s aristocracy was still engaged in the creation 
of a multinational empire. In this light, once it was clear that Muscovy had failed to 
subscribe to the Westphalian principles of governance, the Western European 
perceptions of Russia as a ‘threat’ or ‘follower’ on one side, and of itself as a ‘leader’ on 
the other side, became more significant. Once again, the self-identification of Western 
Europe as a ‘norm-maker’ in the political construction of ‘Europe’ resulted from the 
intersubjective relation with Russia as a constitutive outsider.   
The Enlightenment in Western Europe emphasised principles of governance and the 
centrality of ‘reason’ and ‘justice’ in all human activities. The emergence of liberal 
governance replaced the police state.353 In other words, a new paradigm for governing 
and defining a state became dominant. In order to emulate Western Europe, Russia was 
expected to become a constitutional monarchy and reject alternative paths of 
development different from the Western European course.354 Such an expectation 
further contributed to a representation of Western Europe as a ‘norm-maker’ and a more 
developed civilization. In addition, the fact that enlightenment principles were imbued 
with a significant liberal component, not only underlined even more the extent to which 
Russia was still far from adhering to such standards, but it also contributed to 
characterizing Russian practices as a menace to the social and human progress achieved 
in Western Europe. For example, in his ‘Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow’ 
(1790), Aleksandr Radishchev describes how Russia still censored and limited 
fundamental freedoms such as that of speech and the press.355 
With the Russian revolution (1917) and the birth of the Soviet Union in the 20th century, 
Lenin’s Bolshevik government decided to abandon the political Concert of Europe. This 
was a first endeavour to dislocate from a position of norm-taker / learner of Western 
Europe towards an emancipation of the USSR as an actor able to create a competing set 
of principles for the establishment of an international society opposed to the West-
inspired one.356 In reaction to the October revolution, Westerners contributed to fuelling 
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representations of Soviet Russia as a political and potentially military ‘threat’ that plots 
against the West (US-West and Western Europe). The fear was that the successful 
revolutionary experience in Russia could spread and influence developments in Western 
Europe. As a consequence, Western narratives regarding the USSR started to emphasise 
the perverse nature of the socialist regime to such an extent that a completely different 
discourse, separated from the learner one, was engendered. The Soviet Union continued 
to be represented as the incarnation of a ‘false’  Europe  but its destabilising and hostile 
aspects became dominant in the Western imaginary of it. For example, in his 
publication ‘A Short View of Russia’, the popular economist John Maynard Keynes 
reiterated the aggressive nature of the Russian Revolution as he explained the Russian 
‘mood of oppression’ as ‘In part...fruit of Red Revolution. In part, perhaps, it is the fruit 
of some beastliness in the Russian nature’.357 
 
In the Second World War, the USSR moved from the status of Nazi allied to the one of 
Nazi enemy. Before the breakout of the war, USSR’s foreign Ministry, Vyacheslav 
Molotov, participated in a triple alliance negotiations with Britain, France and Nazi 
Germany. In the negotiations with the Western powers, Molotov was accused of both 
delaying the talks on purpose by dwelling on irrelevant details and of abruptly 
terminating them in favour of an alliance with Germany, which seemed about to achieve 
a military success over France and Britain. Indeed, on 23 August 1939, Germany and 
the USSR signed a pact of non-aggression (so-called Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact) which 
established a neutral position by either party towards the other, in case of a military 
attack by a third party against one of them. Such a Soviet unclear position to carry out 
open negotiations with France and Britain for a pact of mutual assistance on one side, 
while secretly agreeing on a non-aggression pact with the Nazi against the Western 
powers triggered in the Western bloc the negative representation of the USSR as an 
unreliable actor playing a double game.358     
 
During the Cold War, the Soviet military interventions in 1956 (Hungary), and 1968 
(Czechoslovakia) confirmed the rhetoric of the ‘barbarousness’ of the Soviet regime 
and reinforced the image of the Soviet Union as a military threat. Each intervention was 
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described in the Western sphere not only as a reactionary action in a particular Soviet 
satellite but also as examples of imperial ambition and a Soviet plot against the Western 
bloc. In particular, the Soviet interventions were reported in the West as a Soviet 
attempt to delineate its power in Europe. This gave rise to the discourse of Central 
Europe as ‘un occidente kidnappé’. Each intervention was considered as an attack not 
only on the particular Soviet satellite, but also on ‘free’ and ‘true’ Europe.359 As a 
result, in the Western bloc there re-emerged the theme of  the ‘Asiatic barbarian’ 
associated with the USSR, seen as a political power exploiting  the privileged position 
offered by the Second World War to encroach on Europe through a military threat. This 
recalled the old Western European image of the ‘barbarian at Europe’s gate’ that was a 
pervasive construction of the USSR in the Western bloc during the Cold War.360 
As such,  the Western representation of Russia/USSR was gradually reshaped: the image of 
‘threat’ prevailed over the description of ‘learner’.  The Soviet military interventions in the 
satellite states could only confirm this change of representations. The image of ‘threat’ was 
supported by a discourse in which the USSR stood outside the ‘true’ Europe, revealing the 
fluctuant and instrumentalized understanding of the geographical Europe. Particularly, in 
the Western imaginary, the Soviet political and economic model was saddled with the same 
image that belonged to the Nazi enemy and was then labelled as ‘totalitarian’. Moreover, in 
the attempt to decrease the attractiveness of the USSR as a political alternative, the 
distinction between democratic and totalitarian substituted the previous main dichotomies 
of civilized / barbarian and European / Asian. Also, other dichotomies – free/unfree, 
market/plan, West/East, defensive/offensive – contributed to the perception of the USSR  as 
the Other.361 At the same time, this social representation of the USSR as Other served to 
consolidate the political identity of the West (US and Western Europe) as a superior 
civilization.  
 
This first part has illustrated how the initial Western idea of Russia was that of a learner in a 
constant catching up process to reach Western standards. Russia was perceived as a 
backward country in a continued transition towards modernization. Subsequently, the 
defeat of the long-standing tsarist regime, the success of the October Revolution through the 
establishment of a  new soviet regime, the military interventions  in Hungary and 
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Czechoslovakia, all contributed to form the separated narrative representation of 
Russia/USSR as a ‘threat’ to  Western Europe. Those political struggles correspond to the 
affirmation of a national identity and to some extent, to the building of the Western 
European Self. Thus the instrumentalization and the definition of Self and ‘otherness’ varies 
according to their dichotomous and differentiating representations. The idea of Russia as a 
constantly learning country was gradually complemented and replaced by the image of an 
entity that is potentially threatening and unstable because of her backward status. 
However, Russia has not always been constructed as the ‘learner’/’norm-taker’ or ‘threat’ 
to Western Europe incapable of developing competing norms.362 As opposed to these 
representations, the review of the Western representations of Russia presents a competing 
narrative field, which illustrates a Western image of Russia as a recognized equal Great 
Power, rising power or ‘land of the future’.  
This alternative and more positive representation mainly originated in the seventeenth 
century with Peter the Great. Following a regime-type argument, Peter’s ambition to 
establish Western standards and the institutional compatibility between Russian 
autocracy and Western European monarchism enhanced the Western perception of 
Russia as a credible player in European politics.363 As a result, a benevolent image led to 
Western Europe’s toleration of Russia’s expansion toward the south. Similarly, as a 
result of the Northern War  (1700-1721), Sweden had lost her supremacy as the leading 
power in the Baltic region and was replaced by Peter the Great’s  Russia. The 
ascendancy of Russia  in ‘the North’ of Europe – around the Baltic Sea –  was not 
directly characterized as a military threat to Western Europe. Russian geopolitical 
ambitions were not seen with the same anxiety as it was in other periods. Rather, 
through the military victory in the Great Northern War, Russia was viewed as having 
the basis for a role in the Western European diplomacy. As such, at the end of the 
Northern War, Russia became a central player in international society and joined 
France, the Habsburg Empire, and Britain as the dominant powers in Europe. Through 
the favourable position of the ‘new’ European giant, the differences related to the 
‘ambiguous’ nature of Russian Christianity were played down.364 Overall, Peter’s 
efforts to Europeanize Russia towards a Western type of governance and society 
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contributed to the perception of Russia as belonging to the European continent and 
diplomacy.  
Enlightenment principles such as the faith in human reason and the belief that all people 
can be emancipated, led many to consider Russia as having great potential to comply 
with standards of civilization despite her backwardness. In this respect, Malia argues 
that by mid 18th century Russia was considered to have acquired civilization and, thus, 
to have reached a status of equal partner in the ‘European family of states’.365 Russian 
rulers and elites, for example, started to be educated according European principles.366 
In the nineteenth century the representation of Russia as equal counterparts reached its 
apogee. The Vienna Congress in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars left Russia as the 
leading power on the continent. Indeed, Russia was the enforcer and exclusive guardian 
of the political system in Europe – at least until the Crimean War 1854-1856 – as well 
as a supporter of monarchy as a central constitutive principle of sovereignty in 
Europe.367  As an equal Great Power, Russia was entitled to have spheres of influence as 
well as the responsibility to ensure the working of the international system.368 As such, 
Russia was accepted as a legitimate player and acted as a ‘norm-maker’ in the Concert 
of Europe.369  Gibbon also argued that Russia managed to eliminate her barbarous 
nature and joined the ‘polished nations’.370 Moreover, a strategic narrative that 
represented Russia as an actor in the European Concert and potentially an ally against 
the Turk started to emerge.371 As a result, Russia was included in the concert of Europe 
of the 19th century. 
 
Later on in the 19th century, the reaction to the values imposed by the Enlightenment led 
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conservatives in Western Europe to adopt an optimistic vision of Russian people 
described as possessors of a natural wisdom and missing that mere rationality which the 
Enlightenment imposed as a European and global model. In their political discourses, 
conservatives such as Joseph de Maistre372, throughout Western Europe depicted Russia 
as a power, which may help Europe to find its own identity – such as the ancien régime, 
a monarchic and aristocratic political system - and, thus, tended to positively assess 
Russian geo-political objectives.373 
 
Acts of acceptance of Russia’s equality by Western Europeans also occurred at various 
times in the twentieth century, which was a controversial period for the Western 
representation of the Russia-Soviet counterpart. In fact, when in 1917 the 
revolutionaries overthrew the tsarist authority, Bolsheviks initially intended to rule the 
USSR with the firm intention to reject Western European standards and set an 
alternative model outside the Western-led concert. However, already at the end of 1920, 
the Soviets realized that the world revolution could not occur only by relying on the 
proletariat. In order to have a role in international society, some cooperation and 
engagement with the West was deemed as indispensable. This created a paradoxical 
situation for the Soviets that had to re-integrate into the international / Western system 
and, at the same time support anti-Western revolutionary ambitions, refuse the Western 
model and plot for its final collapse.374 
For a number of vested interests, the Western powers accommodated the request of 
recognition of the Soviets. Towards the end of the First World War the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk in 1918 established German recognition of the Soviet government. Similarly, in 
1922 the Treaty of Rapallo formalised Soviet-German military cooperation, further 
contributing to the representation of the USSR as an equal partner.375 In subsequent 
years important recognitions came from France, Britain and the US. In this respect, 
faced with the Nazi threat in Europe, the US first recognized the USSR in 1933 and then 
welcomed it to the US-sponsored League of Nations. This paved the way for the 
institutional access of the USSR, not only in the European political community, but also 
in a kind of international framework, which aimed to establish relations among parties 
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in cooperative terms.376 For example, the League of Nations' high commissioner for 
refugees, Fridtjof Nansen wrote that ‘Russia will one day not only deliver Europe 
materially, but also furnish its spiritual renewal’.377 Similarly, Neumann reports the 
existence of a marginal anthroposofist discourse promoting the idea that ‘below the 
surface of the Soviet state there remained a spiritual Russia’378 with  ambitions to enrich 
humanity Here, the themes of ‘Russia as the land of the future’ with a ‘great potential’ 
as well as the anthroposophist narrative of Russia with a ‘natural wisdom’ is at play.  
Similarly, Western European intellectuals appreciated the creation of the Soviet system 
as a turning point towards the universal process of modernization. In particular, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein often expressed his intention to move to the Soviet Union, which he 
thought was a harsh but just system.379 He also welcomed the idea of a classless society 
and proclaimed that the USSR was a valid alternative to capitalism.380 Before his 
disappointing visit, Andre Gide considered the USSR as an ‘an unprecedented 
experiment’ capable of ‘sweeping along the whole humanity’. His appreciation towards 
the USSR was so high that he declared: ‘if my life were necessary to assure the success 
of the Soviet Union I would gladly give it immediately’.381 In his work ‘Le Couteau 
entre les dents’ in 1921, Henri Barbusse defined the birth of Soviet Russia as the 
‘greatest and most beautiful phenomenon in world history. This fact brings humanity to 
a new phase in its development’.382 
Neumann notes that during the inter-war period an interesting construction of Russia 
was also put forward by Carl Schmitt. Although not strictly positive in its tone, Schmitt 
argued that ’We in Mitteleuropa live sous l’oeil des Russes’ (under Russia’s eye), and 
that Russia was ’a state which is more, and more intensely, statist [staatlich] than any 
state ruled by an absolute monarch’. However, Schmitt also added  that Russia could be 
considered as Europe’s radical brother, who interpreted the European nineteenth century 
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his own way.383  Importantly, along with the idea that Russia’s present should be 
Europe’s future, Schmitt’s representation of Russia emphasised the state as a central 
element in Russian culture.  
 
With the advent of the Cold War, despite the revival of negative images of the USSR as 
the new opponent undermining world stability, the contribution of the USSR to the 
defeat of the common Nazi enemy could not be overlooked. Along with the US, the 
USSR was then recognized as the Great Power responsible for the future post-war 
settlement and as such participating as a necessary player in the exclusive conferences 
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. This brought the US to identify the USSR as the pivotal 
interlocutor that had to be addressed to set the constitutive principle of sovereignty 
globally. In other words, as perceived by the Western side, the USSR acquired again the 
role of  norm-maker of the post-war order.384 
 
Other favourable descriptions persisted even during the Cold War as a notable defection 
to the dominant vision of the USSR as the Western enemy. In fact, the alternative 
interpretation in Western Europe was that of a USSR representing not only the ‘liberator 
of Europe from Nazism’, but also a model for Western Europe to follow, a politico-
economic model more advanced than capitalism. Although this was an ideal celebration 
not based on its actual performance, the Soviet model was viewed as endowed with an 
evolutionary potential on Europe.385 In 1954, following a visit to the Soviet Union, the 
French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre declared that ‘there is a total freedom of criticism 
in the USSR’.386 In opposition to the construction of the USSR as a threat and 
undemocratic, Sartre not only depicted the USSR as a harmless entity but also as a 
model for Western Europe: ‘I have looked, but I just cannot find any evidence of an 
aggressive impulse on the part of the Russians in the last three decades’. ’[The Soviet 
citizen] criticizes [the régime] more frequently and more effectively than us’387 Other 
writers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Bertolt Brecht supported Stalin and the 
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Soviet Union showing faith in the construction of socialism.388 Similarly, in his 
‘Humanism and Terror’ in 1946, Maurice Merleau-Ponty  defended the Soviet 
Communism.389   
On the political level, the treaty signed in August 1970 between the USSR and West 
German governments that sanctioned the exclusion of the use of force as an option to 
settle disputes as well as the agreement on a mutual diplomatic recognition between the 
West and East Germany signed in 1973390 contributed to further decrease political 
tensions and further confirmed Western recognition of the Soviet experiment. 
 
Generally, it can be said that one of the differences between these various narrative 
representations (‘equal power’ ‘learner’, ‘threat’, ‘land of the future’ ) is the extent to 
which Russia is either viewed as a ‘normal’ Great Power (i.e. status quo oriented and 
accepting of the overall system) or alternatively as a revolutionary power seeking 
radical systemic change.  
The post-Cold War period re-proposes such a dichotomy especially in the Western 
European interpretations of Russia, which is either seen as a partner or as a revisionist 
or aggressive state.   
 
 
6 Western Representations of New Russia in the Post-Cold 
War Period 
 
 
Mutual representations between the West and Russia have fluctuated since the end of 
the Cold War. 
As explained in the section on Russia’s identity, in the last phase of the Cold War the 
Soviet initiative to end the Cold War was made through the request to ‘join Europe’ in 
the slogan of the Common European Home. However, different were the Western 
European interpretations of this landmark Soviet transformation. These varied from 
suspicion on the necessity of this Soviet move, to claims that the USSR was ‘in Europe 
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but not of Europe’, to wariness that the Soviet strategy was to decouple Western Europe 
from the US.391 Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons in the world 
epitomized inconsistency in the views of Western European leaders who reacted with a 
certain degree of caution and skepticism but they also expressed interest and hopes in 
the Soviet leader. Dutch Foreign Ministry spokesman Gonker Roelants said:  
 
‘We welcome his plan and we'll study it within the alliance, but it can be 
evaluated only after details are presented in a more definite form by the Soviets 
in Geneva…Gorbachev wants to convince us he's a peacemaker, always at the 
forefront with new proposals, but I think we're sophisticated enough to see 
behind his smile’. 392  
 
A British Foreign Office official said ‘It (the proposal) contains some quite attractive 
new ideas with some tricky conditions’.393 Stephane Chmelewsky, a spokesman on 
Soviet affairs in the French Ministry of External Relations said ‘We aren't impressed. It 
is much more a propaganda exercise’.394  
Despite these varieties of reactions, internal development in Russia resulting from the 
Gorbachevian pro-Western narrative seemed to be welcomed in the West. Western 
powers quickly recognized and expressed their support to the new Russia and to its 
presidents (Gorbachev-Yeltsin). As a consequence, the new Russia was enabled to 
occupy all the positions of the former USSR in international organizations and in all the 
treaties. Western media even regarded Gorbachev as a hero of the twentieth century, 
who contributed to the end of  the Cold War.395 In particular, some of the largest 
counties in Western Europe (e.g. UK) reacted positively to Gorbachev’s main reforms 
and innovations in Soviet foreign policy. In a letter to Mitterand on her return from a 
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meeting with Gorbachev, Prime Minister Thatcher commented that ‘it is in our interest 
to favourably welcome his [Gorbachev’s] effort and to encourage him in the direction in 
which he has engaged himself’. As soon as it became clear that Gorbachev was in 
favour of a European dimension of the USSR and urged cooperation between the two 
‘Europes’ (Russia and Western Europe), Thatcher unconditionally supported perestroika 
and the disarmament talks between the US and the USSR.396 
As a result of the pro-Western stance, the new Russian Federation become the first 
Russian state based on liberal democratic norms. In particular, together with the new 
states of the former USSR, the Russian Federation pledged to implement the principles 
agreed with the Western states at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1975.397 As a result, the ‘immutability of [Russia's] 
democratic foundations’ is asserted in the preamble to the Constitution which also states 
that Russia's sovereignty and the Russian Federation are characterized as a ‘democratic 
federative rule-of-law state with a republican form of government’.398 Subsequent 
articles endorse a free market economy and associate democracy with the protection of 
the rights of the individual.399 It is worth noting here that similarly to what occurred at 
the time of the pro-Western orientation of Peter the Great, these favourable 
developments in Russia enhanced the Western representation of the new Russia.  
Similarly to the early 1990s, in the aftermath of  9/11, the relationship between the 
‘West’ and Russia was enhanced with claims about shared interests, identities and a 
definite end of the Cold War legacies. In particular the EU and Russia found common 
ground for cooperation in fighting threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts. As a Joint Statement issued in 2002 reports ‘We declare that we stay 
united in the fight against terrorism with due regard for the rule of law, for democratic 
principles, and for the territorial integrity of states’.400 
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However, the post-Cold War period was also characterized by signs of tension in many 
instances: Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2000401), Georgia (2008)402, issues related to 
energy403, human rights, and EU foreign policy towards the common ‘near abroad’.404 
In these cases, Russia’s brutal behavior not only fuelled talk about a ‘new cold war’405 
with the West, but it also impacted on the Western representation of Russia as a violent 
and rebellious country that still adheres to the traditional realist understanding of 
international politics as a zero-sum game among Great Powers and that resorts to 
military intervention to pursue interests in its own sphere of influence.  
In the second conflict in Chechnya, a number of Western European countries signed a 
Motion for a Resolution and offered it in the Council of Europe: 
 
‘The Assembly…is deeply concerned by Russia’s military action in 
Chechnya. It considers that, although the conflict between Chechnya and… 
Russian Federation is an internal matter, the means employed by these 
authorities violate Russia’s internal obligations, including the commitments 
entered into upon accession to the Council of Europe…The Assembly 
condemns the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by Russian 
military which has reportedly led to hundreds of civilian casualties in 
Chechnya.’406 
 
In the Georgian war in 2008, as a reaction to Russia’s continued violation of the 
ceasefire agreement, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, that held the EU 
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presidency, pushed the EU leaders to ‘seriously examine relations’ and deliver a ‘clear 
and united message’ to Moscow. He added that ‘Russia's attachment to a relationship of 
understanding and cooperation with the rest of Europe is in question’.407 Similarly, 
Gordon Brown, the then UK Prime Minister, said that ‘root and branch’ review of 
Europe's relations with Russia was needed. In particular, he proposed to ‘exclude Russia 
from the G8 and review Russia’s ties with NATO’. He also called for plans to achieve 
energy independence from Moscow.408 
In this respect, tensions over energy policy provide further evidence of the EU’s 
tendency to exclude the Russian threat from the ‘true’ Europe. For example, as a 
condition to start discussion on gas price, Russian Energy Minister, Alexander Novak, 
warned Moldova – which had asked Gazprom for a 30% decrease in gas prices – to 
‘renounce the protocol on entering the Europe Energy Community agreement’.409 As a 
reaction, Günther Oettinger, the European Commissioner for energy accused Russia of 
‘pure blackmail’, of playing a ‘divide-and-rule’ game, and labeled Russia’s behaviour 
towards Moldova as ‘unacceptable’. As such, MSs were asked to stand by Moldova in a 
confrontation with Russia over its energy supply and to adopt ‘a strong common 
approach’ to reject Russia's threats. This also fuelled the image of Russia as a 
mistrustful/untrustworthy actor:  ‘if you [Russia] work with these measures... then we 
can't trust you for your long term security of supply’.410  
 
Furthermore, in the post-Cold War phase, the West and in particular the EU have often 
criticised Russia for her negative record on basic rights of a democracy. This implied a 
depiction of the Russian regime as authoritarian and backward. In this respect, the 
European Parliament has questioned Russia's legal system in a resolution that criticizes 
the lack of freedom of expression and assembly in Russia. The resolution expresses 
concern about the ‘recent repressive laws and their arbitrary enforcement by the Russian 
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authorities.’ The resolution also stressed worries about the State Duma's  law banning 
‘homosexual propaganda.’411  
The political scenario in the common ‘near abroad’ is a further cause of tension since 
the EU and Russia implement neighborhood policies through which they are mutually 
‘othering’ each other.412 In view of the 2004 Eastern enlargement, the EU launched the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to support political stability and closer 
relationships with its new neighbors.413 A precursor of the ENP was published in March 
2003 under the title ‘Wider Europe Neighbourhood’. One of the aim of the 
neighborhood policy of the EU is to promote EU’s internal security through regulatory 
approximation towards the EU. Russia was also offered to become an ENP partner but 
refused to be treated as a ‘simple’ EU’s neighbor. Rather, Russia perceives itself as an 
equal partner to the EU and as the Eastern pole of attraction in the common European 
neighborhood.414 Similarly, the Eastern Partnership launched in 2009, intended to 
strengthen the relations between the EU and its eastern European partners such as 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Through the Partnership 
the EU intends to support its neighbours in their political, institutional and economic 
reforms based on Western standards of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, commitment to market economy, sustainable development 
and good governance.415 While through the ENP, the EU’s othering of Russia unfolds 
by denying it an inter-subjective interaction with the EU, the Eastern Partnership 
represent the EU’s strategy of ‘region-building’ where Russia is excluded from the 
construction of the region, and as a consequence, excluded from the political 
construction of Europe.  
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By the same token, Russia also aims to strengthen its control and achieve a political and 
security monopoly in those countries located in the ‘near-abroad’ – which Russia still 
consider as belonging to its sphere of influence in Europe – and, thus it rejects any role 
for Western institutions.416 For example, Russia stressed that the EU’s strategy of 
political convergence could trigger the creation of dividing lines in the ex-Soviet space. 
In this context, Deputy Foreign Minister Chizov highlighted the risk of a 
‘counterproductive’ intrusion in the ‘common abroad’.417  
 
Another source of concern in the EU came from Putin's recent plans for the formation of 
a Eurasian Economic Union418 and a Eurasian Union.419  EU leaders have depicted these 
as inappropriate and confrontational projects. For example, in replying to a 
parliamentary question on cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Union, 
Catherine Asthon, High Representative of the EU said: ‘Given the economic orientation 
of the Eurasian Economic Commission as well as the Eurasian Economic Union, it 
would not provide the appropriate framework or be the appropriate partner for bringing 
about political reforms in Belarus.’420 Moreover, by outlining the priorities of the EU in 
its neighborhood, Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan 
Füle, referred to the Eurasian Union as a ‘significant challenge.’421 Through these 
claims, the EU leaders have re-proposed the Cold War dichotomy between the true / 
legitimate Western experiment opposed to the false / illegitimate Soviet one.  
 
Overall, it can be said that in the post-Cold War phase, Western European 
representations of Russia have fluctuated. Russia was either represented as a new 
partner in international politics (e.g. fight against terrorism) imbued with renewed pro-
                                                      
416 Makarychev, Russia-EU:Competing Logics of Region Building, p.1  
417 D., Averre, Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?, European Security, Vol.14, 
No. 2,  June 2005, p. 179 
418 On 29 May 2014, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed an agreement establishing the Eurasian 
Economic Union which aims to create a territory for unified customs tariffs beginning on January 2015. 
419 In Putin’s vision the Eurasian Economic Union is the first step for the creation of a broader Eurasian 
Union,  a supra-national union of sovereign states seen as a political alternative to the EU.  
420 C., Asthon, Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the 
Commission, European Parliament, Question N. E-007665/2012, 16 October 2012.  Available from:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-007665&language=EN 
Accessed 05/08/2013 
421 Commissioner Štefan Füle,  European Neighbourhood Policy – Priorities and Directions for Change, 
Press Release SPEECH, 25 July 2013. Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
661_en.htm Accessed 02/08/2013 
  140 
Western spirit after decades of torpor, or as a rebel outsider of Europe that still resorts to 
military intervention and blackmail as foreign policy tools.     
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
As stated in previous chapters, the overall aim of this thesis is to build a discursive 
structure to explain EU-Russia energy relations. To this purpose, this chapter presented 
an historical overview of the narratives existing respectively in Russia in relation to the 
West and Europe, and the narratives existing in Western Europe/West in relation to 
Russia.  In methodological terms, this discussion contributed to establish the historical 
representations available to the Self to describe the Other (e.g; threat, intrusive, learner, 
norm-maker/norm-taker/ developed/underdeveloped, equal partner). This constructs the 
kinds of ‘otherness’ that can occur in a continuum that goes from a radical confrontation to 
cooperation (e.g. ‘degree of Otherness’). The detection of the mutual and historical 
narratives used by actors (Self / Other) in their mutual relations serves as a basis to analyse, 
in the following chapters, how elements of these narratives emerge in the energy policy 
paradigms in the EU and Russia (layer two). 
Starting from the 19th century debate, Russian thinkers have intensely debated the 
dilemma on where to locate the concept of the ‘West’ in Russia’s identity. As a result, 
the discursive representations of Russia’s identity came to pertain to the three broad 
narrative fields of exceptionalism, westernism and pragmatic statism, which alternated 
throughout history and, as demonstrated, expand in other sub-narratives. As a result, 
Western Europe is constructed as an intrusive and threatening entity, the ‘equal partner’ 
or the ‘model’.  
Similarly, the second section illustrated the narratives through which Western Europeans 
have represented Western Europe in relation to Russia. Western Europe/EU relies on the 
following basic narratives for its self-representation: ‘Europeanization’, ‘Civilian 
Empire’ and ‘Concert of Europe’. As a result, Russia is constructed as a ‘learner’, 
‘threat’, ’equal partner’ or as the ‘land or the future.’ 
For each of these narratives there is a corresponding view of ‘Europe’ that can be 
ascribable to the binary distinction between true/false Europe recurrent on both sides.  
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Importantly, broader narratives and sub-narratives should not be seen as separated. A 
number of common themes – superiority, sense of mission, cooperation – are reflected 
in both. As such, although claiming different paths of development, the narratives 
detected are intertwined and present common themes. First of all, in putting forward 
their arguments, these narratives have constantly reinforced claims to superiority. As 
such, in developing their conceptual apparatus, exceptionalist narratives have assigned – 
from time to time – superiority to the Russian, Slav and Eurasian civilization. Similarly, 
by indicating the Western path as the model to follow for modernization and by denying 
Russia’s unique character, Westernisers in Russia implicitly claimed the superiority of 
Western civilization. 
On the Western side, by describing Russia as a ‘learner’ and in a continued transition 
towards modernization, the West was automatically conceiving itself as a superior 
civilization. Secondly, stemming from the feeling of being a superior civilization, the 
exceptionalist narratives –  such as Slavophilism and Panslavism – supported the idea of 
embracing and absorbing other ethnic groups (e.g. Slavs) under a single umbrella. This 
seems to recall the constitutive element of Westernization / Europeanization ideology, 
which aims to interfere in and assimilate other civilizations and states by introducing 
Western standards. 
In addition, the key concept of cooperation is another recurring theme that can be found 
not only in Russian Westernism but also in the neo-Eurasian doctrine and in the West. 
In particular, although being an exceptionalist narrative, neo-Eurasianism comes to 
accept cooperation with those countries located in Western Europe on condition that 
they hold an anti-Western orientation. Similarly, in specific phases of history, the West 
has recognized Russia as an equal partner belonging to international society and with 
whom cooperation is possible.  
Furthermore, as debate evolved, the messianic principle proved to be a further common 
feature. Starting from Slavophilism, exceptionalist narratives came to believe that 
Russia had been assigned a holy mission to rescue the world from the collapse triggered 
by Western civilization. The aim was to replace the Western principles in what was 
depicted as an evangelic mission to transfer Russian culture to the declining West and 
globally. This objective recalls the sense of mission that Peter the Great and the early 
Westernisers had to westernize Russia through the introduction of Western principles. 
Likewise, the belief in the universal goodness of its standards and the need to spread 
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them has been often implemented as a leading narrative of the Western civilization (e.g. 
Westernisation).  As embodiment of the Western values, the EU’s foreign policy 
(especially with its neighbourhood in the context of the ENP) has also claimed to pursue 
a mission to spread its own standards throughout the world.  
Drawing from this last point, Westernisation/Europeanisation on one side and 
exceptionalism on the other side have one thing in common: they are two different 
reactions to two competing strategies of dealing with globalisation. On one side, 
through the ‘bureaucratic imperialism’ grounded in traditional readings of 
‘Westernness’ as synonym of goodness, the EU aims to project its internal order. On the 
other side, through the promotion of the ‘sovereign democracy’ and a strategy of 
bureaucratic centralization, Russia aims to protect internal order.422 Recent examples 
pertaining to EU-Russia relations can elucidate this idea. Faced with the EU’s intention 
to interfere in its affairs, Putin’s Russia restricted Western dialogue with civil society in 
Russia, as seen in the NGO law as well as in the restriction for Western companies to 
access key oil and gas reserves such as Shtokman and Sakhalin-2. On the contrary, 
through Europeanisation, the EU wants to minimise the ambiguity of its external 
environment (e.g. Ukraine, Russia, energy security) by extending its own acquis. This 
kind of ‘bureaucratic imperialism’ is manifest in policies such as the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCA), the Common Strategy on Russia, the Energy Charter, 
the Road Map for the EU-Russian Common Spaces and the ENP (which Russia did not 
sign).423 
 
The next chapter will narrow down the focus to EU-Russia energy relations. In 
particular, the aim will be to map the energy paradigms of the EU and Russia and on 
this basis, to demonstrate how elements and themes of the narratives detected in this 
chapter (layer one) are reflected in the  EU’s and Russian energy paradigms.  
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Chapter 4 - Building Layer Two: Framing EU’s and Russian Energy 
Paradigms 
  144 
1 Introduction 
 
 
According to Ole Wæver, the understanding of a discursive structure relies on 
abstraction and ‘sedimentation’. As noted, ‘sedimentation’ indicates how deeply rooted 
a discursive structure is.424 In this context, abstract paradigms add specificity to the 
deepest level of ‘sedimentation’ (e.g. narratives), and thus, they further contribute to 
codify the discursive structure as a whole.  
With regard to terminology, it is here useful to recall that this thesis assumes discourses 
as ‘sedimented’ in three layers:  narrative/story, paradigm, and discursive practice. A 
narrative/story refers to a specific interpretation of an event that emerges from a specific 
ordering and selection of historical facts in a way that produces a unified meaning. A 
paradigm refers to a set of ideas and norms that define a way of viewing a specific 
policy field (e.g. energy). The term discursive practice indicates the actual expression of 
a thought (in written or spoken form) or a symbolic action.  
Based on this distinction, this research proposes to build a three-layered structure with a 
view to identifying the discursive framework of EU-Russia energy relations. The 
previous chapter (layer one) investigated the mutual narrative/story through which the 
West / Western Europe and Russia have represented themselves. From such an 
investigation, a variety of narratives have emerged. On one side, the West / Western 
Europe narrated Russia as a ‘learner’, a ‘threat’, an ‘equal great power’ with the 
potential of being a ‘land of the future’. On the other side, Russia represented the 
Western civilization either as model or as hindrance to its unique civilization. Each of 
these representations has implications for Russia’s and Western Europe’s political 
project of ‘Europe’.  
This chapter scales down the layered structure to investigate the second level of 
‘sedimentation’ (or layer two) which focuses on the policy field.  Given that the policy 
field of this thesis is energy, layer two constructs energy paradigms of the EU and 
Russia. In particular, the construction of layer two involves two main aims: (i) 
investigate how the EU and Russia have constituted their energy paradigms, (ii) to 
analyze the extent to which the historical narratives and representations of layer one are 
reflected in the mutual energy relations between the EU and Russia. Layer three (next 
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chapters) will examine how the discursive structure made up of layer one (historical 
representations of the Other) and layer two (energy paradigms) is played out in the 
debates over the Nabucco / South Stream pipeline competition and in the EU-Russia 
ED.  
Ultimately, this research aims to demonstrate that confrontation and cooperation in the 
energy relations between the EU and Russia can be better understood by looking at the 
relationship as a Self / Other discursive interaction and, thus, through the concept of 
‘otherness’. 
 
In order to build layer two, this chapter constructs two competing energy security 
paradigms – Market and Institutions (MI) and Regions and Empire (RE) and shows how 
they have been constructed and how they are used at different times by the EU and 
Russia. In short, in the RE paradigm, energy security can be achieved by applying a 
geopolitical logic (neorealist approach) whereas in a MI paradigm, the neoliberal 
principles of cooperation and interdependence ensure energy security.  
The construction of EU’s and Russia’s energy paradigms is presented as a result of the 
discursive contestation occurring (i) within the internal borders and (ii) with the 
counter-part (the Other). In many instances both the EU and Russia have switched 
between a neorealist and neoliberal paradigm of energy security. As such, by pursuing 
their goals in the energy field, the EC425 seems to mobilize support to the rules of fair 
competition and market liberalization, while Russia appears set on state energy 
governance. However, the internal discourse of the EC changes when it comes to the 
external energy dimension where official discourses reveal a geopolitical tone lying 
behind its public rhetoric. Similarly, Russia has often been perceived as adhering to a 
state-centric model in its energy paradigm. Yet, it will be illustrated that during the 
Soviet time and in the post-Soviet period (especially under President Yeltsin), a market-
oriented series of reforms and actions were undertaken in the energy sector. These were 
mainly inspired by external factors  (a globally dominant ‘westernizing’ discourse in the 
post-Cold War period). Overall, this alternation demonstrated how the EU and Russia 
have constructed their ‘energy identity’ around both the MI and RE paradigms.  
 
As noted in the methodology chapter, the political characterization of an identity relies 
                                                      
425 To avoid confusion, the European Economic Community is abbreviated as (EEC), while the European 
Commission as (EC). 
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on its identification through three dimensions: spatial, (how boundaries between 
Self/Other are drawn), temporal (how temporal schemes such as ‘development’, 
‘continuity’, ‘change,’ ‘stasis’ or ‘repetition’ occur) and ethical (how actors construct 
their responsibility and sense of mission). Similarly, this chapter aims to investigate 
how the EU and Russia have constructed their ‘energy identity’ through drawing 
boundaries with the Other in the European space, through temporal schemes, and 
through their ethical understanding of energy security as a ‘mission.’    
 
This chapter is structured in the following way to achieve its aims. The next section 
draws from IR theory to outline two competing energy security paradigms (MI and RE). 
Section two examines how the EU and Russia have constructed their approach to energy 
around the MI and RE paradigms. It demonstrates how the construction of energy 
paradigms emerges from the discursive contestation within the internal borders and with 
the counter-part (the Other). The analysis also illustrates how the establishment of an 
energy paradigm as dominant, emerges through social antagonism among competing 
paradigms. It also sheds light on the constitutive role of Other in shaping the ‘energy 
identity’ of the Self.  
The conclusion draws out the implications of layer two in the context of the three-
layered discursive structure. It also sets the ground for the construction of layer three, 
which, as said, aims to explain the Nabucco/South Stream pipeline and the EU-Russia 
ED through the mutual historical representations (layer one) and energy paradigms 
(layer two) of the parties.    
Finally, it is worth noting that throughout the chapter, concepts such as ‘energy policy’, 
‘energy sector’, ‘energy cooperation’, etc. refer to oil and gas, unless and when 
otherwise is specified.  In addition, in compliance with the methodology of this thesis, 
the present examination is based upon information from a number of sources, including 
official policy documents, official and business reports, economic and political science 
journals. 
 
 
2 Energy Security Paradigms 
 
 
Explaining energy security acquired significance since the energy shocks of the 1970s, 
  147 
when oil producing countries provoked shortages in consumer countries, demonstrating, 
at the same time, the imbalance between the geographical distribution of resources on 
one side, and energy consumers on the other. Since then, IR analysts have examined 
energy security extensively.  
The existing literature stresses how energy security has different levels of analysis. In 
most instances, energy security is examined through a state’s perspective (e.g. Russian 
and the US’ energy security), or by taking into account the supranational level (e.g. the 
EU) and regional levels (energy security in the post-Soviet region)426.  
 
This chapter mainly focuses on the neorealist and neoliberal literature on energy 
security427 to structure two opposite energy security paradigms – ‘Regions and Empires’ 
and ‘Market and Institutions’.   
In particular, neo-realist and neo-liberalist theories represent the dominant energy 
paradigms that explain how best to achieve energy security.428  
They offer contending understandings of energy security: the first has an economic and 
market-based connotation while the second emphasizes the geopolitical element.  In line 
with this general divide, energy models of governance can follow a geopolitical or 
economic logic.  
Neo-realism attributes to energy a strategic value beyond its market price. From this 
perspective energy security is a zero-sum game involving a cooperation-conflict 
relationship.429 The liberal perspective proposes a market-oriented approach and 
conceives energy as a globally tradable good.430 These two approaches – the realist 
                                                      
426 Shadrina, E., Russia’s Foreign Energy Policy: Norm, Ideas and Driving Dynamics,  Turku: Electronic 
Publications of Pan-European Institute, 2010, p. 28. Available from: 
http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-tietopaketit/Documents/Shadrina_final_netti.pdf  
Accessed 15/09/2012 
427 See in particular Aad, C., and  Van Der Linde, C.,. Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A 
European Perspective. Energy Policy,  Vol. 34, No. 5, 2006, pp 532-543 
428 Luft. G., and Korin, A., Realism and Idealism in the Energy Security Debate, in Luft, G., and Korin, 
A., Energy Security Challenges in the 21st Century. A Reference Handbook, eds., Santa Barbara (USA): 
Greenwood  Publishing Group ABC-CLIO, 2009, p. 340, quoted by Shadrina, Russia’s Foreign Energy 
Policy: Norm, Ideas and Driving Dynamics, p.28 
429 Campbell, D., The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire and the Sports Utility Vehicle, American 
Quarterly, Vol. 57. No. 3 2005, pp. 943–972  
See also Klare, M., Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. How Scarce Energy is Creating a New World 
Order, Oxford: One World Publications, 2008, quoted by Shadrina, Russia’s  Foreign  Energy  Policy: 
Norm, Ideas and Driving Dynamics, p.28 
430 Stanislaw, J., A., Power Play – Resource Nationalism, The Global Scramble for Energy, and the Need 
for Mutual Interdependence, Deloitte Centre for Energy Solutions, 2008, p. 9 quoted by Shadrina, 
Russia’s Foreign Energy Policy: Norm, Ideas and Driving Dynamics, p. 28 
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‘securitization’ and the liberal ‘commodification’ – are not mutually exclusive. In fact, 
different paradigms can be combined and alternate.  
To understand the reason for this alternation, it is important to recall a methodological 
point. As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis conceptualizes discourses (even hegemonic 
ones) as socially constructed. It follows that the meaning and the language of each 
discourse are essential unstable and subject to change. As a result, the objective 
meaning of a discourse can never be fully accomplished. No discourse is fully closed, 
but it is continually challenged and re-articulated through interaction and struggle with 
other discourses to reach hegemony, that is, to establish a specific meaning of 
language.431 This enables the existence of multiple and competing discourses.  
 
 
2.1  The (Neo)realist Approach  
 
 
Realism represents mainstream IR theory as it draws its theoretical principles from 
deeper historical traditions of thinking about international politics. Understanding the 
factors that lead to security or insecurity has always been a key object of investigation 
in the realist tradition.432 Although realism theory does not directly address the concept 
of energy security, it is possible to derive the approach from its principles about the 
state and the international order.433 
In line with the IR theory of realism, international politics is anarchic without one 
central government and is mainly based on a balance of diplomatic and military power. 
In this context, the state is the central source of power and it competes with other states 
to preserve its own security or possibly expand with a view to achieving hegemony.434  
In this context, states perceive cooperation between two or more states as dangerous and 
therefore extremely unlikely. Michael Klare, who contributed to the elaboration of the 
main assumptions of the (neo)realist approach to energy, treats energy security as a 
                                                                                                                                                              
See also Finon, D., and  Locatelli, C., Russian and European Gas Interdependence: Could Contractual 
Trade Channel Geopolitics?, Energy Policy, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2007, p. 423-442 
431 Jørgensen, M., and Phillip L., Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd, 2002, pp.6-7 
432 Rudolph, C., Globalization and Security.  Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1 - 32 
433 Von Campe, C.,  Energy Security in the United Kingdom, Honours Degree Dissertation, University of 
Aberdeen, 2011. p.9 
434 Donnelly, J., Realism, in Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-
Smit, C., et al. 3rd eds., Theories of International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, pp.30-31 
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specific area within the broader field of Security Studies.435 From a (neo)realist 
perspective, Klare asserts that the emergence of energy security is due to three global 
factors related to oil. These factors are the fear of a progressive depletion of global oil 
production, the movement of oil production from industrialised to developing countries 
and the vulnerability of oil infrastructure to hostile groups.436 Drawing from this 
background, Correlje and van der Linde elaborated the RE paradigm to explain energy 
security from a (neo)realist angle. This paradigm foresees a situation in which energy 
relations are characterized by divisions among regions and states and where the absence 
of international markets is counter-balanced by the presence of state-owned energy 
companies.437  
Contrary to the MI approach (see below), within this paradigm, energy trade and 
security follow a geopolitical logic. The geopolitical dimension of oil and fossil fuel is 
due to the fact that these resources are mainly concentrated in limited regions in the 
world characterized by political instability (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Venezuela) and that they 
are non-renewable.438 Within the RE paradigm, geopolitical calculations prevail over 
market-based rules and international institutions. In particular, energy plays a crucial 
role in the foreign policy of states as natural resources are becoming scarcer and more 
insecure. For example, China has fuelled concerns over the insecurity of the Malacca 
straits, and the related prospect of a military embargo of its oil supplies.439 To face their 
fears over energy security and the negative trends of energy resources, governments’ 
direct involvement is needed to ensure access to and control of resources. Indeed, given 
the antagonistic environment of an anarchic world, it is too dangerous for a state to be 
entirely dependent on other states or private companies for its energy security as this 
implies a high degree of vulnerability. In addition, a free and integrated global energy 
market cannot exist, as states cannot rely on unstable markets for their security.  For 
example, before the oil shocks of the 1970s state-owned companies of consumer 
countries had long-term bilateral agreements with producers to ensure predictability of 
                                                      
435 Klare, M., For Oil and Empire? Rethinking War with Iraq, Current History,  Vol.102, 2003, pp. 129-
35.  
436 Klare, M., Energy Security, in Williams, P.D., Security Studies - An Introduction,  Oxon: Routledge, 
2008, pp.483-496 
437 Aad Correljé and Coby van der Linde, Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European 
Perspective, p. 535  
438 Sovacool, B. L., Introduction, in Sovacool, B. L., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, 
New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 21 
439 Dannreuther, R., International Relations Theories: Energy, Minerals and Conflict, POLINARES, 
Working paper n. 8, September 2010 
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globally traded oil.440 
Against this background, realism proposes firm state control and regulation of the 
energy system and market. Energy infrastructure within a state needs to be regulated 
and maintained by a national institution to ensure security and to prevent possible 
interference by private or foreign investors.441 
Such an approach engenders the belief that governments have the right to nationalize 
and actively support access to energy as a strategic asset. Before the 1973 oil crisis, 
nationalization of oil production occurred in Mexico (1938), Iran (1951), Iraq (1961), 
Egypt (1962), Argentina (1963), and Peru (1968).  In particular, President Lázaro 
Cárdenas’s decision to nationalize the oil industry in Mexico (1938) aimed to eject 
Western companies from the country and establish the state-owned Petroleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex). Today, it is still considered as one of Mexico's most popular 
decisions.442 Another example is the decision taken by Gamel Abd al-Nasser of Egypt 
in 1957 to freeze the assets of international oil companies and nationalize the Suez 
Canal. Other examples include the Western European countries where the core 
economic and social role of energy led to an understanding of energy as a ‘national’ or 
‘public good’. In these states, energy companies have historically (before the 1980s) 
tended to be state-owned and, thus, received relevant state backing. More recently the 
re-nationalisation process undertaken by the Russian Federation in the mid-2000s  (see 
below) and the re-nationalization of  YPF – Argentina’s largest oil producer – from the 
Spanish firm Repsol in 2012443, offer good examples revealing the characteristics of the 
RE paradigm at work.   
The re-emergence of energy diplomacy further confirms the recent increase of the state 
in energy matters. Goldthau defines energy diplomacy as the support that a state gives 
to their energy companies to gain a competitive advantage in securing resources. A 
consumer country would use diplomacy to secure energy contracts while a producer 
country would rely on diplomacy to increase its access to markets or reserves.  For 
example, as a consumer country, China’s penetration in Africa epitomizes state efforts 
                                                      
440 Goldthau, A., and Witte, J.M., eds., Global Energy Governance. Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 
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441 Von Campe, Energy Security in the United Kingdom, pp. 9-10 
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Christian Science Monitor, May 2012 
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to secure energy supply.  Conversely, the support of the Russian state to Gazprom’s 
expansion abroad (e.g. in ex-Soviet states) is an example of energy diplomacy of a 
producer country.444  This is reminiscent of the US backing of the business strategies of 
the Seven Sisters oil companies, which dominated the global oil market until the end of 
the 1960s. 
By virtue of its core role, energy can also be used as a way to wield hard diplomacy and 
to gain power. For example, the League of Nations decided to punish Italy for its 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 by restricting its access to oil.445  This illustrates the 
potential risk to security that can derive from a conflict over resources. In this respect, 
sensitive energy issues such as transit and political relations between exporter nations 
and end markets have a geopolitical character related to a state’s sovereignty and in 
extreme cases, they might trigger conflicts. Russia’s intervention in Georgia (2008) and 
the disputes between Russian and Ukraine are further examples of tensions over the 
Eurasian transit route.  
 
In addition, in line with the IR neorealist perspective, relative gains are more significant 
than absolute gains in energy relations between parties. Energy security is conceived as 
a zero-sum game in which one country’s energy security is at the detriment of another 
country.446  In this respect, the realist literature focuses on the new ‘Great Game’ in 
Central Asia – which sees Russia, China and the West in a zero-sum game for control 
over the region’s energy resources – 447 and on the so called ‘scramble for African 
resources’ – that reveals the renewed interest of the most powerful regions of the world 
in African natural resources.448   
In sum, the geopolitical dimension of energy resources, problems with access to 
resources, nationalization of energy resources, state-controlled energy companies that 
prioritise ideological ambitions over market logics, and the reluctance of producers to 
accept foreign direct investments for political reasons are the characteristics that 
construct an RE paradigm. It can be noted how energy security is governed according to 
this paradigm in countries and regions divided on the basis of their political 
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calculations.449  
 
 
2.2 The Neoliberal Approach 
 
 
Generally, the liberal tradition in IR is a critique of the realist account and the latter’s 
attention to realpolitik and geopolitics. Rather than focussing on the geopolitical 
dimension of energy security, the neo-liberal approach refers to a set of market-liberal, 
or free-market, economic principles. Generally, such principles promote the reduction 
of state control in the operation of the economy, and broadly advocate concepts such as 
privatisation, deregulation, free trade, and increased capital mobility. As a result, the 
role of the state in energy policy decreases in the belief that market dynamics will 
deliver energy security. 
While accepting the realist assumption of an anarchical international order, neo-
liberalism believes that cooperation between states is possible. In particular, cooperation 
occurs because states are mainly concerned with absolute gains, regardless of the gains 
of other states.450 Cooperation between states and companies becomes even more likely 
if the advantages from it are greater than the advantages of non-cooperation.  
Within this paradigm, the prospect of mutual gains from trade leads parties to cooperate 
within institutions and set up market-based arrangements. As such, international 
cooperation should promote an integrated and multilateral world with competitive 
global markets and operative institutions. As a general rule, according to the neoliberal 
approach in an ideal world, markets work efficiently without transitional costs. Given 
that such an ideal world does not exist, institutions ensure that these costs are at least 
lowered. Hence, the MI paradigm proposes a scenario in which international energy 
markets play a key role in balancing demand and supply while institutions ensure the 
effective functioning of these markets. Institutions are made of formal rules (laws and 
regulations), informal constraints (norms, conventions) and often they include 
enforcement mechanisms.451 North describes institutions as the rules of the game that 
                                                      
449 Metais, R., Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a Geopolitical 
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enable actors to play.452 They are fundamental to structure global markets, govern 
financing, trading, trade agreements, and fix market failures by addressing short-term 
supply.453 
 
The aftermath of the oil crisis in 1973 offers an example of the MI approach at work. 
The crisis resulted from the politicisation of oil supplies. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 
broke out when Egypt and Syria – with the support of other Arab countries – 
unexpectedly attacked Israel during Yom Kippur, the holiest day for the Jewish 
community.454 The US came to Israel’s support through a re-supply of arms. As a result, 
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)455 announced an oil 
embargo against the US that lasted until March 1974. Following this experience, efforts 
were made to depoliticise the energy sector. The liberal MI paradigm became dominant 
through the promotion of an international market for energy. Consequently the 
importance of political factors and influence between producers and partners was 
downgraded. As such, the main paradigm was that energy had to be subject to the auto-
regulative mechanisms of the market while the political sphere had to retain marginal 
regulative role. The idea was to avoid a politicization of international energy politics 
and achieve security of energy supply by relying on the international market. This 
implied a high degree of coordination within international institutions such as the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) that was set up in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis to 
respond to physical short-term risk management.456 As a confirmation of the 
cooperative spirit to face disruptions in the supply of oil, the IEA also established the 
International Energy Programme (IEP) for the creation of national emergency oil stocks 
among members, and the Coordinated Emergency Response Mechanism (CERM). This 
push towards liberalization generated the creation of the spot oil market in New York 
and London, thus contributing to an oil market less dependent on a bilateral long-term 
contract.457  
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In addition, the consumer-producer dialogue was institutionalized through the creation 
of the International Energy Forum (IEF). In the years that followed, efforts were made 
to increase the transparency of the oil market through the IEF’s Joint Oil Data Initiative 
(JODI) and the establishment of voluntary transparency initiatives such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which intended to enhance the 
transparency of government revenues generated from the oil, gas and mining industry, 
and to improve accountability in the extractive industry sector.458 Other examples 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s when in the UK first, and then in most of the OECD 
countries, fossil fuels as energy sources were increasingly considered in the West as a 
tradable good, or as the UK Department of Energy put it ‘just another commodity’, as 
opposed to a public good or national asset. Increasingly, the private sector became 
responsible for international energy trade and price setting, and energy supply. In other 
words, although energy was an important commodity, the market was seen as the most 
efficient and reliable tool to achieve energy security.  
Overall, the liberalization of energy markets and the opening up of investment 
opportunities to foreign parties on a non-discriminatory fostered since the 1980s, 
contributed to the creation of a number of institutions in which energy plays a key role: 
the ECT, World Trade Organization (WTO), EU-Russia ED and the EU-Gulf 
Cooperation Council.  
More recently a liberal-oriented position on energy has been taken in international fora 
such as the G-8 summit, which in 2007 adopted the Declaration ‘Responsibility for Raw 
Material: Transparency and Sustainable Growth’, declaring that:  
 
‘it is in our common global interest that resource wealth be used responsibly so 
as to help reduce poverty, prevent conflict, and improve the sustainability of 
resource production and supply.  We firmly agree that significant and lasting 
progress in this area can only be achieved on the basis of transparency and 
good governance’.459 
 
In sum, by reasoning through a (neo)liberal lens, energy trade becomes less predictable 
politically and publicly, or ‘de-politicised’, as the process of liberalization, privatization 
and multilateral coordination are monitored by institutions.  
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Having sketched two competing energy security paradigms from IR theories, the next 
section examines how the EU and Russia have constructed their approach to energy 
around the MI and RE paradigms. The construction of their energy paradigms is 
presented as a result of the discursive contestation within the internal borders and with 
the counter-part (the Other). This will demonstrate how the establishment of a paradigm 
as dominant emerges through social antagonism among competing discourses. It also 
sheds light on the constitutive role of Other to shape the ‘energy identity’ of the Self.  
 
Generally speaking, although it is common to believe that the EU energy paradigm 
follows the MI paradigm while Russian energy governance ticks all the boxes to qualify 
as a RE paradigm, the next sections will demonstrate how this is only partly true. In 
fact, by looking at history, the EU on one side, and Russia on the other, have 
interchangeably governed their energy policy through the RE and MI paradigms. The 
employment of these schemes implies that history plays a central role as it allows 
studying how contemporary identities have been constructed in a given arc of time. 
 
Analysing the discursive contestation and alternation from a historical perspective 
represents a first step to uncover the ‘degree of segmentation’ of contemporary energy 
discourses. In his book, Aalto does examine the past and present of European energy 
debate.460 However, it can be argued that his exploration remains focused on energy 
paradigms (layer two) and does not explore how these energy discourses are historically 
‘sedimented’, that it, how they derive on specific historical representations of Self in 
relation to Other (layer three). In other words, he fails to account for how the energy 
discourses played out by the parties are constructed around historical representations of 
Self in relation to Other.  As noted, the layered structure elaborated by Ole Wæver 
provides a tool to explore in more in-depth way how the historical mutual 
representations in the relations between Western Europe and Russia contribute, in the 
first place, to construct the contemporary energy discourses put forward by the EU and 
Russia. In addition layer two of the Wæaverian structure also focuses on the extent to 
which the historical narratives and representations of layer one are reflected in the 
mutual energy relations between the EU and Russia. 
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3 The Energy Paradigm of the EU 
 
 
Energy in Western Europe has had a crucial role since the inception of the European 
Economic Community (EEC).461 The then EEC has played a driving role in promoting 
and constructing the energy approach around the MI paradigm. Karan and Kazdagali 
argue that without the role of the EC, energy reforms in MSs would have occurred 
much later.462  
The first European agreement – the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – was 
at the core of the then EEC which represented a European organization, regrouping both 
producing and consumer countries.463 The ECSC was based on  cooperation around coal 
and steel. This is particularly symbolic as coal and steel were the resources necessary to 
wage a war. On 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman delivered 
the ‘Schuman declaration’ at the Quai d'Orsay. He proposed that: ‘Franco-German 
production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority [the 
future EC], within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the 
other countries of Europe’.464 Such an act was intended to help economic growth and 
consolidate peace between France and Germany, who had previously been enemies. In 
accordance with the MI energy paradigm, the ECSC was the first international 
organization based on the idea of supranationalism and on the principle of a common 
institution. As such, it was proposed that Franco-German coal and steel production be 
placed under a common High Authority within the framework of an organization in 
which other European countries could participate. However, along with the institutional 
dimension, there was a clear political objective to strengthen Franco-German solidarity, 
banish war and open the way to European integration. 
Here, it can be seen how the EC aimed to construct an ethical nuance around its energy 
paradigm through the understanding of energy security as serving the ‘mission’ of 
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avoiding war and furthering European integration.    
 As a continuation of the effort to establish the ECSC, further cooperation and 
institutionalization was proposed to create a common market and an atomic energy 
community. These were the ‘Treaties of Rome’ signed in March 1957. The first treaty 
established the EEC and the second established a European Atomic Energy Community, 
better known as Euratom. To tackle the scarcity of ‘conventional’ energy in the 1950s, 
the six founding States considered nuclear energy as a means of achieving energy 
independence.465 Therefore, provisions on cooperation in another energy-based area –
nuclear power – were located at the core of the European Community. Similar to the 
ECSC, Euratom combined a number of institutional and geopolitical elements as it 
aimed to establish a system for supervising the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and set 
common nuclear legislation and further cooperation in this field. 
Despite these beginnings, European integration in the field of energy policy did not 
develop too smoothly. Differences in energy mixes and structures of energy markets led 
MSs to maintain their pivotal role in both domestic and external energy policies. Thus, 
ambitious plans by the EC for a coherent policy often failed because MSs were reluctant 
to transfer sovereignty in a key field such as energy466 and to further energy policy 
cooperation at a Communitarian level. As a result, only few energy policy decisions 
were taken at the Communitarian level.467  
It soon emerged that the standard Western European approaches to energy involved 
national public utilities and state-owned companies. Within MSs, energy policy was 
mainly conceived through the geopolitical prism of the security of supply to be 
managed at national level. In the cases of electricity and gas this implied monopolies 
with national state or local government ownership. States tried to avoid import of 
foreign gas through pipelines, which could be used as a geopolitical tool.  For example, 
when the idea of exporting Soviet gas to Western Europe emerged in 1966, negotiations 
with the Italian firm, ENI, failed due to the conviction that the communists would make 
Europe dependent on Soviet gas.468  Overall, the Community’s intention to gain 
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competence and construct a liberal-inspired approach to energy was challenged by MSs, 
which preferred a geopolitical energy paradigm, especially in the 60s. 
With the oil crises in 1973-74, a push for European energy cooperation was seen as 
necessary and elements of a paradigm shift could be identified at a global level in the 
flourishing of an international institution aiming to promote cooperation, the IEA. 
Considerable emphasis was put on principles such as energy cooperation, liberalization 
and privatization. Measures in this sense were first proposed as remedies to overcome 
the oil crisis.  
The oil crisis provoked a Communitarian reaction in the adoption of a ‘Council 
Resolution concerning a new energy policy strategy for the Community’ in 1974,469 
through which resolution the Council, which expresses views of the MSs, adopted 
guidelines on the issue of energy supply and demand, and pointed out the advantage of 
close coordination among MSs.470  
However, at MS level, these liberal practices were not fully sustained during and after 
the energy crises of the 1970s. Conversely, concerns over energy insecurity even led to 
a consolidation of a geopolitical approach. A political effect of the crisis was a 
nationalization of energy policies. In line with the RE approach, each MS acted to 
reduce infrastructural reliance on other states. For example, sea-bordering MSs built 
their own oil terminals on the coastline. In addition, electricity and gas supply were 
increasingly perceived as belonging to nation states while nuclear energy was furthered 
as it represented a way to achieve energy self-sufficiency.471 
Overall, while the energy crises offered a possibility to embrace the principles of the MI 
energy paradigm policy, MSs tended to stress their differences and concerns rather than 
to promote closer cooperation. MSs were adamant to keep their national sovereignty in 
ensuring adequate supplies through long-term planning and public ownership and 
involvement. 
In the mid 1980s and 1990s, due to the impression that energy supplies were ample and 
prices low, energy policy focused more on the promotion of markets forces and private 
projects than on issues related to supply. Such a change was in line with global trends 
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towards liberalization and it had implications for the decisions taken on energy 
investments and policies. Given that energy became ‘just another commodity’ subject to 
market forces, a more short-term view prevailed to the detriment of long-term 
calculations of energy availability.472 Critics of this approach (antagonist discourse) 
contended that an increased level of competition was likely to destabilize the long-term 
investment horizons on which energy policy decisions had conventionally relied. To 
counter this antagonist discourse, the EC responded that liberalisation was not only 
compatible with supply security but that it would also support it.473 The 1988 EC 
proposals states that: 
 
‘It must be acknowledged that a more integrated energy market is a significant 
additional factor as regards the security of supply for all Member States. 
Greater interconnection of equipment will make it possible to increase both the 
solidarity between Member States and the flexibility of the industry. It would 
therefore increase the emergency resources available in the events of a crisis 
and create the possibility of additional trading.’474 
 
To sustain its liberal discourse, from the 1980s onwards, the EC became more willing to 
propose common initiatives and the MSs became more disposed to agree cooperative 
measures. In a 1981 Communication475, the EC called for energy policy coordination in 
Europe to achieve  ‘Community solidarity’ in energy policy and ‘common approaches 
and initiatives in energy external relations.’ In addition, since the late 1980s various EU 
initiatives have been adopted to reinforce the supranational influence over particular 
energy sectors.476  In a 1990 document the EC acknowledged that national policy such 
as extensive state support or long term contracts could weaken the development of a 
single energy market. To avoid this scenario, the document underlined the need to set 
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Communitarian measures to make supply security policies compatible with competition 
and internal market rules (the development of a Communitarian approach to energy 
policy).477 
 
During the negotiation for the Treaty of Maastricht in the 1980s and 1990s, the EC – in 
a further attempt to foster energy cooperation at the EU level – presented its proposal to 
include a separate energy chapter into the Treaty and enhance energy cooperation at 
Communitarian level. But, some MSs, particularly those that had rather high reserves of 
their own, rejected this proposal, demonstrating reluctance to decrease their autonomy 
in the energy field.478 Energy was also excluded from the initial package proposed in the 
Cockfield Report on ‘Completing the Internal Market’. However, this did not prevent 
the EC from launching proposals for an ‘Internal Energy Market’ in 1988479 and for 
Directives prescribing the liberalization of energy markets. In this respect, the 
Directives to liberalise EU gas and electricity markets approved in the mid-1990s 
contributed to the creation of a new model, which drew from the UK experience of 
energy market liberalization.480 By acting along these lines, the liberal discourse of the 
EC was persistent and ensured the furthering of its liberalization agenda and its 
embracing of an MI paradigm. However, the level of implementation of the 
liberalization Directives and competition law differed from country to country. Some 
MSs (e.g. Portugal and Spain) promoted the emergence of national champions putting 
forward the argument that this would better secure their energy supplies.481 Similarly, 
the Dutch government planned the creation of a ‘national champion’ by merging four 
regional companies (EPZ, EPON, UNA and EZH) into a joint organization called SEP 
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(Samenwerkende Elektriciteits Produciebedrijven) that would have competitive power 
in the EU market.482 
Overall, throughout the 1990s – and especially around the time of the Amsterdam 
Treaty – the EC aimed to construct a liberal-inspired approach to energy within the EU 
through promotion of competition and cooperation. However, MSs consistently opposed 
the emergence of such a paradigm as dominant. For example, as an EC Communication 
reported, in a number of MSs the market power of incumbents in the sectors of gas and 
electricity determined a situation of lack of competition and transparency. These were 
sectors in which the EC had tried to enforce liberalizing measures.483 
In the 2000s, the EC demonstrated willingness to sustain its liberal paradigm and win 
despite MSs opposition to the liberalisation of European electricity and gas markets. In 
fact, in 2003 the EC issue two new gas and electricity directives including 
‘unbundling’ to ensure that energy transmission networks run independently from the 
production and supply side. Subsequently, in 2007 the EC launched its 'Third Energy 
Package', providing companies in MSs with two options for separating gas and 
electricity production from the ownership of distribution networks.484 The entire process 
of liberalization has changed the sector from a regulated structure of mainly state-owned 
monopolists controlling the entire supply chain into a market where the incumbent 
supplier cannot use its ownership of distribution and transmission networks to prevent 
new entrants from gaining access to the market.485  
However, the proposals to extend the internal market in the electricity and gas sectors 
proved to be controversial. The incumbents affected by the EC’s proposal rejected this 
measure. They also enjoyed the support of their governments. In particular, France and 
Germany headed a minority of MSs in rejecting the EC's proposal. For example, 
German Economy Minister Michael Glos said he ‘strictly rejects’ the package and that 
‘The high quality and security of German electrical power networks should not be put in 
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danger’. Similarly, Christine Lagarde, French economy minister, said that ‘We will do 
everything we can to oppose it [ownership unbundling].’486 The counter-argument put 
forth against the proposal regarded its impact on supply security. In fact unbundling 
would have weakened national energy champions and consequently decreased their 
bargaining power towards external suppliers such as Russia. In general, the opponents 
stressed a contradiction in the EC’s approach to enhance both energy competition and 
greater security.487  
Other examples demonstrating that MSs were ‘neo-realist’ players can be easily found. 
Despite many efforts of the EC to acquire greater competence in the energy field, art. 
194(2) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) still 
foresees that energy taxation, decisions on different energy sources and on how to 
exploit them, and measures on the general arrangement of the energy supply are subject 
to unanimity among MSs. MSs also preserve the right to conduct their bilateral energy 
relations with non-EU MSs.488 In addition, evidence about government intervention to 
protect their national interests in this regard include cases such as Électricité de France 
(EDF)/Montedison, E.ON/Ruhrgas, Suez/Gaz de France, and the famous example of 
ENDESA, that involved Gas Natural, E.ON, Enel and Acciona.489 MSs have often 
justified their intervention underlining the extreme importance of security of supply490   
Yet, despite the resistance of MSs to endorse proposals bringing about communitarian 
forms of cooperation, instances can be found regarding MS’s convergence with the 
more integrationist position of the EC and EP. MSs, in fact, recognized the need to 
reinforce and implement the internal energy market as necessary steps for the 
development of European Energy Policy. Another example is the Council’s 
endorsement of the 20-20-20 targets491, which represents a relevant political 
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commitment.492   
 
To sum up, the EC’s aim to construct the MI paradigm as dominant met the resistance 
of MSs, which promoted the main anti-hegemonic discourse against any transfer of 
sovereignty in favour of a supranational entity. The MSs approach seems to repeat the 
RE energy paradigm often used to describe the Russian approach to energy (see below).  
From this perspective, the discursive scenario can also be read along the schemes of 
temporality. The emphasis on nationalism indicates how MSs both consolidate a ‘static’ 
energy paradigm for the EU in a way that seems to ‘replicate’ the Russian one; whereas 
the EC push for a liberal and supranational energy governance denotes a move towards 
a genuine ‘change’ in the energy paradigms.  
From a discourse analysis perspective, the continued interplay between the EC’s 
liberalizing discourse (MI) and the MS’s aim to keep sovereignty on matters concerning 
security of supply (RE) illustrates how contestation for discursive hegemony over the 
concept of energy security occurs. In other words, the EC’s attempt to construct 
‘liberalizing energy’ as the dominant discourse provided resistance by the MSs’ 
competing discourse. This interplay demonstrates the degree of instability embedded in 
each dominant discourse. In addition, the contestation between the EC’s and MSs’ 
approaches to energy security help us to understand how, rather than assuming a 
specific discourse or representation as ‘dominant’, there is instead a struggle among 
competing discourse to become hegemonic.  
Discursive contestation within the EU also enables us to reject the state-centric analysis 
of conventional constructivism and opens the ground for exploring how discursive 
tension existed beyond the mere state-centric level.   
Having demonstrated how the contestation over energy paradigms occurred within the 
EU, next section investigates how the EC’s constructed its approach to energy in the 
relations with external Others (e.g. Russia). Contrary to the promotion of the 
(neo)liberal paradigm of energy security within its internal borders, the EC’s discourse 
in the realm of foreign energy policy has not consistently followed the same logic. 
Rather, in the energy relations with other actors who follow different approaches to 
energy security, the EC’s liberal paradigm was often replaced with a more geopolitical 
one. This also gives ground to illustrate the power of constitutive outsiders to shape the 
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EC’s energy paradigms. 
 
 
4 The External Dimension of the EU’s Energy Policy  
 
 
With reference to the external dimension of EU energy security policy, at the beginning 
it was limited to political coordination of energy security measures among MSs. Prior to 
the 1973 crisis, coordination measures on oil supply stocks were adopted in 1968. The 
Council Decision493 required MSs to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or 
petroleum products to face oil shocks. Other coordination measures were at play during 
the first oil crisis in 1973. The Directive of the Council494 on measures concerning oil 
supplies was a first response to an external event such as the energy crisis. However, it 
did not contribute to the creation of a common foreign energy security policy of the 
MSs or to the Europeanization of energy security policies as it did not make reference to 
a EU political objective for energy security. Rather, policy targets were limited to a 
response to an external shock.495  
Although the issue of a Communitarian approach to energy security first appeared on 
the European agenda during the oil crisis, it was only from the 1990s onwards that the 
EC made concrete efforts towards formulating and implementing a EU external energy 
policy. With the first assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) published in 1990, the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio in 1992, and the adoption 
of the Kyoto protocol in 1997, climate change – and thus energy issues – came strong 
on the EU agenda. More and more European policy-makers came to the conclusion that 
energy and climate challenges were of such a scale that solutions were not to be found 
on the nation state level. As a result, the climate change agenda added a new dimension 
to EU energy policy and acted as a catalyst for the development of a common external 
                                                      
493 Council of the European Communities, Council Decision of 20 December 1968 on the Conclusion and 
Implementation of Individual Agreements between Governments relating to the Obligation of Member 
States to Maintain Minimum Stocks of Crude Oil and/or Petroleum Products, 20 December, 1968. 
Available from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=DD:I:1968_II:31968D0416:EN:PDF Accessed 06/07/2013 
494 Council of the European Communities,  Council Directive of 24 July 1973 on measures to mitigate the 
effects of difficulties in the supply of crude oil and petroleum products,  EUR-Lex, 24 July 1973. 
Available from:  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31973L0238:EN:HTML Accessed 23/07/2013 
 
495 Belyi, EU External Energy Policies,  p. 4 
  165 
energy policy.496 In 1995 the EC issued a White Paper497 on energy policy that 
delineated three key dimensions of the common external energy policy: security of 
supply, global competitiveness through European energy integration, and environmental 
protection.498 The debate over these three dimensions of the EU’s external energy policy 
increased in the 2000s.  
Given the greater emphasis on the external dimension of the EU energy policy in the 
2000s, this section will focus on how European institutions and MSs contributed to the 
construction of the EU’s external energy paradigm in that decade. The EC has 
increasingly focused on the security of supply and the reliability of exporter countries. 
The Russian-Ukrainan gas dispute in 2006 and 2009, which affected the supply in the 
EU, led the EC to increase its concerns on the securitization of energy. To tackle this 
challenge, the EC, along with the EP, put greater emphasis on the discourse of 
diversification of energy supply (in the forms of different sources and transit) and on the 
need to set energy partnerships with producers and transit countries with a view to 
export its domestic energy ‘acquis’ (e.g. through the Energy Community)499 ‘ensuring 
stable and predictable regulatory framework’.500  In this respect, the Green Paper on 
Energy Policy of the EU (2000) represented the first strategic document on external 
energy security policy in the history of the EU. It developed the idea of initiating 
dialogues with other key countries, an approach that was soon implemented in the EU-
Russia ED launched in 2000.501  
In March 2007, another EC proposal on energy security, the ‘Energy Policy for Europe’ 
(EPE) called for the creation of a more integrated European energy approach. 
Specifically, some of the constitutive elements of the EPE emphasized the need to 
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further a common energy foreign policy and ensure security of supply. For its part, the 
then Competition Commissioner Kroes reiterated the mantra that the solution to the 
threats to EU’s security of supply from outside lies in ensuring competition in the 
internal energy market. In addition, climate change and its negative implications on the 
environment (hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005) featured as a further global ‘threat’ 
on the agenda of the EC. In the words of the then Environment Commissioner Dimas, 
tackling such a challenged requires ‘decisive and urgent actions’.502 Generally, the 
common denominator of the EC energy discourse – mostly shared with the EP – was the 
liberal principles of integration and cooperation among MSs as a way to ‘speak with 
one voice’ and achieve a common energy policy. Apart from the new emphasis on 
climate change, the EC discourses were in line with earlier proposals. Yet, especially in 
2000s, they were presented through the lens of new external threats and, thus, with an 
emphasis on securitization tone in the hope that the target audience (MSs) would 
endorse them.503  
For its part, the EP was even more assertive compared to the EC in illustrating the 
threats to the EU’s energy security and in the promotion of a EU-wide project of a 
common energy policy. From the EP perspective, the potential cut in supply from 
Russia was described as a ‘real challenge’504 while the ‘protectionist support for 
national market leaders’ by MSs  was described as causing lack of competitiveness in 
the energy sector.505 As for partnerships with other countries, the EP approach assumed 
a more confrontational tone compared to the EC’s one. A 2010 resolution of the EP 
even proposed a coalition of consumers countries to compensate for the power of the 
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production countries.506 
Overall, the neoliberalist approach of the EC discourse – shared and furthered by the EP 
– aimed to strengthen the Community role of a principal that interacts with its MSs and 
promotes cooperation with third regions and countries.507 Consequently, such an 
approach reduces the role of states as the main actors of international politics. Similar to 
the construction of the EU’s energy paradigm within internal borders, the main 
resistance to the MI-inspired external energy agenda came from MSs.  Coal-dependent 
Poland for example, prevented the EU from speaking with a single voice on a low-
carbon energy agenda at the Rio Earth Summit in 2012, thus opposing the objective to 
pursue environmental sustainability internationally.508 
In conflict with the idea of developing a common external energy policy, large MSs 
continued to support bilateral agreements and their national energy champions as a way 
to secure energy supply nationally. For example, the case of Germany’s bilateral 
agreement with Russia to build the North Stream pipeline ran against the EC and EP’s 
objective of diversification of energy supply. Polish Minster for Foreign Affairs, 
Sikorski, even labelled the Nord Stream pipeline project509  a new ‘Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact.’510 Similarly, Italy and Hungary’s agreement with Gazprom to build the South 
Stream pipeline clearly undermined the Nabucco pipeline, an EU-backed project 
designed to diversify the source of gas from non-Russian exporter countries.511 These 
examples show how Russia has determined differences in MS positions. While MSs 
such as Italy, Germany, and Hungary signed bilateral agreements with Russia, Central 
European MSs instead, were in favour of decreasing dependence on Russia – viewed as 
using energy as a political tool against them.  
Furthermore, MSs tended to promote intergovernmental forms of cooperation as 
opposed to communitarian solutions. In fact, while endorsing the EC and EP’s discourse 
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in favour of cooperation, several MSs preferred an intergovernmental system to set the 
terms of cooperation. For example, in deviation from the EC and EP discourses, the 
‘NATO energy’ agreement proposed by Poland was designed to be an extra-EU 
intergovernmental cooperation system through which a party would bring assistance to 
another party affected by cuts in its energy supply.512 
Moreover, the determination to maintain sovereignty in deciding the national security 
strategies was instead a common feature of MSs discourse on the development of an 
external energy policy. For example, Portugal expressed its view that ‘member states 
should keep the right to decide on the most appropriate solutions for implementing 
energy policies and measures, in order to take account of their specific situations’.513 
Similarly, Spanish representatives noted the need for ‘preserving national sovereignty 
over energy sources and safeguard national preferences for the choice of energy-mix.’514  
Yet, despite the resistance of MSs to endorse proposals bringing about new institutional 
forms of cooperation, individual MSs also expressed views in line with the EC and EP 
discourse. Belgium, for example, recognized that ‘the time has come to boost Europe’s 
influence in so strategic an area as energy’, and that ‘the pursuit of a European energy 
policy demands that Europe be able to speak with a single voice and bring its full 
economic political weight…in dialogue with third countries, both producer countries 
and consumer countries.’515  In addition, in December 2013, the Council adopted a 
report that promoted the development of an external dimension of the EU energy policy, 
thus confirming the need to ‘speak with one voice’. The adopted report states that  ‘the 
Commission, the Council and member states should continue their effort in the further 
development of the EU’s external energy policy’.516  
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In the same report, the Council also demonstrates its sharing of the EC’s objective to 
export the principles of its internal energy market in third countries:  
 
‘Regulatory convergence is a key instrument for the extension of the EU 
internal energy market to neighbouring countries. Market reforms, 
development and modernisation of institutional frameworks as well as the 
creation of stable and predictable investment frameworks should be 
encouraged, as appropriate and as needed, in relations with third countries. In 
doing so, a regional geographically balanced approach should be encouraged 
whenever beneficial, and differentiation and flexibility are important 
underlying principles for engaging with EU neighbours, based on the EU 
acquis’.517 
 
Such a standpoint is sustained also with regard to the relations with Russia:   
 
‘In the relations with Russia, energy cooperation should reflect the gradual 
integration of the economies. The negotiations on the energy chapter of the 
new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with full consistency with the 
internal energy market legislation should be advanced with vigour and 
firmness.518’ 
 
In particular, here the Council and MSs dismissed the egalitarian and sovereignty-based 
discourse often played against Communitarian attempt to further integrate the energy 
field.  They rather opt for an ‘empiresque’ kind of narrative similarly to the one that the 
EC has tried to promote in its relations with third countries and Russia (see below). In 
doing so, the Council denies Russia a ‘special status’ in global energy politics and 
considers her as just one among other neighbouring countries.  
In general terms, it can be argued, therefore, that the adherence to MI or RE energy 
paradigms have alternated among the EU institutions. While recognizing the need for 
action to ensure energy security, the European Council and individual MSs did not 
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share the EC and EP’s position in favour of a communitarian level to deal with it. In 
line with the RE paradigm, MSs rather reiterated reluctance to transfer sovereignty to 
the supranational level and pushed for inter-governmental forms of cooperation among 
MSs.  It can be argued that MS positions were to continue ‘better exploiting the 
synergies and complementarities between the various, internal and external, components 
of energy policy’.519 In doing so, the discourse of the European Council and MSs appear 
in contestation with the discourse of the EC and EP that attempted to mobilize support 
around an EU-wide approach. 
 
To sum up, in its policy documents on the foreign dimension of energy, the EC and EP 
seem to stick to the MI paradigm supported in the internal debate. Stated principles are 
interdependence, market integration within and beyond Europe, and a convergence of 
governance standards with foreign partners in line with a ‘rules-based governance’ of 
energy security. However, it can be argued that, applied to the foreign policy domain, 
such an MI approach conceals a geopolitical tone. The internal market has often served 
as the model for regulatory rules and standards to be extended to oil and gas producing 
countries in other regions. In this respect, a number of international agreements promote 
a transfer of the EU energy regulatory framework to neighbors (e.g. Energy 
Community, Baku Initiative520, Euromed).  In particular, the wording of the ENP 
affirms that the Action Plans for neighboring countries are expected to ‘promote further 
gradual convergence of energy policies and the legal and regulatory environment, 
increased energy efficiency and energy savings, renewable energy and co-operation in 
energy technologies, such as clean coal’.521 The fact that ‘external actors don’t play the 
same game as the EU’522 is a further example of the EC’s belief that more open and 
accountable governance in producer states is a necessary part of Europe’s own energy 
security interests. These examples demonstrate how the EC’s inclination to consider 
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itself as pursuing the mission to disseminate its ‘universal’ energy principles derives 
from the encounter with the constitutive outside space that needs to be Europeanized.   
These principles of the EU internal market – namely, cooperation and the EU’s 
allegedly ‘good practices’ in the energy field – are incorporated in the foreign policy 
positions of the EU and, thus, they are embedded in the foreign energy policy discourse.  
From this perspective, while the EC’s stated approach to external energy policy can be 
initially described as revolving around the concepts of ‘market-governance’, significant 
geopolitical implications can instead be grasped. The idea to promote as many as 
possible internal energy standards to third countries reflects the imperial design to 
‘educate’ third countries by exporting the Community’s energy governance.523 In other 
words, the combined aims to export energy standards with a view to ensure good energy 
governance characterizes the EU’s external energy policy as geopolitical. The intention 
to Europeanize the outside conceals the ambition to obtain third parties’ adherence to 
the EU’s paradigm and ultimately to the EU-like political space. Although the EU 
intends to set its external energy policy telling the MI story as it does in its internal 
dimension, another side of the story is strictly geopolitical.  
Further evidence is visible in policy documents that clearly underline how the EC 
espouses a combination of market and governance principles as an implicit geopolitical 
strategy to export the EU’s internal energy standards in third countries. For example, the 
EC’s 2007 Strategic Energy Review underlines the need for international partnerships 
based on ‘shared rules or principles derived from EU internal energy policy’ through 
‘transparent legal frameworks’ in producer states.524 Significantly, in its September 
2007 ‘unbundling’ proposal,525 the EC restates the belief that internal market rules 
should be the tool to exert influence over third country producers.526  
These examples revealed an understanding of energy security that goes beyond the MI 
model. Rather these are clear attempts to reproduce the EU’s constituent principles – 
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considered to be universally valid – in third countries.  
In a way, the EC’s intention to develop an open and multilateral framework based on 
the projection of its energy ‘acquis’ can also be read as the ‘empiresque’ logic according 
to which the intrusion of its internal energy rules are used to deconstruct Other’s 
sovereignty. In this respect, the imperial component embedded in the EC’s discourse is 
interpreted along the lines of Hardt and Negri, as opposed to more classical renderings. 
Hardt and Negri hypothesize an ongoing transition from a ‘modern’ imperialism – with 
conflict among individual nation-states – to an evolving postmodern structure consisting 
of ruling powers, which represent a global ‘Empire’. This Empire is made up of 
‘monarchies’ (the US and the G8, and international organizations such as NATO, the 
International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organisation), ‘oligarchies’ 
(multinational corporations and other nation-states) and ‘democracies’ (various non-
government organizations and the UN). The West seems influential in all the 
components. The Empire is total and universal, and resistance to it (e.g. from Russia) 
can only be characterized in the form of negation. The ‘enemy’ opposing resistance is 
not identified on the basis of ideological contraposition or national belonging. The 
enemy is each entity that threatens and resists the rule of law and the ethical order rather 
than a political system or a nation.527   
In this respect, energy relations with Russia clearly elucidate how resistance to the EC’s 
‘empiresque’ attempt to transfer rules of law occurs. The next sections will present 
examples (e.g. 2006 Green Paper, European Charter Treaty and the ‘Gazprom clause’) 
epitomizing how the interaction with the ‘Russian Other’ has triggered confrontational 
and geopolitical paradigms that resonate negatively with the liberal paradigm supported 
by the EC within EU’s borders. From this perspective, Russia features as a constitutive 
outsider. 
 
  
4.1 The Green Paper and the European Charter Treaty (ECT) 
 
 
The 2006 Green Paper issued by the EC called for the EU to develop a common, 
coherent European Energy Policy within the EU as a basis for leading the global energy 
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debate in the international arena. In this respect, the Green Paper argued that energy 
security can be obtained by constructing a ‘pan-European energy community...with a 
common regulatory space, a renewed approach with regard to Europe’s partners, 
including Russia, and finally a new Community mechanism to enable rapid and 
coordinated reactions to emergency external energy supply situations’.528 From the 
document it emerges how Russia is considered as the natural counterpart to the EC’s 
ambitions to create an external energy policy: 
 
‘A new initiative is particularly opportune with regard to Russia, the EU’s most 
important energy supplier. The EU, as Russia’s largest energy buyer, is an 
essential and equal partner in this relationship. The development of a common 
external energy policy should mark a step change in this energy partnership at 
both Community and national level. A true partnership would offer security and 
predictability for both sides . . . [whose] results could be integrated into the 
framework of EU–Russia relations due to replace the current EU–Russia PCA 
agreement in 2007’.529 
 
By addressing Russia as an equal partner for its energy relations, the EC seems to talk 
the language of the cooperative narrative. In terms of historical narrative, the EU / 
Western Europe seems to accept Russia as a key player in Europe, which is understood 
as a united continent with no borders. In particular, similarly to the Western European 
representation in the mid-eighteenth century, Russia was considered to have reached a 
status of equal partner in the European Concert. This implies that the ‘degree of 
Otherness’ through which the EU-Self represents the Russian-Other is very narrow. In 
terms of energy paradigms, the emphasis on cooperation and partnership suggests that 
the EC sticks to a MI understanding of energy security in its relations with Russia: 
 
‘A true partnership would offer security and predictability for both sides, paving 
the way for the necessary long-term investments in new capacity. It would also 
mean fair and reciprocal access to markets and infrastructure including in 
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particular third party access to pipelines. Work should start on an energy initiative 
based on these principles’.530 
 
However, it can be demonstrated how the boundaries and a consequent ‘othering’ 
process do exist and conceal a geopolitical connotation. The emergence of boundaries 
appears when the EU-empire treats its neighbours as ‘learners’, and consequently, the 
‘degree of otherness’ broadens too. The 2006 Green Paper in fact, confirms that a type 
of ‘leader-follower’ narrative is at work. For example, the document states that energy 
security can best be achieved through a ‘pan European energy community’, a ‘common 
regulatory space’ around Europe. This requires ‘[r]einforced market-based provisions 
on energy…in the EU’s existing and future agreements with third countries’.531 Yet, in 
the same year (2006), the paper ‘An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy’ drafted 
by the EC for the European Council, states that energy security ultimately relies on ‘the 
EU extending its own energy market to include its neighbours within a common 
regulatory area with shared trade, transit and environmental rules’.532  
Drawing from Prozorov’s argument, the EU’s approach to energy relations with Russia 
is consistent with an exclusive foreign policy strategy that is characterised by a ‘subject-
object asymmetry’.533 From a normative viewpoint, the EC foreign policy can be 
viewed as aiming to convert the identity of other actors.534 As confirmation of such an 
EU ethos, the Green Paper adds that:  ‘if the EU backs up a new common policy with a 
common voice on energy questions, Europe can lead the global search for energy 
solutions.’535 
By adding to Prozorov’s argument, it can be noted how the historical Western European 
self-representation of being the embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe is here reproduced. 
Similarly, the aim to extend ‘its own energy market to include its neighbours’ reflects 
the presence of another historical theme such as that of Western Europe as a ‘civilian 
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power’ loaded with the ethical mission to spread good governance. Both representations 
reveal the existence of a wide ‘degree of Otherness’ designed by the ‘developed’ EU 
towards its neighbours, which are, thus, constructed as ‘developing’ countries. On the 
other side, the image of the neighbours as ‘developing’ countries, contributes to the 
construction of the EU as a ‘developed’ entity. While Prozorov’s argument stresses how 
the EU constructs Russia as an object, he pays little attention to the constitutive power 
of outside, that is, to how the existence of ‘Others’ also support the construction of the 
EU’s identity.  
In this light, it can be seen how the Green Paper contains a contradiction concerning the 
official discourses of the EC. In fact, while on one side the EC aims to pursue a true 
partnership with Russia based on equality and market-based rules for energy, on the 
other side it still shows the segmented imperial practice of Europeanizing its partner and 
including them in its political space. The EC’s intention to extend its energy ‘acquis’ 
ultimately reveals the ‘othering’ towards the EU’s neighbors and the imperial political 
project over ‘Europe’, its neighbours and Russia. Through the aim to transform and 
integrate European neighbours within its regulatory sphere the EU attributes itself the 
right to transfer its good energy practices into its ‘near-abroad’ - understood as its 
‘Region’- and, thus, characterizes the EU’s vision of energy security in geopolitical 
terms. 
  
The ECT is another example illustrating how the EC constructed its external energy 
policy along a geopolitical paradigm.536 As a result of West’s victory in the Cold War, 
Russia’s adherence to liberal economic policies led to a belief that a global shift was 
about to occur towards a pro-market approach even in the ex-Soviet space. As such, the 
ECT was drafted in the early 1990s within the scenario of the promising West-East 
energy cooperation.537 The ECT was initially based on the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) trading regime rules and norms and therefore informed by the 
liberal principles of the MI. The idea of the creation of such a treaty was dictated by the 
awareness that – in conditions of growing interdependence between the consuming, 
producing and transit countries – international cooperation can be more effectively 
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regulated by multilateral laws rather than by bilateral agreements. In this connection the 
role of the ECT was seen as to build a legal foundation for energy security based on 
principles of open competitive markets, rules-based multilateralism and cooperation 
similar to the rules inspiring the EU internal energy market.  
In its wording, the ECT seems also to endorse equality principles between exporter and 
importer countries. Countries with natural resources should be able to attract 
investments, protect their interests and to guarantee reliable transportation for their 
energy exports to their consumers. For the energy importing countries, the ECT is 
designed to protect their investments and mechanisms to promote the security of supply 
in the European continent.  However, the ECT also presented a clear opportunity to tie 
Russia – one of the world’s leading fossil fuel exporters – into a market economy 
through a binding agreement based on neo-liberal principles.538 This emphasis on 
Western neo-liberal principles was confirmed by the fact that the proposed framework 
for cooperation was designed to promote an efficient use of energy in support of the 
transition of the former Soviet countries539 towards a market-based economy that at the 
time represented the dominant discourse.540   
In line with the Western European representations in the post-Cold War period, Russia 
and the ex-Soviet space were described as potential allies in the international politics 
that was now ready to be enlightened by Western teaching after decades of darkness. In 
particular, the international cooperation between European countries and other 
industrialised counties aimed to develop the energy potential of Central and Eastern 
European states.541 Here, it can be argued that the historical themes of ‘the land of the 
future’ endowed with an evolutionary potential for the security of energy supply in 
Europe was at play. In addition, the EU seemed to employ a broader understanding of 
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Europe, which also included the ‘East’.542 
This demonstrated how the ex-Soviet space was represented more as an ‘opportunity’ 
rather than as a’ threat’. This reflected a narrower ‘degree of Otherness’ - compared to 
other periods – that sheds some light on West’s benevolent attitude towards the ex-
Soviet space.  
Yet, it can be also noted how a geopolitical strategy seemed to lie behind the need to 
formalize the liberal principles of interdependence and cooperation between importer 
and exporter countries. In fact, resulting from the EU’s initiative and modelled on 
Western neo-liberal principles, the ECT might be seen as a mechanism to guarantee 
interdependence and security of supply by stimulating and protecting Western 
investments in the ‘traditional’ upstream energy sector of exporter countries. In this 
respect, the EU tried to speed up Russian ratification of the ECT, proving to attach great 
importance to it.543 As the Secretary General of the Energy Charter Secretariat, Ms 
Kemper, underlined ‘This step [Russia’s ratification] is seen by the EU as highly 
desirable for the creation of a positive investment climate for European energy 
companies in Russia. Major emphasis has been placed on the need for ECT ratification 
during the EU’s dialogue with Russia on a strategic energy partnership’.544 
If contextualized in the aftermath of the post-Cold War 'euphoria’, it can be argued that 
the ECT contains a geopolitical element in the nexus between the possibility of Western 
/ EU investments in the Russian energy sector and Western security of supply. In other 
words, the ECT is a European attempt to facilitate Western (European) investments in 
the energy sectors of Russia and in the Newly Independent States (NIS)  by playing the 
discourse that the penetration of Western investments in the Eastern energy sector 
would generate a win-win exchange.545  It is based on the logic that ‘Russia and many 
of its neighbours were rich in energy resources but needed major investments to ensure 
their development, whilst the states of Western Europe had a strategic interest in 
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diversifying their sources of energy supplies’.546  
In addition as clearly stated, the ‘ECT establishes a framework ...ensuring security of 
energy supply for the European Union’.547 This confirms the view that the ECT appears 
more as a tool for the EU to secure energy supply through geopolitics. According to 
Aalto, by insisting on Russia’s ratification of the ECT, the EU seems to de-politicise 
energy relations with Russia as a way to pursue its geopolitical interest (enhancing its 
own energy security of supply).548 As such, rather than conceiving ‘Europe’ as inclusive 
of the ‘East’, the EU demonstrates a tendency to represent itself as the embodiment of 
the ‘true’ Europe and to construct the ‘East’ as an object to transform. The other part of 
the story – often overlooked by the existing literature – is that the ‘East’ is a 
fundamental element for the construction of the EU-Self’s identity as the embodiment 
of the ‘true’ Europe, therefore, the ‘East’ hold a constitutive power.   
An extension of this argument is that the ECT also offers grounds to appreciate the 
extent to which the EC constructs Russian behaviour as non-cooperative and 
responsible for the inefficiency of energy governance in the European continent. In a 
2004 Communication, the EC states that: 
 
‘Despite the existence of the Agreement [PCA], some specific questions related to 
energy which have arisen in the course of the last ten years, or which have been 
suspended since 1994, as in the case of trade in nuclear materials, remain 
unresolved, causing dissatisfaction to both sides. It has not been possible to find 
solutions through the Energy Charter Treaty…as Russia has stalled ratification of 
the Treaty since signing it in 1994’.549  
 
In this discourse, Russia remains construed as the disease that needs to be cured.550 
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Such a representation of the Other signals a broad ‘degree of Otherness’. The EC 
positioned Russia in a negative relation to energy governance in Europe. Russia’s 
subjectivity is denied and associated to the ‘false’ Europe. Conversely, through such a 
discursive practice the identity of the West and the EU are constructed as true and 
universal. 
 
 
4.2 The ‘Gazprom Clause’ 
  
 
In general terms, the EC’s attempt to transpose the market-based principles of internal 
energy governance/policy to the external dimensions of its energy policy proved to be in 
contradiction especially in respect to relations with Gazprom, the Russian energy giant. 
The geopolitical and realist priorities attached to reducing external dependencies and 
diversifying energy supply (RE paradigm) clashes with the neoliberal principles of 
creating a ‘mutually-beneficial energy partnership’ with producer states (MI 
paradigm).551 In its relations with Russia’s Gazprom, the EC has tended to adhere to the 
geopolitical and realist logic (RE paradigm) rather than to its market-based principles 
(MI paradigm). For example, after failed attempts to finalize bilateral energy co-
operation agreements with Russia – which has continuously rejected any kind of 
binding agreements  (e.g. ECT under the EU-Russia PCA) – the EC proposed a 
‘reciprocity clause’ to be introduced into the Third Energy Package.552 This clause 
establishes that companies of non-EU MSs can operate in EU markets on condition that 
they comply with the same unbundling principles in force in the internal market that 
separates ownership of production, transport and commercial distribution of gas.553  The 
move was generally considered to be targeted at Russian Gazprom.554 The clause was 
finally included into the text of the EC's Third Energy Package and was justified by 
fears that the failure of foreign companies to unbundle would lead to the indiscriminate 
acquisition of EU energy grids by third countries (e.g. Gazprom).555 As Commission 
                                                                                                                                                              
Discourses of Region-Building in the European North, p.48 
551 Youngs, Europe’s External Energy Policy. Between Geopolitics and Market, p.8 
552 Buchan, Policy Making in the European Union 
553 Pick, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A critical analysis, p.330 
554 EurActiv, Gazprom Clause Issues Russia Ultimatum for Energy Co-operation, 20 September 2007. 
Available from: http://www.euractiv.com/energy/gazprom-clause-issues-russia-ult-news-218748 
Accessed 20/07/2013 
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President Barroso stated when the EC presented its new proposals: ‘to protect the 
openness of our market, to protect the benefits that unbundling will bring, we need to 
place tough conditions on ownership of assets by non EU companies to make sure that 
we all play by the same rules’.556 This seems to be in contradiction with the egalitarian 
narrative that emerged in the 2006 Green Paper which proposed  ‘fair and reciprocal 
access to markets and infrastructure including in particular third party access to 
pipelines’557 in the EU’s relations with Russia. 
The EU further proves to be driven by an RE logic in that it not only contradicts its pro-
competition, pro-liberalization approach to energy but it also makes claims about Russia 
as posing obstacles to foreign investments in its internal energy market. In fact, in a 
2011 report the EC stated that ‘Russian law on foreign investment in strategic sectors 
imposes very low thresholds for ex ante approval of foreign energy investments in 
Russia, making EU investment in the upstream Russian energy market very 
cumbersome’.558  
As former executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Claude Mandil, 
argued, such an EU approach might be seen as alienating (read ‘othering’) Russia 
through a policy of double standards. The EC has often pushed Russia to open its 
internal energy market and infrastructure to European companies and investors through, 
for example, the ratification of the ECT. But, the EC itself demonstrates a practice of 
denying third-country companies such access as well as a negative reaction to 
acquisition attempts by foreign investors.559 If the EU were to be coherent with its neo-
liberal paradigm, it should have promoted an inclusive logic with Gazprom in line with 
the principle of market interdependence. Instead, the ‘Gazprom clause’ – designed to 
limit the Russian giant's penetration into the European market – reflects a geopolitical 
logic that aims to exclude Russia and reduce its influence in the ‘true’ Europe.  
A reasoning based on the historical narratives suggests that much of this can be 
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attributed to the negative discourse and representation of Russia as a ‘threat’ which has, 
at times, become dominant over the competing representation of ‘learner’ or ‘equal 
partner.’ By representing Russia as ‘threat’, the EC draws divisions in the European 
continent between the EU-Europe and  Russia-Europe through energy. It also fuels the 
‘othering’ of Russia from the European Concert. Borders are traced between the inside 
and outside of Europe and result in a division between Self and Other.  
The EU’s energy relations with Russia, ultimately demonstrate how the EU’s political 
project on ‘Europe’ tends to draw lines of exclusion at the heart of its own integrationist 
programme.560 
 
Generally, it has been demonstrated how the main historical Western European 
representations of Russia – found in layer one – have re-emerged in the EU’s energy 
approach. In fact, beyond the narrative of cooperation and equal participation in 
European politics, other historical descriptions of Russia are at play: ‘learner’ (the 2006 
Green Paper and ‘An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy, Strategic Energy 
Review’), ‘land of the future’ (ECT), embodiment of the ‘false’ Europe as opposed to 
the Western European ‘true’ Europe, and ‘threat’ to the internal energy policy of the 
‘true’ Europe (the Gazprom clause).  
From a Self’s perspective, each of these representations reflects various ‘degrees of 
Otherness’. In addition, the presence of Other (Russia) also contributes to the 
constitution of Self identity (Western Europe) as ‘equal’, ‘superior entity’, ‘teacher’, or 
‘true’ embodiment of Europe.  
From this perspective, it can be seen that the way in which the EU draws boundaries 
with Russia helps construct its spatial identity as ‘European’. For example, in policy 
frameworks such as the EU-Russia ED, the emphasis on cooperation with Russia 
implied a EU understanding of ‘Europe’ as a united continent with no clear boundaries 
(see chapter 6). Conversely, examples such as the ‘Gazprom clause’ and the ECT 
denote a confrontational approach to the energy relations with the Russian Other and 
consequently determine a spatial demarcation between a ‘true’ EU-Europe and a ‘false’ 
Russian-Europe. 
Furthermore, the use of the concept of ‘degree of Otherness’ to determine Self’s 
position in relation to Others, overcomes the bias of the existing (rationalist and 
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mainstream constructivist) literature on EU-Russia (energy) relations which, as noted, 
assumes tension between actors. The critical constructivist / post-structuralist standpoint 
challenges and problematises such an assumption and opens up the possibility of 
conceptualising ‘otherness’ not only as threatening or confrontational but also as 
cooperation and partnership.561 In this light, the critical constructivist / post-structuralist 
approach enables one to deconstruct the rationalist and conventional constructivist 
belief that the interests and identities of the EU and Russia are simply different or in 
opposition. Actors’ interests and their utility functions are not given a priori but unfold 
in discursive contestation.  
In addition, the centrality of the historical representations combined with the concept of 
‘degree of Otherness’ are the added value of this research to the existing discourse-
based accounts on EU-Russia energy relations.562 These discourse-based accounts still 
overlook the importance of the historical representations of the ‘Other’ in the formation 
of the energy paradigm of the Self (i.g. interplay between layers one and two). This 
research instead provides a methodology that allows understanding of how the 
narratives identified from the historical encounter of the actors influence the actors’ 
discourses on practical policy such as energy. Other studies also pay little attention to 
how the energy paradigm of the ‘Other’ is constitutive of the Self’s energy paradigm 
and ultimately of its identity.  
 
Similarly to the analysis conducted in the first part of this chapter, the next section aims 
to explore how Russia has constructed its energy paradigm in internal borders and in the 
relations with the EU.  
 
 
5 The Russian Energy Paradigm Between MI and RE 
 
 
Normally, Russia`s external energy policy is viewed as influenced by Great Power 
politics thinking. Concepts such as ‘geopolitics’, ‘the energy weapon’, growing ‘statism 
in energy’ are the conventional representations used to describe Russian energy policy. 
                                                      
561 See Connolly, Foucault and Otherness; Neumann, Identity and Security, quoted by Browning, 
Christou, The Constitutive Power of Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Polcy and the Eastern 
Dimension,  p.110 
562 See for example, Aalto 2008, Morozov in Aalto 2008, Khasson 2008-2009, Tichy and Kratochvil 
2013, Kuzemko 2013 
  183 
Much of the literature agrees that Russia operates within a neo-realist approach, 
employing energy exports for political aims.563  
Yet, a more in-depth examination shows that the use of energy as a means of achieving 
Russia's national interests changed over time because of shifts in dominant discourses 
both domestically and internationally. As such, the Russian approach to energy has 
alternated between the MI and RE paradigms. This section will aim to provide evidence 
of this alternation.  
As of the late 1800s, when the tsarist regime saw great potential for the Russian Empire, 
energy was included in the list of tools to use in order to pursue its interests.564  
However, the Empire lacked the technology and the capital to create a national energy 
industry. In order to overcome this problem, the tsarist regime rejected the neo-realist 
principle of direct involvement in the management of energy resources and lifted its 
foreign investment restrictions welcoming Western firms (European and American) to 
develop the Baku and Volga oil fields. As shown in the previous chapter, it can be said 
that this cooperation was also made possible thanks to the positive mutual 
representations between Western Europe and Russia in the nineteenth century, during 
which Russia was perceived as the guardian of the Concert of Europe. In particular the 
Russian Empire had positive relations with Western partners, such as the UK, France 
and the US.565.   
 
Yet, a geopolitical understanding of energy became dominant when the Bolsheviks used 
energy to achieve the political objective of overthrowing the tsarist regime.566 For 
example, in December 1904 the workers of the Baku oilfield declared a general strike, 
which subsequently triggered the 1905 revolution.567  The strict reaction of the tsar led 
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Bolshevik activists to burn the Baku oil fields. With Lenin, energy was in fact perceived 
as an important feature of Soviet planning. Essentially, the underpinning idea was that 
the USSR had to be an independent energy nation and that energy resources represented 
a crucial sector for the Soviet economy. This was recognized in Stalin’s autarky policy 
that included the ambition to develop a proper energy sector. A similar example regards 
art. 3 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovk – signed in September 1918 between Bolsheviks and 
Germans – which entitled the Russian government to exploit the oil fields in the Baku 
region, despite the fact that Azerbaijan had gained its independence in May 1918. Such 
an instance not only further proves the Bolsheviks’ vision of energy security as a zero-
sum game – in which one country’s security is at the detriment of another country – but 
it is also indicative of a specific view, according to which Russia enjoys a sort of 
‘property right’ over the resources of its near abroad.568 It can be said that aspects of 
such a view still persist in the contemporary Russian energy policy.569    
Following World War II, the USSR continued adhering to the RE energy paradigm. As 
one of the two global Great Powers acting in a divided Europe, the USSR aimed to 
dominate the European and global energy market. This intention reflected the historical 
context of the bi-polar Cold War settlement during which the Great Power USSR 
depicted the West as its implacable enemy in its bid for victory for socialism. Between 
the 1950s and 1960s the USSR became the second largest oil producer in the world and 
the major supplier to both Eastern and Western Europe. In particular, the subsidization 
of oil to Western European countries made them dependent on Russian oil and 
strengthened the Russian position in its own periphery. This approach – which the CIA 
called the Soviet Economic Offensive – can be considered in line with a neo-realist 
understanding of energy. In fact, the Soviets were less concerned about increasing their 
profits and more focused on the political objective of maintaining a sphere of influence 
and making Western Europe vulnerable. However, as a confirmation of this political 
ambition and at the detriment of the economic logic, oil production became 
commercially inefficient because the profits were below expectations while fields were 
rapidly depleted.570 From this perspective, it can be argued that the political 
contraposition with the West contributed to constructing the Russian approach to energy 
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in line with geopolitical reasoning.  
If the Bolsheviks and the early post-Soviet leadership had used energy in a neorealist 
fashion in the 1950s and 1960s, a gradual paradigm shift occurred in the 1970s. The 
huge increase of price of oil due to the crises in the Middle East combined with the 
increasing difficulties of maintaining the inefficient and costly USSR structure, led the 
Soviet leadership571 to a crossroads where the choice was between the need to follow an 
economic logic (MI paradigm) – using the high global prices to justify a price rise in 
Eastern Europe and benefit the Soviet economy – or a geopolitical calculation (RE 
paradigm) – keeping its sphere of influence tied to Moscow by continuing to subsidize 
Eastern European countries and preventing them from seeking other energy 
sources. Russia opted to follow an economic logic. In fact, in 1975-1976 the Kremlin 
decided to augment the price of oil in the East on the basis of global market prices. This 
trend continued in the mid-1980s but by then the price of oil had dramatically 
decreased. The West embargoed oil from the USSR in favour of oil from Saudi Arabia. 
This problem was aggravated by the backward energy technology of the Soviets.  
Against this background, as of 1985, the USSR followed again a market-based approach 
by increasing energy prices for the Eastern countries, requiring hard currencies for 
payment, and allowing foreign investments in the energy sector.  
Evidence of a pro-market approach applied to the energy sector can be found also 
during the presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s and reached its peak under 
Yeltsin in the 1990s.572 During the last period of Gorbachev’s presidency, a number of 
joint ventures with Western oil companies were agreed. For example, the US company 
Conoco agreed to employ its expertise learnt in Alaska to a project with Lukoil in the 
Arctic region. Similarly, Exxon was partnered with Russian state company Rosneft in 
the Sakhalin-1 project.573 This demonstrated how the ‘West’ was represented more as a 
‘teacher’ or as an ‘opportunity’ rather than as a ‘threat’, thus, the ‘degree of Otherness’ 
towards the ‘West’ was narrower compared to other phases of history.   
 
One of Yeltsin’s main goals was to stop the planned communist approach that for 
decades had guided the Soviet economy. Russia’s firms were no longer state-owned, 
Russians citizens were given the opportunity to own property and firms, the state had to 
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rely on taxes for collecting revenue, and its currency was traded on foreign exchange 
markets.574 As a result, the market-based model that – by the end of the 1990s – Russia 
seemed prepared to adopt also covered the energy sector. In November 1992, President 
Yeltsin signed a decree N. 1403 starting the privatization of the oil industry. The decree 
intended to break up the Soviet oil monopoly and set up several holdings companies. It 
also turned state-owned companies into joint-stock companies (Lukoil, Surgutnetftegaz 
and Yukos)575 establishing that the state would retain 51% of shares during a three-year 
transition period whilst the remaining shares would be given out in voucher auctions.576   
In general, the sign of a change from mercantilist / state-led energy governance to a 
market-based paradigm was – at that time – becoming the dominant discourse within 
the context of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. The growing consensus in such an 
approach to energy governance reinforced an understanding of energy increasingly as 
an essentially market and trade-driven sector within a multilateral arena where nations, 
companies and societal groups are interdependent. Therefore, external factors 
contributed to determining the increasing dominance of the (neo)liberal approach to 
energy in Russia. This could be particularly noted in the Russian private sector. For 
example, as of 1994, former state oil companies were privatized. In the 1990s, when 
Lukoil577 was made the first oil company to operate abroad, its CEO, Vagit Alekperov, 
preferred to distinguish Lukoil as a Western-style company driven by commercial rather 
than political objectives.578 Similarly, Khodorkovsky decided to run Yukos by 
employing a Western kind of governance and even listed it on Western exchanges.579 
As Yergin reports, during his visits to Western oil companies, Alekperov580 was 
positively impressed by the different structure and way of operating (vertically 
integrated companies able to manage exploration, production, refining and marketing). 
He defined a ‘revelation’, the ability of a company to deal with different issues at the 
same time and returned to Russia under the belief that this type of corporate 
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organization (Western) was the modern way to run the oil industry. As a result, he tried 
to reform the Russian energy sector following the Western model. However, such a 
proposal caused opposition in the Russian internal debate where political adversaries 
accused Alekperov of  ‘destroying the oil sector’.581  In a way, Alekperov’s visit to the 
West triggered comparable reactions to Peter the Great’s learning experience in Western 
Europe. In a similar manner, the positive impressions of both can be read as an 
acknowledgement of the superiority of the Western civilization vis a vis Russian 
traditions. 
 
However, evidence of a Russian understanding of external energy policy in a neorealist 
fashion can also be found in the post-Cold War period. As explained in the historical 
chapter, although the foreign policy discourse imposed by Minister Kozyrev – 
especially in the period between 1993-1996 – opted for cooperation with the West, 
aggressive foreign policy in the post-Soviet space was at the same time part of this 
narrative. This was also reflected in the energy relations with Russia’s neighbors. For 
example, in 1992-1993 the Kremlin reduced gas supply to the Baltic States during a 
dispute about Russian-speaking minorities and Russian military establishment on Baltic 
territory. Moreover, in the early 1990s Russia interrupted the flow of gas towards 
Ukraine during a conflict about the Black Sea Fleet.582  
Despite this evidence, it can be argued that in the post-Cold War period, the global 
‘Westernisation’ model and the creation of a new world politics of energy governed by 
international cooperation and through agreed principles and international institutions, 
emerged as a dominant discourse even in Russia. Yeltsin’s reformers583 intended to 
follow these principles to end the planned economy dictated by the Soviet credo. As a 
result, economic shock therapy, price liberalization and privatization programs were 
implemented under Yeltsin.  
 
However, the way in which privatization in Russia was carried forward caused a 
situation in which a few oligarchs obtained a huge chunk of the national wealth.  The 
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‘voucher reform’ and the ‘loans for shares’ epitomize how this occurred. In late 1992, 
Yeltsin launched a program of free vouchers as a way to initiate mass privatization. 
Under the program, all Russian citizens received vouchers for purchase of shares of 
state enterprises.584 The majority of Russians sold their vouchers to oligarchs for cash. 
In 1995, facing a high fiscal deficit, the government adopted a ‘loans-for-shares 
scheme’ advised by banker Vladimir Potanin and endorsed by Anatoly Chubais, then a 
deputy prime minister. The program intended to trigger a liberalization process by 
leasing the largest state industrial assets through auctions in the hope to cash in 
revenues rapidly. Under the ‘loans for shares’ program, the government sold majority 
stakes in companies operating in crucial sectors – such as energy – in exchange for 
loans (Yukos, Lukoil, Sibneft, Surgutneftegas). For example the oligarch Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky was able to become the chair of Yukos – one of Russia's most valuable 
energy companies – at a relatively low price.585 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, after this disappointing shock therapy, the competing 
statist narrative become dominant in that many Russians favored a return to the Russian 
collectivist idea (rooted in the Slavophilist narrative) of communal assets being owned 
and run by the state as the representative of the people (rooted in the Panslav narrative). 
Putin’s accession to power marked the beginning of a new phase for oligarchs and a 
return to state patrimonianism.586 This approach was reflected also in the energy sector, 
although claims in favour of privatization and multilateralism alternated with the 
dominant statist and geopolitical approach.  
 
Overall, it can be argued that the Russian approach to energy has alternated between the 
MI and RE paradigms. Along with internal facts, the existence of the Western Other 
(EU) and the various ways it was represented (‘degree of Otherness’) has also 
contributed to explaining this alternation. From this perspective, it can be seen that the 
way in which Russia has drawn boundaries with the West/Western Europe contributed 
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to construct its spatial identity as ‘European’. From this perspective, the period 
characterized by energy cooperation with the West/Western Europe implied a Russian 
understanding of ‘Europe’ as a whole continent with no clear boundaries (‘white zone’). 
Conversely, a confrontational approach to energy relations with the Western Other, 
denoted the existence of a divided ‘Europe’. 
  
As noted in the previous chapter, Putin’s pragmatic statism, combines aspects of statism 
with the idea of Russia’s ‘European calling‘. The next section examines how this Putin 
applied this approach to the energy field and how Gazprom became a key actor of the 
foreign policy of Putin’s Russia.  
 
 
5.1 Putin’s Energy Doctrine and Gazprom’s role in Russia’s Energy 
Governance 
 
 
Following the failure of Western-inspired ‘shock therapy’ – which caused 
unemployment, deterioration of welfare, tax evasion, etc, – the majority of Russians 
favoured a return to the ‘Russian’ ideas of an authoritarian state ownership of 
communal assets (e.g. energy) on behalf of the people as promoted by pragmatic 
statists.  
 
Historically, authoritarian drift and socialist / ‘collectivist’ ideas represent two main 
traits of Russia’s internal culture and rules.  On one side, under the Tsarist domination, 
the majority of Russians were for a long period serfs and considered the property of the 
landowners.  With the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the Tsars still kept significant 
authority over the Russians. On the other side, the idea of communal living, or 
‘collectivism’, was accepted in Russia for centuries before the communist revolution in 
1917.  As noted in chapter 3, at the beginning of the 1800s, ‘Slavophilism’ started to 
oppose individualism, which was considered a Western principle and alien to the 
‘natural’ Russian collectivist tendency. Conversely, the community was understood as 
more important than the individual.587 As will be noted, aspects of the authoritarian and 
collectivist ideas are also evident in Putin’s view of energy policy.  
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The period in which Putin acted as president of the Russian Federation (1999-2008) or 
as a Prime Minister (1999-2000 and 2008-2012) is, in fact, particularly associated with 
realism in energy policy, which gradually replaced Westerninsm as the dominant 
narrative. Putin grasped the dominant anti-Western sentiment of Russians, the need to 
restore authority and a sense of collectivism, and applied the principles of pragmatic 
statism also to re-shape Russia’s energy governance. Generally speaking, following the 
pragmatic statist narrative, energy policy should be developed to strengthen the Russian 
state and achieve national interests, and should not be used to enrich foreign oil and gas 
companies which, on the contrary, act to weaken the Russian state. The state decides 
buyers, market, pipelines, how quickly reserves should be developed, and it deals for 
exports. Therefore, Putin acted to restrict the intrusion of Western energy companies 
and reinvigorate the Russian state through its direct ownership of energy assets. 
Russia’s law on Subsoils is a good example of how legal decisions limit foreign 
companies’ access to key Russian energy assets in favour of national champions. In 
particular, amendments to the Subsoil Law passed in 2008 established that only state 
companies would receive licences to develop the deposits in offshore fields.588  
Regarding the influence and control of the Russian state over the energy sector, Putin 
approved a range of legislative initiatives aimed to reverse much of the energy sector 
privatisation of the 1990s (see below) and placed well-known ‘figures of the 
presidential administration’ at the head of Russia’s main energy companies.589   
Under Putin energy companies, such as Gazprom and Transneft were renationalized, 
foreign investments and presence restricted, as in the case of the forced renegotiation of 
oil and gas contracts with the foreign Shell and ExxonMobil. Through Gazprom, the 
Russian state acquired shares in projects managed in Russia by foreign companies as in 
the case of Sakhalin-2, the first Russian PSA590 signed in 1994 without a Russian 
partner.  The project, which was of crucial relevance to Russian energy policy,591 was 
the object of great criticism in Russia for environmental violations in 2005-2006. When 
in December 2005, foreign companies in charge of the project (e.g. Shell and Japanese 
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590 Production Sharing Agreement. 
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partners) accepted Gazprom as majority stakeholder,592 the environmental allegations 
disappeared.593 Another opportunity to reduce foreign presence in the Russian energy 
sector was offered by the cancellation of Russian antimonopoly regulations in 2007. 
This allowed the government to also acquire relevant shares in the main private Russian 
gas producers – such as Itera and Novatek – through Gazprom594 that gradually became 
an organic tool of the central government.  
To construct pragmatic statism as the ‘dominant’ energy paradigm, Putin had to 
dislodge and discredit the competing views (paradigms) which downplayed Russian 
imperial ambition and promoted a new foreign policy in favour of opening Russia’s 
borders as a way to boost national interests and the economy. One aspects of such a 
competing view was, for example, evident in Khodorkovsky’s ambitions to transfer 
control over crucial strategic assets, including oil, outside Russia. Faced with such 
opposition, Putin used brutal measures to marginalize the competing view. Indeed, in 
2005 Khodorkovsky was accused of tax fraud and condemned to a Siberian prison 
camp.595  
 
From this initial account of Putin’s approach to energy policy, it emerges that the role of 
Gazprom has been designed compatibly with the doctrine of pragmatic statism. It is 
therefore important to detail its role in Russia’s energy governance. As a state-owned 
company, Gazprom controls most of Russia’s gas production and dominates foreign 
exports. It also accounts for around 85% of domestic gas production and controls 
domestic pipeline networks.  Overall, Gazprom accounts for almost a third of overall 
state revenues. Given its crucial role for Russian economy, the government has 
constantly supported Gazprom’s expansion abroad and has used the company as its 
foreign policy tool. Flanked by the Kremlin, Gazprom aimes to penetrate the gas 
markets of its neighbors in order to control export routes to Western consumers and 
create a situation of interdependence from which the Russian government can benefit on 
the political level. One way through which Gazprom gains control over the pipeline 
infrastructure of ex-Soviet states is by accepting the ownership of infrastructure 
networks as a compensation for the high debt that these countries have towards the 
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Kremlin. For example, in 2006 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko endorsed 
Gazprom’s inroads – channeled by the company RosUkrEnergo596 - into Ukraine’s gas, 
oil and electricity infrastructure.597 Similarly, Gazprom cut off gas supply to Moldova in 
January 2006 after the former rejected Gazprom’s request for a doubling of the price. 
Gazprom’s re-establishment of supplies on 17 January 2006 occurred because of an 
agreement that allowed Gazprom 63.4% of MoldovaGaz’s shares and control of 
Moldova’s domestic gas infrastructure.598 In these instances, the state-owned Gazprom 
also guided the expansion of private Russian business into all foreign countries. Such a 
strategy of energy expansion in the ‘near-abroad’ complements the doctrine of 
pragmatic statism and reflects the historical theme – present in narratives such as 
slavophilism, panslavism, eurasianism – that promoted a Russian (Soviet) imperial 
vocation through control over Eastern Europe.  
Another reason for the Kremlin to support Gazprom relates to the limited opportunity 
offered by the domestic market, which allows only modest price increases. Therefore, 
Gazprom prioritizes foreign exports from which it can relevantly grow. This is true 
especially in relation to Western Europe from which Gazprom receive more than 80% 
of its profits.  Furthermore, the increase of the domestic demand combined with a fall in 
the overall Russian gas production, has strengthen the support of the Russian state and 
Gazprom since higher foreign reserves are needed. To address this situation, the 
Kremlin has backed Gazprom in concluding deals with Central Asia states and main 
African exporters such as Algeria. This strategy has also served the purpose of locking 
up reserves in producers regions which could become competitors of Gazprom in 
Western Europe.599  
Overall, it emerges a clear strategy of the Russian state to prioritize the expansion of 
Gazprom abroad rather than engaging in more long-term and risky upstream production 
development projects. Also, the focus on promoting Russian capital and preserving 
Gazprom’s monopoly highlight how holding power rather than modernization is the 
priority. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has often advanced 
a competing view calling for market reforms in the Russian gas sector, including the 
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break-up of Gazprom and the encouragement of competition. Gazprom leadership has, 
however, rejected such a plan stressing the potential negative consequences to the 
security of domestic gas supply and national economy.600  
 
Putin’s understanding of the energy governance in Russia reflects his broader view of 
Russia’s position in international affairs which is heavily permeated by the theme of 
sovereignty. In other words, the strategy of resource sovereignty – seen as a main 
economic policy to promote development and national security first – is instrumental to 
Russia’s role in in international arena. As he stated, the only way for Russia to reduce 
its gap with developed countries and achieve an economic growth of 4 to 6 % per year 
is via ‘extraction, processing and exploitation of mineral raw resources’. This would 
make Russia ‘a great economic power’.601 The monopolization of supervision of 
national resources mainly through Gazprom unveils a tendency to establish pricing 
policies on natural gas, hence prioritizing national interests instead of following the 
course of international markets.602  Thus, as Tsygankov mentioned, Putin’s Russia 
rejected calls for complete globalization and liberalization of its energy market. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the current Russian policy based on state-
controlled resources is similar to the economic policies adopted by EU member states 
during their period of industrialization.603  
In addition, Putin’s vision of international politics has added an anti-Western dimension 
to energy governance in Russia. As in a zero-sum game, EU’s diversification plans are 
perceived to be driven by anti-Russian sentiment while the production of natural gas in 
the post-Soviet area by any company with a significant share of foreign capital 
(especially Western) could harm Russian economic and political sovereignty, and is, 
therefore threatening. Similarly, Putin’s pragmatic statism advocates the view that 
monopoly is crucial to exert leverage in domestic and international politics and to 
improve Russia’s relative position in the international arena. Only once Russia paid its 
foreign debts and gained budget surpluses could a slow opening of the Russian energy 
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market to foreign companies be permitted. But this openness still excluded the 
possibility for a foreign company to entirely own Russian energy infrastructure. Russian 
capital, either private or state-controlled, should be prioritized. Any cooperation 
agreement between a foreign company and Russian companies should be limited to 
technological know-how on the condition of its transfer to Russia.604 If the aim is to 
acquire expertise, Russian companies can play the role of ‘learners’. But all relevant 
infrastructure projects must remain under state control. From this perspective, due to the 
high geopolitical importance, access to a pipeline should be possible for the Russian 
state and private operators, but access to foreign investors – which compete with 
Russian operators – is denied.  
Against this background, it becomes clear that the EU’s attempt to dispossess Russia of 
its natural advantage, through, for example, the insistence on the Russian ratification of 
the ECT – which foresees unrestricted access to the Russian pipeline system for foreign 
capital605 – is not viable. 
 
Furthermore, it can be noted how the historical theme of ‘exceptionalism’ that, as noted 
in chapter 3, is also present in Putin’s approach to energy. Asked if Russia could be 
defined as an energy superpower due to its high production and oil revenues, Putin 
rejected the term ‘superpower’ but added that: 
 
‘I have never referred to Russia as an energy superpower. But we do have 
greater possibilities than almost any other country in the world. If put together, 
Russia’s energy potential in all areas, oil, gas, and nuclear, our country is 
unquestionably the leader’.606  
 
Along with exceptionalism, europeanism/westernism represented the other component 
of Putin’s pragmatic statism. When internal debates called for ‘modernization’ through 
investments, and adequate technology for the development of ‘next generation’ fields 
located in the Arctic regions off Russia’s northern coast, Putin’s Russia realized the 
need for an international partner. As a result, Rosneft signed a partnership with 
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ExxonMobil in March 2012 for the development of the oil and gas fields in the Arctic. 
Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, stated that the project went beyond the ‘over-
politicization’ and ‘historic stereotypes that hampered’ the US-West relationship and 
the deal was denoted as offering a ‘big windows of opportunity’. As confirmation of the 
principle of reciprocity, Rosnet obtained 30% shares in various on - and offshore 
ExxonMobil projects in the US and Canada.607 These examples epitomize the balance in 
Putin’s approach between the two competing visions of his pragmatic statism: 
exceptionalism/eurasianism and Europeanism/westernism.  
This balance is also telling of Russia’s temporal identity. The emphasis on statism 
marks a need to consolidate the Russian state and thus, it can be read through the 
schemes of ‘repetition’ or ‘stasis’, whereas cooperation with Western companies is 
indicative of a need for ‘change’ and ‘development’ towards modernization. Similarly, 
the balance between exceptionalism/eurasianism and Europeanism/westernism also 
demonstrates how the ‘degree of Otherness’ can vary. The ‘West’ can be represented as 
a ‘partner’ or as a ‘threat’ to expel from national borders or the ex-Soviet space. Indeed, 
the construction of the spatial identity of Russia as a ‘European’ actor operating in a 
separated or united ‘Europe’ depends on these very representations. 
A wide ‘degree of Otherness’ with a consequent representation of the ‘West’ as a 
negative ‘Other’ can also be noted in the veiled threat that Russia makes to Western 
European consumers to switch supply to less troublesome consumers in other regions. 
The Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) in 2008 made various references to energy focusing 
on the need to strengthen ties with India and China and with countries of the CSTO and 
SCO.608 This was accompanied by opposition towards the (Western-orientated) 
European security structure: 
 
‘The reaction to the prospect of loss by the historic West of its monopoly in global 
processes finds its expression, in particular, in the continued political and 
psychological policy of "containing" Russia, including the use of a selective 
approach to history, for those purposes, first of all as regards  World War Two 
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and the postwar period’.609 
 
In particular, similarly to the neo-Eurasianist narrative that promotes the discourse of a 
Russian empire through further cooperation with ‘greater’ Eurasia (e.g. post-Soviet 
Russia, continental Islamic states, China, India, Eastern Europe) and against Western 
hegemony, the FPC calls for Moscow to look at other non-Western allies for its energy 
projects rather than at the West:610 
 
‘To enhance its interaction with the States of the Islamic world, Russia will 
take advantage of its participation as an observer in the work of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, and 
play an active role in implementing the G8 Partnership with the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa Region. Priority attention will be paid to 
developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation, in particular in the 
energy sector, with countries of this region, which is of strategic importance to 
Russia's national interests’.611 
 
Under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev energy continued to be understood in 
geopolitical terms. The policy document ‘Russia’s National Security Strategy’ issued in 
2009 describes competition over energy security as a potential source of threat and 
tension, which could lead to the use of military force near Russian borders:  
 
‘Sources of threats to national security could include factors such 
as…competition over insufficient raw materials, energy… which increase 
strategic risks associated with dependence on changes in external factors’.612 
 
Regarding energy relations with the EU, the geopolitical tone of the Russian approach 
lies in the fact that Russia’s main political objective is to de-monopolise the EU’s 
attempt to impose itself as a model for the energy governance in Europe.  
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For example, at the basis of Putin’s opposition to the Third Energy Package there is a 
tendency to perceive it as an EU attempt to own the exclusive right to define what is a 
good practice in energy governance by excluding Russia from being a norm-setter on 
the European continent. Commenting on the Package that prevents suppliers from also 
owning a distribution network (e.g. Gazprom), Putin said:  
 
‘We often hear from our partners both in Europe and North America: ‘If you want 
to be members of a global family of civilized nations, you should behave in a 
civilized way.’ What is this then? Have our colleagues forgotten the basic 
principles?’.613 
 
In Putin’s view, the Package – allegedly aiming to liberalize the continent’s energy 
market – hinders investments and is ultimately an ‘uncivilized’ measure.614 In addition, 
Russia’s unwillingness to commit to the EU’s rules-based approach to energy 
cooperation, and its rejection of multilateral structures of governance such as the ECT, 
epitomizes Russia’s realist focus on protecting her national interests in an environment 
hostile to her (RE paradigm) and the historical narrative of the West as an entity 
intending to harm Russian interests.615   
Here, it can be noted how the representation of ‘foreign’ and ‘Western’ seems to refer to 
a threatening entity aiming to weaken the Russian state. This not only indicates a high 
‘degree of Otherness’ but also contributes to grasp the role of outsiders in the 
development of a Russian energy paradigm along a geopolitical reasoning (constitutive 
power of outsiders).   
 
However, Putin’s discourse on Russia’s external energy policy has been discursively 
portrayed as economically and not politically driven. While the 2006 gas dispute 
between Gazprom and Ukraine – Russia’s main eastern European transit in 2006 – has 
been widely reported in Western Europe as an example of Russia’s use of energy for 
geopolitical reasons, there is uncertainty on whether the Russian approach followed 
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political or economic calculations. The crisis was due to Russia’s increase in gas prices 
for Ukraine; Russia’s claims that Ukraine was not paying for gas and was diverting gas 
from Russia to the EU from pipelines that crossed the Ukrainian territory, and referred 
to a disagreement over transit fees for gas transported to EU markets via Ukraine. After 
unsuccessful negotiations, Russia shut down gas supplies to Ukraine on 1st January 
2006. Given that almost 80% of the Russian gas imported by the EU passed through 
pipelines crossing Ukrainian territory, the cuts resulted in decreased supply to the 
EU.616 The Russia–Ukraine 2006 transit dispute ended when Kiev agreed to abandon 
attempts to circumvent the Russian monopoly over the transport and marketing of 
Central Asian gas to Europe.  Although Russia’s decision to cut gas can be read as 
political response to Ukraine’s Western European choice in the Orange Revolution, 
economic reasons should also be considered.617 Factors also related to prices and debts 
might also lead us to think that the Russian move was economically driven.  
All in all, this instance questions the assumption that the Russian understanding of 
energy security has been only interpreted in a (neo)realist fashion.  
Drawing from this example, other instances demonstrate that Putin’s Russia viewed 
energy security through a neoliberal lens. Indeed, Putin’s has often referred to 
cooperation as necessary to guarantee a multilateral framework in international energy. 
For example, the document ‘Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030’ 
strengthened the principles of multilateralism and called for Russia to pursue the 
following objectives: 
  
‘active participation in international negotiation processes on energy issues, 
provision of balance between interests of importers, exporters and transiters of 
energy resources in international treaties and international organizations’.618  
 
The document adds that Russia should coordinate its energy policy and ensure:  
 
‘…development of energy cooperation with the countries of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, Eurasian Economic Union, North-Eastern Asia, Shanghai 
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Cooperation Organization, and European Union as well as with other 
international organizations and countries… coordination of activity on world oil 
and gas markets with the countries-members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum’619 
 
Finally, it also calls for ‘assistance in developing the united European-Russian-Asian 
energy area’.620  
 
Overall, this second part of chapter 4 demonstrated that, although geopolitics has often 
driven Russia’s understanding of energy security, evidence of neo-liberal principles 
exist. History shows how Western concepts such as privatization and market-based 
reforms and state-centric approaches have alternated in the Russian energy sector. The 
interaction with Western Europe / EU and the West also accounts for this alternation. 
The ‘Western Other’ has either triggered a cooperative discourse (e.g. cooperation in the 
Baku and Volga oil fields and Yeltsin’s privatization programmes) or a confrontational 
one (restriction of investments of Western companies in Russian energy sector, 
opposition to the Third Package).   
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter was based on the notion that it is neither geopolitics (RE) alone, nor solely 
market-based calculations (MI) that determine the structure of an actor’s energy 
paradigm. Thus, given the various discourses utilized by the EC and Russia at different 
levels – internal, external and regional – geopolitics and the economic element are often 
intertwined. Instead, reasoning through a clear-cut divide and the assumptions of the 
conventional constructivist literature about the difference in the nature of the EU and 
Russia seems inappropriate and not adequately explored. Unlike the state-centrism of 
the conventional constructivist tradition, the discursive contestation occurring in the 
internal dimension holds explanatory power to account for the difference / sameness in 
actors’ energy policies. In addition, the EC – mainly in its external action – and 
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individual MSs have proved to adhere to the same geopolitical logics that Russia 
seemed to use at times in its energy governance. Similarly, claims in favour of 
cooperation, multilateralism and willingness to adopt liberal principles have also 
informed Russia’s debate on energy paradigms.   
 
Differently from existing accounts, this chapter also highlights how the narrative-based 
background – which detected the various historical Self’s representations in relation to 
the ‘Other’ (see previous chapter) – and the emphasis on the ‘degree of Otherness’ – 
which explains how alien can be the detected ‘Other’ – help better to understand the 
alternation between the MI and RE. From this perspective, this analysis conceptualizes 
EU-Russia energy relation as a discursive encounter. Existing discourse-based 
accounts621 reject the materialism of rationalism by focusing on social factors such as 
discourses. They also overcome the state-centrism of conventional constructivism since 
they explore the degree of discursive contestation occurring within the actors’ internal 
debate. Yet, these accounts remain one-sided because discourses are either investigated 
within the EU or within Russia but never put in interactive perspective. The role of the 
Self / Other discursive encounter and ‘Otherness’ in the policy field of energy is 
neglected. As a result, the constitutive role of outside is understated. 
 
The section on the Russian energy paradigm has demonstrated how the MI and RE 
energy paradigm have alternated in Russia in the last two decades. The 1990s witnessed 
a genuine de-politicisation of energy since trade and relations with the Western bloc – 
including the then ECC – became increasingly marketised and institutionalized. Within 
the post-perestroika period and the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin acted to privatize 
its energy assets as part of a larger process of ‘shock therapy’ accepted by the Russian 
political leadership on the prescriptions of Western governments. In short, in the earlier 
post-Soviet period, liberal ideas prevailed and the transition reforms were largely 
designed in accordance with a pro-Western orientation.  
In the mid 2000s, however, problems for the liberal institutionalist model started to 
surface. Russia’s shift away from the MI paradigm was interpreted as the return of the 
West’s old enemy. By joining the Western model and starting to privatize and liberalize 
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its energy sector, Russia had dismissed other courses of development and endorsed the 
belief that there were no plausible alternatives to the Western energy model.  
Conversely, with Putin’s pragmatic policy, the re-nationalization wave, and the 
economic boost supported by high oil prices, Russia started formulating more ambitious 
political and geopolitical goals.622 
However, when increased tensions with the West and economic difficulties occurred, 
pragmatic statism – which in turn combines Eurasianism/exceptionalism and 
Westernism/Europeanism – became the authoritative and dominant narrative informing 
the policy-making process.  
On one side, Putin’s foreign policy towards Russia’s ‘near-abroad’ entailed strong 
geopolitical considerations including a feeling of rivalry with the EU with a consequent 
negative image of the West plotting against Russia’s interests. Such competition has 
often revolved around the issue of energy security. 
At the same time, the acceptance of the EU-Russian ED as a recognized platform to 
cooperate with the EC on issues such as energy efficiency and renewable energy 
epitomizes Putin’s adherence also to a pro-Western narrative.      
 
The ambivalence of Russian foreign energy policy between liberalism and realism is 
also reflected in Russian energy relations towards the EU. It can be noted how this 
ambivalence reproduces the competition of historical narratives such as 
westernism/europeanism and slavophilism/exceptionalistm623 which has been a constant 
in Russian historical debate on its identity. For example, on one side, in its relations 
with the EU, Russia has demonstrated a spatial understanding of Europe as a unitary 
continent and a positive perception of Western Europe (e.g. by adhering to the EU-
Russia ED, which is a platform for cooperation on energy issues). On the other side, the 
rejection of the EU-sponsored ECT and the launch of the South Stream pipeline – which 
is presented as a much simpler and more secure alternative to the EU-sponsored 
Nabucco – can be read as Russia’s competing project over ‘Europe’ and ultimately it 
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reveals a negative understanding of the West - seen as a threat to Russia’s interests.  
Furthermore, from the section on Russia it emerges how political emphasis has been put 
on the central role for the state in energy management. Once again the historical 
analysis conducted in the previous chapter provided the appropriate background to 
understand the reason for this. In fact, Russia has a long history of state-centric rule as 
well as of socialist, or as it was known earlier ‘collectivist’, thinking. It is important to 
consider such cultural aspects when examining the political economy of energy in 
Russia since this embraces beliefs that still underpin Russia’s politics today. In this 
respect, it can be argued that in Russia, for historical reasons, economic nationalism and 
collectivist ideas are acceptable practices as well as the centralization of energy supply 
and the concentration of control. 
 
Similarly, the section on EU energy security aimed to outline the main themes that 
guided the energy paradigms adopted by MSs, the EP and the EC in its internal and 
external dimensions and in its relations with Russia. As for the internal dimension, it 
has been demonstrated that the EC and the EP emerged as the staunch promoter of 
energy cooperation and integration while MSs advance a competing nationalist 
paradigm. As a result, the EU’s internal energy policy has long been characterized by 
oscillation and contestation between state and market-driven models of governance. 
However, this was due to the lack of power of the EC to mitigate state-centric positions 
of MSs.  
As for the external energy dimension, the EC’s approach turns more geopolitical and 
thus, it falls within an RE paradigm. Although the EC rejects realist geopolitics as a 
basis for energy security, it was demonstrated that behind the liberal principle a more 
geopolitical dimension is concealed as the case of the ECT, 2006 Green Paper, ‘An 
External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy’ and the Strategic Energy Review showed. 
Closer analyses of these policy documents illustrated how the EC’s stated approach to 
energy security in relations with Russia and other third countries reveals the intention to 
spread values inspiring the EU’s internal logics. This indicates that the EC’s 
understanding of relations with Russia (and other neighbours) remains along the 
‘teacher-learner’ historical narrative.  
In addition, the fact that Russia has often opposed the universal Western standards, 
rejecting the ECT and cutting energy supply to its neighboring countries, generated the 
image of Russia as the ‘bad learner’, a theme that has often recurred throughout the 
  203 
history of West-Russia relations. As a result, each Russian decision on energy that 
failed to meet the expectations of the partners in the West (EC and some MSs), 
consequently fuelled the Western representation of Russia as an actor using its ‘energy 
weapon’ to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Similarly, the pragmatic energy policy 
implemented by Putin is conceived in Western Europe as the aspiration of an 
underdeveloped state to become a greater power. This recalls the nineteenth century 
Western European image of Russia as attempting to achieve hegemony in the Concert 
of Europe using the manners of a ‘barbarian at the gate’. However, along with the 
learner-teacher theme, the ED (see chapter 6) has also demonstrated how elements of an 
egalitarian / cooperative narrative is at work. In the context of the ED, the EC tells, in 
fact, the story of cooperation and integration. 
 
In the light of this analysis, the following chapters (5 and 6) will contribute to building 
layer three. In doing so, these chapters will aim to test the layered structure of meaning 
made up of historical narratives (layer one) and policy paradigms (e.g. energy, layer 
two). The overall aim is to demonstrate how historical narratives in Russia and in the 
Western Europe (layer one) and the EU’s and Russia’s understanding of energy security 
(layer two) can help illustrate the political implications underlying the debates over the 
Nabucco/South Stream pipeline and the EU-Russia ED. 
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Chapter 5 - Building Layer Three: Analysing Nabucco and South 
Stream Pipeline through a Discursive Approach 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter focuses on layer three of the Wæverian structure of meaning. As noted, 
this layer switches the analysis from general discursive structure resulting from layers 
one and two, to the concrete performance (discursive practices) of such a structure in 
the context of the energy relations between the EU and Russia. In other words, layer 
three moves from macro-historical narratives and energy paradigms (layers one and 
two) to their practical performance in relation to the case studies in the context of EU-
Russia energy relations. As such, the impact of historical narratives and energy 
paradigms will be now scrutinized through the analysis of a situation inherent to EU-
Russia energy relations: the debate around the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline 
projects.  
Layer three is mainly constructed through language and symbolic acts.  As said, 
discourse analysis includes a number of approaches that focus on written, vocal, or 
symbolic use of language in any significant semiotic event. Political discourse analysis 
is one among various discourse analyses and specifically focuses on the discourses 
spoken in political forms (such as debates, speeches). This thesis aims to construct 
political discourses by focusing on written text, speeches as well as on the symbolic 
nature of discourse. In particular, symbolic acts have the communicative effects of 
materializing discourses. It follows that discourses and symbolic acts are interrelated. A 
mere act does not have an objective meaning.  What allows an act to acquire 
significance is the discursive background624. In other words, through this discursive 
structure the meaning of symbolic actions goes beyond the mere reading of a written 
text.  There is instead a deeper meaning and discursive constructions that should be read 
in light of a given context.625 
 
From this perspective and with the layered structure of analysis in mind, the proposed 
approach combines context, texts, speeches and symbolic meaning to explain the 
                                                      
624 An official visit on a specific day (e.g. national day), is an example of a symbolic act. 
625 L., Heracleous, R.J., Marshak, Conceptualizing Organizational Discourse as Situated Symbolic 
Action, Human Relations, Vol. 57, No. 10, 2004, pp. 1285–1312.  Available from : 
http://www.heracleous.org/uploads/1/1/2/9/11299865/hum_rel_-_disc_as_situated_symb_action.pdf  
Accessed 20/07/2013 
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politics of the South Stream / Nabucco pipelines.  
 
The Nabucco pipeline is included within a EU programme (Trans-European Networks – 
Energy, TEN-E) that confers to the project a strategic importance. Its objectives are to 
improve the connection of the EU to the natural gas sources in the Caspian Sea and the 
Middle East regions as well as to decrease the EU’s dependence on Russian sources 
(currently the largest EU’s supplier) by diversifying EU’s current energy supplies.  
In 2006, Gazprom proposed an alternative project – South Stream – to enhance 
European energy security. South Stream is presented as consistent with the strategy on 
diversifying the Russian routes of gas supplies to the EU.  
While both parties play the diversification discourse, the two projects present a different 
perspective. Through Nabucco, the EU aims to diversify the range of its suppliers (read 
less Russian supply), whilst through South Stream, Gazprom aims to keep its role as 
main supplier of the EU and to diversify the routes. 
 
Rationalist accounts have tried to interpret the approaches of the EU and Russia in the 
Nabucco-South Stream politics as advancing an interest-based argument626. In this 
respect, these approaches have assumed the thesis of ‘a zero sum’ conflict and the 
concept of the geopolitics of pipelines. In the broader literature on EU-Russia energy 
relations, the liberal-institutionalist-inspired approach advanced by authors such as 
Warkotsch and Monaghan627 hold that conflict events are caused by cognitive rather 
than ideological factors, that is, they originate from (mis)perceptions and 
(mis)understandings, rather than discursive contestation for hegemony, as this chapter 
aims to argue.  
Baev and Overland reject both a geopolitical and pure rationalist reading of the pipeline 
politics. They rather aim to assess the feasibility of the Nabucco and South Stream – 
                                                      
626 J., Mankoff, Eurasian Energy Security, CFR, Council Special Report, No.43, February 2009, p.179 
See also Baran, Z., Security Aspects of the South Stream Project, Center for Eurasian Policy, Briefing 
Paper requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2008, p.25. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/afet/2008/388962/EXPO-
AFET_NT(2008)388962_EN.pdf   Accessed 27/08/2013 
See also D., Freifeld, The Great Pipeline Opera, Foreign Policy, Vol.174, 2009, p.122 
T., Varol, The Russian Energy Policy, Republic of Macedonia: EGALITE, ESI – European Scientific 
Institute, 2013. 
627 R., Gotz, Energy Cooperation. The Southern Gas Transport Corridor in A., Warkotsch, eds., The 
European Union and Central Asia, Oxon-New York :Routledge, 2011,  pp.158-189 
See also A., Monaghan, Russia-EU Relations: An Emerging Energy Security Dilemma, Pro et Contra, 
No.10,  2006. Available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/EmergingDilemma1.pdf Accessed 
13/12/2013 
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considered as ‘mega-project’ – by looking at actors’ motivation.628 
 
Overall, existing accounts fail to explore how the alleged conflictual dispositions of 
actors and their motivations unfold through communication. This is not to say that the 
reason for conflict is necessarily discursive in origin, but that the geopolitical, economic 
or cultural factors become interactive and accessible when they are communicated in 
discourses.629 
As a general rule, all these accounts neglect the importance of historical representations 
and how they are reflected in actors’ discursive interaction. By extensively focusing on 
the conflict of interests and misperceptions in such pipeline politics, these approaches 
also fail to grasp the deeper implications on identity construction, resulting in a specific 
representation of the counterpart as the ‘Other’. This chapter aims to fill this gap by 
framing interests within discourses which, in turn, are indicative of a specific 
representation of the Other who can be, for example, a partner or a ‘threat’ depending 
on the ‘degree of Otherness’.  
In short, this chapter explains the politics of the Nabucco and South Stream through the 
mutual representation held by the EU and Russia in their discourses.  
In addition, the proposed account focuses on the meaning of the Nabucco and South 
Stream pipeline for the political construction of ‘Europe’, and on the mutual 
construction of the EU and Russia as ‘European’ actors.  
 
Through the layered structure of meaning it will be demonstrated that the narratives 
evident in layers one and two are actually operative in the pipeline debate on Nabucco 
and South Stream. Findings should confirm the hypothesis that EU and Russian 
discourses in this pipeline debate evoke historical narratives (layer one) and ultimately 
reflect the energy paradigms adopted by the two actors (layer two). The first section 
briefly describes the technicalities of the Nabucco and South Stream projects (route, 
participants etc.) and the politics around the two pipelines.  
A section follows that aims to map the discursive landscape beginning with the non-
                                                      
628 K., P., Baev, and I., Overland, The South Stream versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and 
Economical (ir)ationales and Political Stakes in Mega Projects, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5, 
2010, pp. 1077. Available from: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2010/86_5baev_overland
.pdf   Accessed 20/09/2013 
629 Prozorov, Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU, p.21 
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threatening and conciliatory discursive practices advanced by the EU and Russia. As 
demonstrated in chapter 3, this narrative field describes a positive scenario for 
West/Western European-Russian relations, which are based on the principles of 
cooperation, equality and belonging to the same European continent.  
Conversely, the subsequent section brings evidence to the discursive practice – typical 
of the Cold War – of discrediting the feasibility of the counterpart’s projects, and that 
evokes the historical dichotomy of ‘true/false’ Europe. The historical themes of 
exceptionalism and messianism are also encountered, especially in statements made by 
Russian representatives.  
Subsequently, the analysis turns to the examination of symbolic acts carried out mainly 
by Russian officials (such as strategic official visits in key transit countries on a 
symbolic day) attesting the existence of competing logics at work, as opposed to the 
claimed non-exclusive and conciliatory stance. Against this background, it will be 
illustrated that, for example, the employment of the conventional representation of 
‘Russia as a threatening Other’, and the Europeanisation language found in the official 
discursive practice of the EC, contribute to explain Russian discursive reaction.  
 
 
2 The Politics of the Nabucco and South Stream Pipeline Projects  
 
 
As noted, this first section describes the technicalities of the Nabucco and South Stream 
projects (route, participants etc.) and the politics around the two pipelines.  
The increasing reliance on oil and gas imports is one of the main energy challenges on 
the EU’s agenda. For this reason, the EU has a great interest in an efficient oil and gas 
market and infrastructure. Transportation of natural gas poses a further challenge, as it 
is limited and inflexible.630 Moreover, given gas supply disruptions, the EC was 
concerned that Europe's energy networks might no longer provide secure energy supply. 
This led the EU to move security of supply to the top of its agenda.631  In particular, 
security of gas supply was defined in a Commission Communication as ‘the availability 
                                                      
630 Oil transport infrastructure is less problematic given that oil is often transported by  alternative 
transport means such as tankers 
631 J., Bjørnmose, F., Roca, T., Turgot, D.,  Smederup Hansen, Gas and Oil Pipeline in Europe, Briefing 
Paper requested by European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, 2009, p.3. 
Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110628ATT22856/20110628ATT228
56EN.pdf  Accessed 12/02/2013 
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of gas to users at affordable prices’.632 
Another reason why the EU perceives the availability at risk lies in the fact that gas 
supply depends on few countries (Russia, North Africa and Middle East), some of 
which are unstable and exposed to elevated geopolitical risks. Supply and pipeline 
transmission from these countries can be threatened by internal conflicts, (such as inter-
state wars, embargos and terrorism). This contributed to shaping a perception that gas 
transportation often runs through vulnerable pipeline routes.633  
Against this background, the EU adopted a strategy aiming to review the existing oil 
and gas infrastructures, and decrease the vulnerability to gas supply from few countries 
through supply diversification. In particular, the transportation infrastructure – including 
oil and gas pipelines – play a crucial role in the interdependent relationship with Russia, 
which is the EU’s main supplier. In light of this, the Nord Stream pipeline634, for 
example, has been labeled as a project of ‘European interest’ in the guidelines on TEN-
E.635 Other pipeline projects discussed were Yamal II and the Amber project.636  
However, from a EU perspective, the existing and projected routes are subject to 
political and economic power play, which might destabilize their functioning. Crisis in 
transit countries (e.g. Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 and Belarus in 2007) triggered concerns 
in the EU about the stability of oil and gas exports from Russia. This, in turn, triggered 
a growing perception that Russia is becoming an unreliable supplier or is using its 
dominant position to pursue its geopolitical objectives in the ex-Soviet space. As a 
reaction, the EU has begun to advance the need for diversification of energy 
suppliers.637 The EU has, thus, reconsidered its infrastructure policy with a global 
vision, adding Central Asia and the Caucasus suppliers to Russia. The reason behind 
this strategy is the belief that in order to enhance the EU’s energy security, it is 
important to diversify not only transportation routes but also the sources of energy 
supply.  
Under the Green Paper for the Trans-European Energy Networks a new pipeline 
strategy emerged: ‘some of the main pipelines serving Europe's customers are 
                                                      
632 Committee of Regions on the Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to 
safeguard the security of natural gas supply, COM (2008c), 13 November. Available from: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,en&lng2=bg,cs,da,de,el,en
,es,et,fi,fr,hu,it,lt,lv,mt,nl,pl,pt,ro,sk,sl,sv,&val=483617:cs  Accessed 12/02/2013 
633 Bjørnmose, Roca, Turgot,  Smederup Hansen, Gas and Oil Pipeline in Europe, p. 19 
634 Nord Stream also  aims to diversify transportation routes. 
635 Trans-European Networks - Energy 
636 Labelled as a project of common interest in the TEN-E guidelines 
637 Bjørnmose, Roca, Turgot,  Smederup Hansen, Gas and Oil Pipeline in Europe, pp. 24-25 
  210 
overstretched or in need for maintenance. New import routes, notably from Central Asia 
and the Caspian as well as from the Middle East and Africa, will also be needed’.638 
The decision to back the Nabucco pipeline falls within the EU’s diversification strategy 
as a way to decrease overreliance on Russia and increase security of supply.639 In fact, 
Nabucco would completely bypass Russia, offering a new export route and new gas 
supply from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions. With an approximate budget of 
EUR 8 billion, the Nabucco project is a private initiative supported by OMV (Austria), 
FGSZ Ltd. (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), Bulgarian Energy Holding (Bulgaria), 
Botas (Turkey), and RWE (Germany).640 Although the EU is not a shareholder641, the 
Nabucco project has gained significant political and financial support from the EU642, 
which sees it as a strategic tool in securing access to Caspian and Middle Eastern gas 
supplies in the context of the Southern Corridor Initiative.643 As such, the EU’s TEN-E 
programme – which lists projects eligible for Community assistance644 - designated the 
                                                      
638 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper - Towards a secure, sustainable and 
competitive european energy network 
639 Baev, and Overland, The South Stream versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and Economical 
(ir)ationales and Political Stakes in Mega Projects, p. 1077 
640 Nabucco-Pipeline Website, FAQ Section. Available from: http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/safety/faq Accessed on 15 January 2013 
641 As European Commissioner for Energy, Gunther Oettinger, recalled in answering a Parliamentary 
question entitled ‘Nabucco, South Stream, and Synergies in the Southern Corridor: ‘The EU as such is not 
a party to any pipeline projects; these are implemented by private companies’.  See European Council, 
Reply to Parliamentary Question E-001798/2011, 20 June 2011. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-001798&language=EN 
Accessed 20/09/2013 
642 In his answer to another Parliamentary question Oettinger specifies that: ‘The Commission continues 
to support the Southern Corridor, of which Nabucco is one possible pipeline project’. (See word doc. on 
the right side) Oettinger, G., Parliamentary Questions E-010627/2010. Answer given by Mr Oettinger on 
behalf of the Commission, 28 January 2011.  Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-010627&language=EN 
Accessed 20/09/2013.  
In another official intervention, Mr. Oettinger expressed the intention of the European Commission to 
financially support the Nabucco project: ‘As far as financial support to Nabucco is concerned, the 
European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) allowed the Commission to allocate EUR 200 million 
to the project’.See  Oettinger, G.., Parliamentary Questions E-005505/2012 . Answer given by Mr 
Oettinger on behalf of the Commission, 16 July 2012.Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-005505&language=EN  
Accessed 20/09/2013 
643 For the official document on the launch of the Southern Corridor Initiative see Commission of the 
European Communities, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Second Strategic Energy Review. 
An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM(2008a), 13 November. Available from: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EN:PDF Accessed 
21/09/2013  
644 See for example, DG Energy Website, Energy Infrastructure. Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-
E). Available from:  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/ten_e_en.htm Accessed 15/01/2013 
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Nabucco pipeline as a project of strategic importance.645 The US also welcomed the 
decision of the governments of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria to sign 
the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Nabucco pipeline project.646 In the light of 
European and US support, this chapter assumes that the Nabucco pipeline enjoys 
Western support. 
 
On the Russian side, the most important alternative to Nabucco has been the South 
Stream pipeline project planned to transport Russian natural gas to Western Europe. 
Given the EU’s intention to build Nabucco without Russian involvement and the 
growing tensions with transit states, South Stream is of political – as well as economic – 
importance to Russia. The South Stream pipeline was disegned to undermine the 
monopoly position of Ukraine as a transit country for gas supplies and ensure that 
Western Europe continues to receive a large proportion of its gas from Russia. The 
Russian strategy is to combine North Stream and South Stream into an integrated 
energy supply network which will make Western Europe immune to the consequences 
of Kiev’s and Minsk’s unpredictability. 
The South Stream project was announced in 2007 when the CEO of Italian energy 
company Eni, Paolo Scaroni, and the Vice-Chairman of Russian Gazprom, Alexander 
Medvedev, signed in Rome a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the 
construction of South Stream.647 Currently, the four shareholders of the South Stream 
consortium are Gazprom (Russia, 50%), Eni (Italy, 20%), EDF (France, 15%), and 
Wintershall – a BASF subsidiary (Germany, 15%).648 The South Stream route includes 
an offshore section across the Black Sea and an on-shore section crossing various 
                                                      
645  In the Activity Report of the European Coordinator on the TEN–E  it is reported that: ‘The European 
Union has designated (...) three of the pipelines as of strategic importance (ITGI, Nabucco and White 
Stream)’. See J., Van AArtsen, Activity Report, September 2007 - February 2009,  Project of European 
interest n° NG 3, 4 February 2009, p.7. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/doc/axis/2009_axis_linking_activity_report_2007_2009.p
df Accessed 5/5/2013 
646 In an official note, it is reported that: ‘We congratulate the governments of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary and Austria on the July 13 signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Nabucco pipeline 
project. This Agreement is a significant milestone in achieving our shared vision of opening a new energy 
corridor that will bring Caspian gas to Europe.  See US Department of State, Signing Ceremony for the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Nabucco Pipeline, Press Statement, 2009. Available from: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125968.htm 
647ENI, Eni and Gazprom Sign the Agreement for the South Stream Project, ENI Press Release, 2007. 
Available from: http://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/press-
releases/2007/06/Eni_and_Gazprom_sign_the_agree_23.06.2007.shtml  Accessed 20/09/ 2013 
648 The South Stream Transport Consortium’s Website, The Combined Know-how of Four Major 
Companies, South Stream. Available from:  http://www.south-stream-offshore.com/about-
us/shareholders/ Accessed 20/07/2013 
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European states. In particular, the gas pipeline is planned to transmit gas from West 
Siberia via Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Hungary and Slovenia to 
Italy.649 In terms of costs, South Stream will likely be the most expensive pipeline in the 
world, as the estimated cost of its construction is EUR 19–26 billion.650   
The two pipeline projects have relevant similarities and differences. One of the most 
important differences between Nabucco and South Stream is in ownership; Nabucco is 
financed from the private sector, and thus needs to be commercially workable, while 
South Stream’s main stakeholder is the state-owned Gazprom.651  The two projects have 
shared participants, as is the case with OMV, which has a leading role in South Stream, 
as well as Nabucco. Also, three of the five countries through which Nabucco would 
pass652 are included in the South Stream project too: Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. As 
such, the two pipelines might be seen as ‘competing’ for the same financing resources in 
the target states.653  
Moreover, in supporting their projects, both the EU and Russia put great emphasis on 
the diversification discourse. However, they prove to hold different interpretations of it. 
A rationalist might argue that these two interpretations of the diversification discourse 
reflect the same interest of both actors to secure their self-security, the EU through the 
security of supply, and Russia by maintaining Gazrpom’s quasi-monopolitst role in 
supplying the EU. A conventional constructivist can go beyond the rationalist stance by 
underlining that their understanding of diversification as a way to achieve energy 
security simply differs: for the EU, security of supply means diversification of gas 
sources for the EU (fewer Russian sources), for Russia it means diversification of gas 
transportation routes (but same source).  
However, while these explanations can be accurate, such a dissimilar understanding 
seems assumed and obvious given the material positions of the two actors. The EU’s 
security of supply would be enhanced with less Russian gas whereas Russia as main 
exporter intends to keep its privileged role.  
                                                      
649 The South Stream Transport Consortium’s Website, Gas Pipeline Route, http://www.south-
stream.info/en/pipeline/route/ Accessed 20/01/2013 
See also K., Hubert, Gunther Oettinger: Europe Has to Take the Russians Seriously,  Natural Gas 
Europe, 20 December, 2012. Available from: http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/guenther-oettinger-
europe-has-to-take-the-russians-seriously Accessed 20/02/2013 
650 J.D.A., Tarasov, The Making of Empires : Russia’s Gas Exporting Pipelines v Nabucco,  Journal of  
World Energy Law and Business, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2011, p. 82 
651 Baran, Security Aspects of the South Stream Project, p.8 
652 Or four, if Turkish zone is counted. 
653 Tarasov, The Making of Empires : Russia’s Gas Exporting Pipelines v Nabucco, pp. 86-87 
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Conversely, a discursive approach would oppose the rationalist assumption that interests 
are extra-discursive by stressing the importance of the inter-subjective encounter with 
the ‘Other’ as well as the linguistic component. These are elements overlooked by 
rationalist accounts.654  
In general, the rationalist literature either seeks to explore whether or not South Stream 
and Nabucco are competitors655 or it assumes the competition between the two projects 
and seeks to assess the feasibility of the two projects by outlining limitations and 
advantages of one over the other.656 Moving away from rationalist accounts, the existing 
discourse-based literature problematizes the actor’s view and tends to focus on detecting 
inner contradictions in the context of the pipeline politics. Khasson657 argues that the 
EU’s diversification discourse – which is part of the broader securitisation strategy of 
the EU – dominates over and sits in opposition with the competing EU’s discourse of 
‘integrating Russia’. The latter, thus, becomes a marginal discourse. Yet, here the 
debates over the diversification discourse are one-sided; they are investigated only 
within the EU.  Tichy and Kratochvil658 combine the two perspectives by focusing on 
the discursive practices (e.g. speeches) of both Russian and EU policymakers. In doing 
so, they outline three main discourses – integration, liberalization, and diversification – 
and examine how actors construct these discourses. These accounts certainly add a new 
perspective to the reading of the diversification discourse and to the politics around the 
Nabucco and South Stream pipelines.  
However, the proposed approach represents a progression from existing accounts 
analysing exclusively energy discourses.  These accounts neglect the importance of the 
Russian ‘Other’ and its constitutive role. As such, to address this gap the politics of the 
Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects is here conceptualized as a Self / Other 
discursive encounter. Various mutual representations – emerging  from previous layers 
– such as  the Western-Russian historical encounter and their encounter as energy actors 
                                                      
654 See for example Baran, Security Aspects of the South Stream Project  
655 See for example S., Roginsky, South Stream and Nabucco: Are They Competitors?, Pipeline & Gas 
Journal, Vol. 235, Issue 4, pp. 62-65, April 2008 
656 See for example, D., Finon, The EU Foreign Gas Policy of Transit Corridors: Autopsy of the Stillborn 
Nabucco Project, OPEC Energy Review, Vol. 35, No.,1, March 2011, pp. 47-69 
See also Tarasov, The Making of Empires : Russia’s Gas Exporting Pipelines v Nabucco 
See D., Freifeld, The Great pipeline Opera, Foreign Policy, No. 174, Sept.-Oct. 2009, pp. 120-127 
See also A., Tsiaras, Pipeline Wars, Yale Economic Review, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 2010, pp.21-25 
See also M., Rowley, The Nabucco Pipeline Project -- Gas Bridge To Europe?, Pipeline & Gas Journal, 
Vol. 236, No. 9, Sept. 2009, p. 72-73 
657 Khasson, Discourses and Interests in EU-Russia Energy Relations 
658 Kratochvil and Tichy, EU and Russian Discourse on Energy Relations. 
  214 
– construct a representational continuum – a space that goes from radical confrontation 
to cooperation (‘degree of Otherness’) – that enables us to explain the confrontational or 
the cooperative positions of actors in the politics around the Nabucco and South Stream 
projects. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the layered ‘degree of Otherness’ – 
rather than the mere material factors or the simple interplay of energy discourse – can 
also explain the different positions and understandings of actors. For example, the EU’s 
representation of Russia as a ‘distrustful supplier’ and Russian egalitarian discourse that 
challenges the EU’s leadership in Europe, is indicative of a broad ‘degree of Otherness’ 
that can also contribute to explaining the different and conflicting actors’ visions on 
diversification. The ‘degree of Otherness’ is, however, subject to variation.  
Despite the different understanding of diversification, both parties have extensively 
played the pro-European discourse of security of supply for Europe, demonstrating how 
a narrow ‘degree of Otherness’ is at play. Reasoning on the level of layer one, it can be 
said that both Western Europe (EU) and Russia interpret energy security for Europe as a 
mission. In doing so, both demonstrate a belonging to the European continent by 
arguing in favour of the co-existence of the two pipelines through a non-exclusive 
discourse.  
However, as closer analysis will illustrate, this sense of mission and belonging 
ultimately involves an exclusionary practice. Therefore, the actors move from a 
situation of positive representations and commonness to a scenario of negative 
‘Otherness’.  
 
This case study also paves the ground to understand the concept of  ‘primacy of politics’ 
claimed by Laclau and Mouffe. Identities of actors are not only constructed through 
their different and clashing interests or cultures, but they also derive from the political 
contestation of discourses. Subjects position and identify themselves within a discursive 
structure (e.g. cooperation). However, since these structure are unstable, ‘any concrete 
individual’ can ‘dislocate’, that is, adhere to another discursive structure (e.g. 
antagonism). This is due to the unstable nature of the social and political world. It is in 
the process of identification and dislocation that new political subjectivities are formed 
or reshaped. As such, the process of dislocation illustrates that the subject is not 
determined by an a priori structure659 and confirms the relational essence of identity as 
                                                      
659 Dowding, Encyclopedia of Power,  p. 370 
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well as the social character of objectivity. 
 
The next section will focus on the non-exclusive narrative and will draw out 
implications for the political construction of ‘Europe’, and for the broader relations 
between Western Europe and Russia. 
Before starting the analysis, it is important to clarify who narrates in this storyline. 
Given that Gazprom – which is South Stream’s main shareholder – is owned in majority 
by the Russian government, this chapter considers the statements or symbolic acts made 
by representatives of Gazprom or Russian government as complementary to the Russian 
mainstream discourse in the debate.  
For its part, official documents of the EC as well as speeches and symbolic actions 
made by its representatives and officials of institutions representing the EU per se – as 
opposed to those promoting the interest of individual MS – provide ground for mapping 
the discursive toolbox of the EU.  
 
 
3 The Non-Exclusive Narrative 
 
 
Having described the pipeline projects and the politics behind them, the following  
sections aim to map the discursive context played out by the EU – mainly through the 
language of the EC – and Russian top officials. As the main discourses are identified, it 
will be demonstrated how these are linked to the narratives detected in layers one and 
two.  
 
A first analysis of the discourses played out in this case study demonstrates that EC and 
Russian top officials have embarked on a conciliatory discourse through statements 
denying any sort of rivalry between South Stream and Nabucco.  As the Energy 
Minister of Russia, Sergei Shmatko, commented on the proposal to merge the two 
projects, ‘Nabucco and South Stream are far from being competitors’.660 The then 
Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev as well as Alexander Medvedev661, Deputy 
                                                      
660 A., Shiryaevskaya, Russia Rejects Eni Call to Merge Europe Gas Pipelines, Bloomberg,  15 March 
2010. Available from: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ae4.eb4lPqjk 
Accessed 11/11/2013 
661 Alexander Medvedev wrote in Today's Zaman:  ‘The fact that South Stream is primarily an investment 
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Chairman of Gazprom Management, reiterated this vision by emphasizing the non–
exclusive nature of the two projects.662 Echoing Medvedev, Viktor Zubkov, First 
Deputy Prime Minister of Russia also claimed that the South Stream, Nord Stream and 
Nabucco gas pipelines could co-exist.663  
Putin has also proved to hold a similar stance and has subscribed to the discourse of 
route diversification: ‘In terms of alternative routes of delivery, we are in favour of 
them. We are not taking part and will not take part in the Nabucco project, but we will 
not impede it…In general, we believe that the more diversification, the better’.664   
 
For its part, the EC has confirmed such a non-adversary view denying any competitive 
intention vis a vis the Russian South Stream: ‘What concerns Nabucco, it is our desire 
to diversify. It has nothing to do with South Stream or not South Stream’.665 The Energy 
Commissioner, Günther Oettinger has reiterated – although with less firmness – the 
commitment to open the Southern Corridor Initiative through Nabucco and the possible 
co-existence with South Stream.666  
                                                                                                                                                              
in energy security, not in boosting the market share of Russian gas, also means that it does not compete 
with other pipeline projects that intend to import fresh supply volumes from other possible gas sources.  
South Stream does not oppose these projects’. See A., Medvedev, The EU Supports All New Gas 
Pipelines, Just How Much? Today’s Zaman, 25 March 2011. Available from:  
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-239124-opinion-the-eu-supports-all-new-gas-pipelines-just-how-
much.html Accessed 20/07/2013 
662 During his visit in Hungary Medvedev said: 'South Stream will have no negative impact on Nabucco, 
just as Nabucco will have no negative effect on South Stream'. See O., Shchedrov, UPDATE 2-Russia 
Wins Hungary for South Stream Gas Project, Reuters, 25 February 2008. Available from: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/02/25/russia-hungary-pipeline-idUKL2530997220080225 Accessed 
20/09/2013 
663 Zubkov said that: 'Russia stands for diversification of gas flows to Europe and doesn’t regard 
Nabucco as a competitor to the South Stream and the Nord Stream…The South Stream, Nord Stream and 
Nabucco gas pipelines should be built'. See The South Stream Transport Consortium’s Website, 
Opinions, 2009. Available from: http://www.south-stream.info/en/press/opinions/archive/2009/  Accessed 
15/01/2013  
664 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Met With Foreign 
Media, 8 January 2009.  Available from: http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/2956/print/ 
Accessed 24/11/13 
Another statement in this sense occurred during a joint press conference between Turkish Prime Minister, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Putin following the signature of a contruction agreement, Reuters quoted the 
Russian president as  saying: ‘South Stream will not hinder Nabucco. Nabucco and South Stream 
pipelines are not mutually exclusive. See Putin says South Stream will not hinder Nabucco, Reuters, 6 
August 2009. Available from:  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/08/06/turkey-russia-nabucco-
idUKIST00399120090806  Accessed 10/09/2013 
665 A., Piegbals, Gas Warms EU-Russia Ties, Green Opinion, Issue 776, 7 April 2008. Available from:  
http://greenopinion.ru/energydialogue/?q=node/1737 Accessed 20/09/2013 
666 In answering a parliamentary question, Oettinger said that: ‘South Stream and the Nabucco projects 
(as well as other projects in the Southern Gas Corridor) are not mutually exclusive’. See Oettinger, G.., 
Parliamentary Questions E-005372/2012. Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission, 5 
July 2012. Available from:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-
005372&language=EN Accessed 20/10/2013 
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In addition, under Oettinger, the Commission discourse also gave a boost to the image 
of Russia as an untroubled 667 and non-threatening668 energy partner by even offering 
cooperation: ‘We [European Commission] will support South Stream in its 
administrative processes in the EU, and we will not impose any unreasonable or 
unjustified level of administrative or regulatory requirements’.669 
Overall, the statements reported above reveal the existence of a non-threatening 
discourse with the two actors excluding the existence of any rival logic. The scenario 
reported here is that of two actors following their energy interests in a neoliberal fashion 
(MI in layer two)670 and through positive representations of the historical Other (layer 
one). This initial discursive overview suggests a liberal reading of EU–Russian relations 
which assumes the natural integration of Russia with Europe and the consequent status 
of Russia’s ‘belonging’ to Europe.  
 
 
4 The Discursive Practice of Integration and Modernization 
Discourses 
 
 
The plan to channel gas from the Caspian region to the EU can only complement and 
diminish – but not entirely substitute – existing Russian gas imports to the EU.671 
                                                      
667 Discussing the issue of security of gas supply in the EU during his speech at a Eurogas Conference in 
April 2012, Oettinger noted: ‘Let me take this occasion to clearly state that I do not think that the EU as 
such is too much dependent on Russian gas. We also do not have to worry about increasing Russian gas 
volumes coming to the EU. However, in order to ensure a functioning, competitive and sustainable 
internal gas market, all parts of the EU should have access to different gas sources’. See Oettinger, G.., 
Energy Dialogue: Russia European Union. Gas Aspects.  Eurogas Conference Brussels, 27 April  2012, p. 
3. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/oettinger/headlines/speeches/2012/04/doc/20120427.pdf Accessed 4/4/2013 
668 In March 2010, the Russian online newspaper Ria-Novosti reports a statement by the Oettinger who 
confirmed the non-antagonistic discourse by saying that: 'The European Commission does not view 
Russia-backed South Stream and Western Nabucco gas pipeline projects as rival' . See Ria Novosti, EU 
Rejects View of South Stream, Nabucco Gas Pipeline as Rival, 4 March 2010. Available from:  
http://en.ria.ru/business/20100304/158093544.html Accessed 5/5/2013 
669  G., Oettinger, Speech of Commissioner Oettinger at the South Stream Event, Brussels, 25 May 2011. 
Available from:  http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/documents/news/20110525_en.pdf Accessed 
10/10/2013 
Likewise, the BBC reported Commissioner Oettinger as explicitely saying that: ‘we [European 
Commission] don't want to block South Stream’. UPI- United Press International, EU Unfazed by Russian 
Gas Ambitions', UPI, 11 February 2011. Available from: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-
Resources/2011/02/11/EU-unfazed-by-Russian-gas-ambitions/UPI-87391297427367/ Accessed 
20/09/2013 
670 Both actors attempt to pass on the message that the main aim of their respective projects is to promote 
energy security in the European continent in a non-exclusive way. 
671 P., Aalto, European Perspectives for Managing Dependence, in J., Perovic, R.W., Orttung, and A. 
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Therefore, the EU still has a strong interest in having cooperative rather than hostile 
relations with Russia which could consider a diversification of its export markets away 
from the EU.672 In this light, on the EU side, two further discourses can be identified in 
the debate.  
The first one is the ‘integration discourse’. Such a discourse revolves around the need to 
integrate the EU’s and Russian energy markets673 and reveals a sense of tolerance in the 
implementation of  South Stream along with the Nabucco projects: ‘While South 
Stream is neither a Southern Corridor pipeline, nor a project of European interest as 
defined in the Trans European Energy Networks guidelines, the Commission welcomes 
all investments in the European gas grid and in pipelines bringing gas to the EU674’An 
example of the integration language is provided by French liberal MEP675, Laperrouze, 
who said : ‘I advocate an approach geared to conciliation in dialogue with Russia, 
which supplies 42% of the EU's gas’, adding that, ‘Nabucco will have more chance if 
the EU worked with Moscow’.676 
                                                                                                                                                              
Wenger, eds., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation . 
London: Routledge, 2009, p.164, quoted by Pick, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A critical analysis, p.345 
672 Monaghan, Russia-EU Relations: An Emerging Energy Security Dilemma, quoted by Pick, EU-Russia 
Energy Relations: A critical analysis, p. 345 
673 Speaking at the above-mentioned presentation of the South Stream project in Brussels, Commissioner 
Oettinger stated: ‘Now is the time to join these (EU and Russia) two internal markets, without barriers at 
the border among which I would also count export monopolies. See Oettinger,  Speech of Commissioner 
Oettinger at the South Stream Event  
674  G., Oettinger, Parliamentary Questions E-5280/2010. Answer given by Mr. Oettinger on behalf of the 
Commission, 23 August 2010. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-5280&language=EN Accessed 
20/09/2013. 
Other examples are Oettinger’s reply to another Parliamentary question on ‘South Stream and EU 
antitrust and environmental obligations’, while speaking the sovereignty rhetoric, the Commissioner also 
employes the cooperation language by specifying that: ‘The Commission is ready to assist the Member 
States concerned as well as the companies promoting South Stream on their territory to ensure that this 
project, if built, complies with European law, in particular EU Internal Energy Market and 
environmental rules’. See G. Oettinger, Parliamentary Questions E-010537/2012, Answer given by Mr. 
Oettinger on behalf of the Commission,  22 January 2013. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-010537&language=EN 
Accessed 20/09/2013. 
In Oettinger’s reply to the question on ‘Nabucco, South Stream, and synergies in the Southern Corridor’ 
submitted by Niki Tzavela, the Commissioner notes that: ‘Nabucco, and the Southern Corridor more 
generally, are about promoting European energy security of supply and diversification. The Commission 
has consistently said that Russian, American or indeed any qualified interests are invited to take part in 
the common enterprise that is the Southern Corridor, provided the strategic objectives pursued are fully 
met’.  See G. Oettinger, Parliamentary Questions E-001799/2011. Answer given by Mr. Oettinger on 
behalf of the Commission, 23 March 2011. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-001799&language=EN 
Accessed 20/09/2013  
675 Member of the European Parliament. 
676 A., Laperrouze, MEP, Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the Second Strategic Energy 
Review, European Parliament, 26 January 2009. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-0013/2009 Accessed 
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Evidence of cooperative and messianic discourses can be found also on the Russian 
side. As said, Russia has an interest in reinforcing the role of its energy giant Gazprom 
as the EU’s main supplier. One of the discursive options employed to increase the 
positive image of Gazprom’s project is to depict it as being separate from material 
interest. Rather the tendency is to attach a more profound and ideal significance to it. 
From this perspective, the Russian Federation has proved to attache major importance to 
the realization of a ‘pan-European’ project such as South Stream. In this attempt to 
describe South Stream as a pan-European project, Russian Ambassador Aleksandr 
Chepurin underlined how such a pipeline represents a bridge between the eastern and 
western part of Europe. During a conference in Belgrade he said that: ‘Russia attaches 
major importance to the South Stream pipeline, having in mind its positive European 
commitments to European unification’.677 Moreover, he stressed that this would be a 
new step in the prosperous Europe, which will no longer be limited by ‘Berlin Walls’.678 
 
As demonstrated in layer one (chapter 3), the integration discourse reflects a recurring 
narrative element employed by Western Europe when cooperation with Russia was seen 
as possible and, thus, a positive image of Russia was held (e.g. post-Napolean epoch, 
19th century discourse of Western European conservatives). Likewise, moving to the 
level of layer-two analysis, the discursive evidence reported demonstrates how elements 
of the neoliberal energy paradigm (MI) are at work. In fact, integration and cooperation 
are presented as leading principles to promote energy security through the Nabucco and 
South Stream projects.  
On the EU side, the focus on co-existence and integration fosters the idea that 
modernization of the Russian partner is needed to enhance the outcome of the 
cooperation. As seen in layer one, one of the Western interpretations of Russia was that 
of a country with great potential (e.g. ‘land of the future’) but in a somehow constant 
transition towards modernization. Such a discourse emerges through statements by 
Commissioner Oettinger:  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
20/10/2013 
677 B92, Russia Attaches ‘Great Importance’ to South Stream, 12 July 2013. Available from: 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business.php?yyyy=2013&mm=07&dd=12&nav_id=86924 Accessed 
10/11/2013  
678 B92, Ibidem 
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‘The modernisation of its (Russia) energy sector is also essential for the 
Russian Federation. For the modernisation of Russian coal and gas power 
plants the Russian government has earmarked the amount of 11.1 trillion 
roubles (around 227 billion Euros) to improve their efficiency. In addition to 
power plants, also pipelines and transmission lines have to be modernised. This 
is an opportunity for further cooperation between EU and Russian industry’.679 
 
Yet, as it emerges from this, along with the ‘land of the future’ representation, the 
Eurocentric inclination of Western Europe to position itself as a ‘teacher’ as opposed to 
a ‘learner’ able to judge the development status of Russia, is visible. In other words, the 
EU constructs its temporal identity as a ‘developed’ actor and that of Russian as a 
‘developing’ Other. As such, while benevolently open to cooperation, the EU indicates 
to Russia how it should go about modernization.   
 
All in all, this first analysis leads to the conclusion that in the pipeline politics regarding 
the Nabucco and South Stream projects, the EU and Russia do not represent each other 
as ‘opponents’ or in confrontational terms. From an initial interpretation, the interaction 
seems to be between two partners with different projects – Nabucco and South Stream – 
but a common objective: shipping gas to Western Europe. If the analysis is transposed 
to layer one level, both the EU and Russia are mutually represented as European powers 
belonging to the same European continent and serving the goal of providing Europe 
with energy security. In addition, the examples provided indicate that both actors 
employ a pro-Europe narrative engendering positive and non-threatening images of their 
counterpart. This can be seen as evoking the raison d’être of the Concert of Europe of 
the XIX century whose members were committed to preserve security in the European 
continent. Similarly, the theme of cooperation and integration with Europe reflects the 
ultimate aim of the Russian post-communist orientation. From this perspective, the fact 
that Nabucco and South Stream are seen as different projects serving the same European 
interest evokes the Gorbachevian thinking informing the Common European Home 
Initiative. In fact, the Gorbachevian conception included the idea of mutual respect 
between the Western and Soviet systems that – despite basic differences – belong to the 
same continent and history. More specifically, Garbachev’s perspective even conceived 
                                                      
679 Oettinger, Energy Dialogue: Russia European Union. Gas Aspects 
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competition between two systems as ‘salutary’ as long as it improves the ‘material and 
spiritual condition of life for people’.680 Also, to evoke a separate historical parallel, the 
description of the two pipelines as not mutually exclusive projects recalls the Cold War 
doctrine of peaceful-co-existence, which promoted neutral relationship between the 
Soviet and Western models with the aim to reduce hostility and rule out the possibility 
of a conflict.  
 
Overall, an initial investigation of the discourse field played out in the pipeline politics 
on the construction of Nabucco and South Stream reveals that elements of a cooperative 
narrative are superficially at work, therefore, the ‘degree of Otherness’ appears narrow 
from both sides. These actors’ positions have meaningful implications for the 
construction of actors’ spatial identity as European. Claims of co-existence and 
cooperation from both sides demonstrate a common understanding of Europe as a 
united continent with no clear boundaries (‘white zone’). Similarly, the shared 
benevolent positions also construct the ethical identities of actors through the 
understanding of their pipeline projects as serving the ethical ‘mission’ of ensuring 
energy security for the European continent. 
However, the above claims can be proved to be at odds with other conflicting discourses 
and symbolic acts since different types of discourse reflecting different degree of 
otherness exist. Thus, the initial discursive landscape can be contradicted showing also 
how confrontational discourses are informing the pipeline debate .   
 
 
5 The Discursive Practice of Comparison and Discredit of Other’s 
Project 
 
 
It has been outlined how official discourses from both sides tend to emphasize the non-
exclusive nature of the two projects. Yet, it can be demonstrated how the initial 
predominance of the non-antagonist discourse is undermined by the presence of 
conflictual dispositions between the two players. Such a conflict disposition does not 
refer to any objective phenomenon outside communication, but it can be grasped 
                                                      
680 M. Gorbachev, ‘Europe as a Common Home’. Address given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of 
Europe, Strasbourg, 6 July 1989. Available from: 
http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/1A_Gorbachev.pdf Accessed 27/07/2014 
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through discursive practices played out by both parties. A first sign proving the 
existence of logic of confrontation materializes in the official discourse and speeches 
that phrase the debate on Nabucco and South Stream in comparative terms. For 
example, Commissioner Oettinger admitted that the Russian South Stream gas pipeline 
is a potential competitor to the EU-backed Nabucco project in the long term.681 
Oettinger, moreover, clearly speaks the language of comparison when he stated that 
‘Nabucco is slated to transport gas from previously undeveloped fields in the Caspian 
region to Europe. South Stream on the other hand will transport Russian gas via a 
different route to European consumers.682 
The theme of comparison can also be grasped in the statements released by Russian 
representatives. For example, Minister Shmatko considers South Stream ‘to have every 
chance of being realized earlier than Nabucco…Nabucco has a range of issues which 
still need to be resolved’.683 Furthermore, the sense of urgency that Putin confers to the 
finalization of South Stream can be read in confrontational terms: ‘We will do 
everything as quickly for South Stream…South Stream's major rival Nabucco has little 
chance of success’.684 
Overall, although the initial discursive practices played out by both parties insisted on 
                                                      
681 During a conference marking the 10th anniversary of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in Brussels, 
Oettinger said that 'South Stream is likely to compete with Nabucco in the long term'.  Quoted in Ria 
Novosti, South Stream May Compete with Nabucco ‘In Long Term’- EU Commissioner', November 
2010. Available from:  http://en.rian.ru/world/20101122/161442651.html Accessed 10/10/2013 
682 Pipeline, EU Energy Chief: Nabucco, South Stream Pipeline Don’t Compete, 29 March 2011. 
Available from: http://www.pipelineme.com/news/international-news/2011/04/nabucco-and-south-
stream-are-not-rivals-eu/ Accessed 22/01/2013 
683  Today’s Zaman, South Stream-Nabucco Gas Pipeline Race Speeds Up, 19 May 2009. Available from: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=4D7630105C7DCAF0286E12
A076B834FB?pageNo=509&category=105&dt=0&newsId=175687&columnistId=0 Accessed 
10/11/2013. 
Other similar statements epitomizing a sense o confrontation occurred in March 2010 when Bloomberg 
reports Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko as saying: ‘The need to diversify energy flows to Europe 
is understandable; we think that Nabucco and South Stream are far from being competitors”. However, 
he added that ‘South Stream is “more competitive” than Nabucco’. Shiryaevskaya, Russia Rejects Eni 
Call to Merge Europe Gas Pipelines 
684 Ria Novosti, South Stream to be Built as Quickly as Nord Stream, 6 September 2010. Available from: 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100906/160490570.html Accessed 20/10/2013. 
Two similar opinions can be read on the South Stream website. In the first, Minister Shmatko said that 'It 
is necessary to answer a number of questions in order to build Nabucco and, primarily, what will be the 
gas price for European consumers, where will the route run and where will the resources come from? 
The South Stream has already resolved these issues, and the price of gas delivered through the South 
Stream will be lower if compared to Nabucco'. See The South Stream Transport Consortium’s Website, 
(2009), op. cit. 
In the second opinion Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of Russian Prime Minister said that:  'Russia is not 
against the Nabucco project, although we aren‘t participating in it as we consider it less practicable 
compared to the South Stream'.  See The South Stream Transport Consortium’s Website, Five Questions 
and Answers. Both opinions are available from: http://www.south-
stream.info/en/press/opinions/archive/2009/ Accessed 12/12/2013 
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the ‘non-rival’ and ‘non-contradictory’ elements, these examples are a signal that both 
have also projected a logic of confrontation regarding the other’s project. Such a logic 
recalls the confrontational nature of the relations between the West bloc and the USSR 
during the Cold War when the two blocs competed to show the world the superiority of 
Self’s political model over that of the Other. 
 
One might argue that representing the two projects in comparative terms does not 
necessarily confirm the presence of an antagonist discourse. However, it can be 
illustrated how the discourses of both sides are not limited to a mere comparison but a 
conflictual disposition which occurs through the discursive practice of mutual 
denigration of the Other’s project. In political discourse, when actors put forward 
logical and emotional arguments in support of their projects, they implicitly depict 
themselves as credible and reliable actors (e.g. ‘true’) emphasizing competence, 
benevolence, and dominance. Similarly, such a discursive strategy also leads to the 
discrediting of the opponent’s project.685 In other words, by supporting its own belief 
each actor tries to pass on the message that the course proposed by Self is more 
‘European’ and more developed than the one proposed by Other.  
 
As noted, the existence of an antagonistic logic has often recurred in the history of the 
West-Russian relationship. For example, as analyzed in layer one, the discourse of 
discrediting the Other’s project has been largely employed in Cold War contestation 
during which the Western bloc and the USSR tended to portray the political experiment 
of the counterpart in negative terms and as doomed to failure. Against this background, 
a more in-depth examination of the arguments put forward by EU and Russian top 
officials demonstrates how such a discursive practice is visible also in the politics 
behind the South Stream and Nabucco. For example, Commissioner Oettinger, has shed 
doubt on the feasibility and necessity of the Russian-backed project: 
 
‘Today, I have come to listen and to learn.  For me, South Stream so far seemed 
more of a concept than a concrete project. What we know is that the gas in South 
Stream will leave Russia, cross the Black Sea and arrive in Europe. Beyond that, 
                                                      
685 F. D’Enrico, I. Poggi, Discrediting the Opponent! Effects of Multilodal Discrediting Moves in Public 
Debates, Cognitive Computation, Vol.4, No.2, June 2012, Available from : 
http://europa.uniroma3.it/dse/files/945ec8a9-0a63-46fe-ba07-1c058cd831d7.pdf#lSec4 Accessed 
20/12/2012  
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there are a number of questions.  Where will the gas actually come from?  Where 
will it arrive? How will it arrive, by ship or by pipeline? Will it divert gas from 
Ukraine? Once it gets to Europe, what will happen?  Most importantly, who can 
ship gas in the project? Is it only Gazprom, or also other players?’686 
 
In the same vein, Russian representatives made statements fuelling scepticism over the 
EU-backed Nabucco. Speaking at the 7th meeting of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club in Sochi, Putin stated: 
 
‘Nabucco's biggest problem is lack of guaranteed gas supply. The pipeline does 
not have guaranteed gas sources, and I don't know if it can find any. Russia will 
not provide anything [for the pipeline], and Iran has not yet developed the related 
deposits. The other possible supplier is Azerbaijan, but they are only producing 
small amounts of natural gas and, besides, they have signed a gas supply contract 
with Russia. There is Turkmenistan, but it is unclear how much gas it can supply 
because a gas pipeline has been built from Turkmenistan to China with a 
capacity of 30 billion cu m. It is not clear if Turkmenistan will be able to supply 
gas for Nabucco’.687 
Analogously, Putin’s definition of Nabucco as a ‘senseless’ project falls under the 
discursive strategy of portraying the EU-backed project in negative terms.688 Also 
Viktor Zubkov, Putin’s First Deputy Prime Minister during the Presidency of Dmitri 
                                                      
686 Oettinger, Speech of Commissioner Oettinger at the South Stream Event 
In a similar manner, following Gazprom CEO Miller announcement that the final investment decision for 
the South Stream project had been reached, EU officials reacted to such a declaration pointing out how 
instead a number of issues remain still unresolved. This can be read as a rejection for Russian entry in the 
Concert of Europe. R., Synovitz, and R., Jozwiak, Gazprom Says South Stream Construction To Start, 
While EU Begs to Differ, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, 8 December 2012. Available from:  
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-south-stream-construction/24791378.html Accessed 20/10/2013 
687 Government of Russian Federation, Transcript of the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Meets with 
Participants of the 7th meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, 6 September 2010. 
Available from http://archive.government.ru/eng/docs/12039/print/ Accessed 23/11/2013 
688 During the press conference with Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, Werner Fayman, 
questioned on the contradiction deriving from Austrian involvement in both the Nabucco and South 
Stream project, the President Putin asserted: ‘I would like to draw attention to something that specialists 
are well aware of: before building something you first need to sign a supply contract.  Building a pipeline 
without any contracts is senseless and highly risky. No one in this business would do that. Please, name 
at least one contract that has been signed under the Nabucco project. We can sign such contracts for the 
South Stream but I do not see anybody who would be keen to do the same under Nabucco’.  See 
Government of the Russian Federation, Following Negotiations, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and 
Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria Werner Fayman Give News Conference, 2010. Available 
from: http://archive.government.ru/eng/docs/10337/print/  Accessed 28/01/2013 
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Medvedev questioned the reliability of Nabucco regarding the sufficient gas to fill 
Nabucco.689 
The various quotes reported uncover that within the debate around the Nabucco and 
South Stream pipeline, promoters have repeatedly tried to shed doubt on the opposed 
pipeline project. The mutual discrediting of Self and Other reveals that a remarkable 
(geo)political discourse – rather than an economic one - is played out in the context of 
EU-Russia (energy) relations (layer 2).  
As said, by discrediting the Other, the Self attempted to trace a divide between ‘them’ 
and ‘us’. Such an us / them divide is transformed into ‘otherness’ and portrayed as a 
negation of identity and thus gives ground for potential discrimination and asymmetry 
in power relationships, which is central to the construction of ‘otherness’.  
This sense of asymmentry leads Self to impose the truth of its distinctive identity and to 
undervalue the distinctiveness of Other’s identity, which, in turn, acquires the image of 
a ‘threat’. It emerges that ‘Otherness’ and Self-identity are two indivisible faces of the 
same coin. The Other only exists in relation to the Self, and vice versa. Therefore, the 
Other holds constitutive power. Through this concept it is possible to emphasise the 
validity of intersubjective interaction in identity formation. This represents another key 
notion overlooked by the rationalist account, which derives actors’ identity and interest 
exclusively from an anonymous structure.  
The discursive strategy of discrediting the other’s project around South Stream-
Nabucco politics ultimately translates into an imperial dispute over ‘Europe’ understood 
as a political project. In particular, what is at stake is the ownership of energy security 
in the European continent. As such, each actor seeks to push the Other to the edges of 
European political space through discrediting and exclusion.690  
                                                      
689 Ria Novosti, Nabucco Not Serious Rival to Russian Gas Pipe Project-Zubkov, 15 July 2009. Available 
from: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090715/155533724.html  Accessed 20/10/2012.  
In an interview to Ria-Novosti in 2010, Igor Sechin, the then Russian Deputy Prime Minister told 
reporters: ‘Given the estimates of the Turkmen side, as well as European and international experts, the 
current market situation on the gas track allows us to say and I say so without sarcasm that there are no 
prospects for Nabucco… There are no real prospects of increasing volumes, which makes the Nabucco 
project irrelevant. This can be forgotten until a certain moment of economic growth…The Russian-
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The discursive practice of discrediting Other’s project is neglected by existing 
discourse-based accounts. They also overlook the spatial, temporal, and ethical 
construction of actors’ identity related to ‘discrediting’. Instead, it can be noted that, by 
discrediting the appropriateness of the Other’s project, the Self aims to depict its project 
as more ‘advanced’, thus it constructs the temporal identity of its project as more 
‘developed’ compared to the Other’s. In addition, the widening of the ‘degree of 
Otherness’ between them, and the reappearance of an Othering process indicates the re-
emergence of spatial borders between the Self and the Other in Europe. Similarly, the 
discursive strategy through which Self represents its project as ‘true’ as opposed to the 
Other’s ‘false’ project, reveals a construction of actors as ‘ethical’. The interplay of 
these three dimensions around the discursive strategy of ‘discrediting the Other’ 
determine actors’ positions in conflictual terms. Yet, this is only one of the discursive 
strategies employed. Other discursive strategies – such as sovereignty and 
exceptionalism – that contribute to the actors’ conflictual positions discrediting the 
Other’s project deserve more attention.  
 
 
6 The Discourse of Sovereignty in the Form of EU’s Othering and 
Russian Exceptionalism 
 
 
It has been illustrated how the discursive practice of mutual discrediting undermines the 
initial integration and benevolent discourse claimed by both parties and contributes to 
constructing actors’ positions in confrontational terms. In particular, the themes of 
integration and co-existence have been further eroded by claims revealing the existence 
of a strong sovereignty discourse that acquires the shape of Russian uniqueness and EU 
Eurocentrism691 through which both actors depict each other in hostile or illegitimate 
terms. The EU has consistently – with its exclusionary practice – acted to oppose any 
Russian move to acquire legitimacy and Europeaness for its South Stream project. For 
its part, Russia has disclosed a clear intention to receive a European labeling for its 
South Stream pipeline. For example, Russian-owned Gazprom has sought high-level 
political ties to ensure legitimacy and to provide an impression that these are actual 
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‘European projects’. The Russian quest for Europeaness can be, for example, seen in the 
hiring of Gerhard Schröder, former German Chancellor and Paavo Lipponen, Finnish 
Prime Minister, for the Nord Stream pipeline. Similarly, in attempting to increase the 
political support of South Stream in Europe, Putin offered former EC president and 
Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, the position of head of the South Stream 
project.692  
Another symbolic act that confirms such a strategy is the decision taken by the Russian 
Ministry of Energy and by Gazprom to officially present the South Stream project to the 
EC authorities in 2011 in Brussels. The objective behind such a choice was to obtain for 
South Stream the status of a trans-European gas transmission network – and thus a 
priority status – in order to be treated as projects of European importance and ensure the 
same treatment as Nabucco – which had already been granted such an exclusive 
status693  In May 2011 Russian Energy Minister, Shmatko, called on EC authorities to 
grant South Stream a TREN-E priority status.694 However, the EC negatively reacted to 
such a Russian quest for ‘Europeanness’ and equal treatment. By putting South Stream 
in comparative terms with Nabucco, the EC ultimately demonstrated that Gazprom’s 
project is not in line with the EU’s diversification discourse: ‘South Stream is a very 
important project, but in comparison to Nabucco, it does not offer a diversification of 
gas resources, it is just a new transit route’.695 
A symbolic act that can be seen as confirming the reluctance of the EU to sponsor South 
Stream as a ‘European project’, Commissioner Oettinger reportedly declined the 
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invitation to attend a ceremony near the Russian Black Sea town of Anapa to celebrate, 
in the presence of Putin, the official beginning of the construction of the offshore 
section of the South Stream pipeline.696 It is worth noting here that the Commission 
President Barroso and the then Commissioner for Energy, Andris Piebalgs, did 
represent the EC at the high level ceremony involving the five prime ministers of 
Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary convened in Ankara to sign an 
agreement to build Nabucco.697 
 
Overall, the evidence provided here illustrates how Russia has aimed to receive a 
European blessing for its project. The decision to officially present the project in the 
EU-capital and the request to receive priority status from the EC might not only be 
symbolically read as Russia’s acknowledgement of the EU as embodiment of Europe 
but it also demonstrates Russia’s quest for ‘Europeanness’.  
In this respect, it can be argued that elements of an ‘othering’ practice emerge from the 
EU rejection to grant South Stream the status of ‘European project’ and, thus, to 
sponsor a Russian project. Through such a rejection the EU seems to associate the 
recognition of South Stream with the risk of a potential ‘threat’ to the EU’s stability. In 
doing so, the EU not only depicts itself as the privileged European actor entitled to 
judge on the ‘Europeanness’ of others’ projects but it also draws clear spatial 
boundaries in ‘Europe’ that becomes a ‘red zone’. Ultimately, as seen for the 
modernization discourse, such a rejection reflects the historical Eurocentric inclination 
of Western Europe to pose itself as the embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe that holds the 
mission to construct Europe (ethical identity),  and, thus has the power to decide on the 
position of the Russian Other in Europe (spatial identity).  
The EU’s position as a leader in the European energy agenda is in fact reinforced 
through the discursive self-identification with ‘Europe’. For example, the pre-selection 
                                                      
696 EurActiv, Oettinger Declines Invitation to South Stream Opening, 7 December 2012. Available from:  
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/oettinger-declines-attend-south-news-516524 Accessed 20/10/2013 
697 BBC News, Europe Gas Pipeline Deal Agreed, 13 July 2009. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8147053.stm Accessed 20/10/2013 
Moreover, Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, Richard and Ranking Member of the Unites State Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Richard Lugar represented the US. See Turkish Press, Nabucco 
Summits Begins, 13 July 2009. Available from: 
http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=346171#.URlo_ByXRWs  
Accessed 20/10/2013 
  229 
by the Shah Deniz Consortium (Azerbaijan) in favour of Nabucco West698 as a possible 
pipeline project to ship gas towards Western Europe was deemed as ‘a success for 
Europe and for our security of supply’.699  The ‘success’ for the pre-selection of 
Nabucco West and the ‘security of Europe’ are discursively linked with emphasis put on 
the positive contribution to the energy security of the European continent. As such, 
through this syllogism in its official discourse the EU tends to pose itself as the 
legitimate and responsible actor in charge of the energy security of the European 
continent.  
 
Further discursive evidence regarding the Europeanisation discourse appeared in the 
official language of the EC through the discourse of conditionality and the sovereignty 
narrative. In this respect, the need for third parties – and thus also for Russia – to adhere 
to Communitarian rules in the EU territory is evident also in relation to the South 
Stream project. Oettinger in fact signaled openness towards South Stream claiming that 
it could gain ‘European’ support only on condition that the project meets EU-like 
standards.700 Therefore, the EU rules correspond to the ‘true’ European rules. In 
Oettinger’s words, Putin should understand that the energy giant Gazprom has to play 
by ‘our (EU) rules.’701 He also underlined that once on EU territory ‘South Stream will 
be subject to the Third Package…and it will be subject to the internal (EU) market 
rules”.702  
 
The clash in the discursive practices between Russia’s quest for Europeaness and the 
EU’s rejection of it, indicates that actors construct their spatial identity along different 
discursive practices.  The EU constructs its spatial identity by drawing deep boundaries 
in the European continent between EU-Europe and Russia-Europe. On the other side, 
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Russia plays out an understanding of Europe as a whole continent with no clear 
boundaries (‘white zone’). 
In addition, the emphasis on the non-compliance of the South Stream project with the 
provision of the EU’s Third Energy Package that obliges third parties to access the 
pipelines703 confirms the sovereignty element of the Commission discourse by 
specifying that foreign pipelines on the EU territory have to comply with EU 
competition law. This conditionality tone also suggests that the EU is committed to 
adopting a more conciliatory stance and is willing to ‘recognize’ the South Stream 
project on condition that it complies with the EU competition rule of breaking energy 
monopolies.  
 
However, from official discursive practices, it emerges how EU’s representatives tend 
to understand sovereignty unilaterally, thus, disregarding the principle of recognition of 
Other’s sovereignty. From this perspective, the teacher / learner dichotomy still 
characterizes the EU’s discursive practice vis a vis Russia. During his speech at 
Gazprom’s presentation of its South Stream project, Commissioner Oettinger said: 
 
‘We have developed an internal market with third party access and healthy 
competition…. Just to illustrate an example: as Gazprom can ship gas round the 
EU, Novatek can do so (only) in Russia. I would like to see Novatek in Europe, 
and EU gas companies in Russia. And pluralism between us’.704 
 
Novatek is Russia's largest independent natural gas producer after Gazprom. Here, 
Oettinger refers to the fact that Novatek is prevented from selling to Europe – and other 
foreign countries in general – because the state-owned Russian Gazprom holds 
exclusive export rights. As such Oettinger encourages Russia to break the Gazprom 
monopoly in adherence with the competition principles that informs EU internal energy 
policy. In short, by speaking the language of hierarchy, he urges Russia to follow the 
EU model and develop towards the EU’s objective (e.g. diversification):  
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‘If South Stream...gives access to gas independents active in Russia, then South 
Stream would deliver on two essential criteria:  namely diversification of routes 
and counterparties.  That means a stronger contribution to European 
diversification efforts’.705 
 
As a consequence, the EU tends to replicate its own image as ‘policy-maker’ of Europe 
as opposed to ‘policy-taker’ Russia. Once again, the EU implicitly employs the 
temporal scheme of ‘development’ to constructs its temporal identity as a leader 
opposed to the Russian follower.   
 
Overall, conflict issues – such as the Nabucco-South Stream pipelines – have 
implications for the identity construction process in which the recognition of political 
difference prevails over mere technical issues. The EU’s practice of Othering Russian 
South Stream not only is at odds with the EU’s non-rivalry and non-exclusionary 
position vis-a-vis Russian South Stream, but it impacts on the long-standing debates on 
Russia’s relationship to ‘European civilisation’. In fact, the EU’s inability to speak the 
language of equality in favour of the ‘subject-object’ relation in which Russia is 
depicted as the passive ‘norm-taker’ obstructs the integration of Russia with the Concert 
of Europe.706 
The lack of recognition of Russia as a lawful political subject with its own pipeline 
project fuels a Russian discourse rooted in the renewed reaffirmation of Russian 
exceptionalism as encountered in layer one.  In other words, the perception of Othering 
not only establishes an antagonist discursive framework – as Nabucco and South Stream 
are acknowledged as contenders – but it also leads the Russian Self to depict its own 
project as being more achievable and concrete, that is, ‘unique’. Here, by portraying 
South Stream as a more advanced project, Russia constructs its temporal identity as 
promoter of a ‘developed’ project compared to the ‘developing’ EU-backed Nabucco. 
The discursive strategy appears in Russian official discourse, which tends to confer a 
sense of necessity and distinctiveness to its own pipeline project. In this respect, a 
parallel with the exceptionalist and messianic narratives claimed by Russia in its 
historical relationship with the West can be noted. These kind of narratives are, for 
                                                      
705 A., Torello, EU, Russia Hints on Gas Pipeline, The Wall Street Journal, May 2011. Available from: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2011/05/27/eu-russia-hints-on-gas-pipeline/  Accessed 20/10/2013 
706 See for example Prozorov, The Structure of the EU Russian Conflict Discourse: Issues and Identity 
Conflicts in the Narratives of Exclusion and Self-Exclusion   
  232 
example, caught in Putin’s praise of the exceptional gas endowment of Russia: 
 
‘Do you have any idea how big Russian natural gas reserves are? There are 55 
trillion cubic meters of gas reserves in Russia's north-east alone. This is in just 
one gas province. In fact, we have more than one province like that. These 
natural gas reserves are unparalleled anywhere else in the world. We can meet 
the growing demand of the Russian economy and that of our main customers... 
practically all of our customers in Europe for the next hundred years’. 707 
 
Similar to the Dostoevskian ‘Russian Idea’ – which combined elements of the 
Slavophilism, Christian-Orthodox particularism, and Third Romeism – a messianic 
sense of the destiny attributed to Russia as the country that will rescue the world is 
visible in the statement by Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of Russian Prime Minister: 
 
‘We consider the South Stream as a very significant project not only to Gazprom 
or Russia, but to the European continent and even to the whole world. This is a 
realistic project with very realistic goals and, most importantly, very material 
sources of natural gas. We are talking about the material sources of Russia, 
which guarantee filling pipelines with gas’708 
 
Linked to the messianic and exceptional themes is the philantropic view that the 
Russian South Stream project is planned to protect citizens against threats emanating 
from security of supply. At the launch of the construction work on the South Stream 
pipeline which occurred in Anapa in December 2012, Putin affirmed that: ‘South 
Stream will create the conditions for a reliable gas supply for the main consumers in 
southern Europe’.709 Declarations like this reveal a sense of responsibility taken by 
Russia to carry out its mission to supply Southern Europe and construct Russia as an 
ethical actor.  
As said, the narrative that emphasizes the distinctiveness of the Russian project 
ultimately translates into a Russian discourse that reaffirms its greatness and 
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uniqueness:710 ‘The South Stream Offshore Gas Pipeline through the Black Sea will be 
unique. This large-diameter gas pipeline infrastructure will run the longest distance 
along the bed of the deepest sea: up to 2,250 metres’.711 Further evidence in this 
direction is provided by Konstantin Simonov, the General Director of the National 
Energy Security Fund who said: ‘If you are speaking about Europe in reality there is no 
serious alternative to Russia...and all other alternatives are more problematic like 
Turkmenistan, like Iran, like Egypt, like Libya’.712 
By referring to the theme of exceptionalism, Russia has problematised the EU’s 
exclusionary practice and the hierarchical character of the proposed inclusion. As such, 
Russian discourse revolving around the Nabucco-South Stream has dislocated from the 
initial endorsement of co-existence and to overcoming the integrationist logic in the 
reaffirmation of sovereignty that is unveiled in the claims of distinctiveness and 
‘particularism’. In short, Russian exceptionalism is manifested in the uniqueness of the 
Russian project and in Russian loyalty and dedication to its mission to provide energy 
supply to the European continent.  
The appeal to the exceptionality theme has relevant implications for Russian relations 
with Europe. In the long-standing debate on the ‘true’ and ‘false’ Europe that has often 
informed West-Russian relations, the uniqueness and ‘truth’ of the South Stream project 
implies its superiority as opposed to the ‘false’ nature of the EU-backed project. By 
putting emphasis on the distinctiveness of the South Stream pipeline, Russia also 
engages in an ‘othering’ process towards the EU. Russia in fact aims to contest the role 
of the EU and to implicitly impose itself as the legitimate provider of energy security in 
Europe. As Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov stated: 
 
‘The European Commission should adapt its internal legislation to the bilateral 
agreements Russia signed with six EU countries for building the South Stream 
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pipeline, and not the other way around’.713 
 
In doing so, Russian discourse confirms the narrative tradition of its belonging to 
Europe and its ‘European calling’. Conversely, the type of Kozyrevian narrative 
according to which the national interest of Russian people and domestic stabilization 
should be prioritized over imperial ambitions, is downplayed.   
To sum up, the initial quest for ‘Europeanness’ has been gradually replaced with claims 
for distinctiveness and ‘particularism’. The balance between ‘Europeanness’ and 
exceptionalism implies a reshaping of Russia’s spatial identity in Europe and it is 
indicative of a gradual move in Russia’s vision of ‘Europe’ from a ‘white zone’ to a 
‘grey zone’. 
 
Overall, in the case of Nabucco-South Stream politics, the identity formation process 
involves the construction of boundaries in the European continent and demarcation 
varies. Both actors share the vision of Europe as ‘white zone’. However, spatial 
demarcation gradually became more evident and has determined ‘Europe’ as a ‘grey’ or 
even ‘red’ (see EU exclusion of South Stream) zone.  These spatial identities are 
complemented by historical representations involving temporal schemes such as 
development and change. In other words, the historical narrative of ‘non-exclusion’ and 
the embedded positive representation of the Other as a ‘partner’ in a cooperative 
scenario, gradually transforms into another historical narrative based on a 
confrontational scenario. This is, in turn, indicative of a gradual widening of the ‘degree 
of Otherness’ from both sides. As such, as the degree widens, the actors’ construction of 
their identity as more ethical than the Other’s also became more evident.714   
In addition, discursive practices that depict Russian South Stream as a ‘threat’ and that 
reveal a mutual distrust between the two actors demonstrates a further widening of the 
‘degree of Otherness’ which occurred in the Nabucco-South Stream discursive 
interaction. 
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7 The EU’s Image of Russian South Stream as A‘Threat’ and the 
Theme of Mutual Distrust 
 
 
From the EU side, the ‘othering’ practice towards Russia is complemented by evidence 
of the historical Western European representation of Russia as a ‘threat’. In this respect, 
Russia is, for example, described as a country that achieves its goals through pressuring 
its neighbours and employing ‘divide and rule’ tactics to secure the support of MSs and 
thus, undermine the EU’s internal unity. Similarly, bringing the analysis to layer two, 
the EU seems to perceive Russian energy security strategy as led by geopolitical 
considerations (RE paradigm) – as opposed to the economic logic (MI paradigm).715 If 
we apply the two levels of analysis – the historical level of layer one, and the policy-
specific one in layer two – to the case study here investigated, it can be demonstrated 
how elements of the representation of Russia as a ‘threat’ recur also in the context of the 
Nabucco and South Stream projects. In this case, the image of ‘threat’ derives from two 
perceptions: Russia as an imperial country at the border of Europe that pressures 
European countries (not necessarily MSs) to win their support in favour of South 
Stream; and Russia as a country that plays the ‘divide and rule’ tactic with MSs 
undermining the EU’s unity. 
As an illustration that the EU’s discursive practices tend to represent Russia as a 
country using political pressure on its neighbours, it can be noted how Oettinger has 
clearly urged Russia to prevent itself from obstructing the Nabucco project by exerting 
pressure on Central Asian countries which are potentially the EU’s natural gas suppliers 
and key transit routes for Nabucco.716  
Moreover, the construction of Russia as a ‘threat’ playing the divide and rule tactic 
comes from a series of symbolic acts aiming to increasingly exert influence on states 
that are of a crucial relevance to the construction of Nabucco. These attempts sit in 
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contradiction to the initial non-antagonistic discourse that informed the debate over the 
Nabucco and South Stream projects.  
As noted in the introduction of this chapter and in the methodology chapter, the 
identities of the Self and the Other are ultimately constructed in discursive practices, 
which encompass both linguistic and behavioural practices, that is, both language and 
action.717 In particular, a symbolic act is an episode that has little practical impact but 
that acquires interpretive power in the light of a specific narrative context. 
From this perspective, the Russian strategy aimed to undermine Nabucco by isolating its 
two final markets for its gas – Hungary and Austria – and can be read as antagonistic. 
The first target was Hungary. President Bush’s trip to Hungary on 22 June 2006 was 
pre-empted by Alexei Miller, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom, 
who anticipated the President by a day to Budapest in order to discuss the Southern 
European Gas Pipeline.718 Moreover, in a 2007 interview, Hungarian Prime Minister, 
Ferenc Gyurcsany, was quoted as saying ‘The Nabucco has been a long dream and an 
old plan…But we don't need dreams. We need projects.’719 Despite the EU’s attempt to 
react through a conference organized by the EC in which Gyurcsany publicly asserted 
his support for Nabucco, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Viktor Zubkov, 
visited Hungary on 7 December and secured the Hungarian leader's commitment to 
South Stream. Subsequently, Dmitry Medvedev, visited Hungary on 25 February 
2008.720 This was followed by a ceremony in Moscow on 28 February 2008 during 
which Gyurcsany officially signed the South Stream agreement.721 
While negotiations with Hungary were ongoing, Putin and Miller widened their strategy 
against Nabucco by including Austria, another of Nabucco’s final markets. In May 2007 
they visited Vienna and signed the OMV-Gazprom MoU.722 Then, on 25 January 2008, 
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Alexander Medvedev visited Austria and secured the Baumgarten agreement with the 
Austrian state-dominated OMV energy company. This can be considered as a major 
success of the Russian divide and rule tactic, as the Austrian city of Baumgarten had 
already been selected as Nabucco’s terminal point. Furthermore, in June 2008 OMV – 
the company acting as coordinator for Nabucco – was invited to cover the same role for 
South Stream.723  The significance of such a Russian success also impacts on the 
relationship between symbolic acts and material power. These symbolic acts can be read 
in line with Putin’s pragmatic statism according to which Russia should challenge the 
EU’s role as agenda-setter of energy governance in Europe. As such, Russian South 
Stream should contest the EU’s spatial identity as an embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe 
and demonstrate the possibility to construct a Russian-Europe with Russia as a pivotal 
player.  
Further evidence of the divide and rule strategy comes in relation to Bulgaria. After 
long talks, Bulgaria and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement for the 
construction of the Bulgarian section of the South Stream gas transit pipeline in the 
presence of their Prime Ministers, Boyko Borisov and Putin in Sofia.  However, 
Bulgaria had also expressed interest in the construction of Nabucco. In order to push 
Bulgaria away from Nabucco, Russia offered Bulgaria lower gas prices in exchange for 
its continued support of the South Stream project (July 2010).724 In the same month, the 
US ambassador in Sofia, James Warlick, promised a $400 million investment in 
Bulgaria for energy projects sponsored by the American AES Solar Energy. He 
underlined that the implementation of this investment was linked to the approval of the 
Bulgarian government, which would not have any cost to bear.725  In making such a 
proposal, Ambassador Warlick repeated that Bulgaria should follow the energy 
priorities set by its Euro-Atlantic orientation. In addition, on 27 July 2010, Bulgarian 
President, Boyko Borissov, and Economic and Energy Minister, Traycho Traykov, met 
with Greek President, Georgios Papandreou, to discuss three pipeline projects with 
Russia (e.g. South Stream, B-A and Belene). Nabucco was vaguely mentioned. On the 
same day, Commissioner Oettinger decided to deliver a speech at a conference on 
energy security and investments in the Black Sea. Such an act sounded like a reminder 
                                                      
723 Baran, Security Aspects of the South Stream Project, p.14 
724 R., Kovacheva, Energy Coincidences (Or Not?), euinside, 10 August 2010. Available from: 
http://www.euinside.eu/en/analyses/energy-coincidences-or-not Accessed 20/01/2013   
725 Embassy of The United States in Sofia,  AES Solar Energy Ready to Invest USD 400 Million in 
Bulgaria,  28 July 2010. Available from: http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/event_07282010.html  Accessed 
23/01/2013   
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for Bulgaria to consider also the EU's energy priorities including the Southern Corridor 
Initiative726 and thus Nabucco. After the meeting with his Greek counterpart, Traykov 
went to Odessa, where he was expected to participate in a panel on energy challenges in 
the Black Sea region, together with Oettinger.  
This seems to suggest that although pressured from Russia, the Bulgarian government 
aimed to reassure the EU that it has not overlooked its commitment to the EU’s energy 
priority regarding the Southern Corridor Initiative. In fact, the draft of the National 
Energy Strategy confirmed that, despite discussing the Russian pipeline projects with 
Greece, Bulgaria’s energy priorities ultimately overlapped with those of the EU.727 
 
Overall, Russian imperial ambition to achieve ownership in the security of supply in 
Europe through pressure on non-EU states; thus undermining the EU’s unity, and the 
Russian challenge to the EU’s role as leader in energy governance in Europe, triggered 
the EU’s negative representation of Russia as ‘threat’ to the energy security and stability 
of the European continent.  
In January 2009, addressing a summit dedicated to the Nabucco project in Budapest, the 
Czech Prime Minister, Topolanek, holding the EU Presidency – and thus representing 
the EU (although not specifically the EC) clearly described Russia’s pipeline projects as 
aimed at perpetuating Europe's energy dependency. The South Stream project was 
defined as a ‘direct threat’ to Nabucco.728   
As such, the sense of competition that seems to occur in a technical issue (such as 
Nabucco vs South Stream) ultimately spills over into a more profound identity contest 
regarding who controls the game of energy security in ‘Europe’. As it emerges, the 
representation of Russia as a ‘threat’ means that Russia is depicted as  Other of the 
‘true’ EU-Europe. However, on the other side, the EU cannot overlook the key role of 
Russia as its main energy supplier. Given its dual role of indispensable supplier and 
‘threat’ to Europe, it is necessary for the EU discourse to emphatically set the relations 
                                                      
726 G., Oettinger, Speech of Commissioner Oettinger at the International Odessa Forum, Press Release 
SPEECH,  27 July 2010. Available from : http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-
402_en.htm?locale=en Accessed 20/01/2013 
727 The draft proposal says: ‘Bulgaria has a direct interest and will directly participate in the realisation 
of strategic EU initiatives to build the necessary infrastructure and diversification of energy supplies for 
the EU - namely the Southern Gas Corridor, access to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and transmission links 
of the axis North-South etc. Given the high gas dependence and inadequate energy infrastructure in the 
country, these initiatives are of particular importance for us and for the entire region of Southeast 
Europe’. See Kovacheva, Energy Coincidences (Or Not?)   
728 Khasson, Discourses and Interests in EU-Russia Energy Relations, p.14 
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in the terms of a friendly and sympathetic partnership and, at the same time, gradually 
try to decrease the role of the alleged Russian ‘partner’: ‘We have to reduce dependency 
on Russia without backing out of our strategic relation with Russia, which has 
characterized our last ten years and will characterize the next 10 years’.729  
The EU’s intention to keep the Russian giant calm is also evident through reassuring 
messages that reject the view that the EU is overdependent on Russia.730 For example, 
as a symbolic act, Oettinger even participated in the ceremony in the compressor station 
Portovaya in the Russian city of Viborg (April, 2010), where the construction of another 
Russian-backed pipeline, North Stream, had started.  
On this ground, the EU’s celebration of a pipeline that increases the dependence on 
Russia contradicts the Commission discourse that underlines the need to diversify 
energy towards non-Russian sources.731 In other words, the great emphasis that the 
Commission discourse put on diversification of routes (other than Russia’s), sits in 
contradiction with the participation in the starting of the North Stream pipeline and the 
reassurances regarding overdependence on Russian supply.  
As such, the EC constructs its interests around different discursive practices, which, in 
turn, embed a specific position for Russia. Russia is a partner when the EU needs more 
guarantees for its energy supply (e.g. North Stream). However, when the contestation 
for Europe’s leadership in energy governance is at stake, overdependence on Russia is 
seen as problematic and hinders the aim of diversification. Ultimately, Russia is 
constructed as a untrustworthy supplier from whom it is better to be less dependent. 
On the Russian side, a sense of suspicion towards the EU can also be noted. This leads 
to the construction of the EU as a ‘threat’ to Russia. In this respect, European attempts 
to diversify energy supply bypassing Russia are interpreted as acts driven by distrust. 
Despite almost forty years of reliable supply, the EU’s concerns turn out to be deceitful 
and mortifying.732  In this respect, questioned on the possible conflict deriving from the 
                                                      
729 A.J., Burgess, German Oettinger Wastes Little Energy Impressing MEPs,  La Treizieme Etoile, 14 
January 2010. Available from:  http://andrewjburgess-eu.blogspot.com/2010/01/german-oettinger-wastes-
little-energy.html Accessed 20/01/2013  
See also M., Schepp and S., Christoph Drifting Apart: Summit Underscores EU Tensions with Russia, 
Spiegel Online, 20 December 2012. Available from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/brussels-
summit-casts-light-on-eu-differences-with-russia-a-874033.html Accessed 03/01/2013 
730 In particular, Oettinger stated :‘I do not think that the EU as such is too much dependent on Russian 
gas. We also do not have to worry about increasing Russian gas volumes coming to the EU’. Oettinger, 
Energy Dialogue: Russia European Union. Gas Aspects, p. 3 
731 Kovacheva, Energy Coincidences (Or Not?) 
732 D., Böhme, EU-Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions? A Focus on the Natural Gas 
Sector, University of Potsdam : Potsdam,  2011, pp.30-31 
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Austrian participation in the Nabucco and South Stream projects, Putin challenged the 
EU’s diversification discourse by asserting that:  ‘I hear this thesis all the time, that it is 
necessary to ensure independence from Russian gas supplies. And I always want to ask 
a question: why would you want that? There is a good saying: it if ain't broke, don't fix 
it’.733 Broad implication can be drawn from this last statement. Hinting at the fact that 
the EU is ‘illogically’ seeking to switch its source of supply although the current 
supplier (Russia) is reliable, Putin’s affirmation grasps Western contradiction in its 
essence. Why does the EU support the construction of the Nabucco project running the 
risk that other non-Russian suppliers could be less reliable and/or encounter insufficient 
energy reserve, when Russia has proven to be reliable and endowed with the necessary 
reserves?  
This feeds doubts on the authenticity of the EU diversification discourse that is instead 
driven by geopolitical calculations. In fact, Putin’s belief is that the EU’s attempt to 
decrease dependence on Russian gas comes from the dominance of geopolitical 
reasoning of harming Russian interests. Such reasoning poses a challenge to the 
interest-based assumption of rationalist accounts. The EU seems to breach the objective 
rationality that would instead suggest sticking with a secure energy provider for its own 
security of supply. Interests should instead be read within the framework of mutual 
representations and discourses.  
In addition, the proposed layered structure also marks a progression from existing 
discourse-based accounts. In fact, on the basis of the representations derived from layer 
one and layer two (historical narratives and energy paradigms) of the layered structure it 
is possible to explain how Russia depicts the EU as an actor that follows a geopolitical 
paradigm to achieve its energy security rather than an economic logic (see layer two).734 
As a consequence, discursive elements of pragmatic statism and Eurasianism identified 
in layer one are played out to reproduce the West as the entity acting to weaken Russian 
geopolitical interests and its position in the international arena. 
 
A number of more factual circumstances contribute to provide a further basis to test and 
complement the representational-based interpretation of the Nabucco-South Stream 
politics proposed in this chapter. 
                                                      
733 Government of Russian Federation, Transcript of the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Meets with 
Participants of the 7th meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi 
734 See for example, the ambiguity around the EU’s diversification discourse. 
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The South Stream project is expected to cost twice as much as Nabucco and, as some 
analysts argue, it is expected to generate a scenario of oversupply towards the EU that 
would imply a decrease in gas price. All these indicators characterize this project as 
economically non-viable. The intention to build South Stream, despite the fact that it is 
likely to be the most expensive pipeline in the world, points to the main driver being the 
geopolitical objective to oppose Nabucco and to consolidate Russian presence in the 
region rather than an economic logic. As noted in layer two, such a move is consistent 
with an RE vision of energy security.  Russia prefers to proceed with its costly project 
in the belief that abandoning it would imply a political victory for the adversary and a 
reputational loss vis-à-vis the West.735 This can be seen as reflecting the anti-Western 
narrative of neo-Eurasianism and the dominant narrative in the Cold War time during 
which the West was the enemy to defeat, the entity that undermines Russia’s progress.  
In particular, the cooperation with Western European energy companies to accomplish 
the South Stream project reflects the neo-Eurasian belief that cooperation with 
Europeans is possible only within an anti-western perspective (neo-Euroasianism). On 
the other side, the fact that the EU insisted on backing the Nabucco project despite the 
huge degree of uncertainty around the supplier of the pipeline736, reinforces the 
perception that the EU is instead inspired by the geopolitical aim to counter Russian 
energy strategy. South Stream instead offers simpler and more secure alternative to 
Nabucco.  
In principle South Stream represents stable gas supplies for Europe as – unlike Nabucco 
– it relies on a secure supplier (Russia) and does not cross unstable regions of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus. Furthermore, it bypasses the Ukrainian territory – on which 80% 
of Russian gas supplies to Europe transit – preventing the risk that Russian–Ukrainian 
disputes affect supply to Europe as occurred in 2006 and 2009. The preference for a 
project that is in principle more ‘insecure’ not only contradicts the EU’s discourse on 
security of supply but confirms claims regarding the geopolitical character of the EU’s 
strategy (RE paradigm in layer two). Following a rationalist account, the South Stream 
pipeline would be a better fit with the EU’s interest in security of supply.  
                                                      
735 Baev, and Overland, The South Stream versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and Economical 
(ir)ationales and Political Stakes in Mega Projects, pp. 1075–1090. Available from : 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2010/86_5baev_overland
.pdf  Accessed: 5/5/2013  
736 In fact, given sanctions and strong opposition from the US, Iran would represent a politically 
unrealistic supplier. Iraq is also an unstable country, while the ex-Soviet countries of Central Asia are 
seen as the object of Russian pressure and are likely to favour relations with Russia or China.  
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Conversely, by focusing on the role of the Self/Other discursive interaction, other post-
structuralist or discourse-based accounts would introduce the notion of ‘otherness’ that 
reinforces the dichotomy ‘us’ and ‘them’, and rejects the fixed ‘reality’ of the rationalist 
tradition (realism and liberalism).737 This dynamic can be grasped through a focus on 
the intersubjective interaction with the Other. The pre-given nature of interests is also 
questioned in favour of a vision that rather sees interests as socially constructed and 
framed within a discourse.  
However, the existing discourse-based approaches738 would limit their examination to 
illustrate how the EU and Russia employ their energy paradigms in the pipeline politics 
and how – especially on the EU’s side – the aim to diversify energy supplies by 
decreasing dependence on Russian pipelines (‘diversification discourse’) contradicts 
with the competing discourse of ‘integrating Russia’ in the EU’s political space. In 
short, they would limit their account to layer two level. Conversely, the proposed 
approach broadens the analysis to include how historical representations – which 
construct the various possibilities of Otherness (‘degree of Otherness’) – are played out 
in the energy field (layer two) and, then, in the discursive practices informing the 
Nabucco-South Stream politics (layer three).  
From this perspective, the proposed reading hypothesises that a narrow ‘degree of 
Otherness’ explains the benevolent positions of both actors as well as claims in favour 
of  ‘co-existence’ and ‘non-competition’ between the two pipeline projects.  
Conversely, the EU’s ’normative’ insistence in favour of the EU-sponsored Nabucco, 
despite huge uncertainty about its supplier, is indicative that a negative representation of 
mistrust towards the Russian Other is at play. 
 
 
8 Conclusion  
 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explain the politics behind Nabucco and South Stream 
through mutual representations and discourses rather than through a mere conflict of 
                                                      
737 J., Der Derrian, The (S)pace of International Reltions : Simulation, Surveillance and Speed, 
International Study Quarterly, Vol. 34, No.3, 1990, p.298   
738 See for example Pick, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A critical analysis,  for critical accounts. See for 
example Khasson, Discourses and Interests in EU-Russia Energy Relations, and Tichy and Kratochvil, 
EU and Russian Discourse on Energy Relations, for discourse-based approaches. 
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different interests. In order to do this, the discourse landscape has been mapped to 
construct the ‘degree of Otherness’, that is, to identify how the representation of Other 
unveiled in the narratives and discourses of layers one and two are actually operative in 
the pipeline debate.  
Contrary to readings of the Nabucco-South Stream that derive the antagonist element 
from a pre-constituted difference in actors’ interests or (mis)perceptions (e.g. realism 
and liberalism), this approach enables us to understand not only antagonism but also 
cooperation through mutual representations and competing projects on ‘Europe’. 
Furthermore, the contribution of this approach to existing constructivists and discourse-
based accounts739 is that the meaning of the discursive practices played out in the 
Nabucco-South Stream politics (documents, speeches, statements and symbolic acts) is 
examined in light of a broader discursive structure that encompasses the energy 
paradigm of actors and their historical representations. In other words, the meaning of 
documents, speeches, statements and symbolic acts analyzed is not only the one 
derivable from their mere textual reading. Rather, these documents, speeches, 
statements and symbolic acts acquire a broader meaning through the three-layered 
discursive structure that takes into account how the actors have historically represented 
each other (layer one) and which energy paradigm they employed in their mutual 
relations (layer two). 
Another contribution is to the specific strand of the literature that merely assumes 
actors’ identity and modus operandi as 'different’. In fact, from a constructivist angle, 
this strand argues that the EU’s aim is to introduce its universal liberal agenda into the 
Russian energy sector, which operates according to different logics.740  Rather than 
assuming such a ‘difference’, the proposed account allows for a focus on how this 
difference is spatially, temporally and ethically situated.741 It also represents a 
progression from existing discourse-based approaches as it focuses on the way in which 
these three dimensions of identity construction interrelate. The analysis of this 
                                                      
739 See for example  Khasson, Discourses and Interests in EU-Russia Energy Relations;  Tichy and 
Kratochvil, EU and Russian Discourse on Energy Relations 
740 See for example, H., Haukkala, The Role of Norms and Values in the European Union’s Russia 
Policy, in J. Gower, and G. Timmins, eds., Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: an Uneasy 
Partnership, London: Anthem Press, 2007,  pp.133-148 quoted by Pick, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A 
critical analysis, p.323 
See also K., Westphal, Energy Policy between Multilateral Governance and Geopolitics: Whither 
Europe?  Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft , Vol. 4, 2006, pp. 44-62 quoted by Pick, EU-Russia 
Energy Relations: A critical analysis, p.323 
741 Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 45-51 
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interrelation sheds light on how political subjectivities are constituted as well as on the 
possibility for analyzing differences and similarities between discourses and their 
changes over time.  
 
From an initial analysis, the official discourses played out by the EC and Russia are 
characterized by a benevolent narrative in which both actors hold a non-threatening 
representation of the Other (low degree of Otherness). Through their projects, both 
actors are working to ensure the security of supply of the European continent (Europe as 
a ‘white zone’). However, from a closer examination, discourses and symbolic acts 
signal that the ‘degree of Otherness’ gradually widens. Therefore, the political 
implication is that the counterpart is gradually represented as the ‘Other’ of ‘Europe’. 
This indicates the presence of a contestation among competing projects on ‘Europe’ – 
seen as a ‘grey’ or even ‘red’ zone – and, thus, the existence of a discursive antagonism. 
The technical dispute on the two pipelines discloses in reality a deeper challenge. For 
the EU, South Stream is more than a mere competing project on energy; it rather 
embodies a competing project on ‘Europe’. Similarly, for Russia, Nabucco represents 
the EU’s attempt to reiterate its hegemonic project to Westernize Europe.   
As the degree of Otherness widens, a logic of competition in both layer one and layer 
two emerges. This is further confirmed by the discursive practice of comparison and 
mutual discrediting that both parties have utilized to denigrate the competitor’s pipeline 
project. Such logic evokes the typical confrontational scheme that was dominant during 
the Cold War where contestation had a geopolitical tone: the race for the construction of 
pipelines for ‘Europe’ recalls the race for world leadership. The contestation between 
Nabucco and South Stream within a context of the New Cold War portrays a case in 
which the EU and Russia employ the geopolitical energy paradigm (RE in layer two).  
Such a scenario permits us to scale down the layered structure to layer one and 
demonstrate how Russia has engaged in its typical divide and rule tactic and resorted to 
its historical exceptionalist narrative while the EC proved its legacy to its typical 
Othering vocation as well as Europeanisation and Eurocentric language.  
The discursive practices analyzed also depict a scenario in which both parties trigger an 
‘othering’ process representing a confrontational discursive landscape. On the Russian 
side, by presenting South Stream as a simpler and more secure option to Nabucco, 
Russia aims to ‘other’ the EU by limiting its role of leader in the energy governance of 
Europe, and excluding other Nabucco suppliers (e.g. in Central Asia) which may 
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undermine the quasi-monopolistic position of Gazprom.  
A representation of West/Western Europe as a ‘threat’ emerges in that it attempts to 
lessen dependence on Russia and thus undermine Russian interest (e.g. pragmatic 
statism and Eurasianism in layer one).  
On the other side, with the rejection of the Russian attempt to bless South Stream as a 
European project and the intention to build a pipeline without Russian involvement, the 
EU demonstrated its opposition to Russian inclusion as a legitimate actor in the 
European space and confirmed its representation as the threatening ‘Other’ of Europe. 
In addition, the emphasis on the discourse of reducing dependency from Russia reflects 
an RE understanding of energy security (layer two) according to which a player aims to 
avoid overdependence on other players. This is seen as a source of concern and 
ultimately threatening to self-security. As a result of this analysis, it can be said that the 
EU’s understanding of international politics in this area is closer to the realist anarchic 
world.  
The next chapter turns its focus to examine the case of the EU-Russia ED. The literature 
has extensively explained the dialogue as a relationship between two different actors 
that take on cooperative and integrative practices but with modest results on technical 
issues because of their essential ‘difference’.742  
Rather than analysing actors’ divergence on technical issues, Morozov743 provides an 
innovative perspective by arguing that a more fundamental identity conflict on actors’ 
idea of Europe is at stake. However, while he focuses on explaining the identity conflict 
between the EU and Russia in the ED, he treats such a conflict as given.  The next 
chapter instead explains how the actors discursively move from cooperative to 
confrontational positions and illustrates how such a shift has also implications for the 
political construction of ‘Europe’. In addition, the historical narratives and 
representations of the Self in relation to the Other, outlined in chapter 3, help 
understand the move from the image of ‘partner’ to that of confrontational ‘Other’ or 
‘learner’ (‘degree of Otherness’). In addition, the conceptualization of the ED through 
the historical encounter of identities, allow us to grasp how a mutual process of identity 
construction (constructive power of outsiders) also occurs in this case study.
                                                      
742See for example Romanova, The Russian Perspective on the Energy Dialogue. See also Hadfield, EU-
Russia Energy Relations: Aggregation and Aggravation 
743 Morozov, in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security 
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Chapter 6 - Layer Three (2): The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: A 
Rethink 
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1 Introduction  
 
 
This chapter provides empirical evidence to demonstrate the socially constructed nature 
of energy security in the context of EU-Russia energy relations.  The chapter employs a 
narrative analysis to the case of the EU-Russia ED and it aims to understand what such 
a relationship means for the construction of ‘Europe’.  
As explained throughout the thesis, deeper examination of EU-Russia energy relations 
needs to consider technical problems, political issues and discursive structures as 
interrelated and ultimately dependent on EU and Russian mutual understanding based 
on historical representations as well as on their political projects of Europe.744 In this 
perspective, it emerges that the way in which questions related to energy governance are 
handled might have relevant implications and meanings not only for the ‘energy 
security’ of both parties, but also for the entire political structure of Europe. 
 
As noted, one of the aims of this thesis is to explore EU-Russian energy relations 
through a discursive approach. According to Ringmar, the stories we tell ourselves 
about things are only one kind of narrative among many, and as such they have no 
privileged status. Social scientists should discard their belief in the existence of a 
unified, coherent and transcendental truth or identity.745 There is no underlying 
‘essence’ which guarantees our integrity and which makes it possible for us to order our 
preferences coherently over time and between narrative contexts. In this perspective, a 
discursive approach considers identities and its preferences as constructed through and 
dependent on discourses. As such, each discourse put forward to justify an actor’s 
argument or interest relies on a specific identity told by the actor itself.  However, the 
relationship between interests and identity is not fixed per se but it holds as long as 
identity and interest are framed in a specific discourse. Neither actions nor interests can 
exist outside of the context of a discourse.  
However, given their essential instability, discourses are likely to vary. As a result, the 
way in which actors define their interests will vary correspondingly. Hence, interests 
                                                      
744 See for example Morozov, in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy 
Security  
745 Ringmar, Identity, Interests and Action 
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can never refer to something that subjects ‘really’ want, but only to what they may want 
themselves to want before a particular audience. Once the discourse has given meaning 
to a specific interest, actions will then follow as a consequence. In addition, specific 
meaning and representations that have been powerful in a specific historical period can 
be traced and seen as operative in other historical circumstances. In this light, an 
account phrased only in terms of interests can by itself never be enough. Instead, the 
triangular relationship narrative-identity-interests provides a more comprehensive and 
organic structure to study social science.  
When an identity is in the process of being established (‘formative moment’) or is 
maintained as dominant, old meanings are contested and new meanings are advanced 
with the help of discourses. These new discourse put forward a different identity-
interests relation through which new stories about the Self are introduced and a new 
identity is shaped.746 Essentially, the contestation is, therefore first over identities and 
subsequently over interests.747 
From this perspective, the Wæverian layered structure is rooted in the conviction that 
any attempt to pursue a specific interest will not be successful as long as this discursive 
structure is neglected.748 Within this approach, the dominance of a discourse over others 
is maintained through its confirmation and the simultaneous rejection of alternative 
options. A policy that ignores the structure of meaning will not be recognized as being 
involved in the struggle for discursive hegemony nor as a viable option in the EU-
Russia energy debate. The Wæverian structure of meaning tends to confer on  historical 
trajectory – rather than mere interests – ‘taken for granted’ and sedimented 
characteristics.749  
As demonstrated in chapter 3, layer one includes the historical political project on 
Europe and the mutual representations held respectively by Western Europe and Russia.  
In particular, Western Europe has shown inclinations to build ‘Europe’ through mainly 
two competing narratives: the eurocentric ‘civilian empire’ or the cooperative Concert 
of Europe. As a consequence, relations with Russia have been set according to the 
formula ‘transformation through integration’ in the European political space, through 
egalitarianism or through the idea of Russia being the ‘land of the future’.   
Russia, for its part, has aspired to pursue its political project on Europe either through a 
                                                      
746 Ringmar, Identity, Interests and Action, pp. 83-85 
747 Ringmar, Identity, Interests and Action, p. 90  
748 See Wæver, in Hansen and Wæver, European Integration and National Identity 
749 Wæver, Ibidem 
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representation of itself as ‘Great Power’ that wants to establish its relations with the 
West/Western Europe on an equal basis in order to preserve its sovereignty, or through 
a westernising narrative through which Russia subscribes to a leader / follower logic.750 
Layer two demonstrated how this narrative background – and its representations – of 
layer one are reflected in two main energy paradigms (MI and RE) played out by the EU 
and Russia. These paradigms are also indicative of the EU’s and Russia’s projects of 
Europe and they stem from the kind of self and mutual representation in place 
(eurocentrism or Concert of Europe for Western Europe vs Great Power or ‘follower’ 
for Russia). The third layer regards specific discursive practices played out by the EU 
and Russia in two case studies informing their energy relations.  
After having analyzed the politics around Nabucco and South Stream, the focus now 
turns to the ED.   These two cases have been picked because the literature commonly 
explained them by assuming confrontation as the ‘dominant’ discourses.751 While these 
readings can be accurate, this thesis rejects the fact that the confrontation is assumed. 
Rather the aim is to explore how it becomes constructed as ‘dominant’ in the two cases 
above-mentioned, that is, how dominant discourses overcame the resistance of 
competing discourses. By doing so, it will be demonstrated that ‘confrontation’ is not a 
fixed lens of analysis for these two case studies, rather it alternates with ‘cooperation’ 
discourse and become constructed through the relations with the Other. From this 
perspective, the assumed confrontational discourses might also be misleading. 
 
This chapter argues that in the context of the ED, the EU’s intention was to deal with 
Russia as an ‘equal partner’ in facing the problem and finding solutions, that is, to 
establish an egalitarian discourse enabling Russia to reclaim its subjectivity. The 
underlying idea was that negative Self / Other perceptions inherited from the Cold War 
could be overcome through a process of constructing policies, through dialogue rather 
than negotiation or diktat. However, it will be demonstrated that, while the EU’s 
discourse attempts to promote change in its energy relations with Russia, the traditional 
representation of the EU as a eurocentric ‘civilian empire’ occurred in such a way  that 
only served to re-inscribe the negative perception of Russia that the EU seemed willing 
                                                      
750 Wæver, Ibidem 
751 Morozov in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security, for example 
assumes an identity conflict in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. 
Similarly Baran, Security Aspects of the South Stream Project, for example assumes the conflict between 
the South Stream and Nabucco pipelines.  
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to erase. 
On the other side, Russia – consistent with the ‘Russia Great Power’ narrative and in 
response to EU’s imperial attitude – attempts to maintain its independence in energy 
market regulation in the context of the ED. While recognizing the need to reform the 
energy market towards more liberalization, Russia also acknowledges that changes in 
domestic legislation will occur ‘at her own pace’ and taking into consideration the 
specificity of domestic energy market. Russia’s refusal to accept EU rules drawn from 
the acquis communautaire as a long-term basis for mutual energy relations confirms this 
dynamic.752  
It follows that Russia’s long-term vision of the ED differs from the concept that the EC 
proposes on behalf of the EU. Generally, the EU’s claimed objective is to create a 
secure regulatory framework inspired by energy liberalization. In principle, this 
framework will lead to a decrease in the control of public authorities in energy relations 
while energy companies would mainly be in charge of security energy in Europe. 
Conversely, the Russian position relies on the concept of equality between partners and 
preservation of this equality through the action of the state. This, for example, can 
explain why the Russian state and top representatives have shares in the key national 
energy companies.753  
From this perspective Russia rejects any proposal implying the introduction in Russia of 
EU’s legislation. Conversely, the objective is to promote a mutual approximation within 
an international organisation such as the WTO. Importantly, as Romanova reports, 
Russians even invented a different term: ‘legal convergence’, rather than ‘legal 
approximation’.754 
 
Against this background, it will be demonstrated how the EU’s and Russia’s relations in 
the ED tell the broader story of their political projects and contest on ‘Europe’ and can 
be derived from their mutual representations. The critical and discourse-based literature 
has already investigated the ED. Boute, for example, examines how energy efficiency 
has been constructed as a new paradigm in EU’s external energy policy, in particular in 
the context of the ED with Russia.755 However, he only analyses one side of the self-
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other relationship played out in the ED, since Russian internal discourse and positions 
vis a vis the EU are neglected. In addition, the ‘Other’ of the ED is exclusively 
associated with Russia. This is only one half of the story.  
To address this gap, Morozov analyze the positions of both actors rather than only from 
Western perspective.756 In doing so, he notes that, despite the aim to promote 
cooperation, the ED epitomizes how the EU and Russia ultimately play out competing 
visions of Europe. The EU persists in using its ‘imperial’ and assimilative logic of 
enlargement in its interaction with Russia insisting on the principle of conditionality. 
But, this EU position clashes with Russia’s assertion of the sovereign principle. As a 
consequence, Russia’s interests in energy diverge from the EU ambition of liberalized 
market. Rather than looking at these disputes as mere technical issues, Morozov rightly 
indicates that identity questions are at stake.  
While drawing from this critical strand, the explanation of the ED proposed here sheds 
further light on the historical and representation-based origin of the identity-conflict, 
which Morozov treats as given. With reference to this last point, this chapter also 
underlines how the representation of the counterpart moves from  ‘partnership’ to 
confrontational ‘Other’ (‘degree of Otherness’).  
In addition, this account also focuses on the constructive power of outsiders as a way to 
explain the mutual identity construction process emanating from the discursive 
encounter of the actors. In his work, Morozov as well as other authors757, seems to 
overlook this aspect. 
 
Finally, with regard to the structure of this chapter, the following section contextualizes 
the ED, outlining how its main discourse revolves around the theme of cooperation and 
de-securitization. A section on the EU approach to the ED will illustrate how elements 
of ‘othering’ and representations of Russia as an untrustworthy threat are at play along 
with the established cooperation narrative.  
Similarly, an analysis of the Russian approach to the ED will shed light on the 
continued tension between claims for equal integration as a ‘Great Power’ and the 
reaffirmation of the ‘sovereign’ narrative. Again, Russia’s positive image of the EU as a 
‘partner’ is contradicted by a representation of the counterpart as an untrustworthy 
                                                      
756 Morozov in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security  
757 See for example Romanova, The Russian Perspective on the Energy Dialogue; Hadfield, EU-Russia 
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Other. As indicated throughout the chapter, these discursive strategies and 
representation dynamics have broader implications for tracing the border of the 
European continent (spatial identity), as well as on the temporal and ethical construction 
of actors’ identity. 
 
 
2 The Energy Dialogue and Its Meaning  
 
 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, both Russian and EU officials viewed the 
ECT as a fruitless mechanism. Under the auspices of the French EU Presidency Jacques 
Chirac, Javier Solana, Romano Prodi and the newly elected President Putin announced a 
‘new phase of institutional, economic and social reforms’758 in the relationship between 
the two partners with energy as the focus of cooperation. To overcome the stalemate of 
the ongoing Russian rejection of the ECT, the two sides agreed on launching the ED.759 
The intention to define energy relations in the form of a ‘dialogue’ discloses a more 
egalitarian and positive approach compared to the ECT. Such a new approach is visible 
from the language of the ‘dialogue’ itself.  
In this respect, the repeated use of the word ‘partnership’ highlights the equivalent 
position of the two actors: ‘The European Union and the Russian Federation have 
decided at the Paris Summit in October 2000 to establish a strategic Energy 
Partnership’.760  
From a linguistic point of view, the term ‘dialogue’ is not used to gain maximum 
benefit for the Self, since in a relationship of dialogue ‘there is no a priori certainty 
about who will learn from whom’.761 The ED proposes the possibility of the emergence 
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International Theory : Positivism and Beyond,  Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996,  quoted 
by K.M., Fierke,  Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement: NATO, Russia, and the CEECs, 
Millennium- Journal of international Studies,  Vol.28, No.1 1999, p. 27, quoted by Browning, The 
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of a strategic inter-subjectivity as opposed to a subject-object relationship. 
As Fierke notes, relations based on ‘dialogue’ differ from relations set on negotiation. 
While ‘negotiation’ is a confrontational communication revolving around a ‘we–them’ 
relationship, within which each party tries to maximize its own interests, a ‘dialogue’ 
reflects instead a problem-solving approach that leads actors to recognize mutual 
subjectivity and  ‘empathize with the experience and suffering of the other’.762 In a 
dialogue, therefore, the other participant is considered as an ‘equal partner’. From this 
perspective, an initial analysis suggests that the ED is an example of ‘dialogue’ rather 
than a ‘negotiation’. As such, a number of joint official documents on the ED make 
frequent reference to developing an egalitarian relationship of ‘dialogue’ and 
‘partnership’. For example, the joint declaration that launched the ED reports:  
 
‘We, the leaders of the European Union and the Russian Federation, meeting in 
Paris for the sixth summit since the entry into force of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), reaffirm the particular importance we attach to 
strengthening our strategic partnership, based on the principles of democracy, 
respect for human rights, the rule of law and the market economy.’763   
 
The language of egalitarianism is often repeated in the yearly ‘Progress Reports’ on the 
status of the ED: ‘Parties note the importance of equal conditions and equivalent basic 
rules relating to market’.764  As a confirmation of the equal status of the partners in 
Europe, the ED specifies that parties are expected to work together to: ‘Enhance the 
energy security of the European continent by binding Russia and the EU into a closer 
relationship in which all issues of mutual concern in the energy sector can be 
addressed’.765 Furthermore, by referring to cooperation in a number of energy issues of 
‘mutual concern’, the ED implicitly recognizes Russia and the EU as actors contributing 
to the security of energy in Europe.  
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Along with cooperation on issues related to the energy security of the European 
continent, the ED calls for partners to cooperate also at regional level: ‘EU-Russia 
Energy Efficiency Initiative included projects on cooperation at regional level, 
strengthening partnership programs between local and regional energy efficiency 
centers in the EU and Russia’.766  
In this light, it can be argued that the ED promotes ‘desecuritization’ as the dominant 
theme to govern energy relations between the partners. The desecuritization theme was 
introduced by the so-called Copenhagen School767 and refers to the discursive strategy 
according to which the avoidance of the language of security – in favour of other issues 
– will result in the enhancement of security per se.768  
Arguing that the political discourse of the ED is ‘desecuritized’ implies an improvement 
of mutual relations. Within the desecuritization narrative, the possibility of constructing 
each other’s identities in antagonistic terms is reduced, thus, the ‘degree of Otherness’ is 
narrow.  
‘Desecuritization’ has implications also for the construction of actors’ spatial identity as 
‘European’. In fact, the reported claims in favour of cooperation and equality 
demonstrate a common understanding of ‘Europe’ as a united continent with no clear 
boundaries (‘white zone’) as well as actors’ equal inclusion in the European Concert.  In 
addition, by promoting energy cooperation, both actors re-conceptualize their mutual 
identities in terms of ‘commonness’ rather than antagonism. For example, the emphasis 
on the possibility to create convergence and integration between the European and 
Russian energy markets expresses the ambition to construct that commonality: 
‘Regulatory convergence…will permit the progressive integration of the EU and 
Russian energy markets’769  
The ED also adheres to the liberal paradigm of  MI (layer two) as it makes a connection 
between the theme of integration and that of mutual interdependence. As explained by 
the liberal-institutionalists, Keohane and Nye,770 interdependence leads both sides to 
neglect conflictual issues and focus on long-term mutually beneficial solutions. In the 
ED the interdependence between the two actors is clearly specified. In this respect, the 
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yearly ‘Progress Reports’ specify that the relationship is not asymmetrical but there is 
interdependence between the two partners: ‘EU and Russia are interdependent in terms 
of energy relations‘771 This interdependence has to continue since both sides are 
encouraged ‘to further develop their relations’ 772 in the future. As such, although the 
official joint documents describe the interdependence between the EU and Russia 
mainly through economic figures, the acknowledgment of the interdependent and 
symmetric nature of energy relations between the EU and Russia can be read as a 
confirmation of the egalitarian character of the ED.   
 
If we look at the ED through the lens of the historical relations of the two partners, it 
emerges that the ED offers a way out of the Cold War ‘us-them’ contraposition and the 
conventional East-West dichotomy. Similarly, the ED decreases the polarization 
between the historical narratives of Eurocentrism and ‘Great Power Russia’. As a result, 
the historical divisive borders are reworked in ‘de-securitizing’ terms. The EU rejects 
Western European imperial ambitions in which the subjectivity of the Russian Other is 
overlooked. Instead, it expands the borders of the European continent by including 
Russia.  
For its part, by subscribing to the ED, Russia understands itself as contributor to 
European energy security as well as an equal participant of ‘the Concert of Europe’. To 
paraphrase Browning, in the context of the relations between Western Europe and 
Russia, the ED represents a ‘move towards emancipation, egalitarianism and the 
emergence of a postmodern spatial politics of loosely defined networks rather than 
rigidly defined exclusionary state borders’.773 As a result, it can be initially concluded 
that the official language of the ED is mainly inspired by the logic of integration.  
Yet, as the next sections will demonstrate, the EU and Russia construct their integration 
discourse differently. 
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3 The European Approach to Energy Dialogue 
 
 
As noted, an initial analysis shows that, from an EU perspective, the language used to 
describe the ED does not reflect the EU’s narrative of the ‘civilian empire’, which aims 
to integrate the partners in its sphere of influence through legal approximation. In fact, 
in the wording of the agenda of the ED there is no clear mention of the principle of 
conditionality. The EC states that ‘Russia and the European Union are natural partners 
in the energy sector’.774 Also, in describing the objective of the ED, it confirms that: 
 
‘the overall objective of the energy partnership is to enhance the energy security 
of the European continent by binding Russia and the EU into a closer relationship 
in which all issues of mutual concern in the energy sector can be addressed …  the 
strong mutual dependency and common interest in the energy sector  is clearly a 
key area of EU-Russia relations’775 
 
However, the initial impression of the EU as aiming to set equal integration with Russia 
to enhance the energy security of Europe can be questioned. For example, the common 
aim of the establishment of a ‘pan-European energy market’776 – one of the stated 
objectives of the ED – sits in contradiction with some EU references to the follower / 
teacher logic. In fact, despite the endorsed principle of equality, the EC Communication 
of 13 December 2004 on ‘The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue between 2000 and 2004’ 
reports: 
 
[t]he energy dialogue (…) has opened the way for the convergence of strategies 
in the Russian and EU markets. The principles of the internal energy market, 
such as energy efficiency, reform of internal industrial structures, reform in the 
electricity sector and unbundling, could provide part of the reference 
framework for the restructuring of Russia’s energy sector.777  
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This demonstrates how, despite the endorsement of the egalitarian stance, references to 
Russian legal approximation with ‘the principles of the internal energy market’ still 
appear in the EU language on the ED. 
This consequently paves the ground to argue that, the EU’s idea on energy in Europe is 
also tied to the RE energy paradigm (layer two), and ultimately linked to the traditional 
narrative of the EU as a eurocentric ‘civil empire’ (layer one).  
The EU’s alleged detachment from its narrative of ‘civil empire’ is only apparent. The 
EU understands the concept of a ‘pan-European energy market’ as Russia’s adherence 
to the EU’s standards and norms. As a consequence, the EU’s ambition remains to 
establish a continent-wide energy market based on the EU’s (or similar to the EU’s) 
legislation, which would create adequate conditions for private investors.  The language 
of the EC Communication defines the space for ‘acceptable’ behavior and makes the 
socialization of Russia possible into that space. At the same time, it recalls the repeated 
utterance of ‘making them like us’.  
Essentially, some EU’s discursive practices denote a broadening of the ‘degree of 
Otherness’, and mark clear boundaries in the European space.  
Fierke disputes that an equal dialogue can occur in a circumstance where the type of 
relation is that of ‘teacher / learner’.778  
Conversely, by stating what is to be considered as acceptable ‘reference’ to implement a 
convergence strategy within the ED, the integration theme, as played out by the EU, 
stresses the goodness and the universality of the EU’s energy framework that should be 
applied also in Russia.  
This seems to suggest that the possibility for Russia being treated as a subject is 
enhanced only if incorporation of the EU’s norms and values takes place. This reveals 
how the Western European representation of Russia as ‘learner’ still exists. In historical 
terms, this reading suggests that the EU imposes on itself the traditional mission to 
assimilate and civilize Russia into the Western political space through the extension of 
the EU’s acquis communautaire to the ‘East’. Russia needs to absorb the characterizing 
elements of Western democracies if it aims to be included in the Concert of Europe.  
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It emerges that from the EU perspective, the meaning of integration is imbued by a 
considerable ambivalence. Further evidence demonstrates how, despite its apparent 
subjectivity, Russia still occupies a learner position in the EU debate on the ED: ‘The 
EU has developed broad legislative and regulatory basis for energy efficiency which we 
are keen to share with our Russian partners’.779 
Here, the EU integration discourse serves to construct European identity as superior and 
benevolent civilization bloc, while it reinforces the Russian identity as a learner from 
Europe (layer one). Although described as a ‘partner’, the EU still treats Russia as a 
‘policy recipient’.  
The ED and its core values of integration and cooperation ultimately reveal a power 
relation proper of the traditional eurocentric/europeanising discourse with consequences 
for the political construction of ‘Europe’ as well as for the position of Russia in Europe.  
In fact, the EU advances the value of integration on a hierarchical basis and seeks to 
confer it a degree of ‘naturalness’.  
The EU not only demonstrates its attitude to perpetuate the teacher / learner dichotomy 
but evidence can also be found to demonstrate how EU discourse contributes to the 
construction of Russia as a ‘threat’ through the theme of mistrust. On the one hand, the 
ED opens the way for cooperation and integration, thus, dismissing claims of a New 
Cold War contraposition. In fact the ED aims ‘to reinforce mutual confidence’780, and 
the EU confirms that ‘Russia will remain an important supplier to the EU for years to 
come’781 On the other hand, the 2004 Commission Communication acknowledges that: 
 
‘..the gas sector, on which the EU economy will become most dependent in the 
future, appears particularly vulnerable…It is therefore important that exporting  
countries do not distort the rules of the internal market by contracts which are 
inconsistent with Community law.’ 782 
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As Russia is the EU’s major exporter, there is ground to argue that Russia is constructed 
as a source of anxiety and instability that comes from the EU’s eastern borders, similar 
to the theme of ‘Russia as a barbaric entity at the gate of Europe’ (layer one). In another 
circumstance, the EC feels the need to specify that: 
 
‘it is vital for both the EU and Russia that companies such as Gazprom play a 
real, equal and active role in the EU's competitive energy markets. The 
presentation which took place at expert level just before the meeting confirm 
our commitment to transparency and openness, key for success in our dialogue.’ 
783 
 
The EC questions the integrity of Gazprom by casting doubts on its potential conduct. 
By doing so, it poses as a superior and fully-fledged player compliant with good and 
universal rules and it expects Russia to follow its example. It can be argued that, similar 
to its threatening image during the Cold War, Russia is represented as an alarming 
presence able to jeopardize the correct functioning of the EU’s internal market. Here the 
condition is for Russia to adopt Western values and to be included into the ‘we’ of EU–
Europe.  
The impact of this interaction on Western European identity is twofold. On one side, it 
is the EU’s mistrust towards Russia that reinforces the traditional Western European 
identity in terms of ‘eurocentrism’, ‘europeanisation’ and ‘messianism’. On the other 
side, Russia’s ‘different’ modus operandi has a constitutive power on the Western 
European identity that, as will be demonstrated, tends to be portrayed not only as 
universal but also as benevolent.  
The existing conventional constructivist and discourse-based literatures on the ED784, 
overlook such a mutual constitutive dynamic because they merely examine the 
differences in policy interests and discourses between the two opposed actors, EU and 
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Russia, without grasping the constitutive implication of this interaction.  For example, 
Hadfield,785 by examining a number of documents pertaining to the ED, only concludes 
that the two actors hold dissimilar understandings of energy security.  
The idea that Western Europe has a universal civilizing mission in Russia reflects a 
historical parallel that validates a particular construction of the ‘West’ as possessing 
ultimate knowledge as well as the universal prescriptions for modernization. As a 
consequence, Russia is perceived not only as barbarian and backward vis a vis the West/ 
Western Europe, but also as a country in need of modernization.  
From this perspective, the EC’s dedication to promote the ‘good’ European practices of 
energy efficiency and energy savings in Russia as a way to guarantee availability of 
energy resources for future supply to the EU, is inscribed in a representation of Russia 
as a country in transition towards modernization. As the above mentioned EC 
Communication reports:  
 
‘[t]he modernisation of the Russian economy, support to its high rate of 
growth (around 7% p.a.) makes it all the more essential that Russian industry 
adopts efficient energy practices in order to increase capacities for export, 
including towards the EU’.786  
 
The same Communication reports that:  
 
‘Consideration should be given to involvement of the Russian electricity 
supply industry in the Community electricity market, given forecasts of 
European electricity needs. Thus the synchronous interconnection of the 
Russian electricity network with the EU continental network was entered on 
the list of “common interest” projects agreed on at the EU-Russia summit of 
October 2001. To achieve this, many related issues will need to be resolved, 
notably those relating to the respect of environmental standards, nuclear safety 
in Russia and reciprocal access to electricity markets with due respect to 
relevant international obligations incumbent on each party’.787  
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Such affirmations support the construction of the EU’s identity as guardian and 
responsible for the energy security in Europe (ethical identity) and reveals a unilateral 
approach to energy relations between the EU and Russia based on the assumption that 
Russia should approximate to the EU standards, assimilate its internal priorities and 
ultimately serve its energy needs.788 The uneven understanding of the relationship with 
Russia is also evident from the wording. In fact, by focusing on the ‘…synchronous 
interconnection of the Russian electricity network in the EU continental network…’ as 
an issue to consider, the EU projects itself as a term of reference. On one side, the 
constitutive power of the Russian Other is here evident in that the EU reinforces its own 
eurocentric identity. On the other side, the integrationist vocation of the EU towards the 
creation of a Common European Home implies a construction of Russia as a country 
that needs modernization in order to be accepted. In doing so, the EU constructs both its 
temporal identity as a ‘developed’ actor as well as Russian identity as ‘developing’ 
Other. At the same time, the Russian-Other supports the construction of the EU-Self and 
its policy principles as more advanced. 
In addition, the EU represents Russia as an external object of the ED rather than an 
equal subject within an equal framework.  The EU’s urgency to include Russia in the 
Concert characterizes the ED as a policy ‘on’ Russia rather than a policy that sets a 
framework for equal relationship ‘with’ Russia. A consequence of such a position is that 
the EU projects itself as the privileged ‘agenda-setter’ entitled to govern energy in 
Europe by defining energy priorities and objectives (e.g. energy efficiency, energy 
saving, environmental standards, nuclear safety). Given that the agenda of the ED is 
mainly advancing the EU’s own interests, it is clear that the EU fails to involve Russia 
in the formulation of common energy cooperation and equalitarian status.789 As such, an 
eventual lack of Russia’s commitment to follow the objectives indicated by the EU 
means Russia’s failure to achieve equal subjectivity with the EU and her relegation to 
the outside.   
In other words, if Russia rejects these energy objectives and standards defined by the 
EU, it would be constructed as an ‘opponent’ to the peace project, and as posing a threat 
to the energy security of Europe. In doing so – similar to the Western European 
treatment of the new Russian Federation in the period following the collapse of the 
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USSR during which economic dependence and unequal exchange were re-established – 
the EU keeps treating Russia as a ‘learner’ and employing an implicit conditionality.  
In particular, the imposition of the EU energy agenda in the ED, reiterates the vision of  
Russia as a backward country790: 
 
‘The investment situation in the Russian Federation was another important topic 
of discussion within the Dialogue. The EU side underlined the need to proceed 
with market reforms, the application of market-based pricing and to simplify 
administrative and licensing procedures.’791 
 
The teacher-learner understanding of the EU’s relations with Russia can also be grasped 
in the words of the former Energy Commissioner Piebalgs who explicitly considered 
that: ‘Russia needs to ensure a secure and attractive investment climate which reduces, 
as far as possible, the level of non-commercial risk’.792 Similarly, on the occasion of the 
tenth anniversary of the ED, the Joint Report specifies that: 
 
‘[s]ince the start of the energy dialogue with Russia, the Commission has 
underlined the importance which it attaches to commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol on climate change. In the framework of the dialogue, the Commission 
has insisted on raising the question of Russian ratification of the Protocol, without 
which the Protocol could not come into force’.793  
 
By referring to the missed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU constructs Russia 
as an ‘obstacle’ that undermines international progress as well as an actor unwilling to 
comply with ‘good’ regulation. As such, the EU still fails to embark on an equal 
‘subject-subject’ avenue of cooperation. Rather, it sets a ‘subject-object’ relation, in 
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which Russia is cast in the passive role of policy-taker.794 Also, by representing Russia 
as an obstacle, the EU rejects the Russian challenge to the EU hegemonic discourse. 
Such a discursive practice contributes to unify the hegemonic discourse and allows, at 
the same time, the description of a threatening outside that prevents the closure of the 
hegemonic and universal discourse itself.795  
Furthermore, it can be argued how the examples of technical assistance projects have 
much wider political meanings compared to what usually is made apparent and, to some 
extent, are framed by identity politics. In fact, perceptions and recognition of political 
difference prevail over technical issues of cooperation.796  
On one side, the invitation to participate in these projects confirms how the EU still 
holds an image of Russia as a ‘recipient’ and as a country in need of assistance. On the 
other side, the EU’s offer to assist its counterpart contributes to the construction of the 
identity of the EU as a ‘benevolent’ and ‘charitable’ actor.  For example, with reference 
to the EU-funded TACIS programme – which aimed to provide technical assistance, 
including the implementation of the energy issues of the Kyoto protocol – the EU 
stresses that:  
 
‘The Russian Federation is a key supplier to the EU nuclear industry…Through 
the TACIS programme, the EU supported a large number of support activities 
and technical assistance to nuclear safety projects in the Russian Federation’.797  
 
Despite the benevolent purpose, by emphasizing its support to projects in Russia, the 
EU speaks the language of hierarchy, re-inscribing once again the relationship with 
Russia within the historical teacher / learner dichotomy.  
By implementing projects for the nuclear safety of Russian Federation, the EU is 
projecting itself as benevolent leader that shows the good energy practices to his 
follower. Here, the issue concerns the lack of intersubjectivity in the cooperation 
between the EU and Russia with the latter being denied the status of political subject 
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with its own interests. Behind the benevolent intention to develop regional cooperation 
on energy, the EU discourse tends to portray Russia as a country unready to contribute 
to the progress of the European energy agenda and thus, still in need of assistance. 
Given that Russia is still portrayed as a learner, its integration into Europe can only be 
assisted.798   
Overall, through technical assistance projects, the EU continues to construct Russia as 
the object whose subjectivity is denied in favour of its continued ‘backward’ status in 
Western discourse.  
Once again, Russia contributes to the construction of the EU’s identity as 
‘benevolent’.799 In short, through its assistance the EU also tries to reject the image of 
the West as a self-interested entity. Rather, as an expression of the Western civilization, 
the EU reinforces its self-representation as a charitable actor willing to spread its 
universally valid principles to the backward ‘East’. The Eurocentric tradition here 
emerges in the Self’s attribution of the moral ‘obligation’ or ‘unique’ privilege to 
intercede in the social development of Russia by assisting it in finding the true course to 
social and economic progress.800  
 
 
4 Summary 
 
 
From a first reading, the European understanding of the ED tends to establish a 
relationship between partners through a dialogue between equals. It also tends to ‘de-
securitize’ the whole European discourse on energy security and enlarge the borders of 
Europe. The ED offers ground to ‘desacralize’ the Western image of Russia as a liminar 
case and unstable Other of the West that has been played out for centuries. By treating 
Russia as an equal partner the ED provides the opportunity to integrate Russia into 
Europe. Moreover, the ‘de-securitisation’ of energy is seen as a first step in the 
liberation of ‘Europe’ from the politics of modernity with its focus on state sovereignty 
and territorial security. Conversely, the ED seems to set European energy security on 
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the innovative (post-modern) path in which issues of general interest (e.g. energy 
efficiency, environmental concerns) replace traditional state concerns related to energy 
supply (e.g. reliability, diversification).  
However, despite its stated goal of integration between equals, the EU proved to define 
integration in hierarchical terms. As such, the EU’s approach to the ED confirms the 
Western European legacy that constitutes the EU as a civilisational empire. Relations 
with Russia are ultimately understood in unequal terms; the possibility for a genuine 
dialogue seems compromised as Russia keeps occupying a learner (object) position in 
the EU’s discourse. Overall, such a negative position of Russia is at odds with the 
wording of the ED that establishes an equal status of the two partners in the energy 
governance of Europe. Ultimately the EU re-inscribes the boundaries of ‘Europe’ in 
exclusionary terms.801  
This offers Russia the option, either of being imperialized within the EU’s political 
space802, or, as it will be demonstrated below, of insisting on claims for a dialogue that 
promotes equality as conditio sine qua non.   
Rationalist theories would explain the tension as caused by clashing interests, 
conventional constructivists by clashing identities, instead existing discourse-based 
accounts analyze the construction of competing energy paradigms or how the different 
approaches of the EU and Russia towards the ED are indicative of a deeper discursive 
or power contest that eventually translate into a struggle for ‘Europe’.803 The proposed 
reading goes beyond these discourse-based accounts because it introduce the ‘degree of 
Otherness’ as the factor that explain how actors – through their discursive practices 
played out in the context of the ED – move from a condition of mutual positive 
representations and commonness to a scenario of negative Otherness. This has 
implications on the mutual construction of actors’ identity in spatial, temporal and 
ethical terms.  
In addition, the proposed approach stresses how the discursive practices played out in 
the context of the ED (layer three) are a reflection of actors’ energy paradigms (layer 
two) and ultimately of historical representation of Self in relation to the Other (layer 
one). 
                                                      
801 Browning, The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses 
of Region-Building in the European North, p. 48 
802 Browning, Ibidem  
803 See for example Tichy and Kratochvil, EU and Russian Discourse on Energy Relations; Morozov in 
Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security 
  267 
 
 
5 The Russian Approach 
 
 
The employment of discursive practices by the EC, showing an understanding of 
‘integration’ in terms of a civilizing mission, is problematic for Russia and it reignites 
the internal debates on Russian identity, which either constructs itself as a member of 
Western civilization, or as the ‘Other’ of Europe.804   
In its wording, the ED represents an opportunity for Russia to participate in Western 
European society that – according to nineteenth century thinking – is a Concert of Great 
Powers with smaller powers relegated to the margins. From this perspective, it can be 
said that Russia initially accepted the ED with the EU as it adheres to the idea that 
salient issues – such as energy – have to be discussed among equal Great Powers.805  
A certain urgency to be recognized as belonging to the European society can also be 
noticed in that: ‘Gazprom is ready to provide as much gas as Europe wishes’806 on 
condition that ‘we [EU and Russia] heed mutual interests’.807 Claims for a balanced 
energy relationship with other Great Powers, also reflects Putin’s understanding of 
international politics and Russia’s position in it. In particular, the ambivalence of 
Putin’s discourse is evident as he promotes Russia’s identification with Europe – 
through the endorsement of the ED – on condition that it is cooperation between formal 
equals. As a result, the ED represents a tangible tool for maintaining the prospect of a 
Concert of Europe composed of superpowers, which includes Russia. Here, it can be 
noted how Russia constructs its ‘European’ identity in spatial terms since ‘Europe’ is 
understood as a united continent with no confrontational boundaries among 
superpowers.  
In this respect, as a dialogue based on an equal partnership, Russia validates the ED and 
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identifies itself with ‘Europe’ and with the principles of cooperation. According to a 
previous Russian energy Minister, Shmatko: ‘Stable, reliable and predictable relations 
between Russia and the EU based on mutual trust in the field of energy constitute the 
most important conditions for providing energy security for Europe’.808  Overall, such a 
Russian approach focused on equality reflects Russia’s political thinking characterized 
by a great emphasis on the notion of mutual respect of sovereignty, which represents the 
cornerstone of the Westphalian, or pluralist international society. In fact, the attempt to 
promote cooperation through the scheme of Great Power management, to ensure 
balance of power, is a familiar trait of a number of Russian historical traditions such as 
Tsarist and Soviet Russia. More specifically, the understanding of international society 
as a concert headed by Great Powers acting in a multilateral and exclusive forum is also 
present in the historical narratives of Eurasianism and pragmatic statism (see chapter 3). 
Answering a question during a press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said:  
 
‘We want that this (energy) dialogue would be based on the principles which 
were earlier agreed, primarily which were agreed at the G8 Summit in St. 
Petersburg, which rest on a mutual consideration of interests, a balance of 
interests of producer countries, consumer countries and transiter countries. We 
continue to believe that these principles are absolutely essential for tackling all 
the questions that arise in this sector’.809 
 
The self-understanding of ‘Russia Great Power’,  that deals with other Great Powers in 
a multipolar structure, downplays claims of the competing historical tradition – 
dominant during the Petrin period and later under Gorbachev – that describes Russia as 
constantly trying to catch up with the more developed Western European powers.810  
Russia’s claim for equality also contributes to the construction of its temporal identity 
as a country with a level of development comparable to Western Europe. Consequently 
the EU’s scheme of ‘developed vs developing’ is rejected. On the contrary, the 
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emphasis on the balanced nature of the ED suggests that integration can only occur if 
partners have equal say in the interaction.  
Similar to the EU, from an analysis of the Russian official documents and speeches 
available in English, integration represents the main concern for Russia, which has 
proved to hold a different understanding of the concept of energy integration compared 
to the EU. As noted, the latter has defined the integration process in the sense of Russia 
looking at the EU energy standards as terms of reference. By contrast, Russia 
emphasizes the principles of a mutually beneficial and symmetric cooperation and 
integration, where Russia would be an equal partner of the EU. To quote Minister 
Shmatko: ‘what is important for us is dialogue, not a diktat’.811  
From a Russian perspective, the ED re-proposes a tension in which Russia claims 
integration with the EU and it tries, at the same time, to erase the long-standing image 
of Russia’s ‘ambiguity’ vis a vis Western Europe. Russia is both a ‘normal state’ and a 
‘Great Power’. As Secrieriu contends, the tension is between an aspiration for 
integration in the international community – that is recognition of ‘normalness’ – and 
the ambitions of Great Power.812 It follows that Russia problematizes the EU’s 
hierarchical inclusion. This explains the rejection of asymmetric integration and 
acceptance of claims that would secure symmetric inter-subjectivity between the EU 
and Russia. As Putin, put it: 
 
‘Today our energy dialogue is getting deeper both on a bilateral level and within 
the Russia-EU format. But I shall say directly that such cooperation can only 
exist on an equal rights and mutually advantageous basis. And if people want us 
to create the conditions that will allow foreign firms access to the Russian market 
then it is also our right to expect a non-discriminatory attitude from the 
governments of interested states when Russian companies plan to enter European 
markets’.813 
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Here, it can be noted how Putin emphasizes the concept of Russia’s recognition as a 
‘sovereign equal’ to the EU. In other words, he pushes for the ‘transition’ from a status 
of ‘apprentice’/ ‘learner’ to the recognition of Russia’s sovereign subjectivity that 
entitles Russia to act as the counterpart of the EU in the ED.  
As Prozorov suggests, Russia’s interaction with the EU in the context of the ED can 
ultimately be read through the categories of identity recognition rather than being a 
matter of interest divergence814,  as a rationalist account would argue. However, 
Prozorov’s frame fails to explain how such an identity recognition game is not only 
historically grounded but also based on mutual representations. In fact, thanks to the 
various historical representations of the Self in relation to the Other, it is possible to 
build a representational continuum (degree of Otherness) that goes from 
sameness/partnership to inequality/confrontation. Once this continuum is built, it is 
possible to decipher – from a Self’s perspective – the terms of identity recognition 
(partnership, equality) or a lack of it (mistrust, inferiority) vis a vis Other’s identity. For 
instance, coming back to the above-mentioned statement by Putin, it can be noted how, 
given his adherence to the historical narrative tradition promoting egalitarian relations 
with the West, he expresses a view positioned on the sameness side of the 
representational continuum. This contributes to explain his claim for equal identity 
recognition with the EU in the context of the ED.  
 
In historical perspective, the claim for equality has relevant implications for relations 
with the ‘West’. In the history of Russian thought, equality belongs to the specific 
narrative field of ‘Great Power Russia’, and implies the typical realist concern of 
preserving ‘national interests’. Part of this narrative tradition viewed the ‘West’ as an 
entity undermining Russian national interests as well as Russia’s status as Great Power. 
It emerges that adherence to the Great Power tradition suggests also a negative reading 
of the West, described through the Eurasian themes of ‘threat’ and ‘mistrust’. As the 
Third Progress Report specifies: 
 
‘Russia asks for an indication that the EU’s policy of opening up the electricity 
and natural gas markets to competition is not being conceived in a way that 
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would limit the presence of Russian supplies in the EU.’815  
 
By negatively depicting certain European energy objectives – e.g. opening up of gas and 
electricity markets to competition – which derive from specific EU culture and values 
and by acknowledging mistrust towards the EU, Russia is posing a civilization 
challenge. In particular, some European energy objectives sound unfamiliar to the 
Russian tradition of energy governance and are deemed as potentially detrimental to 
Russian interests.   
As such, the perceived mistrust contributes to constructing Western Europe as plotting 
against Russian interest. Russia’s mistrust towards Western Europeans can be further 
demonstrated. As Shmatko himself noted on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the 
ED : ‘Unfortunately a note of mistrust remains in the energy field between Russian and 
European partners. A consequence of it is the actively pursued policy of 
diversification’.816 
Such a sense of mistrust ultimately reveals a recognition problem for Russia. For its 
part, Russia feels that Western Europe is denying its political subjectivity. As Putin 
noted :  ‘We always say ... we want to operate on the basis of a clear, market 
relationship… without actually going into detail about which rules Russia was prepared 
to commit itself to’.817   
Overall, the anti-Western element of the Eurasianist narrative is used to describe the 
West as a threat to Russia. By contrast, the pro-Western Russian tradition – that accepts 
the position as ‘student of the West’ – is discarded. In other words, the appearance of 
Eurasian narratives serves to elicit the closure of the Russian pro-Western narrative – 
initially evident in the ED – in which the West is depicted as the natural partner for 
cooperation. The Eurasian reading also suggests that the positive views of itself that the 
West has tried to promote was false. The West is not sincere about its relationship with 
Russia given that it questions Russia’s honesty. Western ‘falsity’ offers an opportunity 
for Russia to reiterate and construct its ethical conduct. As Putin clarified: ‘I would like 
to repeat what I told my colleagues today: Russia is not behaving in a selfish way and 
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has always been a highly reliable partner.818  As a result, Eurasianism resurrects the 
West from the positive position in which it was initially inscribed while Russia is 
‘liberated’ from the Western label as an untrustworthy partner. Russia’s concerns over 
the reliability of the European energy market are no longer unfounded but legitimate.  
Of relevant importance in this anti-Western narrative is the appropriation of a specific 
language (e.g. mistrust, reliable partner, ‘Russia is not selfish’) that describe new 
conflictual dispositions and negative constructions of the West.819 In the Eurasianist 
discourse, Russia’s mission of promoting a genuine and non-US biased multiculturalism 
which is by counterbalancing ‘the monocentrism rooted in the power of the West’ is 
reinforced.820 This, in turn, paves the ground for advancing realist concerns of 
preserving and promoting  ‘power balance’, ‘national interests’, ‘national security’ and 
‘national sovereignty.821  
In this context, Russia’s intention to diversify its oil exports – as specified in the 
Russian 2030 Energy Strategy822  - can also be read through the multipolar ambition 
proper of the Eurasian tradition. As specified, the share of Russian exports to the Asian 
countries ‘would grow from 6% to 22-25% in 2030. Russian policy aims at the gradual 
reduction of oil supply to the European market while significantly increasing exports 
eastwards’.823 Russia problematizes the hierarchical integration of the EU’s discourse 
because the latter imposes a subject-object relationship. The hierarchical inclusion of 
the EU challenges the logic of sovereignty and ‘Great Power Russia’ and generates in 
Russia a narrative of exclusion from Europe and a re-orientation towards the ‘East’.  
The Russian discourse therefore moves, from the initial endorsement of integration, to 
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the disillusioned abandonment of the integrationist concept and the consequent 
construction of the ‘East’ as a legitimate entity for a new energy dialogue.824 
Ultimately, to paraphrase Prozorov, Russia’s approach to the ED connects with the 
Russian demand for a ‘strategic intersubjectivity’. Russia desires a ‘subject-subject’ 
relationship between equal policy-makers rather than a ‘subject-object’ relationship.825  
Moreover, to complement Prozorov’s reading, the proposed analysis of the ED sheds 
light on the constitutive power of the outsider. In fact, the interaction with the EU 
contributes to Russia’s shift towards the East and, thus, it constructs Russian identity as 
‘Eastern’ and Eurasian. 
From this perspective, EU’s hierarchical attitude holds here a constitutive power as it 
contributes to a re-definition of Russia’s identity in Eurasian terms. In fact, the 
perception of a lack of recognition as an actor entitled to have a say, substantiates a 
Russian discourse of self-exclusion from European integration rooted in the 
reaffirmation of sovereignty826  through the construction of an alternative Russian 
Europe: 
 
‘…it is very important to have a solid regulatory framework. What kind of 
framework? It can either be our idea on energy dialogue, based on the 
corresponding principles of energy cooperation, or – as I have said many times to 
my colleagues – we are ready to work on the basis of the Energy Charter, but not 
on the basis of its current version. Instead, we are willing to work under its new 
version, which has been supplemented and amended, taking into account Russia’s 
suggestions…So if we can agree on this kind of regulatory framework, then I 
think everything will be done to give gas supplies operations a good legislative 
format’.827  
 
Here, it can also be seen how the contest for ‘Europe’ occurs in that Russia aims to 
challenge the role of the EU as the embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe that leads the 
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energy agenda of the continent. As a consequence, Russian discourse on the ED 
provides reason to remind us that Russian identity has not always been Western and that 
there is a Russian alternative to the ‘Western’ course for Europe.  
As such, through the ED, the competing discourse of a Russian Europe challenges the 
hegemonic discourse of the EU-Europe. The political contestation between the Self and 
Other is ultimately a contestation for power and hegemony and stems from the 
awareness that even the dominant discourse is vulnerable and incomplete. This opens 
the possibility for a competing Russian project.  
 
Elements of the above-mentioned cultural clash – as in the Eurasian tradition – (layer 
one) contribute to understand, for example, actors’ different interests and paradigms of 
energy security (layer two). As Romanova put it, EU and Russia  ‘have a mutual interest 
in the dialogue, but each pursues its own agenda’.828 Analogous to the different 
understanding of diversification (see chapter 5), the term ‘reciprocity’ – found  in the 
EU and Russian discourse and used to foster mutual cooperation in the ED – discloses 
in reality a divergent understanding of the term that draws from the two competing 
energy security paradigms – MI and RE.  As Barysch reports, from an EU perspective 
reciprocity entails a ‘mutually agreed regulatory framework promoting mutual 
investment’, and it is designed to serve the objective of market opening and integration;  
Russia instead interprets it as an exchange of assets of comparable value or benefit, and 
as a principle that should serve the objective of acquiring profitable downstream assets 
in European markets.829 Here it emerges how, a conflict on a technical issue that 
expresses different understandings of energy governance (layer two) ultimately 
discloses a broader cultural conflict. 
 
 
6 Overview 
 
 
This last section demonstrates how a discursive tension between the demand for greater 
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inclusion as a ‘Great Power’ (the ‘integrationist’ narrative) and the valorization of self-
exclusion (Russian ‘sovereign’ narrative) operates within the Russian discourse.830 The 
EU’s approach that – despite claims of cooperation and equal integration – has still 
proved to treat Russia as an external object rather than an equal subject, contributes to 
shape such a conflict. As a consequence, Russia seeks to deal with the EU’s approach 
either by insisting on the need for more equitable inclusion or through attempts to evade 
hierarchical subjection and exit the space of ‘inclusion’ by looking eastwards.  
As such, the unjust hierarchical ‘inclusion’ of the EU tends to spill over into the domain 
of identity politics, in which the asymmetry in question is generative of ethical 
resentment.831 In other words, it is precisely the status of object in logic of hierarchical 
inclusion that generates the assertive discourse of Russia’s self-exclusion.832 This, in 
turn, explains the resurrection of the Eurasian identity with its great emphasis on 
equality, mistrust towards the West and multipolarism.  
From this perspective, Russia’s reaffirmation of sovereignty logically limits the success 
of a top-level dialogue – as it was initially designed – and generates a mutual 
delimitation of the two parties as sovereign entities.  
All in all, the crucial grievance that triggers the discursive tension is precisely the 
perception of the absence of authentic intersubjectivity.  EU hierarchical inclusion turns 
out to be the key ‘point of diffraction’ of the political discourse on Russia’s relations 
with the European continent. This is because the concept of hierarchical inclusion 
challenges the principle of sovereignty which is a key element of Russian historical 
tradition.  
By applying Prozorov’s interpretation to the case of the ED, what  emerges is a 
relationship in which ‘while the subject enfolded in the hierarchical structure is by 
definition deprived of its sovereignty (Russia), the subject (EU) who constitutes the 
hierarchy in question is endowed with sovereignty in the very act of this 
constitution’.833 
While this intuition might be accurate, Prozorov fails to stress how this is a reflection of 
                                                      
830 Prozorov, The Structure of the EU Russian Conflict Discourse: Issues and Identity Conflicts in the 
Narratives of Exclusion and Self-Exclusion, p. 39 
831 Prozorov, The Structure of the EU Russian Conflict Discourse: Issues and Identity Conflicts in the 
Narratives of Exclusion and Self-Exclusion, p. 24 
832 Prozorov, The Structure of the EU Russian Conflict Discourse: Issues and Identity Conflicts in the 
Narratives of Exclusion and Self-Exclusion, p. 38 
833 Prozorov, The Structure of the EU Russian Conflict Discourse: Issues and Identity Conflicts in the 
Narratives of Exclusion and Self-Exclusion, p. 40 
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the historical encounters of the actors. From this perspective, the proposed analysis 
explains Prozorov’s intuition through historical narratives and representations.  
As such, the EU / Western Europe proves to rest on the principles of the historical 
eurocentric narrative that constructs non-Western cultures as Others to convert. By 
doing so, EU/Western Europe draws boundaries and constructs Otherness. Russia, for 
its part, responds by reaffirming its sovereignity and resuscitating its Euasian identity.  
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter aimed to demonstrate how the ED epitomizes a struggle for hegemony at 
the level of discourse and to demonstrate how the language of Othering can challenge 
the established discourse of cooperation.  The mutual perception of mistrust and the 
contestation on ‘Europe’ (EU-Europe vs Russia-Europe) are indicative of a discursive 
structure framed also in antagonistic terms. This presupposes the presence of a ‘negative 
outside’ perceived on both sides. As a result, the stability of the hegemonic discourse 
that actors seem to pursue (e.g. cooperation between two equal partners) is undermined. 
 
In particular, this chapter pointed out the relevant consequences and meaning that can 
be grasped in the complex energy relations between the EU and Russia.  In setting its 
energy relations with Russia, the EU has acted consistently within the Eurocentric 
narrative of ‘EU civilian empire’.  The case of the ED shows how this imperial ambition 
occurs despite egalitarian language.  
Through the ED, the ultimate objective of the EU is to include Russia in a European 
political space in which the EU can retain the primary role of agenda setter for energy 
policy in Europe. Russia is invited to adhere to the EU’s political project.  In short, the 
EU’s debate on the ED epitomizes how the EU aspires to transform Russia, offering her 
integration in the European political space.  
This, in turn, leads to the EU’s ‘Othering’ of Russia. In other words, acting along the 
imperial logic, the EU not only fails to recognize Russian European subjectivity but it 
also represents itself as the embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe opposed to Russia’s ‘false’ 
project. In the light of this ‘Othering’ process, it is therefore important to underline how, 
in the EU’s discursive practices, Russia continues to occupy a negative position. 
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The alleged new approach of the EU to the ED echoed a Western European legacy that 
sees the EU as the embodiment of  ‘Europe’. In other words, in the EU’s discourse on 
ED, Russia remains construed as the object to be acted upon, the ‘Other’ different from 
Europe. Hence, Russia’s subjectivity is denied in favour of its continued negative 
position in Western discourses. This, in turn, represents a catalyst for constructions of 
the Western (EU) identity as ‘charitable’ and ‘benevolent’.834 Such a negative location 
of Russia undermines the efforts to move towards the EU’s initial objective of a more 
open, equal and de-securitised relationship with Russia. It also re-establishes the 
boundaries of ‘Europe’ in hierarchical and exclusionary terms. The EU’s approach 
offers Russia the option, either of being imperialised or alternatively of being 
marginalised on the periphery of Europe.835 
As Morozov contends, faced with the adamant position of the EU bureaucracy and with 
the increasing scarcity of energy resources, Russia could consider redirecting a 
substantial fraction of its energy to non-Western European countries (e.g. China, India), 
rather than to private western investors.836 This is not only due to a rational calculus. 
Rather, it is also a question of identities interaction and mutual representation: 
Eurasianist ideology is still fashionable among the Russian leadership, and therefore 
western ownership and the EU’s project on Europe are perceived as a potential threat to 
Russia’s economic security.  Even if President Putin does not fully adhere to the 
slavophile/Eurasianist, legacy, his policy is still clearly stimulated by the idea of a 
balance between Europe and Asia.837 In particular, evidence of a shift eastward of 
Russian foreign policy can be easily found. In February 2012 Putin published an article 
entitled ‘Russia and the Changing World’ in which he referred to Russia as an 
‘inalienable and organic’ part of European civilisation, adding, however, that  the Asia-
Pacific represents the new driver of globalisation. In particular, he portrayed Russia and 
China as natural partners. In his view, the two countries embarked on an openly 
pragmatic relationship permeated by extraordinary levels of trust838. The Ukrainian 
crisis in 2014 has accelerated Russia’s eastward turn. The Western sanctions against 
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836 Morozov, in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security, p.50 
837 Browning, Reassessing Putin's project: reflections on IR theory and the West, pp.4-19  
838 V. Putin, Vladimir Putin on foreign policy: Russia and the changing world, Valdai Club, 27 February 
2012. Available from: http://valdaiclub.com/politics/39300.html Accessed 27/09/2014 
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Russia have fuelled the image of the West acting to isolate Russia in international arena. 
As a reaction, Moscow has reiterated its strategy to look East for new business, energy 
deals, military contracts and political alliances.839 For example, in May 2014 Russia 
agreed on a major gas deal with China after ten years of negotiation. In addition, as 
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev put it, Russia's shift of its economic 
development strategy onto the Asian-Pacific region is a ‘natural response’ to the 
development of global affairs, such as the Ukrainian crisis. He also added that  ‘our new 
Asian strategy is not just a senseless revenge to Europe but quite a logical development 
of events and a thoughtful response to the changing economic environment’840.  
The rhetoric permeating such a geopolitical shift seems to suggest a marginalization of 
the West which is constructed as a second-ordered actor in international affairs still 
trying to implement its ineffective and old fashion strategy to plot against Russian 
national interests. 
 
Coming back to the ED, wider political implications to broader EU-Russia relations can 
be drawn from the way in which energy relations between Russia and the EU are 
handled. The ED between the EU and Russia shows that these partners mutually 
constitute themselves as two potentially hostile geopolitical subjects. The positive 
image of the EU, so common for the Russian discourse of the mid-1990s, is transformed 
into the undifferentiated image of the West as the eternal enemy. Conversely, the 
European discourse is recreating the Cold War descriptions of Russia as an 
‘authoritarian state’ with an undemocratic past, which lies in the backyard of Europe. 
Instead of a ‘Europe whole and free’, the scenario is that of a Europe divided into two, 
as it was during the Cold War.841  
With reference to the existing literature on broader EU-Russia energy relations, the 
liberal approach examines the relations under the prism of institutionalism and mutual 
interdependence. In particular, this strand put great emphasis on the existence of 
common interests, a market-based approach, linkages and spillover factors beyond 
energy relations. The EU 2004 enlargement – that included eight states from Central 
and Eastern Europe – historically dependent on Russia energy – indicates that the 
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degree of interdependence is now even more intense.842 This interdependence is 
beneficial for both: Russia depends on stable long-term European demand while the EU 
depends on Russia’s stable supply.843 Within this scenario, institutions are expected to 
consolidate the strategic relationship between the EU and Russia. Therefore, rather than 
conceiving the interdependence as problematic or as revealing the vulnerability of both 
actors – as a realist approach would do –  convergence of common energy interests can 
trigger win-win cooperation. From this perspective, the ED was designed following this 
liberal-institutionalist approach and with the belief that the institutionalisation of the 
relationship would engender a constructive and successful energy dialogue between the 
EU and Russia.844  
Yet, the prediction of a liberal-inspired reading of the ED seems disappointing. Despite 
this attempt to create a genuine partnership – through the creation of the early warning 
mechanism to notify the partner on gas disruption, and the EU-Russia Gas Advisory 
Council – the outcome of the ED is below expectations and has not eliminated 
misunderstandings or conflict. Agreements are limited to technical issues and to 
intangible long-term objectives, (common energy market between the EU and Russia) 
with no detailed guideline to achieve them.845 Conflicts remain on issues such as 
pipeline projects, transit, pricing, and definition of reciprocity.846  
 
Conversely, in line with the broader critical constructivist/post-structuralist tradition, 
this chapter has tried to analyse the EU-Russia ED as a discursive relationship between 
Self and Other. This permits us to explain the formation of identity and interests not 
through a remote and anarchic structure nor through the undifferentiated notion of 
collective identity but through a relational process based on difference or similarities, 
framed by identity politics, supported by discourses and historically contextualized. The 
existing critical and discursive literature in this respect has the merit to introduce 
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discursive and identity-related factors to explain the ED.847 However, these analyses pay 
little attention to the ‘degree of sedimentation’ of the discourses under examination. 
Tichy and Kratochvil848, for example, only look at how specific energy discourses are 
constructed in the interaction but they fail to research the broader historical narratives 
that support these energy discourses. Conversely, the layered structure of this thesis 
enables us, for example, to understand that Putin’s insistence (or interest) on setting the 
ED on an equal basis is influenced by the historical narrative of pragmatic statism. In 
other words, the Wæverian structure provides a tool to explore the ‘degree of 
sedimentation’ of the energy discourses played out by the EU and Russia, that is, how 
energy discourses are constructed in the first place (historically). In fact, the existing 
literature fails to look at deeper layers (or level of ‘sedimentation’ of discourses) to fully 
explain how the discourses played out are constructed. 
The proposed analysis contributes in this sense by constructing a layered structure that 
explains how the discursive practices employed by the EU and Russia in the ED derives 
from historical representations (layer one) and energy paradigms (layer two). In 
particular, Morozov has grasped how a struggle for ‘Europe’ underpins the politics 
around the ED.849 However, he assumes a situation of identity conflict between the EU 
and Russia in the ED and, thus, he fails to explain how the actors move from a scenario 
of declared cooperation to a confrontational one. In fact, an initial reading of the texts 
related to the ED suggests that both actors are willing to cooperate to take benefit from 
their mutual interdependence (Europe as a united continent or ‘white zone’). However, 
from a closer examination, the ‘degree of Otherness’ gradually widens because of the 
presence of the Eurocentric and Eurasianist narratives. The implication is that the 
counterpart gradually constructs themselves as confrontational ‘Others’ of Europe. Such 
a change in the mutual representations of actors towards the negative edge of the 
representational continuum (widening of the degree of Otherness) accounts for the 
identity conflict assumed by Prozorov and Morozov. It can be argued that the various 
possibilities of Otherness (partner/threat, Concert of Europe/divided Europe, dialogue/ 
negotiation, mistrust/ trust) emerged from the historical encounter of actors (layer one) 
and their energy paradigms (layer two), contribute to explain actors’ positions and the 
                                                      
847 See for example Morozov in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy 
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meaning of their discursive practices in the ED (layer three). 
 
Finally, although Morozov seizes the fundamental contestation among competing 
political projects on ‘Europe’, this approach adds that, through such a discursive 
contestation, actors draw spatial boundaries in Europe and they mutually construct their 
spatial identity as ‘European’. Similarly, it is added that actors also construct their 
temporal and ethical identity along the schemes of ‘development’ and ‘responsibility’ 
(e.g. mission to ‘de-securitize’ energy in Europe for European citizens). 
 In this respect, existing discourse-based accounts overlook the spatial, temporal, and 
ethical construction of actors’ identity. As such, the focus on the construction of actors’ 
identities as ‘different’ or ‘similar’ along the spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions 
represents a further contribution to the existing literature.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
In a context of dissatisfaction with current discourse-based and rationalist accounts, this 
research employed a critical constructivist/post-structuralist approach to the case of EU-
Russia energy relations and aimed to explain what this energy relationship tells us about 
EU-Russia relations in general and about their political construction of ‘Europe’. From 
this perspective, it is also argued that, to some extent, the energy relationship itself is 
framed by identity politics and interaction.   
 
Much of the literature on this topic focuses on material and institutional aspects to 
explain actors’ cooperative or confrontational positions in their energy relations, 
neglecting the ideational level that informs such a relationship. For example, 
mainstream rationalist traditions – (neo)-realism and (neo)-liberalism – explain energy 
security through material and institutional factors. (Neo)-realist studies generally 
describe EU-Russian energy relations through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis or 
through material factors such as the exploitation of energy potential and resources in 
Russia. Other neorealist-inspired approaches have illustrated how Russia’s pragmatic 
use of energy is indicative of a zero-sum game with the EU, especially in Ukraine, 
Poland and the Baltics.850  
(Neo)-liberal approaches, meanwhile, have focused on the institutional arrangements of 
the relationship to illustrate how material factors are translated into rules regulating the 
energy relationship between the two actors. Great emphasis is placed on the concepts of 
interdependence and institutionalization in the energy relations between these two 
actors.851 By examining the degree of mutual / asymmetrical interdependence852, 
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neoliberalism concludes that Russia is more dependent on the EU energy market than 
the EU is on gas supplies from Russia.  
Another liberal-inspired strand, (so called ‘transitionalist’), conceptualizes the EU’s 
liberal approach to energy policy as the term of reference from which Russia has 
recently moved away.853 Other existing accounts between rationalism (especially neo-
liberalism) and conventional constructivism, keep the assumption that the EU’s liberal 
approach to energy policy is the benchmark from which Russia is moving away, but 
they provide historical insights regarding the origin of such an assumption, and 
conclude that the actors simply hold different understandings of energy security.854  
However, the alleged difference between the identity of the EU and Russia is given and 
not examined.855  
Existing discourse-based accounts on EU-Russia relations analyze the construction of 
competing energy discourses or how the different approaches of the EU and Russia are 
indicative of a struggle for ‘Europe’. However, the dissatisfaction with these works 
arises from the fact that they either neglect the political implications underlying EU-
Russia856 or they fail to explain how energy discourses between Self and Other are 
constructed in the first place (e.g. history).  
Conversely, drawing from critical constructivism and post-structuralism and deploying 
a framework drawn from Wæver this research understood discourses as socially 
constructed and ‘sedimented’. It also used the concept of ‘Otherness’ to illustrate how 
actors’ positions alternate between cooperation and confrontation, rather than 
continually interacting in an assumed ever-present tension.   
In this respect, this thesis studied EU-Russian energy relations as an intersubjective 
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interaction between Self and Other, both advancing mutual discursive representations of 
each other. Such a conceptualization of the relationship as a Self / Other interaction 
sheds light on the role of ‘Otherness’ as factors underlying cooperative and conflicting 
positions of the actors. In this light, the main research question that this research has 
tried to answer was: 
 
• Can self-other discursive interactions explain the alternation between 
cooperative and conflicting positions in EU-Russia energy relations? 
The immediate answer to this question is that analyzing this relationship as a Self / 
Other discursive interaction enables the investigation of the ‘degrees of otherness’, a 
concept which ultimately explains the alternation between the cooperative and 
conflicting positions of the actors. The ‘degree of otherness’ tells us how alien the Self 
perceives the Other to be. In order to measure it, it is necessary to construct ‘Otherness’ 
and examine Self‘s various representations in relation to the Other.  
In fact, a given actor constructs ‘Otherness’ through discourses that include specific 
representations of the Self in relation to salient Others. To each of these representations 
corresponds a relatively broad or narrow ‘degree of Otherness’.  
As such, this research identified a number of discursive representations from the 
historical encounter of Self with Other (layer one) and from the Self’s energy paradigm 
used in its relation with Other (layer two).  
The historical narratives and energy paradigms detected in these two layers indicated 
the existence of a number of mutual representations that contributed to the construction 
of a representational continuum through   which the ‘degree of otherness’ could be 
measured. The existence of the representations forming the continuum were then tested 
in the third dimension (layer three) related to the discursive practices of representatives 
of the EU and Russia in two cases pertaining to their mutual energy relations: the 
pipeline politics around the South Stream and Nabucco, and the EU-Russia ED. 
The implication of such an examination sheds light not only on how the Self constructs 
the Other but also on how the Other holds constitutive power on the construction of 
Self’s identity. This arises from an understanding of energy security as something more 
than a mere exporter-importer relation or as a mere issue in EU-Russian relations but 
rather as impacting on the identity formation of the actors. As a result, this study leaves 
aside the technical, material and institutional aspects of the relationship, instead 
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focusing on the discursive framework – and on the representations included in each 
discourse – characterizing the energy relationship between the EU and Russia.  
 
In particular, the three-layered structure elaborated by Ole Wæver has been the 
methodological tool that served to uncover the various layers of discourses and 
ultimately to construct the discursive structure. Chapter 3 (layer 1) focused on the 
historically ‘sedimented’ narratives (re)produced by the actors and showed how each of 
these narratives included a specific historical representation of the Self in relation to the 
Other. As noted, each historical representation unfolded a specific ‘degree of otherness’. 
For example, by claiming the superiority of the European civilization over others – 
including the Russian civilization – the Eurocentric narrative embodies a broad ‘degree 
of Otherness’ towards Russia. In addition, this layer illustrated how historical narratives 
and representations have changed over time and re-emerged in a revisited version with 
similarities and dissimilarities vis-á-vis the original narrative. For example, the 
exceptionalist and Westernizing narrative traditions in Russia not only alternated 
throughout history but they also both re-emerged in a slightly updated version as in the 
case of Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism which belong to the broader Russian 
exceptionalist tradition.   
 
Having established the basic narratives that framed the historical debate between 
Western Europe and Russia, Chapter 4 constructed layer 2 regarding the EU’s and 
Russia’s paradigms on energy security. It was illustrated how the ‘degree of otherness’ 
between the EU and Russia unfolds in the energy field. To do so, the chapter examined 
the Self’s energy security paradigm and focused on how relations with the Other are 
conceived in this paradigm. It was found that the EU’s and Russia’s understanding of 
energy security alternated between a market-based paradigm - ‘Market and Institution’- 
and a geopolitical one - ‘Region and Empire’. It was also noted how historical 
representations of the Self in relation to the Other (layer 1) lay at the core of these 
energy paradigms. In line with the overall aim of the thesis, chapters 5 and 6 applied the 
discursive structure of layers 1 and 2 to the two case-studies. The aim was to explain the 
pipeline politics of  South Stream vs  Nabucco and the EU-Russia ED through the 
representational continuum and ‘degree of otherness’  identified in historical 
representations and in actors’ understanding of energy security.     
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Overall, the Wæverian structure represented a specific methodological contribution of 
this thesis to the existing discourse-based accounts. In fact it enabled the 
conceptualization of alternation among competing narratives, representations and 
energy paradigms, as a constant and as a key methodological principle manifest in each 
of the layers demonstrating, in this way, the ‘becoming’ nature of the proposed 
approach. 
 
Having outlined the aims of the thesis the remainder of the chapter will  first,  discuss 
the empirical and theoretical contributions of studying EU-Russian energy relations 
through the discursive approach; that is, through concepts such as mutual recognition 
and the constitutive power of the outside. The implication resulting from the case-
studies illustrates how a broader contestation occurred on the concept of ‘Europe’ 
between an EU-Europe and a Russian-Europe. As such, through their mutual energy 
relations, the EU and Russia not only reveal specific historical representations of the 
Other but also their political projects of ‘Europe’. As Neumann857 illustrated, there is a 
confrontation for Europe in which actors tend to oppose the ‘true’ Europe of the Self to 
the ‘false’ Europe of the Other. This dynamic can only be grasped through a discursive 
approach that believes in the incomplete nature of discourses (e.g. that on Europe) and 
opens the ground for antagonism over discursive hegemony. 
 
The implications deriving from conceptualizing EU-Russia energy relation as a 
Self/Other discursive interaction, is that it permits us to analyze a) how Self’s  
interaction with Other impacts not only on the construction of Other but also on that of 
Self, b) and how energy is ultimately related to a broader contestation between the 
actors’ political projects on Europe. The second and final section discusses findings and 
limitations of the research. One of the main findings is that in specific contexts some 
approaches are less likely to be received well than others and, therefore, policy-makers 
should be sensitive to the identity projects / debates dominant in those to whom one’s 
policies are targeted.  
As for limitations, the lack of Russian language skills has meant that the analysis has 
focused primarily on Western perspectives.  
In addition, the fact that discourses are ‘unfinished’ by nature means that the very nature 
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of social reality is incomplete but contemporary in constant progress. However, it will 
be argued that such an ‘unfinished’ nature ultimately provides the ground for future 
research as it leaves the possibility to modify and progress the discursive framework 
elaborated in this study.  
 
 
2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions of the Thesis 
 
 
From a theoretical perspective, this thesis prioritized the issue of recognition of political 
difference over the more technical issues pertaining to EU-Russian (energy) relations. 
Actors’ positions as cooperative or confrontational are ultimately linked to the issue of 
recognition rather than depending on policy divergence or convergence. 
As noted, Self and Other acquire subjectivity through interaction. However, 
intersubjective interaction requires mutual recognition. From this perspective, Other’s 
entitlement to define the relationship of ‘Otherness’ depends on Self’s recognition of 
Other. If Self fails to recognize Other’s subjectivity, the latter can either accept such a 
lack of recognition as a legitimate political subject or choose to be excluded from the 
Self’s project and consequently open the contest with Self by proposing a competing 
project.858 In the latter case, Other acts as a subject without being recognized. 
The desire for recognition as a particular type of subject (equal subject/partner), for 
example, seems to account for Russia’s refusal to ratify the ECT and ENP since what 
was on offer, from a Russian perspective, was recognition of a restricted level of 
subjectivity as a norm taker/learner. Russian reaction to the attempts within such EU’s 
policies to impose a subject-object relationship, reinforced and justified the 
reaffirmation of a Russian sovereignty discourse and a certain ambition to promote non-
EU projects.859 For example, through the Eurasian Economic Union, Putin underlines 
his opposition to the EU-European project based on the acceptance of EU's norms 
without a prospect of membership. In other words, faced with the lack of recognition 
deriving from the EU’s hierarchic integration, Russia avoids the position of policy-taker 
and rejects the proposed integration into the EU’s political space. Conversely, by 
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drawing discursive power from its exceptionalist narrative, Russia prefers to enhance its 
focus towards the integration of the post-Soviet space into the Russian empire, with a 
view to create a political entity (e.g. Eurasian Union) that is seen as an equal or 
alternative to the EU. Similarly, Russia’s intention to intensify and institutionalize 
bilateral (energy) relations with Asian countries – seen as less problematic than the EU 
– is indicative of dissatisfaction with the EU’s conditions and triggers a dislocation of 
Russian identity from European to Eurasian. Through interaction with such a choosy 
Other (e.g. EU), Russia re-discovers its Eurasian Self, a Euro-Pacific nation that enjoys 
a great position to connect directly with the most important economic, technological, 
political, military actors in the world, loaded with the mission of keeping the right 
balance among them.860  
However, recognition should occur on both sides. In fact, in the interaction process, 
Self’s claims for its identity are not sufficient. This should be complemented by Other’s 
recognition of the legitimacy of Self’s claims.  
In the intersubjective interaction the Other is empowered to impact on how ‘Otherness’ 
is defined.861 For example, Russian requests to the EC for granting South Stream the 
status of project of ‘European interest’ epitomizes how Russia recognizes the EU as the 
legitimate power in Europe. The importance of Other’s recognition resides in the fact 
that if this does not occur, the identity of Self is questioned and a new story needs to be 
told (e.g. constitutive power of outside).862 For example, during his foreign policy 
speech in the German Bundestag in 2001, Putin  – then in his first term – endorsed 
Russia's European choice as a way to seek equal recognition.  He also called for a near-
alliance with the US. Yet, despite such a promising position, the disappointing degree of 
recognition that the EU granted Russia might explain why Putin has dismissed that 
story.863 In a speech delivered at the Valdai Club in September 2013864, Putin in fact 
shifted to a more exceptionalist kind of narrative: Russia may be European, from an 
                                                      
860 D., Trenin, Russia, a Euro-Pacific Nation, Carnegie, 14 October 2013. Available from:  
http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53293&lang=en#wholeanswer  Accessed 11/11/2013 
861 V., Morozov, Western hegemony, Global Democracy and the Russian Challenge, in Browning, Lehti, 
The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy, pp. 185- 200, quoted by Browning, Christou, 
The Constitutive Power of Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Polcy and the Eastern Dimension, p. 
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862 Browning, Christou, The Constitutive Power of Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Polcy and 
the Eastern Dimension, p.110 
863 D., Trenin, Russia, a Euro-Pacific Nation, Eurasia Outlook, 14 October 2013. Available from:  
http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53293&lang=en#wholeanswer Accessed 11/11/2013 
864 A., Malashenko, Jubilee With Everything But The Unexpected, Carnagie Moskow Centre, 26 
September 2013. Available from: http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53109 Accessed 11/11/2013 
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historical and cultural perspective, but it is not part of the Europe represented by the 
EU. It follows that, for Russia, the EU is no longer a teacher or a model.865 
Similarly, the adherence to a renewed egalitarian discourse by the EU in the ED with 
Russia can be read as an attempt to tell a new story that is no longer based on the 
teacher-learner assumption since the Russian Other is now reluctant to hold a position 
of policy-recipient.  
What all this indicates is that theoretically, for interaction to occur, Self and Other need 
to recognize their mutual identity claims. Thus, it can be said that lack of recognition is 
what might undermine the progress of their relations. Russia’s revisionist stance might 
not result from aversion to the existing balance of power, but rather from the lack of 
recognition of Russia’s Great Power status by the EU. In this light, rather than a lack of 
cooperation and institutionalization – as a neoliberal would argue – the scarce 
achievement reached so far in the ED, for example, might well result from a Russian 
perception that the EU’s discourse does not fully recognize Russia’s identity as equal. 
To understand the extent to which Self recognizes Other, this thesis explored how 
boundaries between the two actors were drawn (‘degree of otherness’). Therefore, great 
emphasis was put on the power of the margins. By applying such a theoretical 
framework to the empirical case studies, it was possible to understand how, in their 
mutual energy relations, the EU and Russia constructed ‘Otherness’ by drawing more or 
less deep boundaries between each other depending on the specific representation of 
Self in relation to Other.   
Both the case studies demonstrate how the EU and Russia try to keep a narrow ‘degree 
of otherness’ through mutual positive representations where the Other is seen in friendly 
and benevolent terms rather than as an enemy. In both instances, there is an attempt to 
describe the Other as unproblematic (e.g. theme of co-existence in the Nabucco –South 
Stream case) and as an equal partner (e.g. ED).  
However, as soon as the discursive practices denote a broadening of the ‘degree of 
otherness’, the margin acquires increasing explanatory power. In fact, it gradually 
becomes clear how despite initial claims, the EU does not grant friendship out of 
benevolence, but only on condition that the Russian Other recognizes the role of the EU 
as agenda-setter for ‘Europe’. This arises from the Eurocentric legacy of Western 
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Europe that associates ‘Otherness’/‘non-Westernness’ as threatening or as a sign of 
underdevelopment. Similarly, Russia has demonstrated itself to be willing to cooperate 
with the EU-Other on condition that it is recognized as an equal partner. Similarly, from 
a Russian perspective, the narrative legacy is one that represents otherness/Western 
expression as a ‘threat’ that attempts to undermine Russia’s internal stability.   
 
Overall, the presence of conditionality from both sides denotes the progressive 
broadening of the ‘degree of Otherness’ that ultimately results in the different 
understanding of ‘hierarchy’ and ‘sovereignty’.  
In fact, in its relations with Russia, the EU tends to understand ‘hierarchy’ and 
‘sovereignty’ in unequal terms by posing itself in the position of a benevolent teacher 
who sets down universally valid prescriptions for Other’s development. Conversely, in 
its relations with the EU, Russia challenges the EU’s understanding of ‘hierarchy’ and 
‘sovereignty’ by adding an egalitarian characterization. This dynamic occurs also in the 
energy field with consequences on the constitutive power of the outside. Especially in 
the case of the ED, Russia adheres to the belief that only great and sovereign powers 
should deal with salient issues866 – such as energy – in non-hierarchical terms.867  
The Russian emphasis on an equal (energy) relationship with the EU to preserve 
Russian sovereignty contributes not only to the depiction of the EU as an equal Great 
Power to Russian unity but reinforces Russian ambition to emerge as a Great Power in 
the international arena.  
Similarly, by indicating the need for Russia to look at EU energy standards as a 
reference, the EU not only describes its counterpart as a ‘learner’, a potential ‘threat’ 
and ‘inferior’ but it consequently also depicts itself as a ‘teacher’, ‘harmless’, and 
‘superior’.  
Overall, such different understandings of hierarchy and sovereignty disprove the initial 
claims of mutual co-existence (Nabucco-South Stream) and partnership (ED). As noted, 
this is indicative of a broadening of the ‘degree of Otherness’ that consequently emerges 
as the conceptual tool explaining how actors’ positions shift from cooperation to 
confrontation. 
                                                      
866 Aalto, Russia’s Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International 
Societies, p.464  
867 From a Russian perspective, hierarchy and sovereignty come closer to the EU’s understanding only in 
Russia’s relations with ex-Soviet countries that are seen as a source to fuel Russian ‘greatness’ (see for 
example Gazprom’s acquisition of Moldovan and Ukrainian energy infrastructure). 
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It follows that in the measurement of the extraneousness between Self and Other, 
‘Otherness’ should not be seen only as threatening/confrontational or only as 
cooperative.868 In the case of Russia, part of the existing literature that examines the role 
of the constitutive ‘West’ for Russian identity tends to portray the concept of the ‘West’ 
as an absolute negation which permits the Russian Self to be constituted.869 The ‘West’ 
– in the forms of the US, Western Europe or, NATO – is usually described as the major 
antagonist of Russia in the zero-sum geopolitical game for international or European 
hegemony, as well as the main source of threat, either  material (e.g. military and 
economic) or normative (e.g. ‘westernization’).  
Similarly, in the battle for Europe, Russia comes to be represented as the negative Other 
of the EU in both geopolitical (e.g. expansion of the Russian sphere of influence to the 
detriment of the EU’s) and civilizational terms (e.g. Russia plots to erode Western 
cultural hegemony). Against this background, another theoretical implication deriving 
from the ‘degree of otherness’ is that Others can be friends and partners as well as 
enemies. For example, the empirical chapters 5 and 6 showed that the egalitarian and 
‘non-exclusive’ themes have informed part of the discursive strategy of the EU and 
Russia in the ED and the Nabucco-South Stream politics. In short, the Other is not 
necessarily constituted in radicalised terms or as the ‘rival’ to oppose but it can also be 
depicted as a ‘partner’.  
As such, the ‘degree of otherness’ should be imagined as a spectrum that has at its 
extremes radical confrontation on one side, and partnership and cooperation on the other 
side. However, a number of intermediate possibilities beyond the mere enemy-friend 
dichotomy870 – such as superiority, emulation, threat – lie between these extremes. 
Therefore, the qualitative value of ‘Otherness’ can vary. For example, the Russian 
Westernizing tradition and the Western European narrative of ‘Russia as land of the 
future’ go beyond the mere identification of the Other as simply negative Other and 
                                                      
868 Connolly, Taylor, Foucault and Otherness, p. 371, quoted by Browning, Christou, The Constitutive 
Power of Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Polcy and the Eastern Dimension, p.110 
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869 See Yanovsky and Lotman  quoted by in Morozov, Inside/Outside. Europe and the Boundaries of 
Russian Political Community,  p.7, (see notes 21 and 22) 
870 See for example Browning, Christou, The Constitutive Power of Outsiders: The European 
Neighbourhood Polcy and the Eastern Dimension, p. 110 
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they also assign it a qualitative value; Other is respectively a model to emulate or  an 
actor endowed with enormous spiritual and material resources. Similarly, themes such 
as ‘Russia’s return to Europe’871 and the Western European ‘Concert of Europe’ entail 
discourses that represent Western Europe and Russia as different but ultimately united 
by the same European experience and belonging to the same world’s narrative on 
Europe.  In these themes, the concept of Europe – meant as the European continent - is 
used as a reference to indicate a common ground and, thus, is characterized by a 
narrower  ‘degree of otherness’.  
The concept of ‘Europe’ further demonstrated how the degree of otherness can vary.  
Empirically, the case studies proved how Europe was a battlefield for a struggle on 
discursive hegemony.  Drawing from Morozov’s standpoints, energy relations between 
the EU and Russia are more than a conflict over technical issues but are also an identity-
based conflict and ultimately a contestation for Europe. This epitomizes how issues of 
recognition of political difference and similarity ultimately are at the core of technical 
conflicts.872 However, the proposed approach represents a progression from Morozov’s 
and other discourse-based accounts because – through the ‘degree of Otherness’ –  it 
explains how actors’ positions move from cooperation to confrontation through the 
politics around these two case-studies, rather than assuming the conflict a priori 
between the two competing projects on Europe. 
Similarly, the case study on the Nabucco-South Stream politics illustrated how it goes 
beyond mere technical competition between two pipelines and reveals a deeper contest 
between two political projects of Europe: the EU-Europe with less Russian influence, 
and the Russian-Europe with Russia having a pivotal role or an equal say in European 
affairs to the detriment of the EU. Despite the material interests of actors, the politics 
revolving around Nabucco and South Stream can thus be read as the Russian attempt to 
challenge the EU’s hegemonic political discourse and as the EU’s attempt to reiterate its 
hegemonic discourse on energy security in Europe.   
 In this respect, a further implication of this research regards a ‘Europe’ that turns out to 
be a third signifier in the context of the energy relations between the EU and Russia. In 
Russian discourse, ‘Europe’ is an ‘irreducible signifier’ – neither fully incorporated into 
                                                      
871 See for example the Gorbachev’s discourse on the ‘Common European Home’ 
872 See also Morozov, in Aalto, The EU–Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security, p. 
43   
See Prozorov, The Structure of the EU Russian Conflict Discourse: Issues and Identity Conflicts in the 
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the Self’s political space, nor fully rejected into the outside873- or an ‘empty signifier’ – 
an ambiguous entity with fuzzy borders that can be used as needed for meaning-
making.874 This means that Russia perceives a ‘European calling’ only partially. On one 
side, any prospect of definitive exclusion triggers alarms of being relegated ‘in the 
backyard of Europe’.875  
On the other side, Russia has little power to impact on the meaning of ‘Europe’ since 
the EU (and Western Europe) has managed to impose a hegemonic discourse which 
depicts itself as the legitimate embodiment of Europe and Europeanness.  From a 
Western European perspective , Europe can be defined as a ‘reducible signifier’ – an 
entity entirely incorporated into the Self – or a ‘full signifier’ – an entity with clear 
borders and bearing a single universal meaning.    
The concept of ‘Europe’ emerged as a beneficial dimension also with regard to the 
actors’ construction of their spatial identity. In the case studies proposed, spatiality 
highlighted how the EU and Russia draw their boundaries in Europe. For example, 
claims of co-existence and cooperation from representatives of the EU and Russia in the 
Nabucco-South Stream pipeline politics as well as in the ED demonstrated a spatial 
understanding of Europe as a united continent with no clear boundaries (‘white zone’). 
This means that the two actors seem to position themselves on the point of the 
representational continuum that describes them as European partners. This specific 
point is, in addition, indicative of a narrow ‘degree of Otherness’.  
However, as discursive practices denote confrontational dispositions,  dividing lines 
progressively emerge in the spatial understanding of Europe that, consequently, 
constitutes  a ‘grey’ or even ‘red’ zone, depending on how broad  the ‘degree of 
Otherness’ is. For example, Russia’s position in the Nabucco-South Stream politics 
moves from common Europeaness (white zone), to exceptionalism (grey zone) and 
aversion towards the EU (red zone).   
The spatial dimension is complemented by temporal identity that is constructed through 
a comparison between Self and Other around the temporal schemes of ‘development’ 
and ‘stasis’. For example, in the case of the ED, the references in the EU’s discursive 
practices calling for Russia to improve its energy standards portrayed Russia as a 
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country that needs modernization. In doing so, the EU constructs both its temporal 
identity as a ‘developed’ actor as well as Russian identity as a ‘developing’ Other. At 
the same time, the Russian-Other supported the construction of the EU-Self and its 
policy principles as more advanced. 
The third dimension relates to the construction of actors’ identity in ethical terms. In 
particular, it focused on the construction of responsibility and the sense of mission that 
actors deploy in their discursive practices. The articulation of ethical identity looked at 
the discursive construction of ethics, morality, and responsibility. For example, the 
sense of responsibility and necessity that Russian representatives attached to the 
construction of  South Steam in their discursive practices (e.g. speeches, statements) are 
indicative of a sense of mission that Russia feels to supply Southern Europe, and 
contributes to constructing Russia as an ethical and ‘true’ European actor. 
 
Overall, in the light of the objective to demonstrate that the energy relationship is 
framed by identity politics and interaction, this thesis tried to assign a political character 
to  identity. This has been done by exploring the spatial, temporal and ethical dimension 
of the identities of Self and Other. From this perspective, the proposed account 
represents a progression from existing discourse-based approaches as it focuses on the 
way in which these three dimensions of identity construction interrelate. This 
interrelation, once again, contributes to an understanding that actors’ positions move 
from cooperation and confrontation depending on how Self perceives the Other to be 
alien in spatial, temporal and ethical terms. From this perspective, rather than only 
recognizing two constructions of identity as ‘different’, there is a focus on how this 
difference is spatially, temporally and ethically situated.876  
 
Furthermore, in this light, the research  contributes to two existing bodies of literature: 
the critical renderings on EU-Russia relations and the specific discourse-based literature 
on EU-Russia energy relations.877 In general terms, while using discourses, both the 
above-mentioned strands failed to adequately examine the ‘degree of sedimentation’ of 
the energy discourses under examination by only focusing on energy paradigms (layer 
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two) and discursive practices (layer three). In fact, the discourse-based literature on 
energy focuses extensively on energy paradigms and discursive practices, and it thus 
pays little attention to the influence of historical narratives. In other words, energy 
discourses are not historically contextualised within the framework of EU-Russia 
relations.  To address this gap, as noted, this research employed Waever’s layered 
structure that established three levels on which the ‘sedimentation’ of each discourse 
can be studied. This allowed a more in depth exploration of how discourses are 
constructed in the first place, that is, how the EU and Russia have constructed – 
throughout history – the narrative/story they tell about their identity.  
In addition, in order to produce new empirical data, this thesis applied the concept of 
‘Otherness’ to explain the Nabucco-South Stream pipeline politics and the EU-Russia 
ED. In doing so, such an approach ultimately contributes to exploring the political 
implications deriving from the conceptualization of  EU-Russia energy relations as an 
interaction of layered – not assumed – identities and their discourses. Existing studies, 
in fact, fail to illustrate the broader political implications of energy for wider EU-Russia 
relations. In particular, the majority of critical and post-structuralist accounts on the 
relations between EU and Russia have applied the theoretical apparatus of critical and 
post-structuralist approaches – such as mutual identity formation, political recognition, 
‘degree of Otherness’, discursive contest, and the struggle for Europe – to a limited 
number of case-studies such as the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), ENP, the 
Kaliningrad enclave, and the visa regime.878 This thesis demonstrated how such a 
theoretical apparatus sheds light on some political implications deriving from  energy 
relations between the EU and Russia. Finally, as noted, the reliance on the Waeverian 
layered structure and the investigation of political subjectivity in spatial, temporal and 
ethical terms adds specific value to the critical and post-structuralists works on the 
relations between EU and Russia.    
 
 
3 The Implications and Value of the Research 
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The value of this research is to have contextualized the discursive structure and 
illustrated the implications of studying energy relations between EU and Russia as a 
Self / Other interaction.  The first finding emerging from the two case studies is that 
actors’ positions – cooperation/partnership and confrontation/conflict – alternate with 
consequences on the spatial, temporal and ethical construction of actors’ identities. 
Therefore, actors’ positions are not fixed but cooperation or confrontation alternate on 
the basis of Self’s representation in relation to the Other. The alternation depends on the 
extent to which Self’s discourses depict Other to be alien (‘degree of otherness’). The 
measurement of ‘Otherness’ unfolds in historical terms (layer one), and in energy 
paradigms that the EU and Russia played out in their mutual energy relations (layer 
two). 
This begs the question of why actors alternate their positions. The rationalist answer 
would be that ultimately these discourses are just deployed in the service of material 
interests. To properly challenge this position, it should be remembered that ultimately 
there is a power relationship underlying the discursive interaction. Power is not merely 
material (e.g. military) but  can also be understood in ideational terms as the capacity to 
impose one’s discourse as dominant. Thus, actors should be seen as constantly seeking 
to establish their discourse as ‘dominant’ over Other’s discourse. In fact, if Other’s 
discourse does not conform to the Self’s, the latter would seek a new discursive strategy 
to downplay Other’s competing discourse or discredit it before its audience. As a 
consequence, Other would react to avoid Self’s submission and establish its discourse as 
dominant. 
In the context of this thesis, it has been noted how Russia has often rejected any 
discursive practice of EU’s representatives that called for an approximation of its energy 
legislation to the EU’s one. An eventual acceptance from Russia would imply a 
recognition of the EU as the embodiment of the ‘true’ Europe that has the discursive 
power to set the energy governance of the entire continent. 
As noted, conventional constructivism and rationalism do not adequately justify the 
complexity of the power relations between the EU and Russia. They simply assume the 
materiality of the power relationship and the consequent opposition of two actors 
(rationalism) who simply hold different identities (conventional constructivism). These 
two last assumptions represent another key critique of this thesis to rationalism and 
conventional constructivism. By relying on the deconstructive method, this thesis tried 
to challenge conventional representations that analysts have often used to account for 
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EU- Russia (energy) relations. This, for example, translates into the deconstruction of 
the EU’s image as a ‘benevolent’ player driven by its values and multilateral identity, 
and that of Russia as a ‘threat’ to multilateral cooperation. 
Rather it has been noted how the EU as also acted as a modern actor that prefers 
geopolitics over market-based solutions (e.g. ‘Gazprom clause’). Similarly, in various 
phases of her history Russia has successfully projected the image  of a contemporary 
Great Power willing to cooperate with the West against global terrorism,  and through 
multilateralism and equality in the energy field.879    
Another finding demonstrated that Self’s interaction with Other has implications not 
only for the construction of Other but also for that of Self. It can be seen that behind the 
public and benevolent rhetoric of their energy discourses, the EU and Russia are 
mutually constituting themselves as two competing, and potentially hostile, European 
actors. On the Russian side, the positive image of the EU gradually becomes associated 
with the ‘West’, which is historically an antagonistic entity in Russian imaginary. On 
the other side, the EU’s Eurocentric discourse is recreating the Cold War image of 
Russia as a ‘learner’ that lies in the backyard of Europe. Rather than a ‘Europe whole 
and free’, the two actors are in competition for hegemony on ‘Europe’. This is pretty 
much the same political situation as during the Cold War.880 As a result, from the 
energy-related case studies it emerges that behind the public and benevolent rhetoric, 
the Russian political project of ‘Europe’ is in continuous interaction and eventually in 
contestation with the EU-Europe one.  
Finally, what emerges from this research is that in specific contexts some approaches 
are less likely to be received well than others and, therefore, the analysis highlights the 
need to be sensitive to the identity projects/debates dominant in those to whom one’s 
policies are targeted. In other words, for the inception of specific energy policies, a 
policy-maker should assess the extent to which the energy governance of the entity he 
represents differs from that implemented by another actor (‘degree of Otherness’). This 
difference or similarity in governance emerges a) from the dominant historical 
narratives at play in Self’s relation with Other (layer 1), and b) from the identification of 
Self’s energy security paradigm which indicates how the relation with Other in the 
energy field is conceived. If such an investigation is conducted, the result is that some 
policy options are more viable than others simply because they are more likely to be 
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accepted and recognized by the counterpart than others. This explains why, rather than a 
simple clash of material interests, the EU’s ambition to get Russia to embark on 
approximating its legislation and practices to the EU acquis communitaire – that could 
work with a pro-Western narrative in Russia – is no longer valid because Putin’s new 
discourse recognizes Russia as a Great Power, whereas the West is an equal partner 
with no right to interfere in the internal affairs of other Great Powers. 
 
 
 3.1 Reflection on the Limitations and Agenda for Future Research  
 
 
As previously underlined, one of the strengths that allows a discursive methodology to 
overcome the limitations of conventional constructivism is the focus on the linguistic 
aspect of interaction. The advantage of the linguistic element is that it makes actors’ 
interests accessible. In fact, actors enunciate their interests in the form of policy 
documents or public speech; that is, through language. Each narrative tradition and 
paradigm found in the layers encompasses specific interests and beliefs which are 
expressed through language.  
Through interaction, actors’ interests are also continually shaped through language 
rather than given a priori as a rationalist account would hold. The emphasis in discourse 
analysis on the importance of language means that linguistic abilities are crucial. 
Translations can be useful to examine original texts. However, speaking a language is 
not only a linguistic ability, it is also a social epistemology encompassing the 
knowledge of specific codes and nuances. Therefore, the same word can have one 
meaning in English and a different one in Russian. In this light, the choice of a 
discursive encounter combined with a comparative Self-Other study is influenced by 
pragmatic questions of linguistic abilities. In fact, in order to conduct a comprehensive 
discursive encounter, the researcher usually needs to know the language of the Self as 
well as the encountered Other. On the one side, the EU is a collective actor comprised 
of various nation states and at times represented by a multilingual institutional 
framework. In addition, for most of its members and civil servants English is a second 
language. However, this thesis only examines official documents of the EU institutions 
published in English. In short, it is assumed that the EU institutions speak in English. 
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On the other side, the absence of Russian skills makes it imperative to rely on official 
texts translated into English. However, this is possible only for the analysis of the 
Russian position in layer three881 which focuses on official documents and speeches 
(discursive practices).882 Conversely, the reliance on academic writings in English for 
the investigation of layers one and two means that this research employs the process of 
discourse encounter as mainly interpreted from a Western perspective. In other words, 
given the lack of Russian skills, the historical narrative and energy paradigms of both 
EU (Western Europe) and Russia are gleaned from texts belonging to a Western 
political debate and available in English.  
In addition, questions of access to material documenting the Russian discourse need to 
be considered for future studies. This research relied only on the official documents of 
the Russian government available in English and on a few secondary sources 
specializing on Russian politics (e.g. Ria Novosti) and translated into English. 
Therefore, future research in this area can be improved by engaging in a more balanced 
discourse analysis that examines the discourses of Self and Other adding a Russian 
perspective. To do so, it is necessary to be able to read Russian and possibly conduct 
field research in a Russian-speaking environment to access documents in the original 
language. This allows the exploration of energy relations without the bias of language 
intruding.  
A further methodological weakness regards the reliability of discourse analysis. The 
Wæverian layered structure of this research relied on a specific selection of texts to map 
the debates. In other words, the mutual narratives of Self and Other identified in the 
historical interaction between Western Europe and Russia derived from secondary 
sources such as books, scholarly journals and on-line material. The second and third 
layers drew from a number of secondary as well as primary sources such as official 
speeches and documents, and press releases. The fact that the selection of texts may 
vary is at the same time the limitation and the lynchpin of the proposed approach. In 
fact, if a similar discourse analysis were to be conducted using the same texts, it is not 
guaranteed that the findings would be identical.  
On this basis, one might contest the validity of the proposed discourse-based account 
over more interest-based ones. However, this research did not aim to discard the 
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material character of the energy relations between the EU and Russia. Instead, the 
objective was to illustrate the deeper discursive contest behind the materiality. In short, 
the thesis aimed to demonstrate the political meaning of actors’ pursuit of their energy 
interests through discourse. 
The political implications that emerge from conceptualizing EU-Russia energy relations 
as a Self / Other discursive interaction are that a deeper discursive contest underlies EU-
Russia energy relations. Such a contest sheds light on the mutual construction of actors’ 
identity, and on their construction of ‘Europe’ as a political project. 
 
Another related limitation regards the selection of the case-studies and in particular the 
extent to which the type and number of cases studies can lead to general conclusions 
about EU-Russia energy relations. The original reason why these two cases were  
selected is because the literature commonly explains them by looking at actors’ 
interests. This thesis, however, aimed to uncover the discursive structure informing the 
debate around the two case studies by relying on specific representations derived from 
actors’ historical encounters and from their mutual energy policy. However, the link 
between generalization (micro level) and case studies (macro level) can be problematic 
in complex relations such as that between the EU and Russia. In other words, the 
discursive framework as well as the representations identified in layer one and two 
(macro level) might not necessary be valid to explain other cases pertaining to EU-
Russia (energy) relations (micro level). For example, in the case of energy 
infrastructure, the debate around the need to protect critical energy infrastructure from 
terrorist and cyber attacks represents a common goal in which actors are unlikely to 
move from cooperation to  open confrontational positions. While this is true, it can be 
noted that the proposed interpretations of the case studies of this thesis provide working 
hypotheses that may be suitable for other cases if the ‘fit’ is reasonably compatible. The 
fact that knowledge cannot be automatically generalized does not imply that it cannot 
contribute to knowledge accumulation in a given field.883 
 
Moreover, the creation of each narrative / paradigm is subject to the researcher’s 
interpretation and to the material he has accessed. Therefore, the discursive structure 
presented in this research offers a lens to read the interaction but it is only one among 
                                                      
883 B., Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 
2, April 2006, pp. 219-245 
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other possibilities. However, there is strong academic evidence regarding the existence 
of certain frames of thinking on which this thesis draws.  In particular, this thesis  refers 
to a well worn tradition about Western European / EU and Russian identities especially 
in the historical chapter three (e.g. see Russia’s exceptionalism on one side, and the 
Western European idea of ‘Concert of Europe’ on the other side). 
Future research in this area can, thus, draw from this initial discursive framework and 
widen the scope of the identified narratives / paradigms by analyzing other texts to 
discover new or sub-narratives / paradigms that can explain more accurately specific 
dynamics of the (energy) interaction between EU and Russia. As such, the discursive 
framework proposed can be applied to explain other cases pertaining to  EU-Russia 
energy relations, and can be enlarged or narrowed down to create different and wider 
narratives or paradigms that might have been overlooked. Or, it can even be contested 
as the analysis of new texts opens the ground for different interpretations. As noted, this 
possibility arises from the impossibility of discourses to achieve permanent hegemony. 
In a way, the incomplete nature of discourses permits the exploration of other discursive 
structures, therefore, it is the weakness and, at the same time, the strength of this 
approach.  
The impossibility of closure implies that the unity of a discourse and its very existence 
is neither self-evident nor necessarily found by each analysis that engages with the same 
texts. The researcher needs to infer unity from the textual material accessed. In this 
thesis, the unity of a discourse has been derived from the continued interplay and 
reiteration of certain descriptions and features found in a specific discourse produced 
throughout history. For example, Russian sub-narratives such as Slavophilism, 
Panslavism and Eurasianism that focused on themes such as ‘Russian particularism’ and 
‘Russia as Great Power’ provided ground for claiming the existence of a united and 
broader ‘excepetionalist’ narrative in Russia.  
Yet, unity does not tell us where the signifying practice of a specific discourse 
terminates and another begins, as discourses are incomplete. To address this weakness it 
is necessary to postulate that the limits of a discourse are to be found within the 
discourse itself by exploring how, in a particular discourse, the boundaries are drawn. 
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